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PREFACE
“The Lord said to Moses... you shall not defraud or rob your neighbor. ” 
"Where large sums of money are involved, it is advisable to trust nobody."
—Leviticus 19:1,13
—Agatha Christie
Fraud is estimated to cost the North American economy more than $400 billion annually, 
according to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. This figure may even be conservative 
when it is considered that insurance fraud alone costs U.S. industry $120 billion annually, as 
reported by Conning & Company, a prominent research and investment firm.
Despite these loud numbers, fraud is primarily a silent problem. Fraud experts estimate that more 
than 75 percent of frauds are undetected, and many that are detected are not reported. Firms do 
not disclose their losses resulting from fraud for many reasons, including that they are embarrassed 
that they have been defrauded, or they want to keep the bad news from clients and customers.
Perhaps because fraud is so underreported, many companies think it will never happen to them. 
Unfortunately, a firm unwilling to consider that its personnel, agents or vendors could act 
dishonestly is a fraudster’s dream. What better environment to exploit than one in which the guard 
is down?
The purpose of this Handbook is to provide CPAs with practical information and resources to help 
them identify and respond to fraud in the workplace, with an emphasis on prevention rather than 
investigation. Although it is impossible to eliminate the risk of fraud completely, effective 
prevention policies can reduce opportunities for fraud to occur. At the same time, sophisticated 
detection methods can help uncover fraud in the early stages, minimize losses, and enable those 
affected by fraud, particularly CPAs or financial managers responsible for fraud prevention, to 
react to fraud in a way that could solve or mitigate the problem rather than contributing to it.
Handbook Overview
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention. Since prevention cannot be realized 
without understanding how fraud is perpetrated and concealed, the material in this Handbook has 
been written to explain to CPAs the nature and extent of fraud and to familiarize them with general 
fraud prevention techniques. In addition to the core topics of fraud prevention and methods of 
combating specific kinds of fraud, two chapters are devoted to computer security and the unique 
kinds of crimes and criminals related to computer crimes.
The contents of the Handbook are summarized below, in brief synopses of each chapter, to provide 
readers an overview of the material.
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Chapter Contents
Managing the Risk of Fraud
Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” describes the concept of fraud risk: understanding it and 
guarding against the threat posed by it. The specific factors that affect fraud risk are addressed, 
including the key internal controls—basic, supervisory and audit—that help prevent fraud. Since 
detecting and preventing fraud in books of account is key to any prevention strategy, there is a 
section devoted exclusively to this topic, with fraud and AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards 
(SAS) No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 316) discussed in relation to fraud auditing. A comprehensive and practical risk 
management checklist is included at the end of the chapter.
Promoting an Ethical Environment
Because an ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy, chapter 2, 
“Promoting an Ethical Environment,” describes the various steps that can be taken to promote an 
ethical environment within an organization, and thereby reduce the risk of fraud. A sample code of 
ethics and business conduct, which can be reproduced and/or adapted for use in any organization, 
is included, along with an ethical environment checklist.
Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance
Risk management is a key component of fraud awareness and is essential for providing protection 
against potentially catastrophic risks, including fraud-related losses. Chapter 3, “Risk Financing 
and Fidelity Insurance,” examines the concept of risk financing. The chapter gives a description of 
the kinds of fidelity insurance policies that are available—including some of the more typical policy 
clauses and the insured’s responsibilities—and the factors that enter into the fidelity insurance 
purchase decision. A practical checklist is included at the end of the chapter.
Computer Security and System Recovery
Adequate computer security is an indispensable fraud prevention tool. Chapter 4, “Computer 
Security and System Recovery,” provides a comprehensive overview of computer security, 
including physical security, logical security, and system recovery. A checklist is also included with 
this chapter.
Internal Fraud
Chapter 5, “Internal Fraud,” addresses the various ways fraud is committed against an organization 
by a perpetrator from within that organization, meaning, by officers, managers, or employees—the 
most common form of fraud. Frauds are classified according to the various accounting cycles to 
which they relate: sales and collection, acquisition and payment, payroll and personnel, inventory 
and warehousing, and capital acquisition and repayment. Since cash is the focal point of most 
entities, a separate section is devoted to cash misappropriation.
vi
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External Fraud for Personal Gain
Fraud can also be committed against organizations by suppliers, professional con artists and other 
outside perpetrators. Chapter 6, “External Fraud for Personal Gain,” is a discussion of the various 
ways frauds are committed against small businesses and individuals, the government, and financial 
institutions, such as banks and insurance companies. Case studies are included to clarify the 
various kinds of fraud perpetrated by outsiders.
Commercial Crime
In addition to being victimized by fraud, organizations can also be the perpetrators of fraud.
Chapter 7, “Commercial Crime,” provides an overview of the various forms of commercial crime 
and methods of preventing them. The crimes considered include false advertising, industrial 
espionage and trade secret theft, insider trading, securities fraud, organizational bribe giving. 
Interesting and informative case studies are included to exemplify the different kinds of 
commercial crime.
Computer Crime and Computer Criminals
Although it has resulted in very few genuinely “new” frauds, the computer has dramatically 
changed the environment in which fraud is committed. Chapter 8, “Computer Crime and 
Computer Criminals,” is a description of the nature of computer-related crime and computer 
criminals and the control considerations that affect the risk of fraud in a computer environment, 
and provides selected computer crime case studies.
Addressing a Known or Suspected Fraud
Despite the best prevention strategies, an actual crisis may strike. Chapter 9, “Dealing With a 
Known or Suspected Fraud,” focuses on crisis management and, more particularly, forensic 
accounting. A comprehensive checklist is included at the end of the chapter.
Appendices
A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector
This comprehensive section outlines a breakdown of fraud in the different sectors, complete with 
checklists and fraud vulnerability grids for each of the following sectors:
• Construction
• Financial services
• Government
• High technology
• Manufacturing
• Media and communications
• Nonprofit
• Professional services
• Real estate
vii
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• Recreation
• Natural resources
• Retail
• Small business
• Transportation
• Wholesale
B—Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration of 
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
A complete text version of SAS 82 is provided as Appendix B for reference.
Bibliography
This alphabetical listing of the most current and relevant sources of information, including a 
separate section for Web sites and books, pertaining to fraud, commercial crime, and other closely 
related topics for further reading.
Glossary
The comprehensive glossary is an effective quick-reference tool which provides an alphabetically 
arranged listing of definitions and explanations for all fraud-related terms and kinds of fraud.
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CHAPTER 1:
Managing the Risk of Fraud
1.1 The Nature and Extent of Fraud
1.1.1 Definitions
The key word used in most dictionaries to define fraud is deception. In the broadest sense of 
the word fraud, this definition may be sufficient. However, in the context of this Handbook, 
a slightly more restrictive definition is appropriate: fraud is criminal deception intended to 
financially benefit the deceiver. Both of the qualifiers in this definition are necessary—that is, 
the deception must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.
Criminal Deception
The qualifier criminal is necessary to exclude certain deceptions that may financially benefit 
the deceiver—for example, the mild overstatement of one’s skills on a job application; 
however, this kind of transgression will not be examined in this Handbook. While such an 
overstatement could be labeled fraudulent in the broadest sense of the word, it can hardly be 
described as criminal.
Note that, for purposes of this definition, the word criminal is not used in a strict legal sense. 
Rather, it refers to a seriously “wrong” action taken with malicious intent. Thus, even if 
perpetrators of fraud are able to avoid successful criminal prosecution—for example, 
because a particular jurisdiction has lax laws or enforcement, or because of some legal 
technicality—their actions are still considered “criminal” for purposes of this Handbook.
Financial Benefit
The qualifier financial benefit is necessary in order to exclude certain types of criminal 
deception that we do not commonly think of as fraud and therefore, are not dealt with in 
this Handbook—for example, a wealthy bigamist failing to disclose a previous marriage.
The financial benefit accruing to the fraudster from an action need not be direct for that 
action to be considered fraudulent. Indirect financial benefits are also possible, for example, 
environmental criminals (fraudsters) who dump toxic waste into rivers to avoid higher 
disposal costs and falsify records to conceal their actions.
1.1.2 Magnitude of the Threat
Because the essence of fraud is deception, determining its prevalence is problematic. Many 
frauds go undetected—probably more than 75 percent—and many frauds that are detected 
are not reported. It is virtually impossible to compile reliable statistics under these 
circumstances.
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Simply based on the largest reported frauds—for example, the U.S. savings and loan 
scandal, BCCI, Boesky and Milken—it is safe to say that fraud in the United States runs in 
the billions of dollars. If one assumes that fraud represents about 3 percent of gross national 
product (GNP)—conservative by some estimates—then the total cost in the United States 
would be about $300 billion.
Macro statistics are not particularly meaningful, however, even if you could obtain accurate 
statistics. The fact is that the threat of fraud depends largely on the circumstances, that is, 
the environment in which it takes place. Let’s begin with a view of personal integrity, as 
illustrated by Figure 1-1.
Figure 1-1. One View of Personal Integrity
One View of Personal Integrity
Views of commitment to personal integrity vary, and the percentage figures shown are not 
definitive. Some views suggest a more even split between the three categories, while others 
state that the honest and dishonest categories may be as low as ten percent each. However, 
all of these views point to one important conclusion: exclusive reliance on the honesty of 
individuals is the surest way to be victimized. Over half the population—and probably 
more than two thirds—is quite capable of committing dishonest acts in the right (or should 
we say wrong?) environment.
The importance of creating an environment that discourages fraud brings us back to the 
question “What is the magnitude of the threat?” Answer: the threat of fraud is as big as it is 
allowed to be.
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1.1.3 Sources of the Threat
The magnitude of the fraud threat is only one dimension contributing to the extent of the 
problem. The breadth of the fraud threat—that is, the various sources of fraud—must also 
be considered. A truly comprehensive prevention strategy must address the full spectrum of 
fraud sources.
You can classify the sources of the fraud threat as either internal or external collusion. A 
brief description of each classification follows.
Internal Sources
Internal opportunities to commit fraud differ from company to company. Some typical 
examples, which illustrate the broad nature of these internal opportunities, include the 
following.
• Officers of a company create false financial reports to improve their own performance 
measurement.
• Managers inflate their expense accounts or turn a blind eye to supplier fraud in 
exchange for kickbacks.
• Other employees commit fraud such as embezzlement, cash skimming, or accounts 
receivable lapping.
• Corporate directors defraud a company’s shareholders through stock market 
manipulation or insider trading.
External Sources
Typical examples of external opportunities to commit fraud include the following.
• Suppliers falsify or duplicate invoices.
• Competitors victimize a company through industrial espionage or price fixing.
• Con artists defraud a company with schemes involving products, services, or investment 
opportunities that never materialize.
• Customers commit fraud through false credits posted to their accounts or through rebate 
coupon frauds.
See figure 1-2 for a depiction of the various internal and external sources of fraud.
1.1.4 The Causes of White Collar Crime
The theory of differential association is undoubtedly the best known among all explanations 
offered to account for crime. Although it applies to all forms of crime—not just white collar 
crime—it is nevertheless useful for the purposes of this Handbook.
This theory first appeared in 1939 in the third edition of Edwin H. Sutherland’s Principles of 
Criminology. Later, Sutherland would make his best-known contribution to criminology by 
coining the phrase white-collar crime and writing a monograph on the subject.
Based on nine concepts or points, the theory of differential association begins by asserting 
that criminal behavior is learned. Expanding on that assertion, Sutherland specifies as a 
second point that criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other people in a process 
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of communication. If individuals acquiring criminal habits or propensities were exposed to 
situations, circumstances, and interactions totally of a criminal nature, it would be relatively 
easy to comprehend how this process of communication operates. In view of the enormous 
variation in standards and personalities to which any individual in our society is exposed, it 
becomes exceedingly difficult to discern the elements that induce criminal behavior without 
some additional principles.
Sutherland’s third point is that criminal behavior is acquired through participation within 
intimate personal groups. This suggests that the roots of crime are in the socializing 
experiences of the individual. Unfortunately, the process of socialization is far from 
adequately understood. Sutherland’s fourth point indicates that the criminal learning
Figure 1-2. How a Company Can Be Victimized
How a Company Can Be Victimized
Supplier (false invoicing) Externally 
Competitors (profit fixing)
Con Men (false sale of ad products)
Customers (false credits)
Officers (false financial reporting) internally 
Managers (kickbacks, expense accounts) 
Other Employees (cover up asset theft) 
Directors (manipulate share prices)
process includes not only techniques of committing crime but also the shaping of motives, 
drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. Crime techniques often can involve a high degree of 
skill: picking pockets (and not getting caught at it) demands considerable adroitness.
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Fifth, Sutherland stipulates that legal codes define the specific direction of motives and 
drives as favorable or unfavorable.
Sixth, Sutherland establishes the principle of differential association. According to this 
postulate, a person becomes criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to 
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. Sutherland states in 
his seventh point that differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and 
intensity. But he does not suggest which of these elements is apt to be more important than 
the others.
Sutherland’s eighth point is that learning criminal and delinquent behavior involves all the 
mechanisms that are involved in any other learning. As his next to last proposition 
Sutherland stresses that learning differs from pure imitation.
The last point is a worthwhile reminder that while criminal behavior is an expression of 
general needs and values, it is not explained by these general needs and values because 
noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. This means that the 
generalizations sometimes employed to account for crime—that people steal because they 
crave “esteem” or are “greedy” or kill because they are “unhappy”—have little scientific 
merit.
In other words, much of the same needs and values motivate criminals and noncriminals 
alike. People become or do not become criminals on the basis of their unique responses to 
common drives for prestige, happiness, success, power, wealth, and other human 
aspirations. One person with a pressing need for money may take an extra weekend job 
pumping gas, or try to borrow from a friend. Another person, feeling the same need, may 
hold up a fast food outlet.
1.1.5 Understanding the Risk
Of the two available ways to combat fraud—prevention and detection—a prevention 
strategy is obviously the preferred approach. Such a strategy can be either general or 
specific in its objective. General prevention techniques for risk management involve two 
main elements: understanding the risk and guarding against the threat.
Fraud Versus Theft
Resolved: fraud is not the same as theft.
In a debate, most people would choose to defend the above statement. They might win by 
arguing that—
• Theft is like robbing a bank; fraud is like cooking the books to cover up petty cash theft.
• People committing theft do so at night, wearing masks; people committing fraud do so 
during the day, wearing suits.
• Theft is direct; fraud is indirect.
• Theft is what lower-class criminals commit; fraud is what upper-class criminals commit.
Few people, if any, however, will point out what is perhaps the most important difference 
between fraud and theft: the risk of fraud is much greater.
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With an increasingly high media profile given to crime, particularly in large cities, most 
people are acutely aware of the need to protect themselves against crime’s overt forms. In a 
bad neighborhood, for example, you would not leave the keys in your car or the doors 
unlocked. In fact you probably would not want to be there at all. In this case the risk of 
theft, a more overt and direct form of criminal act than fraud, is easy to assess and deal 
with.
Now consider a different scenario: if you were to leave your wallet briefly on your desk at 
work, you would also be exposing yourself to a risk. However, assuming that access to your 
workplace is restricted to other employees, in all likelihood, you would consider this risk to 
be a very small one. Presumably the people you work with aren’t criminals and would 
never pick up your wallet in a direct act of theft. The risk of being detected, as perceived by 
a perpetrator, would be relatively high. You would certainly know that your wallet had 
been stolen and a thorough investigation would ensue, possibly implicating a coworker.
Herein lies the first of two pillars on which the greater threat of fraud is built. One pillar is 
based on the premise that most people believe that those who are relatively close to them— 
their friends and coworkers—are basically honest. Potential victims may rationalize about 
those around them: “They would never steal. As long as we lock the doors at night to keep 
out the ‘real crooks,’ we’ll be safe.”
The other pillar is based on the perception that fraud is in some sense an indirect form of 
theft. Although a criminal act, people who perpetrate fraud will in many cases rationalize 
their behavior, believing that because it’s indirect, it’s victimless. Alternatively, the 
perpetrator may rationalize that the victim deserves it, or where the amount involved in the 
fraud is low in relation to the total assets available, that the victim can afford it and—or 
won’t—even miss it. And so the second pillar is formed from the rationalizations of most 
fraudsters—the denial that the fraud is morally wrong: “No one will be hurt by this. The 
company won’t even miss it. Besides, they deserve it for the lousy way they treat me.” 
These two pillars—low perception of the threat of fraud by potential victims, and a high 
degree of rationalization by potential perpetrators—combine to make fraud a much more 
insidious threat than ordinary theft. A further illustration of this greater risk: according to 
FBI statistics, by the early 1980s losses suffered by banks from computer fraud alone were 
about ten times the amount lost to bank robberies. By 1985, fraud losses were twenty-six 
times that of robberies.
Generic Versus Individual Risk Factors
A large number of factors can impact the risk of fraud. This Handbook contains an 
approach—a system of categorization—that facilitates the understanding of fraud risk and 
the development of an appropriate strategy to manage it.
The literature is filled with many different systems of categorizing fraud risk. The system 
developed for this Handbook splits the risk factors into two groups: generic and individual.
Generic risk factors remain relatively constant in their impact on any subject individual or 
group of individuals. They are largely within the control of the organization or entity that is 
protecting itself, and largely outside the control of potential perpetrators. Because these risk 
factors apply in the same way to any employee, they can be set and manipulated by an 
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organization without considering individual differences among employees. Employee 
turnover has virtually no effect on these risk factors.
Individual risk factors change from person to person and can even change for the same 
individual over time. They are only partially within the control of the organization or entity 
that is protecting itself, and this control is more difficult to exercise because it applies to 
each individual separately. Whenever turnover occurs, the individual risk factors change 
and must be managed. Even worse, whenever an individual’s personality, state of mind, 
circumstance, or motivation changes—which, after all, is a constant process—the associated 
risk factors may also change.
See sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of generic and individual risk 
factors.
1.1.6 Guarding Against the Threat
On understanding the risk of fraud, you must develop an appropriate strategy and 
implement policies to guard against the threat. The main elements of this process are:
• Choosing acceptable risk levels
• Developing and implementing internal controls
• Promoting an ethical environment
• Arranging appropriate risk financing (insurance)
• Ensuring adequate computer security
Choosing Acceptable Risk Levels
The risk of fraud can never be completely eliminated. Even if this were possible, it would 
probably not be desirable because of prohibitive costs and extremely tight controls that 
would stifle creativity and make employee morale suffer. The first step in a fraud- 
prevention strategy is to determine the acceptable level of risk.
Choosing acceptable risk levels intertwines with assessing the various risk factors. For 
example, one of the generic risk factors is the opportunity risk available to potential 
perpetrators. Assessing this opportunity risk enables you to make other decisions—such as: 
“Do we need to lower this risk, and if so, by how much?”
Developing and Implementing Internal Controls
Internal controls—consisting of basic controls, supervisory controls, and audit—represent 
the cornerstone of any fraud prevention strategy.
To ensure complete and accurate reporting an internal control system must be designed 
and implemented regardless of the risk of fraud. However, a system should never disregard 
the risk of fraud; such disregard would amount to a virtual invitation to potential 
perpetrators.
See section 1.3 for a detailed discussion of internal controls.
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Promoting an Ethical Environment
Promoting an ethical environment is another key element in a prevention strategy. In 
particular implementing a formal code of ethics and business conduct helps set the tone for 
all employees within an organization. See chapter 2 for further discussion.
Arranging Appropriate Insurance
Recognizing that there will always be some risk of fraud, organizations must finance this 
risk either externally and explicitly (fidelity insurance) or internally and implicitly (self­
insurance). See chapter 3 for further discussion.
Ensuring Adequate Computer Security
Computers and information technology play an increasingly important role in business and 
society in general. The pervasive nature of these technologies demands that adequate 
computer security be an integral part of any prevention strategy. Although computer 
security may be considered a subset of internal control, it is still an important aspect. See 
chapter 4 for details.
1.2 Fraud Risk Factors
Several factors contribute to the risk of fraud. Organizations use various systems for 
categorizing these factors; however, under most systems, the elements that combine to 
determine fraud risk are largely the same.
For example, one classification system is known as the GONE theory, an acronym for 
Greed, Opportunity, Need, and Exposure. Under this system, the Greed and Need factors relate 
largely to the individual (that is, the potential perpetrator), while the Opportunity and 
Exposure factors relate largely to the organization (that is, the potential victim). The four 
elements of the GONE theory interact to determine the level of fraud risk, and no one 
factor is universally more important than another. Each of the factors is unfavorable, to 
some extent, in virtually all situations. However, an organization that allows a sufficiently 
unfavorable or an out-of-balance combination of all four factors may face serious troubles. 
As one fraud investigator observed, “You can consider your money GONE.”
In this Handbook we use a slightly different system that groups the risk factors into generic 
or individual, as previously defined. However, as described below, many of the same 
elements of the GONE theory apply under this system as well.
1.2.1 Generic Risk Factors
Generic risk factors—those largely under the control of the organization or entity that is 
protecting itself—include:
• The opportunity given to potential perpetrators.
• The likelihood of discovering a fraud that was committed.
• The nature and extent of the punishment a perpetrator will receive once the fraud is 
uncovered and the perpetrator is caught.
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Note that the first factor corresponds to the “O” or Opportunity in the GONE theory, while 
the second and third factors correspond to the “E” or Exposure risk element. The Exposure 
risk under the GONE theory is a product of two generic factors: the likelihood of getting 
caught and the subsequent consequences. The product of both must be low for there to be 
any risk to the organization. For example, if the likelihood of getting caught is 0 percent, 
then the exposure risk is 100 percent. Similarly, if the consequences of getting caught are 
insignificant, then the Exposure risk is high.
A brief description of each generic risk factor follows.
Opportunity to Commit Fraud
The opportunity to commit fraud refers primarily to allowing a potential perpetrator access 
to the assets of the organization or object of the fraud. No organization can completely 
eliminate opportunity; experts consider such attempts uneconomical and 
counterproductive. As long as organizations have assets of value and these assets flow, are 
traded or come under the control of others—such as employees, customers and suppliers— 
the opportunity to commit fraud will always exist.
For organizations the challenge in fraud prevention is ensuring that the opportunity risk 
level is minimal under the circumstances, that is:
1. Assign, either explicitly or implicitly, to each employee an appropriate maximum 
opportunity level. For example, limit a junior clerk’s opportunity level to certain smaller 
fixed assets not bolted down in the office. Allow a more senior clerk’s maximum 
opportunity level to include an additional $500 petty cash fund, or the day’s cash 
receipts. Allow a senior executive an additional $5,000 check-signing limit.
2. Prohibit catastrophic opportunity levels. The definition of a catastrophic level depends 
on the circumstances—in particular, the size of the organization. For example, a small 
business with $50,000 in cash should probably not allow anyone but its owner(s) access 
to the full amount.
Likelihood of Discovery
If an opportunity to commit fraud exists, making the chances of discovery high reduces the 
risk. In fact, even the perception that the chances of discovery are high can act as a deterrent. 
Of course, if a fraud does occur, discovery may result in recovery of some of the lost assets.
The likelihood of discovery stems primarily from the system of internal controls. While 
these controls can never be so tight as to preclude any fraud from taking place, ideally they 
should be sufficient to prevent most material frauds from going undetected for any length of 
time.
See section 1.3 for a closer look at internal controls.
Nature and Extent of Punishment
Discovery of a fraud is, in itself, insufficient to act as a deterrent against future fraud. 
Organizations must put in place some adverse consequences for potential perpetrators, 
who, most important, must perceive these adverse consequences.
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Although research has not provided proof, conventional wisdom holds that the nature and 
extent of punishment has a deterrent impact. The occurrence of theft in countries governed 
by Islamic law is extremely low compared to Western countries. Presumably this is due, at 
least in part, to the severity of the punishment (amputation of one or both of the hands). 
Can anyone doubt that the occurrence of theft in North America would diminish if 
perpetrators knew they would face the same punishment? Of course, the reality is that the 
punishment must “fit the crime” and be consistent with a society’s justice system.
Organizations or entities wishing to protect themselves from fraud should have clear 
policies regarding the nature and extent of the consequences of getting caught; for 
example—
• Anyone who commits a fraud will be dismissed.
• All frauds will be reported to the authorities and charges will be laid.
1.2.2 Individual Risk Factors
Individual risk factors—those that vary from employee to employee, largely outside the 
control of the organization or entity that is protecting itself—fall into two categories:
1. Moral character
2. Motivation
Moral character corresponds to the “G” or Greed factor in the GONE theory, while 
motivation is equivalent to the “N” or Need factor. Each of these categories is described 
below.
Moral Character (Greed Factor)
Greed represents broad concepts, such as ethics and moral character, or the lack thereof. 
Moreover greed and ethics essentially relate to the internal or personality attributes of an 
individual, as do character, integrity, honesty, and the like. You cannot know whether an 
individual possesses these attributes without the ability to read that individual’s mind. Even 
if this were possible, personal interpretation would still come into play.
Social values also have an impact on moral character. Many sociologists lamented a trend 
in Western societies during the 1980s, namely the pursuit of wealth as an overriding 
objective. The Me Generation and the Decade Of Greed were phrases coined in connection 
with this trend, which was perhaps best epitomized by the memorable speech of Michael 
Douglas’ Gordon Gecco character in the 1987 movie, Wall Street: “Greed is right. Greed is 
good.. .”
In fact, Gordon Gecco’s philosophy may hold some element of truth. A certain amount of 
greed, tough-mindedness, and competitive instinct could greatly enhance the chances of 
success for an organization or an individual in a free enterprise society. Regardless of one’s 
own value judgment, there is no doubt that these attributes do exist in society. This poses a 
problem, however, because, while greed may not necessarily preclude the existence of 
ethics and good moral character, if left unchecked or promoted to a great extent, it can 
have an adverse impact vis-a-vis the risk of fraud.
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This leads to the essential question at issue here: What can or should an organization do to 
minimize the risk of fraud posed by greed and other negative human attributes? Consider 
the following.
• Corporate Mission Statement: Set the goals of an organization in a corporate mission 
statement, and communicate it to all managers and other employees. The primary goal 
of most businesses is to maximize profits, presumably over the long-term in order to 
survive. Other objectives might include maintaining either a high market share, 
leadership in an industry, or both. However, businesses must pursue these goals in a 
manner consistent with good corporate citizenship and standing in the community. This 
emphasis on corporate responsibility sets the tone for management and employees, and 
encourages personal responsibility. Conversely, business should discourage 
irresponsible actions—and by extension, fraud.
• Written Codes of Business Conduct: “Good moral character” means different things to 
different people; an organization must define this term and relate it to particular types of 
behavior. For example, does your organization consider it moral and ethical for its 
employees to accept gifts from customers and, if so, is there a specified value or limit? A 
written code of ethics and business conduct can help translate the relative concepts of 
greed, ethics, and morality into more specific behaviors that are either acceptable or 
unacceptable.
• Management Style and Role Models: Management must set the right example for employees 
by acting responsibly and living up to the spirit of the corporate mission statement and 
code of business conduct. Moreover, it must clearly and visibly appear to do so in its 
dealings and communications with employees. Policy statements mean nothing when 
undermined by management’s actions. In fact, such a situation may be worse than 
having no policy at all because management’s failure to adhere to its own guidelines 
would foster a kind of cynicism and “rules are made to be broken” philosophy that 
might potentially encourage fraud and commercial crime.
• Hiring Practices: Regardless of corporate mission statements, codes of business conduct, 
and good role models, moral character ultimately depends on the individual employee. 
To the extent possible set hiring practices that weed out prospects with low moral 
character. See chapter 3 for further discussion.
Motivation (Need Factor)
Why do people commit fraud? There is obviously no single, specific answer. People 
commit frauds for a variety of reasons.
Probably the most common group of fraud motivations relates to economic need. For 
example, the perpetrator may be experiencing an actual or perceived cash emergency: a 
mortgage to pay, drugs to purchase to satisfy an addiction, or gambling losses to win back. 
Alternatively, there may be no emergency but simply an unchecked desire for the good life: 
expensive restaurants, clothes, furs, jewelry, vacations, cars, homes, and summer cottages.
Less frequently, there might be other reasons, such as, disenchantment, revenge, or simply 
the fact that everyone else seems to do it. Even more rarely, the motives could be eccentric: 
a sense of challenge or thrill. Finally, the cause may be some form of psychological illness: 
compulsion, anxiety, paranoia, or outright psychosis.
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What can be done about all of these complex motives, seemingly locked up in the 
Pandora’s box of an employee’s mind? Admittedly, the options are limited but they 
include—
• A Favorable Environment: Creating the right environment can reduce the motivation 
among employees to commit fraud. In an unfavorable environment, morale suffers and 
feelings of disenchantment—even hate and the desire for revenge—may take hold. Try 
to promote the right environment by treating employees fairly, keeping communication 
lines open, and providing mechanisms for discussing and resolving grievances.
• Performance Appraisal and Reward Systems: Measure each employee’s work fairly by 
implementing a performance appraisal and reward system.
• Employee Assistance Programs: Many enlightened employers provide free counseling and 
other assistance to employees facing personal problems, for example, alcohol and drug 
abuse. From the point of view of fraud prevention, this approach is preferable to keeping 
these problems “bottled up.” This approach helps prevent resentment that could 
ultimately lead to the commission of fraud.
• Employee Testing and Screening: As part of their hiring practices and sometimes on a 
regular basis thereafter, some employers use testing and screening procedures to identify 
and weed out high risk individuals, or form the basis for remedial action, or both. 
Procedures include psychological testing, drug testing, and even honesty testing in the 
form of lie detector tests where not prohibited by law. Highly controversial, these tests, 
in some instances, could cause more harm than good, for example, to employee morale, 
the organization’s reputation among prospective employees, and so on. Nevertheless, in 
especially sensitive occupations or circumstances, employers might find this testing 
appropriate and even necessary.
• Common Sense and a Watchful Eye: While motives are not observable, the product of 
certain motives often is. An employee with a drug or gambling problem may not be able 
to keep it a secret. And beware the $25,000-a-year bookkeeper who comes to work 
driving a Mercedes or who, wary of getting caught, never takes a vacation.
Profiles of Fraud Perpetrators
While external pressures do play a major role in whether or not an individual commits 
fraud, internal characteristics can affect a potential fraud perpetrator as well. Gwynn Nettler 
in his book, Lying, Cheating and Stealing, makes the following observations:
• People who have experienced failure are more likely to cheat.
• People who are disliked and who dislike themselves tend to be more deceitful.
• People who are impulsive, distractible, and unable to postpone gratification are more 
likely to engage in deceitful crimes.
• People who have a conscience (fear, apprehension, and punishment) are more resistant 
to the temptation to deceive.
• Intelligent people tend to be more honest than ignorant people.
• The easier it is to cheat and steal, the more people will do so.
• Individuals have different needs and therefore different levels at which they will be 
moved to lie, cheat, or steal.
14
• Lying, cheating, and stealing increase when people are under great pressure to achieve 
important objectives.
• The struggle to survive generates deceit.
The highly publicized cases in recent years of computer hackers committing high-tech 
crimes have resulted in a public perception that individuals who are highly knowledgeable 
about computers are more likely to commit fraud; however, there is no evidence to support 
this premise.
1.2.3 High Fraud-Low Fraud Environments
Employee fraud, theft, and embezzlement are more likely to occur in some organizations 
than others. The most vulnerable organizations are usually hampered by weak management 
and inadequate accounting and security controls. Solutions often proposed include:
• Tight accounting and audit controls
• Thorough screening of applicants for employment
• Close supervision and monitoring of employee performance and behavior
• Explicit rules against theft, fraud, embezzlement, sabotage, and information piracy
Other considerations also affect the likelihood of employee crime. See table 1.1 for a 
comparison of the environment and culture of organizations with high fraud potential and 
organizations with low fraud potential.
Table 1.1 Environmental and cultural comparison of those organizations with 
HIGH FRAUD POTENTIAL AND THOSE WITH LOW FRAUD POTENTIAL.
Variable High Fraud Potential Low Fraud Potential
1. Management style a. Autocratic a. Participative
2. Management orientation a. Low trust
b. Power-driven
a. High trust
b. Achievement-driven
3. Distribution of authority a. Centralized, reserved by top 
management
a. Decentralized, dispersed to 
all levels, delegated
4. Planning a. Centralized
b. Short range
a. Decentralized
b. Long range
5. Performance a. Measured quantitatively and 
on a short term basis
a. Measured both 
quantitatively and 
qualitatively
and on a long term basis
6. Business focus a. Profit-focused a. Customer-focused
7. Management strategy a. Management by crisis a. Management by objectives
8. Reporting a. Reporting by routine a. Reporting by exception
(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable High Fraud Potential Low Fraud Potential
9. Policies and rules a. Rigid and inflexible, strongly 
policed
a. Reasonable, fairly 
enforced
10. Primary management 
concern
a. Capital assets a. Human, then capital and 
technological assets
11. Reward system a. Punitive
b. Penurious
c. Politically administered
a. Generous
b. Reinforcing
c. Fairly administered
12. Feedback on 
performance
a. Critical
b. Negative
a. Positive
b. Stroking
13. Interaction mode a. Issues and personal differences 
are skirted or repressed
a. Issues and personal 
differences are confronted 
and addressed openly
14. Payoffs for good 
behavior
a. Mainly monetary a. Recognition, promotion, 
added responsibility, 
choice assignments, plus 
money
15. Business ethics a. Ambivalent, rides the tide a. Clearly defined and 
regularly followed
16. Internal relationships a. Highly competitive, hostile a. Friendly, competitive, 
supportive
17. Values and beliefs a. Economic, political, self­
centered
a. Social, spiritual, group- 
centered
18. Success formula a. Works harder a. Works smarter
19. Human resources a. Burnout
b. High turnover
c. Grievances
a. Not enough promotional 
opportunities for all the 
talent
b. Low turnover
c. Job satisfaction
20. Company loyalty a. Low a. High
21. Major financial concern a. Cash flow shortage a. Opportunities for new 
investment
22. Growth pattern a. Sporadic a. Consistent
23. Relationship with 
competitors
a. Hostile a. Professional
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Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable High Fraud Potential Low Fraud Potential
24. Innovativeness a. Copy cat, reactive a. Leader, proactive
25. CEO characteristics a. Swinger, braggart, self­
interested, driver, insensitive to 
people, feared, insecure, 
gambler, impulsive, tight-fisted 
numbers- and things-oriented, 
profit-seeker, vain, bombastic, 
highly emotional, partial, 
pretend to be more than they 
are
a. Professional, decisive, 
fast- paced, respected by 
peers, secure risk-taker, 
thoughtful, generous with 
personal time and money, 
people- products- and 
market-oriented, builder­
helper, self-confident, 
composed, calm, 
deliberate, even 
disposition, fair, know 
who they are, what they 
are and where they are 
going
26. Management structure, systems 
and controls
a. Bureaucratic
b. Regimented
c. Inflexible
d. Imposed controls
e. Many-tiered structure, vertical
f. Everything documented, a rule 
for everything
a. Collegial
b. Systematic
c. Open to change
d. Self-controlled
e. Flat structure, horizontal
f. Documentation is 
adequate but not 
burdensome, some 
discretion is afforded
27. Internal communication a. Formal, written, stiff, pompous, 
ambiguous
a. Informal, oral, clear, 
friendly, open, candid
28. Peer relationships a. Hostile, aggressive, rivalrous a. Cooperative, friendly, 
trusting
1.3 Internal Controls and “Fraudproofing”
Developing an understanding of the various factors that contribute to the risk of fraud is 
only the first step in a fraud prevention strategy. Following this, it is necessary to implement 
policies that will help to reduce the threat.
Some of the measures that can guard against the threat of fraud were explained previously 
in this chapter. Consider what is perhaps the main, and certainly the most common, 
prevention tool: a good system of internal controls.
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1.3.1 Defining Internal Control Objectives
In recent years, fraudproofing has appeared in the literature and some seminars. This term is 
somewhat misleading, however, because no internal control system can completely 
eliminate the risk of fraud. What fraud proofing should do, in theory, is reduce the risk of 
fraud to an acceptable level.
The risk of fraud is not the only factor in defining internal control objectives; for example, 
management information and reporting requirements are important considerations as well. 
However, the acceptable levels of risk and opportunity, as defined in section 1.1.6 should 
also be considered. This means effectively combining the three levels of internal control— 
basic, supervisory, and audit (see sections 1.3.2-1.3.4)—to limit the risk of fraud to 
acceptable levels.
1.3.2 Basic Controls
A variety of basic controls exist in a typical system of internal controls. The most relevant 
basic controls are grouped into three categories: physical access, job descriptions, and 
accounting reconciliations and analyses.
Physical Access
Most people acknowledge the need to control physical access to valuable assets including 
intangible assets such as information. Measures to control physical access include the 
obvious practice of locking doors, desks, and file cabinets so that unauthorized personnel, 
either within or outside the organization, cannot gain access. Other measures include 
employee IDs and passwords, computerized security systems (for example, access cards 
that record time of entry and exit), and electronic surveillance systems.
As a general rule, organizations should restrict physical access to those who require it to 
perform their job function. Of course, controlling physical access in this way will not 
completely reduce the risk of fraud. However, it will help to reduce the risk in the following 
ways:
• Many frauds require that the perpetrator come into physical contact with either the asset 
being misappropriated, or the related asset records, in order to conceal the fraud. 
Reducing physical access reduces opportunity.
• Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong 
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the 
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Access controls that do not prevent fraud often assist in the fraud investigation process 
(for example, determining what actually happened and narrowing down suspects).
Job Descriptions
Formal, specific job descriptions are a very effective fraud prevention tool. These 
descriptions should spell out exactly what is expected of each employee. Generally, 
employees should not perform duties outside their job description. Those who do, 
represent a significant red flag.
Create job descriptions that reflect the important principle of division of duties. For 
example, employees with physical control over an asset should not also keep the records
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relating to that asset (this will only make it easier for them to cover up the fraud). Segregate 
all other especially sensitive duties—for example purchasing and check signing.
The need for job descriptions goes beyond the widely recognized concept of segregating 
duties, although it is certainly one of the important consequences of job descriptions. Some 
cases may result in an entirely appropriate duplication of duties, for example, double 
signing checks. Specify in the job description that all employees must take annual vacations 
(another well known fraud prevention tool, because an employer can more likely discover 
perpetrators running an ongoing fraud scheme when they’re removed from the scene).
Thus, it is apparent that employers must approach the process of formulating job 
descriptions for their employees in an integrated fashion. From an internal-control and 
fraud-prevention perspective, different tasks performed by different individuals may be 
interrelated; therefore, an appropriate job description for one employee will often depend 
on the job descriptions of others, and vice versa.
Employers often ignore or underestimate the need for formal job descriptions, writing them 
off as “more useless paper.” At other times, employers create job descriptions but then 
ignore them. This attitude invites trouble. As one leading fraud investigator put it: “When 
people begin to do things outside their job description, you have reason to be concerned. If 
it goes unrewarded, they begin to develop a justification to steal. It’s very important that job 
descriptions are clear, agreed upon, and adhered to.”
Accounting Reconciliations and Analyses
After access controls and job descriptions, accounting reconciliations and analyses are the 
third most important group of basic controls. An essential ingredient of a successful fraud is 
successful concealment. Regular, appropriately performed accounting reconciliations and 
analyses often make such concealment difficult or impossible.
Perform accounting reconciliations regularly (for example, monthly basis) including:
• Bank reconciliations, for all accounts
• Accounts receivable reconciliations (both month to month and general ledger to 
subledger)
• Accounts payable reconciliations (again, both month to month and general ledger to 
subledger)
The exact nature of the accounting analyses performed depends on the nature of the 
organization’s operations. Analyses relevant for most organizations include:
• Variance analysis of general ledger accounts (budget to actual, current year versus prior 
year, and so on)
• Vertical analysis of profit and loss accounts (that is, calculation of expenses as a 
percentage of sales, and comparison of these percentages with historical standards, or 
budgets, or both)
• Detailed sales and major expense analyses (for example, by product line or territory)
Of course, organizations often undertake accounting reconciliations and analyses with other 
purposes in mind—for example, to make management decisions or to ensure the accuracy 
of the accounting records, or both. Nevertheless, this process also can highlight 
discrepancies that point to fraud.
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1.3.3 Supervision
Supervision represents the second level of internal control. From a fraud prevention 
perspective, strong supervision is vital—especially in small businesses that may have 
difficulty achieving segregation of duties.
Note that active supervision most definitely differs from supervisory or management 
override, in which a manager or supervisor actually takes charge of or alters the work of a 
subordinate. In fact, override itself is a red flag—that is, it suggests that the manager or 
supervisor may be engaged in fraud or the concealment of one. Allow basic controls to 
operate as they were intended, rather than to be circumvented by those at higher levels.
As a fraud prevention mechanism, good supervision consists of:
• Fraud awareness
• Approval, review, double-checking and redoing
Fraud Awareness
Fraud prevention specialists constantly emphasize the need for “fraud awareness,” to the 
point that the term has almost become a cliche. However, such awareness is perhaps the 
key prerequisite in building any effective fraud prevention strategy, and is especially 
important at the supervisory level.
Specifically, supervisors must be alert to the possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or 
exceptional situation occurs, such as complaints from suppliers or customers, discrepancies 
that don’t make sense, or accounting reconciliations that don’t balance. If a manager’s mind 
is closed to the possibility of fraud during an unusual or exceptional situation, the risk of the 
fraud continuing unabated greatly increases.
Approval, Review, Double-checking and Redoing
In addition to awareness, fraud prevention demands that supervisors actually supervise. 
This means going beyond the typical approval function, such as initialing invoices or 
performing other duties of supervisors and managers. A more thorough review, double­
checking employees’ work, and redoing some tasks, may be necessary and should be 
approached diligently. For example, assign supervisors the responsibility of double­
checking important procedures such as the monthly bank reconciliation—that is, 
comparing the numbers on the bank reconciliations to those on the bank statements and in 
the general ledger, making certain those numbers total correctly, test-checking outstanding 
items at the very least, and so on. To simply initial bank reconciliations in a habitual or 
reflex-like manner without really reviewing and actually redoing them invites fraud.
For example, the owner of a busy downtown restaurant used the following system of 
internal control for sales. Employees entered all prenumbered customer bills into the cash 
register, and at least once each day the hostess/bookkeeper batched the customer bills, 
listed them on a deposit sheet, and made the related bank deposit. The owner then 
matched the totals on the deposit sheet with the amounts shown in the stamped deposit 
book, and believed this to be adequate supervision.
The owner’s supervision of the bookkeeper, however, was inadequate especially because 
she was responsible for handling the cash (the bank deposit) and related records (customer 
bills, cash register tapes, deposit sheets). In fact, over a three-month period, the bookkeeper
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skimmed a portion of each day’s cash receipts by omitting some of the cash sales bills and 
pocketing the corresponding amounts. The owner might have uncovered the fraud by using 
any one of the following methods:
• Segregating duties: The owner rejected this method because he trusted the bookkeeper 
and did not want to incur the cost of an additional employee.
• Accounting for all prenumbered bills: The owner opted not to use prenumbered bills 
because it was too time-consuming. The bookkeeper intentionally did not list the bills in 
numbered order on the deposit sheet and prenumbered books were issued out of 
sequence to waiters and waitresses.
• Matching daily cash register tapes to the daily cash deposit: The owner rejected this simplest 
and most appropriate method; not wanting to check his employee’s work in this way 
because the tapes were a messy “dog’s breakfast” kept in a shoe box by the bookkeeper, 
entirely by design, of course, to cover up the fraud.
The owner eventually uncovered the fraud when the bookkeeper became too greedy and 
withheld a bit too much from what the owner knew was an especially good cash sales day, 
which raised his suspicions and lead to an investigation.
This example illustrates the necessity of supervision: often it is the primary defense against 
ongoing frauds such as the skimming of cash or the lapping of accounts receivable. The 
maximum opportunity level for the bookkeeper in the previous example should have been 
the outright theft of the day’s cash receipts—typically less than half of a day’s total receipts 
of about $10,000. However, inadequate supervision allowed a smaller amount of cash— 
about $700 a day—to be stolen over a period of three months, which amounted to a total 
loss of over $60,000.
1.3.4 Audit
From a fraud-prevention perspective, audit represents the third level of an organization’s 
internal control system.
Internal Audit
Internal auditors work for the organization and perform the kinds of work defined by senior 
management. In this sense, internal auditors are an extension of senior management—they 
have the same concerns and deal with the same issues described throughout this chapter. 
Therefore, their work might include fraud detection, or developing fraud prevention 
mechanisms, or both.
The training programs and available literature for internal auditors—as provided by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)—pay specific attention to the issue of fraud prevention 
and detection. Historically the perspective of internal auditors differs from that of the 
external auditors, which is described below.
External Audit
External auditors are independent of the organization. They report on financial statements 
and perform other independent reviews. The restricted role of the external auditor has 
evolved over time. During the late 1800s and into the early 1900s, auditors actively looked 
for fraud—to be a kind of “bloodhound.” Court rulings redefined their role to that of a
21
Chapter One: Managing the Risk of Fraud
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
“watchdog.” Today, auditors are expected to bark if they see something suspicious, but they 
are not expected to sniff around for things that might be suspicious.
This watchdog metaphor has persisted throughout most of the twentieth century. In 
particular, the concept of materiality has played an important part in the accounting 
profession’s view of fraud, which is, specifically, that an auditor’s procedures cannot be 
expected to detect immaterial frauds. No audit can be expected to give absolute assurances 
in this area, and even limited assurances would require procedures so extensive that the 
audit would be uneconomical. If a fraud is material enough to affect the financial statements 
of an organization—and an auditor’s opinion on those financial statements—then the 
auditor’s procedures may uncover it. However, there is certainly no guarantee of detection. 
For example, even when the auditor’s procedures are sound, the perpetrator(s) may go to 
extensive lengths to deceive the auditor and hide the defalcation.
In recent years, the public’s expectations has reopened to some extent the bloodhound­
watchdog debate primarily because of the perception that auditors should bear 
responsibility for detecting significant frauds even when immaterial to the total worth of an 
organization.
1.4 Detecting and Preventing Fraud in Books of Account
1.4.1 The Auditor’s Duty to Detect Fraud
Shortly after human beings became rational animals, their thinking skills were enhanced by 
the ability to rationalize. Unfortunately, this led to lying and cheating. Today, lying and 
cheating are commonly labeled fraud. Accordingly, humans have a long history of both 
committing frauds and being victims of fraud.
Accountants and auditors have had to contend with dishonest practices in accounting 
records since commerce was first recorded and bookkeeping became a double-entry 
process of recording. Since that time, we have needed accountants to make such double 
entries and auditors to assure the accuracy of their entries.
In addition to the auditor’s duty to determine whether entries are made accurately, 
historically auditors have had a corollary responsibility to determine whether any entries 
were false (that is, fraudulent). But not everyone agreed that the latter was the peculiar 
province of the auditor. Some found management primarily responsible for detecting fraud 
in the accounting records. At its discretion, management could delegate that duty to 
auditors.
Most outside auditors do not accept responsibility for detecting fraud in the usual course of 
independent audits. But despite their protestations, many courts have suggested that 
independent auditors be given such a duty. These precedents were established in cases in 
which outside auditors were the targets of regulatory agencies. In these suits, courts have 
ruled that outside auditors have a duty to detect fraud in the accounting records, but only to 
the point where clients actively have attempted to deceive the outside auditors by 
concealing fraudulent transactions or entries. Federal courts seem to hold auditors to a 
higher duty of professional care than do State courts. But even State courts tend to impose a 
duty to detect fraud under some circumstances. In fact, a large number of professional 
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malpractice suits brought against outside auditors in State courts involve allegations of 
undetected embezzlement.
Other distinguishing characteristics of the businesses most frequently involved in 
malpractice suits include:
• Nonpublic, small, family owned enterprises
• One-person, unbonded bookkeeping staff with loose internal controls
• Poor prospects of business survival and a chronic cash flow shortage
• Inactive or incompetent management and a high rate of turnover of outside audit firms
• Engaging an auditor to review or compile rather than to audit.
1.4.2 Fraud and Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Fraud detection is not the primary objective of a financial statement audit. Yet the auditors’ 
responsibility for detecting fraud is increasingly controversial. This is due, in part, to the 
expectation gap.
The expectation gap is the difference between what the public expects auditors do and what 
auditors in fact, do. In other words, the public remains ignorant of the extent of the auditors’ 
responsibilities. This contrasts with the limitations of what auditors can reasonably expect to 
achieve. The average person’s exposure to what an accountant or auditor does is usually 
limited to the tax season or tax audits. Accordingly, the general public, regardless of the 
efforts by the AICPA and other professional groups, still lacks a true perception of the role 
of the auditor. 
Auditors should be fully aware of their responsibilities under the AICPA’s Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. This 
SAS was issued in February of 1997 and superceded SAS 53, entitled The Auditors 
Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities.
According to SAS No. 53, “Since the auditors opinion on the financial statements is based 
on the concept of reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and his report does not 
constitute a guarantee.” While auditors agree with this statement, the public, due in large 
part to the expectation gap, may not agree.
As stated in SAS No. 82, the auditor should consider the risk that the financial statements 
are materially misstated due either to unintentional error or fraud. Accordingly, the auditor 
must specifically consider factors that bear on the likelihood of fraud. The level of risk 
assessed may affect engagement staffing, extent of supervision, overall strategy, and the 
degree of professional skepticism applied.
Auditors' Responsibility
SAS No. 82, in amending SAS No. 53, states, in part: “When considering the auditor’s 
responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from 
material misstatement, there is no important distinction between errors and fraud.” In other 
words, the auditor is responsible for planning the audit to detect material misstatements due 
to fraud. SAS No. 82 does not increase the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of 
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material misstatement due to fraud, but rather makes clear the responsibility that previously 
existed. According to SAS No. 82, an auditor should do the following:
• Assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud and 
consider that assessment in designing audit procedures.
• Inquire of management about its understanding of the risk of fraud and its knowledge of 
frauds perpetrated on or within the organization.
• Plan and perform the audit to achieve reasonable assurance of detecting material 
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud.
• Consider whether misstatements detected during the audit are the result of fraud and, if 
so, evaluate the implications and communicate the matter to appropriate client 
personnel.
• Document the facts that evidence the auditor’s assessment of the risk of fraud and the 
auditor’s response to the risks identified.
Types of Fraud
The misstatements most relevant to an audit of financial statements originate from two 
types of fraud:
1. Fraudulent financial reporting. The client intentionally misstates the financial statements 
through phony accounting records or documents, misrepresentation or omission of 
significant information, or misapplication of accounting principles. Fraudulent 
management usually directs or performs these activities.
2. Misappropriation of assets: Client personnel steal entity assets and conceal the theft 
through misstatement of financial records. Fraudulent employees usually perform these 
activities. 
The auditor has no responsibility for detection of misstatements, whether caused by error or 
fraud, that are not material to the financial statements. For example, misappropriation of 
assets often is not material to the financial statements. However, the client might incorrectly 
expect that the auditor should detect all cases of fraud, whether or not the financial 
statements are materially misstated.
1.4.3 Fraud Auditing versus Financial Statement Auditing
Financial statement auditing is a methodology for evaluating the level of accuracy, 
timeliness and completeness of the recordings of business transactions. However, auditors 
do not review all transactions. Auditors use sampling and confirmation techniques to test 
accuracy, timeliness and completeness. The purpose of testing is to determine whether 
transaction data are free of material error and to confirm that financial statements 
accordingly are free of material misstatement.
Fraud auditing, while borrowing many techniques from financial statement auditing, is 
more a mindset than a methodology. It relies on creativity (right-brain thinking) as much as 
it does on reasoning (left-brain thinking). It requires that the fraud auditor think, but not act, 
like a thief by considering the following:
• Where are the weakest links in the chain of controls?
• How can the controls be attacked without drawing attention?
• How can thieves destroy the evidence of their attack?
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• What powers can the thieves enlarge?
• What plausible explanation can thieves give if someone suspects their activities?
• How can fraudsters, if apprehended, explain their conduct?
The more fraud auditors can learn to think like thieves, the more effective their efforts will 
be in detecting fraud.
Financial statement and fraud auditing also differ in the degree of concern for evidence of 
material error or misstatement. While the materiality rule in financial statement auditing 
has its place in a cost-benefit context, materiality is not a guiding principle in fraud auditing. 
The amount of a visible fraud may be small, but frauds in books of account can be like 
icebergs—the biggest part is below the surface. Discovering even small discrepancies can 
reveal large defalcations. That’s one reason why auditors often say they discover fraud by 
accident, not by audit plan or design. In truth, the “discovery” of fraud is generally no 
accident. It comes from diligent effort and a basic assumption by auditors that if fraud 
exists, they will find it.
Are all frauds in the accounting records discovered on the basis of undetected 
discrepancies? No. Many frauds surface on the basis of allegations or complaints by 
coworkers, coconspirators, customers, competitors, suppliers, or prospective suppliers.
1.4.4 Fraud Auditors versus Financial Statement Auditors
Skills of fraud auditors include:
• Reconstructing financial transactions through third-party sources
• Gathering and preserving accounting evidence for trial
• Testifying as expert witnesses
• Calculating net worth and living expenses
• Inspecting documents for authenticity, alteration, forgery and counterfeiting
• Documenting a fraud case for criminal, civil, and insurance claim purposes
• Designing fraud scenarios, that is, imagining what a criminal might think and do in 
situations where internal controls are loose or not enforced and the criminal has certain 
powers and authority over assets and accounting records
What distinguishes fraud auditors from financial statement auditors? In most respects, they 
are the same. Financial statement auditors are in their element when books and records are 
complete and reasonably accurate. Fraud auditors must make order out of what looks like 
chaos in books and records. Most of the supporting documents the fraud auditor must 
access for confirmation lie in the hands of third parties who might be reluctant to assist in 
the audit effort.
Fraud auditors tend to be right-brain thinkers, that is, more creative than rational in their 
thought processes. In that context, they may understand the inner workings of the criminal 
mind somewhat better because many criminals are not noted for orderly, rational or 
systematic thinking. Criminals are often of the “hit and run” variety—neither planning their 
crimes thoroughly nor anticipating the consequences of getting caught. They want the “big 
score” now. Most embezzlers, however, tend to be left brain thinkers, that is, known for 
their reasoning abilities, who will steal small sums over an extended period of time.
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1.4.5 The Risk of Fraud
Some organizations suffer more fraud than others. What increases the risk or exposure to 
loss from fraud in any organization? The answer depends on a number of factors. The 
incidence of fraud in the accounting records is distributed unevenly. Some industries, some 
companies, some occupations, and some individuals are higher risks than others.
High-risk industries are noted for intense rivalry, low profits, and unethical business practices. 
Some members of these industries are controlled by underworld figures and may enjoy 
sweetheart arrangements with corrupt labor unions. Disputes are often settled by bribes, or, 
when necessary, by force.
High-risk companies are noted for poor management, loose controls, loose cash, and loose 
business morality.
High-risk occupations provide easy access to cash and accounting records, and are often 
characterized by low pay, long hours and job-related stress.
High-risk individuals are financially overburdened people with low self-esteems, addictive 
personalities (gambling, substance abuse, high living), are poor managers of their financial 
resources, have worked their way into positions of trust, and rationalize their thefts as 
“borrowing” or getting even for imagined exploitation. Such people often work long hours 
at their own discretion, and take no vacations for fear their defalcations might be 
discovered while they are away. A growing number of these thieves also keep elaborate 
records of their thefts. The records usually contain dates, amounts, and details of the 
conditions in their lives at the time the cash or property was taken. It is believed that such 
scrupulous bookkeeping is a defensive ploy. If they get caught, they think they can make a 
credible defense of their intention to return the money or property. This defense may cast 
doubt on one element of proof needed to convict: the intent to permanently deprive the 
owners of their property.
People commit crimes for a number of reasons. The main motives are economic, 
egocentric, ideological, and psychotic. The economic motive (need or greed) is the most 
common one found for the crimes of fraud, theft, and embezzlement.
In large corporations, with promotional policies and compensation plans geared to short­
term bottom-line results and little else, a form of competitive greed can set in at the profit­
center management level. Even well managed companies have become victims of their own 
compensation designs. Therefore, falsifications of unit profits, revenues and expenses have 
become a greater problem in the U.S. corporate landscape.
1.5 Risk Management Checklist
Table 1.2, Risk Management Checklist, is designed to assist CPAs in assessing and 
managing the risk of fraud in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all 
NO answers require investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be 
documented. Use the Ref column to cross-reference any additional documentation to the 
appropriate work papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist 
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute 
26
Chapter One: Managing the Risk of Fraud
for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who 
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.
Table 1.2 Risk Management Checklist
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Does the organization have an adequate level 
of fraud awareness and are appropriate 
policies in place to minimize fraud risk, 
specifically:
a. Generic risk factors
• Has the organization assigned each employee a 
maximum “opportunity level” to commit fraud, 
that is, has management asked itself the question, 
“What is the maximum amount this employee 
could defraud the organization, and does this 
represent an acceptable risk?”
• Has the organization set a catastrophic 
opportunity level; that is, has management asked 
itself the question, “Have we ensured that no 
single employee—or group of employees in 
collusion—can commit a fraud that would place 
the organization in imminent risk of survival?”
• Does the organization have a policy of 
immediately dismissing any employee who has 
committed fraud?
• Does the organization have a policy of reporting 
all frauds to the authorities and pressing charges? ____
• For all frauds experienced by the organization in 
the past, has management evaluated the reasons 
that led to the fraud and taken corrective action?
b. Individual risk factors
• Does the organization have a corporate mission 
statement, which includes as an objective good 
citizenship, that is, the maintenance of good 
standing in the community?
• Does the organization have a written code of 
ethics and business conduct (see checklist in 
chapter 2 for details)? ____
• Does the organization conduct ethical and 
security training for new employees and periodic 
updates for existing employees? ____
(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Does management set the right example; that is, 
does it follow the organization’s mission 
statement, code of ethics and business conduct, 
and other policies of the organization, and is it 
clearly seen to be doing so by employees?
• Does the organization’s culture avoid 
characteristics that promote unethical behavior, 
for example, high or even hostile competitiveness 
within the organization that might push 
employees to the point of burnout; pointless rigid 
or petty policies, or both; over-centralization of 
authority?
—
• Do the organization’s hiring policies, to the extent 
possible, seek out individuals of high moral 
character and weed out those of low moral 
character (see checklist in chapter 3)?
• Does the organization use for especially sensitive 
positions screening or testing procedures, or both; 
for example, psychological tests, drug tests, or lie 
detector tests, or a combination of all three, where 
permitted by law?
• Does the organization provide or encourage 
counseling, or both, for employees with personal 
problems, for example, alcohol and drug abuse?
—
• Does the organization have fair policies in the 
area of employee relations and compensation, for 
example, salaries, fringe benefits, performance 
appraisal, promotions, severance pay, and do 
these policies compare favorably with those of 
competitors and promote an environment that 
minimizes disenchantment and other similar 
motives to commit fraud?
• Does the organization have fair mechanisms in 
place for dealing with employee grievances?
• Does the organization, as a feedback mechanism 
concerning employee relations’ policies, conduct 
exit interviews with departing employees?
—
c. Overall risk factors
• Does the organization exhibit an awareness of 
fraud and its possible manifestations, for example, 
signs of employee problems such as drug 
addictions, the low paid employee who suddenly 
appears with the trappings of wealth, and so on? □ ___
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
2. Does the organization have an adequate 
system of internal controls, specifically:
a. Internal control
• Has the organization explicitly considered the 
need for fraud prevention in the design and 
maintenance of the system of internal controls?
b. Control over physical- and logical-access
• Does the organization have a policy of locking 
doors, desks, and cabinets after hours and when
unattended, especially in areas with valuable 
assets including files and records, for example, 
personnel and payroll, customer and vendor lists, 
corporate strategies, marketing plans, research?
• Does the organization use IDs and passwords, for 
example, for computer files?
• Does the organization state and enforce a policy 
that restricts access to those requiring it for job 
performance, including a strict policy against 
employees allowing access to unauthorized 
personnel, for example, by loaning keys or 
sharing passwords?
• Has the organization installed, for especially 
sensitive areas, computerized security or 
electronic surveillance systems, or both?
• Does the workplace appear to an impartial 
observer to have adequate access controls?
c. Job descriptions
• Does the organization have written, specific job 
descriptions? —
• Are job descriptions adhered to?
• Does the organization have an organization chart 
that reflects and is consistent with the job 
descriptions of its employees?
• Are incompatible duties segregated, for example, 
handling of valuable assets—especially cash—and 
related records?
(continued)
29
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Does the organization properly segregate the 
purchasing functions, that is, ensuring that one 
individual cannot requisition goods or services, 
approve and make the related payment, and 
access accounts payable records?
• Are especially sensitive duties duplicated, for 
example, the double-signing of checks over a 
specified amount?
• Do job descriptions specify that employees must 
take annual vacations?
• Is the overall process of formulating job 
descriptions integrated with adequate 
consideration to the importance of fraud 
prevention?
d. Regular accounting reconciliations and analyses
• Are all bank accounts reconciled?
• Are all accounts receivable reconciled, for 
example, month to month, general ledger to 
subledger?
• Are all accounts payable reconciled, for example, 
month to month, general ledger to subledger?
• Has the organization performed a variance 
analysis of general ledger accounts, for example, 
budget to actual, current year versus prior year?
• Has the organization performed a vertical analysis 
of profit and loss accounts, that is, as a percentage 
of sales against historical or budget standards, or 
both?
• Has the organization performed an analysis of 
detailed sales and major expenses, for example, 
by product line or geographic territory?
e. Supervision
• Do supervisors and managers have adequate 
fraud awareness, that is, are they alert to the 
possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or 
exceptional situation occurs, such as supplier or 
customer complaints about their accounts?
• Do supervisors and managers diligently review 
their subordinates’ work, for example, accounting 
reconciliations, and redo the work when 
appropriate?
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Does close supervision adequately compensate 
against the increased risk of fraud in smaller 
businesses or where an inability to divide duties 
exists.
• Is supervisory or management override, that is, a 
manager or supervisor taking charge of, altering, 
or otherwise interfering in the work of a 
subordinate prohibited, and are others in the 
hierarchy alert to this situation as a fraud red flag?
f. Audit
• Is there an internal audit function?
• Does the internal audit function perform regular 
checks to ensure that fraud prevention 
mechanisms are in place and operating as 
intended?
• Are external audits performed on a regular basis, 
for example, quarterly for larger businesses?
• Do external auditors receive full cooperation 
from management with respect to their work in 
general and fraud matters in particular, for 
example, through the audit committee?
3. Has the organization specifically addressed 
the following fraud prevention issues:
a. Ethical Environment
b. Risk Financing
c. Computer Security
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CHAPTER 2:
Promoting an Ethical Environment
2.1 Ethics: A Framework
An ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy. This chapter 
will acquaint you with the field of applied ethics, provide essential tools for promoting an 
ethical environment within an organization, and conclude with a diagnostic tool that you 
can use when evaluating an organization’s current ethical status.
2.1.1 Overview
Ethics—derived from the Greek ethos, meaning character or custom—is a very broad term 
referring to principles or standards of human conduct. Ethics has been, and continues to be, 
one of the key concerns of all religions, schools of philosophy, sciences, liberal arts, 
professions, and political movements. Moses, Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Kanto, and many 
others devoted a great deal of their recorded teachings to the subject of ethics. It is 
impossible to engage in any human endeavor, including business, without entering the field 
of ethics.
Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the science devoted to the study of the “walk,” rather than the talk, of 
ethics. According to Lisa H. Newton, in her text Doing Good and Avoiding Evil: Principles and 
Reasoning of Applied Ethics, “Applied ethics, then, is the field that holds ethical theory 
accountable to practice and professional and business practice accountable to theory.” It’s 
where the rubber meets the road.
Personal Versus Organizational Ethics
Whose principles and standards should we adopt? There remains much confusion about 
this fundamental question. Some believe that ethics are a matter of personal choice. 
Therefore, any attempt to establish a code of ethics, or conduct, would result in a narrow 
flight of parochial fancy that would be so patently offensive to so many, it would render 
itself immediately irrelevant. Others believe that a kind of universal genetic code of ethics 
or conduct exists. This theory suggests that we are all born with an inherent sense of right 
and wrong. So, any artificial code of ethics is unnecessary and would be flawed in any way 
in which it conflicted with the natural code. Both groups believe it would be wrong for any 
organization to impose ethical standards on its members, employees, or other stakeholders. 
Nothing could be further from the truth.
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It is an organization’s right and duty to clearly communicate its values and expectations 
regarding the conduct of its affairs to all its stakeholders. Employees or members may freely 
choose to join, or not to join, any given organization. But, once individuals choose to join 
an organization, they assume a duty to respect the organization’s values and abide by its 
code of conduct.
Ethics and the Law
When confronted about unethical behavior, many people will point out that their actions 
were not illegal. This would be roughly analogous to saying that because a person follows 
the rules of law, he or she would be an excellent judge. According to the Professional Ethics 
for Certified Public Accountants (a publication of the California Certified Public Accountants 
Foundation for Education and Research) “Laws and rules establish minimum standards of 
consensus impropriety, they do not define the criteria of ethical behavior.”
2.1.2 Ethics at Work
In the Professions
Most, if not all, recognized professions have developed written codes of ethics, professional 
conduct, or both. They also have implemented means to assure that members of the 
profession abide by these codes. Violators are usually disciplined or expelled, sometimes in 
public proceedings, to demonstrate the profession’s commitment to its code and willingness 
to effectively police itself.
Some would argue that the professions became interested in ethics for entirely selfish 
reasons. They see the rise of successful plaintiffs’ litigation in the 1970s as a key motivator 
in the promulgation of professional codes of ethics and conduct They also point out that, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government demonstrated an interest in playing an 
increased role, including the actual promulgation of codes of conduct, in the regulation of 
professions. The AICPA has written and rewritten its code of professional conduct many 
times during the past 100 years or so. In fact, according to Professional Ethics for Certified 
Public Accountants, a complete restatement of the code was made in 1973.
Whatever the motivation, professional codes of conduct have been effective. The reason is 
simple: if you do not abide by the ethics code of your profession, you lose the right to 
practice and earn a living. Coupling this reason with the profession’s corporate interest in 
maintaining its standing and authority, thus minimizing its exposure to litigation and 
intrusion by the government, demonstrates the steps taken toward promoting an ethical 
environment.
But, how do we apply this model to businesses, including professional firms?
Business Ethics
Should business be concerned with ethics? The answer was not always a unanimous yes. 
Who hasn’t heard the appropriated maxim: All is fair in love and business. You may recall 
Shakespeare’s merchant and Dickens’ Fagan as examples of at least the perception of 
business motives in western society. In this country, tales of the robber barons of the 
nineteenth century suggest that business ethics were not at the top of the enterprise success­
factor list. That was then, but what about now? As recently as the 1970s, mainstream 
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economist Milton Friedman said that the only obligation of a business is to make a profit. 
This became dogma in American business schools in the 1970s and 1980s.
So, why should business be concerned with ethics today? One could argue that after 
November 1991—the effective date of the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations— 
business became concerned with ethics in order to guard against huge fines and penalties. 
But there are other, pragmatic reasons for business to be concerned with ethics:
Enlightened self-interest. According to the Professional Ethics for Certified Public Accountants, a 
business needs to avoid scandals, keep government off its back, protect itself from internal 
corruption, avoid fines and penalties, and keep its executives out of jail. Also, there is the 
value of a good corporate image, the internal cost of investigations and legal fees, the value 
of good employee morale, and the impact of wrongdoing on the share value of public 
companies to consider. In fact, ethics may have a great deal more to do with making a 
profit than Mr. Friedman imagined.
2.1.3 Promoting an Ethical Environment
The Tone at the Top
You’ve heard it before and it must be said again. The tone of upper management is most 
important in the field of ethics. Ethics will not suffer senior management’s clever 
rationalization or thinly veiled hypocrisy. Fortunately, or unfortunately, ethics always 
comes down to a simple choice of right over wrong. Even the most learned defense of 
improper conduct in the executive suite would fail the ethics test. If the bosses aren’t ready 
to walk the talk, the process simply will not work.
Senior management must be made aware of this essential element. Some will raise 
objections about the cost of an ethics program or its potential negative impact on revenue. 
Even today, the best way to communicate the value of an effective ethics program is to 
quantify the cost of not having an ethics program. Statistics and examples abound. The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce estimates that more than $100 billion is lost to fraud annually. But, 
to bring the point home, you need look no further than your favorite daily business journal. 
Virtually every issue contains stories of businesses and other organizations that have been 
victimized through fraud and paid dearly for it. Those businesses that allegedly “benefited” 
from the fraud end up losing the most.
The Current Situation
All ethics, like all politics, are local. Resist the temptation to run out and “buy” someone 
else’s ethics program for your organization. An ethical environment flows from an ethics 
program that is tailored to the organization. If you try to develop a rule in advance for 
every situation, you will fail. If you try to fix things that are not broken, you will fail. 
Finally, if in the process of installing your new, super-deluxe, off-the-shelf ethics program, 
you communicate your distrust of employees and other stakeholders to them, they, in turn, 
will justify that distrust.
For all of these reasons, begin by analyzing your individual organization. Involve everyone 
in the process. Get their input. Develop a brief statement (mission statement) of the 
organization’s core values and mission.
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Perform a diagnostic to identify weak and strong areas of ethical conduct within the 
organization. You should consider using the Ethical Environmental Checklist at the end of 
this chapter, or you could use this checklist as a template to develop a diagnostic tool of 
your own. Once you compile the results of your diagnostic exercise, analyze the results, 
make any necessary decisions, and begin designing the program.
Designing the Ethics Program
The most important requirement when promoting an ethical environment is having a 
written code of ethics and business conduct. A written code helps to set the right ethical 
tone within an organization. Figure 2-1 is an example of a written mission statement.
Figure 2-1. A Written Mission Statement
Mission Statement
The Organization’s mission is to provide the highest quality goods and services to its 
customers; to strive at all times for market leadership and in so doing, to benefit the 
Organization’s shareholders and its employees.
The Organization is committed to a policy of fair dealing and integrity in the conduct of all 
aspects of its business. This commitment is based on a fundamental belief in law, honesty 
and fairness. The Organization expects its employees to share its commitment to high legal, 
ethical and moral standards.
This Code of Business Conduct is mandatory, and the Organization expects full compliance 
by all of its employees and by its subsidiaries under all circumstances. The Organization 
will monitor compliance, and any violation of the Code may result in disciplinary action 
that could include termination of employment.
Employees uncertain about the application of the Code should consult with their superior. 
Similarly any employee who becomes aware of, or suspects, a contravention of the Code, 
must promptly advise his or her superior, or report the matter directly to Human 
Resources, Internal Audit or the Law Department.
Figure 2-2 is an example of an organizational code of conduct, which includes definitions of 
what is considered unacceptable, and the consequences of any breaches thereof. Note that 
figure 2-2 is only an example. The specific content and areas addressed in your mission 
statement and code should flow from your own analysis of your organization.
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Figure 2-2. An Organizational Code of Conduct
Organizational Code of Conduct
The Organization and its employees must, at all times, comply with all applicable laws and 
regulations. The Organization will not condone the activities of employees who achieve 
results through violation of the law or unethical business dealings. This includes any 
payments for illegal acts, indirect contributions, rebates and bribery. The Organization does 
not permit any activity that fails to stand the closest possible public scrutiny.
All business conduct should be well above the minimum standards required by law. 
Accordingly, employees must ensure that their actions cannot be interpreted as being, in 
any way, in contravention of the laws and regulations governing the Organization’s 
worldwide operations.
Employees uncertain about the application or interpretation of any legal requirements 
should refer the matter to their superior, who, if necessary, should seek the advice of the 
Law Department.
General Employee Conduct
The Organization expects its employees to conduct themselves in a businesslike manner. 
Drinking, gambling, fighting, swearing and similar unprofessional activities are strictly 
prohibited while on the job.
Employees must not engage in sexual harassment, or conduct themselves in a way that 
could be construed as such, for example, by using inappropriate language, keeping or 
posting inappropriate materials in their work area, or accessing inappropriate materials on 
their computer.
Conflicts of Interest
The Organization expects that employees will perform their duties conscientiously, 
honestly and in accordance with the best interests of the Organization. Employees must not 
use their position or the knowledge gained as a result of their position for private or 
personal advantage. Regardless of the circumstances, if employees sense that a course of 
action they have pursued, are presently pursuing or are contemplating pursuing may 
involve them in a conflict of interest with their employer, they should immediately 
communicate all the facts to their superior.
Outside Activities, Employment and Directorships
All employees share a serious responsibility for an Organization’s good public relations, 
especially at the community level. Their readiness to help with religious, charitable, 
educational and civic activities brings credit to the Organization and is encouraged. 
Employees must, however, avoid acquiring any business interest or participating in any 
other activity outside the Organization that would, or would appear to—
(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)
• Create an excessive demand upon their time and attention, thus depriving the 
Organization of their best efforts on the job.
• Create a conflict of interest—an obligation, interest or distraction—that may interfere 
with the independent exercise of judgment in the Organization’s best interest.
Relationships with Clients and Suppliers
Employees should avoid investing in or acquiring a financial interest for their own accounts 
in any business organization that has a contractual relationship with the Organization, or 
that provides goods or services, or both to the Organization, if such investment or interest 
could influence or create the impression of influencing their decisions in the performance 
of their duties on behalf of the Organization.
Gifts, Entertainment and Favors
Employees must not accept entertainment, gifts, or personal favors that could, in any way, 
influence, or appear to influence, business decisions in favor of any person or organization 
with whom or with which the Organization has, or is likely to have, business dealings.
Similarly, employees must not accept any other preferential treatment under these 
circumstances because their position with the Organization might be inclined to, or be 
perceived to, place them under obligation.
Kickbacks and Secret Commissions
Regarding the Organization’s business activities, employees may not receive payment or 
compensation of any kind, except as authorized under the Organization’s remuneration 
policies. In particular, the Organization strictly prohibits the acceptance of kickbacks and 
secret commissions from suppliers or others. Any breach of this rule will result in 
immediate termination and prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.
Organization Funds and Other Assets
Employees who have access to Organization funds in any form must follow the prescribed 
procedures for recording, handling and protecting money as detailed in the Organization’s 
instructional manuals or other explanatory materials, or both. The Organization imposes 
strict standards to prevent fraud and dishonesty. If employees become aware of any 
evidence of fraud and dishonesty, they should immediately advise their superior or the Law 
Department so that the Organization can promptly investigate further.
When an employee’s position requires spending Organization funds or incurring any 
reimbursable personal expenses, that individual must use good judgment on the 
Organization’s behalf to ensure that good value is received for every expenditure.
Organization funds and all other assets of the Organization are for Organization purposes 
only and not for personal benefit. This includes the personal use of organizational assets 
such as computers.
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Figure 2-2. (continued)
Organization Records and Communications
Accurate and reliable records of many kinds are necessary to meet the Organization’s legal 
and financial obligations and to manage the affairs of the Organization. The Organization’s 
books and records must reflect in an accurate and timely manner all business transactions. 
The employees responsible for accounting and record-keeping must fully disclose and 
record all assets, liabilities, or both, and must exercise diligence in enforcing these 
requirements.
Employees must not make or engage in any false record or communication of any kind, 
whether internal or external, including but not limited to—
• False expense, attendance, production, financial or similar reports and statements
• False advertising, deceptive marketing practices, or other misleading representations
Dealing With Outside People and Organizations
Employees must take care to separate their personal roles from their Organization positions 
when communicating on matters not involving Organization business. Employees must not 
use organization identification, stationery, supplies and equipment for personal or political 
matters.
When communicating publicly on matters that involve Organization business, employees 
must not presume to speak for the Organization on any topic, unless they are certain that 
the views they express are those of the Organization, and it is the Organization’s desire that 
such views be publicly disseminated.
When dealing with anyone outside the Organization, including public officials, employees 
must take care not to compromise the integrity or damage the reputation of either the 
Organization, or any outside individual, business, or government body.
Prompt Communications
In all matters relevant to customers, suppliers, government authorities, the public and 
others in the Organization, all employees must make every effort to achieve complete, 
accurate and timely communications—responding promptly and courteously to all proper 
requests for information and to all complaints.
Privacy and Confidentiality
When handling financial and personal information about customers or others with whom 
the Organization has dealings, observe the following principles:
1. Collect, use, and retain only the personal information necessary for the Organization’s 
business. Whenever possible, obtain any relevant information directly from the person 
concerned. Use only reputable and reliable sources to supplement this information.
(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)
2. Retain information only for as long as necessary or as required by law. Protect the 
physical security of this information.
3. Limit internal access to personal information to those with a legitimate business reason 
for seeking that information. Only use personal information for the purposes for which it 
was originally obtained. Obtain the consent of the person concerned before externally 
disclosing any personal information, unless legal process or contractual obligation 
provides otherwise.
When designing your program, implementation strategy and training, remember the 
following bit of wisdom:
Give a person a fish and he or she will be able to eat today. Teach a person to fish and he 
or she will be able to eat for a lifetime.
If you try to create a rule for every ethical dilemma, your people will focus on how to fit 
their decisions to the rules. On this premise, if there is no rule, there is no problem. If you 
train your people to make ethical decisions for themselves, however, they will focus on 
doing just that.
Training and Communication
After writing your organization’s code of ethics and business conduct, ask everyone to read 
it and have them confirm in writing that they have done so and understood the content. 
Keep a record of this acknowledgment.
You should consider seminar training for all employees and agents. The training doesn’t 
have to be long and complicated. Use the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) method to develop 
your ethics curriculum. Instead of giving them rules, give them tools. These tools can be as 
simple as a list of broad principles to follow and questions to ask when making decisions.
In Policies and Persons: A Case Book in Business Ethics, John B. Mathews and coauthors suggest 
the following tools.
1. Avoid harming others.
2. Prevent harm to others.
3. Respect the rights of others.
4. Do not lie or cheat.
5. Keep promises and contracts.
6. Obey the law.
7. Help those in need.
8. Be fair.
So, when a considered action may raise serious ethical questions, try applying the 
generalized criteria. For example, you can use the guidelines above and ask yourself the 
following specific questions.
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1. Does the considered action violate any of the following?:
—A criminal law
—A civil law
—A company policy
—A professional code
—An industry code
—My personal values
2. Is the action fair, just, and equitable to all parties?
3. Does the action serve the common good and the public’s interest?
4. Does it provide the greatest good for the greatest number?
5. Does it do the least harm to the greatest number?
6. Does it cost more than its social benefits?
7. Would you like it if it were done to you (known as “The Golden Rule”)?
8. Would an ethical role model (for example, your parent, priest, or minister) approve of 
this act?
Enforcement
As discussed in chapter 1, an effective prevention strategy demands there be some adverse 
consequences when an employee is caught committing fraud (for example, dismissal of the 
employee and the pressing of charges). Similarly, there also must be some adverse 
consequences—commensurate with the severity of the breach—when an employee 
contravenes an organization’s stated policies, and in particular its code of ethics and 
business conduct For severe breaches, or for repeat offenders, dismissal may be an 
appropriate consequence and the organization’s policies should so state.
To ensure that all employees are aware of their responsibilities, organizations should 
require that the staff sign an annual declaration stating they are aware of the company’s 
code of ethics and business conduct policies, and confirming they have complied in the past 
and will continue to do so.
Employee Hiring and Employee Relations
Ultimately, the employees, not the organization’s policies, create a good ethical climate. 
Employee hiring practices and employee relations are therefore important fraud prevention 
variables. The Ethical Environment Checklist (at the end of this chapter) provides a fairly 
comprehensive list of the factors to consider.
Generally, organizations face a balancing act. On the one hand, they must minimize the 
risk of fraud and be cost-effective in employee remuneration. On the other hand, they must 
promote an open environment in which employee morale and creativity flourish, while 
employees feel rewarded for their efforts. Tipping the scale too far to one side or the other 
can lead to problems, or reduce the competitiveness of an organization, or both.
Organizations can achieve success at a point somewhere in between and only through the 
good judgment of management.
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2.1.4 Ethics and Information Technology
The ever-accelerating information revolution—particularly during the latter half of the 
twentieth century—has raised special ethical issues. In particular, makers, distributors, 
owners, managers, and users of information resources have ethical responsibilities for the 
products and services that they create, own, sell, manage, and use. The ethical issues raised 
by information technology include the following:
• Privacy
• Piracy
• Safety and health
• Data security
• Data integrity
• Competence
• Honesty
• Loyalty
• Fairness
Privacy
A myriad of both private-and public-sector organizations collect data for a wide variety of 
purposes. The U.S. government alone has gathered and stored four billion records on 
individuals. The development of database management software for personal computers 
has extended these capabilities to anyone with a few hundred dollars. Although databases 
have grown explosively, controls over access and disclosure of confidential data have not 
kept pace. Unauthorized access to databases and disclosure of confidential information 
contained therein are commonplace.
There are legal constraints on the improper collection and dissemination of personal data in 
the United States and Canada, embodied in their respective Constitutions, Supreme Court 
decisions, tort law, and in federal and state privacy and consumer rights enactment.
However, these laws and rulings are not sufficiently clear to reach consensus. For example, 
on the question of access to personal history databases versus an individual’s right of 
privacy, an ethicist might ask the following.
● Who is collecting the data?
● For what use are the data being collected?
● How, to whom, and for what purpose will the data be disseminated?
 ●How well protected is that data against unauthorized access and disclosure?
● How accurate, complete, and timely are the data?
● What degrees of confidentiality should be accorded to such disparate data as medical, 
psychiatric, credit, employment, school and criminal records?
If medical records were considered the most confidential of the lot, the ethical standard for 
the care accorded such data would be higher; that is, medical records should be gathered, 
stored, and disseminated with great care and caution.
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Piracy
Software piracy signifies that the creative work of another has been used or duplicated 
without permission or payment of royalty, or both. The definition assumes that the 
software’s creator has complied adequately with the legal requirements of the federal 
copyright law. Therefore, the software pirate commits an act of infringement and may be 
civilly sued for damages, criminally prosecuted, or both.
Software piracy is probably the most common breach of ethics in the field of information 
technology. For each software program sold, developers claim that another two to five 
copies are bootlegged. The lost royalties of developers are staggering. Some thieves 
rationalize that software prices are too high and that the developers are large and will not 
miss the lost royalties. In reality, the software industry has become increasingly competitive 
and losses to piracy can have a serious impact on a company’s viability. Moreover, even the 
largest and most profitable developers have a right to seek a fair price and return for their 
development efforts, the costs incurred and the risks taken.
Safety and Health
The widespread use of computers in today’s information-driven economy has contributed 
to and in some instances created, unique safety issues that can be divided into the following 
two distinct categories:
1. Accidents resulting from the use of computer-controlled systems
2. Occupational health and safety problems for users caused by long-term or improper use 
of computers, or both
Computer-controlled systems safety issues—The accelerated pace of technological change in this 
century has resulted in an exponential increase in new industries with many innovative 
products and processes. Dangerous substances and sensitive information are being handled 
on an unparalleled scale. New systems are being built—using computers to control them— 
that have the capacity to cause extensive destruction of life and the environment. A single 
accident could be catastrophic. Computers now control most safety-critical devices and they 
often replace traditional hardware safety interlocks and protection systems. Even when 
hardware protection devices are retained, software is often used to control them. Because of 
the explosive increase in the use of, and reliance on computers, methods to ensure the 
safety of computer-controlled systems have not always kept pace with the development of 
these very systems. Ethicists recognize there is a serious danger of overreliance on the 
accuracy of computer outputs and databases. The nonoccurrence of particular types of 
accidents in the past is no guarantee that they will not take place in the future. Software and 
hardware developers and information technology professionals alike must recognize their 
moral and ethical responsibilities. We can’t wait to learn from experience, but must attempt 
to anticipate and prevent accidents before they occur.
Computer-related safety and health issues—Today’s computer operators, particularly heavy 
users, may develop problems caused by the repetitive motions used daily in operating their 
machines. The most common problem is repetitive stress injury (RSI), in which workers 
experience moderate to severe pain in the muscles and joints of the hands, wrists, arms, 
shoulders, neck and back. RSI can be caused by carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), irritation of 
the nerves leading to the fingers due to the prolonged use of a keyboard while the body is 
in an unnatural or strained position. RSI can be completely incapacitating, sometimes
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requiring surgery if not treated early. According to Patrick G. McKeown in his text, Living 
With Computers, these injuries are epidemic in computer-related jobs; RSI constitutes more 
than 60 percent of work injuries and costs employers $20 billion annually. Other health- 
related problems involve radiation emissions from the monitor and eyestrain from watching 
the screen for long periods of time without proper lighting or screen glare protection, as 
well as noise-induced problems caused by the pervasive low-level noise in today’s computer 
environment.
Because of the enormous costs resulting from worker’s health and safety issues, many 
organizations are opting for ergonomically designed work environments. Ergonomics, or 
human factor engineering, is the science of designing equipment for the workplace to keep 
employees safe and healthy while they work, which usually results in fewer physical 
complaints, higher employee morale and increased productivity. An ergonomically 
designed work area considers the following factors:
• The height and position of the monitor
• The height and angle of the keyboard
• A fully adjustable chair that provides lower back and adjustable arm support and height 
adjustment capabilities
• A keyboard that allows users to work with their hands in a natural position
• A mouse designed for either a left- or right-handed user with wrist support
• An anti-glare monitor screen
• Noise reduction measures
• Proper indirect and task lighting
• Adequate ventilation
In addition, employers should emphasize the proper use of equipment, encourage regular 
breaks, and provide stress reduction training for employees to further minimize the risk 
factors related to RSI and related injuries. In an ethical environment management is 
sensitive to the well-being of regular employees and applies the same principles to part-time 
workers and support staff.
Data Security
The protection of personal information from unauthorized access, disclosure, and 
duplication obligates a database owner to—
• Formulate and enforce standards for the proper use of the data.
• Communicate to, educate, and train users about their responsibility for protecting such 
information.
• Plan for likely contingencies.
• Establish adequate security controls.
• Monitor control exceptions.
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Data Integrity
An incorrectly entered arrest report, credit report, insurance rejection, debt default, or lab 
test can cause great emotional and financial damage. Yet the error rates of databases with 
such sensitive information are often higher than the standards of quality set by the original 
designers of these systems. Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and relevance are what give 
information its value. In particular, creators of personal history databases have a special 
obligation to compile and process such data accurately and to protect it from the prying 
eyes of snoops, browsers, and hackers.
Today people can collect, process and disseminate information at a high speed. If 
information is irrelevant to the needs of users or is flawed in logic, assumptions or 
conclusions, relying on such specious data can cause catastrophic damage. Therefore, 
quality begins with clear objectives, exacting designs, flawless development and proper 
training of users. People and organizations involved in software development and database 
design are obliged to make products that are fit for their intended uses and have no 
fundamental defects.
Competence
The field of information technology is notable for its fast growth and complexity, and the 
sweeping social, economic, and political changes it has wrought. At times, change seems 
overwhelming. Skills and products become obsolete overnight. Companies must invest 
large sums of money in research and product development.
In the race to get new products out of the labs and into the market, people often 
compromise quality, safety and security. New products might contain design flaws, software 
errors, bugs and glitches, and other impediments to proper functioning. These impediments 
can be costly to uninformed and unsophisticated users. Makers and providers of 
information technology products—both hardware and software—must take great care and 
caution in their work to avoid damage or interruption of service to their users. Providers of 
information technology should seek the most competent people available for sensitive 
design and product development projects. They should also create an ethical climate in 
their firms and foster responsible behavior among all employees.
Honesty
Makers, sellers, dealers, distributors, and installers of information technology products— 
like all other business people—must be honest in their dealings with one another. All 
parties should use truthful representations, nondeceptive advertising, and accurate labeling, 
as well as fulfill contract requirements.
Loyalty
The information technology industry is large, complex, fast changing, and highly 
competitive. Some information products—such as chips and PCs—have become 
commodities. The relationship between buyers and sellers is changing from one in which 
mutual trust, confidence, and faith give way to arms-length transactions. Sellers attract 
buyers on the basis of price alone. The service-after-sale element is forgotten.
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These same industry dynamics have also changed the relationship between employers and 
employees. Loyalty is supposed to be a two-way street. In today’s competitive environment, 
some high-tech, high-talent employees are loyal only to their paychecks thereby blurring 
obligations between employers and employees, sellers and buyers, and manufacturers and 
suppliers.
Fairness
Normally people conduct business on the basis of mutual faith and trust. You cannot, 
however, provide for all contingencies in a formal contract. The writing and execution of a 
detailed contract would take too long, thus frustrating the objectives of both parties.
Assuming business ethics are a matter of mutual rights and obligations of the transacting 
parties implies that fairness is the rule by which we measure whether a transaction is right 
or wrong. In theory, both parties have equal bargaining power in a commercial transaction. 
Therefore, ethics should leave the parties to their own negotiations. Often in the 
information industry, both parties are not of equal size, competence, skill, knowledge or 
experience. In these circumstances, fairness may mean that the more powerful of the two 
has an added measure of obligation. The English common law treated buyers and sellers as 
equally competent to transact business. Yet in the modern era the notion of caveat emptor (let 
the buyer beware) has been diluted. Sellers with superior knowledge, skills, and resources 
must be most forthcoming. Fairness may no longer be a 50-50 proposition. Fairness 
depends on the relationship between the parties, their relative power positions, and the 
context of the business transaction.
2.2 Ethical Environment Checklist
CPAs can use table 2.1, Ethical Environment Checklist to help promote an ethical 
environment in their organizations and in those of their clients. No answers may require 
investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. Use the Ref column 
to cross-reference the checklist to appropriate work papers.
Some sections in this comprehensive checklist may not be applicable or appropriate in 
certain instances. For example, most organizations will not conduct the entire employee 
screening procedures described in section 4 of the checklist. This checklist is intended for 
general guidance and information only. Use of this checklist does not guarantee the 
prevention of fraud. If fraud prevention is an especially vital concern or if fraud is suspected, 
consider seeking the advice of a knowledgeable fraud practitioner.
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Table 2.1 Ethical Environment Checklist
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Organizational Approach to Ethics
a. Does the organization have a Mission Statement that 
emphasizes respect for the law, ethics, and ethical conduct?
b. Does the organization have a written and enforced Code of 
Ethics?
c. If the organization or its employees are subject to outside 
ethical standards and rules (e.g., industry or professional), 
does the organization’s code refer to and emphasize their 
importance?
d. Does the organization have—
• Internal auditors?
• Electronic data processing (EDP) auditors?
• At least one Data-Security Officer or Administrator?
• A Corporate-Security or Loss-Prevention Unit?
• An investigative staff?
e. Does the organization, as a matter of written policy, refer 
incidents of employee crimes on the job to police or 
prosecutorial authorities?
f. If the organization has experienced fraud in the past five 
years, has management established the causes and taken 
remedial action for any of the following:
• A substantial inventory shortage corporate-wide
• A substantial inventory shortage in a major operating 
division
• A major embezzlement involving a loss of more than 
$10,000
• A successful penetration of the main office computers by 
outsiders
• An accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, or 
benefit claim fraud of any amount
• A commercial bribery of purchasing or other personnel
2. Situational Approach to Ethics
a. Are ethical considerations a critical element in corporate 
policies, tactics, and decision-making?
b. Is there a specific framework—especially for important and 
difficult corporate decisions or actions—for addressing the 
ethical element, such as a series of questions like those set out 
in item 2c (below)?
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
c. Does the organization, when contemplating actions or 
decisions that may raise ethical concerns, consider the 
following:
• Does the action violate any law or code to which the 
organization is subject?
• Is the action fair, just and equitable to all the parties 
involved?
• Does the action serve the common good and the public’s 
interest (for example, does it: (i) provide the greatest good 
for the greatest number, (ii) do the least harm to the 
greatest number, and (iii) yield social benefits that exceed 
the cost)?
• Would an ethical purist or role model (for example, the 
stereotypical good parent, priest or minister) approve of 
the act?
3. Policy Approach to Ethics
a. Does management set the right tone for employees and 
demonstrate the organization’s commitment to ethical 
conduct (for example, by regularly referring to the 
organization’s code of ethics in policy meetings and 
communications) ?
b. Do the organization’s policies in all activities, 
communications, and transactions reflect a commitment to 
the following:
• Honesty and integrity
• Competence and due care
• Commitment to excellence
• Fair and prompt dealings
• Respect for privacy and confidentiality
c. Does the organization have written policies that restrict or 
prohibit the following:
• Engaging in outside employment (moonlighting)
• Engaging in conflicts of interest
• Accepting gratuities, expensive gifts or lavish 
entertainments from vendors, contractors and suppliers
• Compromising or bribing customers
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Engaging in false advertising and deceptive marketing 
practices
• Disclosing company trade secrets to unauthorized persons
• Fixing prices with competitors
• Gambling on the job
• Abusing drugs or alcohol, or both
• Fighting on the job
• Stealing company property, including personal use of 
company property (for example, computer time)
• Destroying company property
• Falsifying time or attendance reports
• Falsifying production reports
• Falsifying personal data on a job application
• Falsifying or forging accounting records
• Destroying accounting records
• Falsifying expense accounts
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to confidential 
records (for example, payroll and personnel records, 
customer and vendor lists, research results, product and 
marketing plans)
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to company 
buildings or critical work areas
• Loaning company building access identification cards, 
badges or door keys to unauthorized persons
• Disclosing computer log-on codes or passwords to 
unauthorized persons
• Allowing unauthorized persons use of computer terminals
4. Ethics and Human Resources
a. To the extent necessary, when considering an applicant and 
depending on the importance and sensitivity of the position, 
does the organization perform reference checks, background 
inquiries or investigations, or any combination thereof, to 
confirm the applicant’s—
• Identity
• Educational achievements
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Credit standing
• Satisfactory past employment history
• Absence of criminal convictions (including name or 
fingerprint checks, or both)
• Reputation
• Character
b. Especially for very sensitive positions (for example, those 
affecting public safety, the custodianship of large amounts of 
cash or securities, the secrecy of important information), and 
to the extent allowed by law, does the organization 
administer any of the following to employees and 
prospective employees:
• Polygraphs
• Paper and pencil honesty tests
• Voice stress analyses
• Handwriting analyses
• Intelligence tests
• Psychological diagnostic tests
• Drug tests
c. Does the organization conduct or provide (or both) any of 
the following:
• Security orientation training for new hires
• Ongoing security awareness training programs for all 
employees
• Written rules of employee conduct to all employees
• Annual, signed employee declarations acknowledging 
awareness of the company’s code of conduct, and past and 
future adherence to it
• Hearings for employees charged with punishable offenses
• Employee representation at such hearings
d. Does the organization use or provide any of the following:
• Job descriptions
• Organization charts
• Performance standards
• Performance appraisals ______
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(continued)
Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Coaching and counseling of employees whose work is 
unsatisfactory
• Counseling of employees with drug abuse problems
• Technical training programs
• Human resource development programs
• Tuition reimbursement
• Time off for study
• Time off for family emergencies
• Employee involvement programs
• Job enlargement, enrichment or rotation programs
• Exit interviews for departing employees
e. Does the organization compare favorably or at least equally 
with other firms in its industry, or areas of operations, or 
both, with respect to any of the following:
• Salaries
• Fringe benefits
• Blue-collar turnover
• White-collar turnover
• Absenteeism
• Employee firings
• Promotions from within the company
• Ability to recruit new employees
• Skills of its employees
• Educational level of employees
• Employee attitudes toward their work
• Employee loyalty
5. Ethics and Information Technology
a. Does the organization’s code of conduct specifically address 
the importance of using information technology (especially 
computers) in an ethical manner?
b. Are the following specific ethical concerns relating to 
information technology adequately addressed in the 
organization’s code of conduct and in its policies:
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Privacy of information (for example, information related 
to employees, customers or clients)
• Prohibition of software piracy
• Safety and health (for example, ergonomically sound 
computer workstations)
• Quality standards for information technologies and the 
information they process (for example, accuracy, integrity, 
security)
© Relationship of technology and human resources (for 
example, communication with employees concerning 
technological change, adequate training)
22
Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance
CHAPTER 3:
Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance
3.1 The Concept of Risk Financing.............................................................................................  3
3.2 Dishonesty Insurance..............................................................................................................  3
3.2.1 Overview......................................................................................................................  3
3.2.2 The Policy Provisions.................................................................................................  4
3.2.3 Coverage in Insuring Agreements.............................................................................. 4
3.2.4 Riders............................................................................................................................ 6
3.3 Important Clauses in Dishonesty Policies.............................................................................  6
3.3.1 Policy Definitions........................................................................................................ 6
3.3.2 Policy Exclusions......................................................................................................... 7
3.4 Insured’s Responsibilities in the Event of a Loss.................................................................. 12
3.4.1 Duties of the Insured....................................................................................................12
3.4.2 Handling the Discovery of Employee Dishonesty....................................................13
3.4.3 A Course of Action......................................................................................................13
3.4.4 Notice of Loss...............................................................................................................14
3.4.5 Supporting Documents................................................................................................15
3.5 The Insurer..............................................................................................................................15
3.5.1 The Insurer’s Investigation..........................................................................................15
3.5.2 Subrogation Rights and Duties...................................................................................15
3.5.3 Response to a Claim Denial........................................................................................15
3.5.4 Summary.......................................................................................................................16
3.6 Risk Financing Checklist........................................................................................................ 17

CHAPTER 3:
Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance
3.1 The Concept of Risk Financing
The risk of loss due to fraud and other forms of dishonesty can never be completely 
eliminated. Organizations can finance the potential loss either by purchasing fidelity 
insurance coverage or by self-insuring the risk, that is, absorbing out of one’s own pocket 
any losses incurred. Experts recommend giving serious consideration to purchasing 
insurance in situations with significant risk or potential loss. In reality, however, many 
organizations choose the self-insurance default because they either fail to assess the risk and 
its financial impact or they are simply unfamiliar with fidelity insurance.
Most individuals and businesses would never—or at least should never—consider self­
insurance as a viable option in the case of potentially catastrophic risk. Examples of 
insuring against potentially catastrophic risks include life and disability insurance for 
breadwinners supporting families, fire insurance for homeowners, and liability insurance for 
doctors and automobile owners. In some cases, a statute or contractual agreement may 
mandate insurance; for example, a mortgage agreement may require fire insurance. The 
risk of catastrophic loss due to fraud merits serious consideration for the purchase of fidelity 
coverage.
This chapter reviews the kinds of available “dishonesty” insurance including the issues 
typically addressed in a policy, policy exemptions and the duties of the insured. The 
remainder of the chapter provides some insights into preparing an employee dishonesty 
claim.
3.2 Dishonesty Insurance
3.2.1 Overview
Insurance coverage for dishonest acts is known by many names, including fidelity 
insurance, commercial crime coverage, blanket bonds and 3D policies (Dishonesty, 
Destruction and Disappearance). The desired coverage can be written in standard bond or 
policy language, as a rider to other insurance policies, or in a manuscript format, that is, 
written for a specific company or organization.
For certain industries there are standard policy-bond forms. For example, there are 
standard forms for financial institutions such as banks, brokerages and insurance 
companies. For other industries, including manufacturing, health care, retailing, 
transportation or service providers, dishonesty coverage is more generic. Regardless of 
name, the policies generally follow a similar format. This Handbook uses the term 
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commercial crime policy to refer to dishonesty coverage except in discussions of other, specific 
kinds of coverage.
3.2.2 The Policy Provisions
When considering the purchase of dishonesty coverage, you should understand what is and 
what is not covered under the policy. Generally, you can acquire an understanding from 
the four major policy provisions:
1. Insuring agreements that describe what the policy covers
2. Definitions that provide specificity of terms of coverage and effectively limit the scope for 
interpretation of coverage
3. Exclusions that enumerate what the policy does not cover
4. Duties of the insured that specify what the insured must do to receive indemnity under a 
policy
3. 2.3 Coverage in Insuring Agreements
The first sections of a policy, usually called insuring agreements, specify what types of losses 
are covered. Typically, the insuring agreements (and riders when necessary) cover—
• Employee dishonesty
• Loss Inside the Premises
• Loss Outside the Premises
• Money Order Fraud and Counterfeit Paper
• Depositor Forgery
Employee Dishonesty
The generally used employee dishonesty Blanket Coverage Form Insuring Agreement (CR 
00 01) is shown in figure 3-1. You should note that coverage applies only to loss of “covered 
property.”
Covered property is defined very narrowly in the insuring agreement and, in addition, the 
terms used in that agreement are also subject to further specific definitions. Therefore, when 
considering filing a claim, one of the first questions that you should answer is whether 
covered property was lost. Also, you should make sure to tailor your coverage to your 
organization’s specific industry and needs, and to include the kinds of risks your 
organization may encounter.
Insuring Agreements and riders are also available to cover losses caused by non-employees. 
These include the following:
Loss Inside the Premises
Organizations can insure against loss inside the premises, which is defined in most 
agreements and riders as “Losses of money and securities by the actual destruction, 
disappearance or wrongful abstraction .. . within the premises ... or banking premises .... 
Including loss resulting from safe burglary or robbery with the premises . . . .”
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Loss Outside the Premises
Organizations can insure against loss outside the premises, which is defined in most 
agreements and riders as a “Loss of money and securities and other property . . . while 
being conveyed by messenger ... or armored car company.”
Figure 3-1. Blanket Coverage Form Insuring Agreement (CR 00 01)
BLANKET COVERAGE FORM 
INSURING AGREEMENT
We will pay for loss of and loss from damage to, Covered Property resulting directly from 
the Covered Cause of Loss.
1. Covered Property: "Money," "securities," and "property other than money and securities"
2. Covered Cause of Loss: "employee dishonesty"
3. Coverage Extension
Employees Temporarily Outside Coverage Territory: We will pay for loss caused by any 
"employee" while temporarily outside the territory specified in the Territory General 
Condition for a period of not more than 90 days.
Money Order Fraud and Counterfeit Paper
Organizations can insure against money order fraud and counterfeit paper, which is defined 
in most agreements and riders as “Loss due to the acceptance in good faith, in exchange for 
merchandise, money ... in the normal course of business of counterfeit currency, money 
orders, etc., through the Insured bank account. . . .”
Depositor Forgery
Organizations can insure against depositor forgery, which is defined in most agreements 
and riders as “Loss as a result of the Insured having someone process forged checks, money 
orders, etc., through the Insured bank account. . . .”
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3.2.4 Riders
Remember you can add riders to the standard policy coverage to provide for the unique 
areas of risk not otherwise included. Some riders that you should consider include coverage 
for loss from:
• Unauthorized electronic transfers
• Pension plan frauds
• Credit card forgeries
• Computer frauds
• Unauthorized use of telephone services
3.3 Important Clauses in Dishonesty Policies
3.3.1 Policy Definitions
Other policy provisions include definitions of the terms used in the insuring agreements. 
Usually, the definitions are used to limit the scope for interpreting the terms of coverage. 
For example, the employee dishonesty insuring agreement describes a covered loss as one 
resulting from employee dishonesty. This term and the term employee, on which it relies, are 
further defined to provide specific qualifications of coverage as to cause. Figure 3-2 contains 
a typical policy definition of employee dishonesty.
For coverage to apply, the first requirement is that an employee must commit the covered act. 
If the perpetrator were not an employee, coverage would not apply. This requirement 
makes it important to determine the identity of the perpetrator(s).
While the policy language specifically defines the term employee, you can request 
endorsements to alter the definition and to expand coverage of certain other parties (for 
example, volunteer workers and designated agents) as employees.
Because a policy provides a specific definition of dishonesty, it is important for you to 
ascertain—
1. That the employee committed the act with the manifest intent to cause the insured to 
incur a loss, and
2. That the employee or some intended third party received a benefit. Few other 
provisions in a policy have resulted in as much litigation as this one, particularly 
concerning the meaning of manifest intent.
Unfortunately, there is no consensus among jurisdictions on the interpretation of manifest 
intent, rather, there is a broad spectrum of interpretations. Some courts have found this term 
to apply only to those situations where the employee has the intent to gain a benefit for 
someone at the expense of the insured. Other courts have found a broader meaning 
affording coverage for situations in which the employee acted with such disregard for the 
insured that the loss was a substantial certainty. In one case involving the definition of the 
term a court ruled, “Such a person is deemed to intend the natural and probable 
consequences of his acts.”
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Figure 3-2. Typical Policy Definition of Employee Dishonesty
EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY DEFINITION
"Employee Dishonesty" in paragraph 3.3.1 means only dishonest acts committed by an "employee," 
whether identified or not, acting alone or in collusion with other persons, except you or a partner, with 
the manifest intent to:
(1) Cause you to sustain loss; and also
(2) Obtain financial benefit (other than employee benefits earned in the normal course of employment, 
including: salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profits sharing or pensions) for:
a. The "employee," or
b. Any person or organization intended by the "employee" to receive that benefit.
"Employee" means
a. Any natural person:
(1) While in your service (and for 30 days after termination of service); and
(2) Whom you compensate directly by salary, wages or commissions; and
(3) Whom you have the right to direct and control while performing services for you; or 
b. Any natural person employed by an employment contractor while that person is subject to your 
direction and control and performing services for you excluding, however, any such person while 
having care and custody of property.
Consequently, an insured should not necessarily give up on a claim just because the insurer 
believes the dishonest individual did not possess the requisite manifest intent. Before 
challenging a claim denial, legal counsel should be retained to conduct research to discover 
how the applicable jurisdiction interprets this language. Then if favorable case law is found, 
you can approach the insurer seeking a reversal of the claim denial.
3.3.2 Policy Exclusions
The policy describes the covered losses and the specific exclusions for losses that it will not 
cover. Because insurers tailor each policy with its own list of exclusions, you should read 
and understand the terms before purchasing the coverage.
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Although we won’t explore the legal implications of policy provisions, you should consider 
the practical problems arising from the exclusions both when purchasing the coverage and 
when preparing a proof of loss. Even though the specific exclusions can vary, here are some 
examples of typical exclusions found in many standard policies:
Indirect Losses
Commercial crime policies specifically exclude indirect and consequential losses. It is 
generally accepted that this exclusion’s original intent was to limit the coverage to direct 
losses, thus, excluding consequential losses, such as lost profits, lost business opportunities, 
or lost interest on stolen funds. While this exclusion’s intent may seem to be clear, judicial 
interpretations remain inconsistent. Clearly, you should discuss this issue with legal counsel, 
who can interpret the relevant case law in the applicable jurisdiction(s).
An indirect loss may involve the costs incurred in establishing the insured’s claim. Again, 
this provision excludes from coverage the costs of investigating and quantifying a claim. In 
today’s market, you can purchase coverage for the costs of establishing a claim. Some 
carriers write policies that cover all, or a stated amount, of an investigation’s costs, while 
others write policies under which the costs are shared between the insured and the carrier. 
Of course, you should evaluate the cost of purchasing this coverage in light of the potential 
cost of any investigation. The indirect loss policy provision is excerpted in figure 3-3.
Inventory Loss
The inventory loss exclusion addresses losses of inventory when the insured may catch 
dishonest employees with “the goods,” or the employees may confess their dishonesty, but 
the insured cannot prove the extent of the dishonest acts and the resulting losses. See figure 
3-4 for an example of a standard inventory loss exclusion.
Under this exclusion, an insurer will not accept a shortage of inventory on a comparison of 
book to physical quantities as proof of dishonesty nor as verification of the quantum of loss 
sustained. Similarly, the insurer will not consider a reduction in profits as proof of 
dishonesty or loss because there can be other plausible explanations for either an inventory 
shortage or a reduction in profits.
Thieves normally keep few, if any, records, and their veracity, at best, is questionable. 
Often, dishonest employees purposely understate, in their confessions, the extent of the 
losses in the hopes of avoiding not only prosecution but also any subsequent requirement to 
make restitution. Conversely, dishonest employees may overestimate losses in an effort to 
appease their employers by supporting a claim for a large insurance recovery. Simply 
stated, most dishonest employees do not know how much they have actually stolen.
For example, an employee of an auto parts dealer is caught with a trunk full of stolen 
automobile parts. When confronted, the employee confesses to stealing parts for four years 
but doesn’t have the slightest idea of how much he actually took. In this situation, an 
insured instinctively presents a proof of loss based on an inventory computation.
Essentially, this methodology attempts to blame all shortages, including those in the normal 
inventory process, on the dishonest employee. Therefore, if the insured compares the 
physical inventory available with the inventory records and discovers a shortage of 
$400,000 in automobile parts, the insured may attempt to claim this amount.
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Figure 3-3. Indirect Loss Policy Provision
INDIRECT LOSS EXCLUSION
Indirect Loss: Loss that is an indirect result of any act or 
"occurrence" covered by this insurance including but not limited 
to, loss resulting from:
a. Your inability to realize income that you would have realized 
had there been no loss of, or loss from damage to, Covered 
Property...
b. Payment of costs, fees or other expenses you incur in 
establishing either the existence or the amount of loss under 
this insurance.
The same issues arise for claims based on lost profit calculations. If an insured projected a 
profit of $500,000 but achieved a profit of only $200,000, the insured may attribute the 
$300,000 difference to the dishonest employee.
Although an insured can use an inventory or profit computation to help support a claimed 
loss amount, this method, generally, will not provide sufficient proof for a claim. Unless the 
insured can demonstrate, in an irrefutable way, that the only explanation for the shortage 
could be through the act of an employee, any claim presented will likely fail.
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Figure 3-4. Standard Inventory Loss Exclusion
INVENTORY SHORTAGES EXCLUSION
Loss, or that part of any loss, the proof of which as to its 
existence or amount is dependent upon (1) an inventory 
computation; or (2) a profit or loss computation.
Source: Employee Dishonesty Coverage Form (CR 00 01)
Therefore an insured should meticulously outline the method the employee used to 
perpetrate the theft to demonstrate that the employee had the necessary access to perform 
the dishonest act, and should also present all documents that connect the employee to the 
claimed loss. For example, if part of the dishonesty involved the alteration of shipping 
receipts, the insured should provide all the altered receipts to the insurer. Although these 
documents may not directly support the loss amount, they will connect the employee to the 
dishonesty and support the method by which the dishonesty occurred.
Is this documentation enough to assure a full recovery? Maybe not; however, every link 
between the employee and the claimed loss strengthens the insured’s claim.
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Figure 3-5. Loan Loss Exclusion
LOAN LOSS EXCLUSION
This bond does not cover... (e) loss resulting directly or 
indirectly from the complete or partial nonpayment of, or 
default upon, any Loan or transaction involving the Insured as 
lender or borrower, or extension of credit, including the 
purchase, discounting or other acquisition of false or genuine 
accounts, invoices, notes, agreements or Evidence of Debt, 
whether such Loan, transaction, or extension was procured in 
good faith or through trick, artifice, fraud or false pretense, 
except when covered under Insuring Agreement A [Employee 
Dishonesty], (d) or (E)...
Loan Loss
This chapter has focused on the standard provisions of a Commercial Crime Policy. 
Although not part of a Commercial Crime Policy, the loan loss exclusion is worthy of 
special mention. See figure 3-5 for an example of a loan loss exclusion taken from a 
Financial Institution Bond.
This language establishes that the bond does not cover all risks; specifically, it avoids 
coverage for credit decisions. The bond’s language seems clear, particularly because the 
wording even stipulates that loans obtained through “trick, artifice, [or] fraud” are excluded.
You can obtain coverage for loan losses generated by a dishonest employee who had the 
manifest intent both to cause a loss and to obtain a financial benefit. In addition, the insurer 
may specify in the bond that it will cover those loan losses when an employee was in 
collusion with one or more parties to the transaction and the employee received, as a result 
of the dishonesty, a financial benefit with a value of at least $2,500.
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Figure 3-6. Insured’s Duties to Insurer in the Event of Loss
3.4 Insured’s Responsibilities in the Event of a Loss
3.4.1 Duties of the Insured
Dishonesty policies typically impose several duties that the insured must fulfill in order to 
protect its ability to recover under the terms of the policy once a loss is discovered. In all 
cases, the insured should take action to prevent further loss and take the appropriate steps 
to mitigate the damage and recover from any loss sustained. These duties include:
• Giving timely notice of potential loss
• Filing a proof-of-loss form
• Cooperating with any insurance investigation
See figure 3-6 for an example of the specific language used in a Commercial Crime Policy 
to spell out the insured’s duties.
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Most dishonesty policies typically contain two additional obligations for the insured. The 
obligations are (1) agreeing not to prejudice the rights of the insurance carrier and (2) 
accepting the procedures for filing a law suit in the event of a claim denial. See section 3.4.2 
for more information on these duties.
3.4.2 Handling the Discovery of Employee Dishonesty
It’s a call that all executives dread—internal audit reveals that the controller has been 
diverting corporate funds for his or her personal use. The discovery spawns a myriad of 
questions and problems, all of which require quick solutions.
Dealing with an allegation of wrongdoing against an employee is never easy. Invariably it 
provokes feelings of shock and betrayal within the firm, and often causes a decline in 
internal morale and external goodwill. It may also hurt the bottom line, depending on the 
extent of the loss and, most critically, whether the loss is covered by fidelity insurance.
You must deal with dishonest acts, whether you report to the police and pursue aggressively 
or handle discreetly within the organization. In either case, the actions you take will have a 
critical bearing on whether or not you can recover under your fidelity insurance. Therefore, 
it is important to know how to respond when allegations of wrongdoing arise. Most victims 
(and even most claims adjusters), however, rarely deal with these types of situations, and, as 
a result, these claims are often learning experiences for all concerned.
Victims of dishonesty should never forget that it is their property that has been lost. There 
can be no relaxed attitude when responding to this kind of incident. You must conduct 
yourself as if no insurance existed, including making efforts to minimize or prevent further 
loss and initiating proceedings for maximum recovery.
On the issue of recovery, it is important to note the right of first recovery provisions in fidelity 
coverage. Typically, where a loss does not exceed the policy limit and recoveries are made, 
the right of first recovery is to the underwriter and then to the insured, to satisfy any policy 
deductible. However, if the loss exceeds the policy coverage amount, the right of first 
recovery is to the insured for the amount of the loss in excess of the bond coverage only, 
and then the aforementioned rule applies.
3.4.3 A Course of Action
The first decision to make on the discovery of any form of dishonesty is whether or not to 
conduct an investigation. Some victims choose not to proceed even when they have fidelity 
coverage. They consider the potential cost of an investigation, including the time lost 
internally, combined with external investigators’ costs and legal fees, among other costs, to 
be prohibitive.
There are many reasons to proceed with an investigation. The loss may be covered under 
the fidelity insurance and therefore would be recoverable. In addition, there may be more 
to the dishonest scheme than was initially manifest. Failing to investigate and take 
appropriate action when the crime is first discovered may prejudice the insurer’s rights and 
result in coverage denial when the true extent of the loss surfaces. Similarly, there may be 
more people involved than originally believed, which could make any initial corrective 
actions ineffective.
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A victim that fails to report a loss or reports a loss late risks the possibility of a subsequent 
coverage denial. The typical policy includes the standard requirement for reporting a loss 
as soon as possible (see section 3.4.4). In addition, the insurer also immediately cancels 
coverage for any employee discovered by the insured (or the insured’s partners, officers, or 
directors) to have committed any dishonest act. Therefore, it is extremely risky to continue 
the employment of an individual who has defrauded or stolen from the company. If 
management determines that the best course is to continue the employment of the 
dishonest employee, management should consult with the insurer and request a waiver of 
the provision canceling coverage for that employee.
Assuming the organization decides to proceed with an investigation, management should 
assign a representative of the firm the responsibility of coordinating the organization’s 
efforts to investigate, document, and prepare a proof of loss. In view of the timing 
obligations under the policy, this individual should immediately be available to devote 
considerable time to the claim. This claim coordinator should have a financial background 
and the authority to cross departmental boundaries because the loss investigation will 
undoubtedly involve numerous departments. The claim coordinator also must thoroughly 
understand the policy before an in-depth investigation can begin. The claim coordinator, 
along with legal counsel, should bear responsibility for all communications with the 
dishonest employee, the insurer, and its representatives, including the insurance agent.
3.4.4 Notice of Loss
As discussed previously, immediate action after discovery is critical because discovery 
triggers the policy’s notice and proof-of loss timing requirements. The policy requires the 
insured to notify the insurer as soon as possible after a potential covered-loss situation is 
discovered. Notice can be provided by telephone; however, best practice is to send a 
written follow-up notification. Although the coverage states “as soon as possible,” sooner is 
always better than later, as the date of notification is determined by the circumstances of the 
case and can become a question for a jury. One jury found seventeen days to be an 
unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer, but in another case, a fifteen-month delay was 
not deemed unreasonable.
Some victims opt to allow the dishonest individual to continue his or her wrongdoing in an 
attempt to gather evidence. This is not advisable because, as previously discussed, an 
insurer will cancel coverage for any dishonest employee immediately upon discovery, and, 
therefore, the policy will not cover subsequent losses.
When providing notice, it is not necessary to develop all the facts or even the extent of the 
loss. After a more comprehensive investigation, the insured can then provide the details of 
the claim in the form of a written, and sworn to, proof of loss. The policy typically requires 
that the insured file the proof of loss within 120 days from the time it discovers the covered 
act—not from the time the insured gave notice. If it is not possible to comply with the 120- 
day deadline, ask for an extension—in advance—from the insurer, requesting a response in 
writing. Most insurers will accommodate this request, thereby providing an extension under 
a reservation of rights.
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3.4.5 Supporting Documents
Although insurers value statements made by the dishonest employee, they also require 
documentation supporting the claim of dishonesty and the resulting loss amount. Make it a 
priority to obtain and secure the relevant documents. Verify what may seem obvious or 
conclusive in appearance using the most complete documentation possible. Use discussions 
with other employees to determine the existence and importance of the documentation.
Early in the investigation, identify those employees who may be able to assist in the loss 
calculation. While there are a myriad of factors that affect the timing and appropriateness of 
interviewing these employees, remember that over time memories not only fade but 
become selective. Conduct these interviews individually, and take detailed notes.
Whenever possible, the claim coordinator should attend all interviews.
3.5 The Insurer
3.5.1 The Insurer’s Investigation
After receiving the proof of loss, the insurer may send in an independent investigator to 
analyze the claim. Start preparing for this investigation by designating one contact person— 
usually the claim coordinator. This designated contact should act as liaison for all requests 
from and discussions with the insurer’s representative.
3.5.2 Subrogation Rights and Duties
If the insurer pays any portion of the claim, the insurer is subrogated to the insured’s 
recovery rights. This is covered under Section B 17 of the crime general conditions policy 
form.
Although subrogation is thought of as arising in the context of a resolved claim, subrogation 
also imposes a further duty on the insured long before resolution. The insured must, in no 
way, jeopardize the subrogation rights of the insurer.
However, if the insured has the opportunity to maximize its recovery as a result of 
accepting a settlement offer from the dishonest employee or the employee’s attorney, the 
insured could appear to be acting contrary to the language of the subrogation provision. In 
this case, the insured should bring the settlement offer to the attention of the insurer and 
demonstrate its benefits. Generally speaking, insurers will agree to reasonable settlement 
offers. As always, get all such “side agreements” with the insurer in writing.
3.5.3 Response to a Claim Denial
The game is not necessarily over when an insurer denies a claim. Request a detailed, 
written explanation for the denial. Ask independent advisers to carefully review the claim 
and the rationale for the coverage denial to determine whether the denial is warranted. If 
you can make a good argument for coverage and it becomes necessary to file a lawsuit 
against the insurer to invoke coverage, the provision form stipulates certain procedures for 
the insured to follow (see figure 3-7.)
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Figure 3-7. Legal Action Against Insurer Provision
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST INSURER 
PROVISION
You may not bring any legal action against us involving loss:
a. Unless you have complied with all of the terms of this 
insurance;
b. Until 90 days after you have filed proof of loss with us; and
c. Unless brought within 2 years from the date you discover the 
loss.
Source: Crime General Provisions (CR 10 00)
As stated in the clause in figure 3-7, the insured must give the insurer at least 90 days from 
the day the proof of loss was filed, so that the insurer may investigate and make a decision 
about the claim, before the insured may file a lawsuit against the insurer. However, the 
insured also is limited in the amount of time permitted to bring such an action: within two 
years after discovery of the crime.
3.5.4 Summary
Fortunately, most organizations experience few employee dishonesty losses of any 
consequence. The strict policy requirements and sensitive nature of the investigation 
required to document claims and the entire process of asserting a fidelity coverage claim 
can be quite intimidating. If dealt with in a well thought-out and logical manner, however, 
you can effectively handle employee dishonesty claims. The process reviewed in this
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Handbook should give risk- and insurance-professionals some guidance for planning a 
response.
3.6 Risk Financing Checklist
See table 3.1 for a checklist designed to assist CPAs to address risk financing and fidelity 
insurance issues in their organizations and in those of their clients. If necessary, investigate 
and follow up No answers and then document the results. Use the Ref column is to cross­
reference the checklist to any additional documentation.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If risk financing is a 
concern, seek the advice of a risk management specialist.
Table 3.1 Risk Financing Checklist
Risk Financing Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Purchase of Fidelity Insurance Coverage
a. Has management reviewed operations to determine the nature 
and extent of potential losses from fraud and commercial 
crime?
b. Has management considered the extent to which the 
organization can self-finance this risk (that is, could it survive a 
catastrophic loss without insurance)?
c. Has management taken all reasonable steps to remedy any 
previously identified vulnerable areas of the business or any 
weaknesses in internal controls?
d. Has management established contact with a reputable 
insurance broker capable of placing the required fidelity 
coverage?
e. Has management assigned an appropriate person the task of 
liaising with the broker to determine alternative kinds, levels, 
and costs of coverage, and to report back to management on 
these alternatives with appropriate recommendations?
f. Are procedures in place to provide for the timely and 
appropriate response to circumstances where dishonesty is 
identified, suspected or alleged?
g. Prior to finalizing the recommended fidelity coverage, has 
management and, if necessary, legal counsel, carefully 
reviewed the wording of the policy to ensure the following:
• Definitions, exclusions, and other clauses are acceptable 
and consistent with the nature of the business
• When possible, duplication with other insurance (for 
example, fire and theft policies) has been avoided
(continued)
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Risk Financing Checklist Yes No NA Ref
h. Prior to signing, has management verified all answers to the 
questions on the application for coverage (for example, where 
an internal control is indicated, does it exist and is it operating 
effectively)?
i. Prior to signing, has management reviewed the wording of the 
policy to determine what changes, if any, are required and 
which of these changes should be made in the conduct of the 
business, including the following:
• Hiring-screening of new employees
• Use of contract employees, who may not be covered
• Bookkeeping and reporting practices
• Internal controls
2. Maintenance of Fidelity Insurance Coverage
a. Is a mechanism in place to ensure that the organization meets 
the important terms in the policy in order to keep the policy in 
good standing, including the following:
© Paying premiums when due
• Reporting any loss incidents to the underwriter, even those 
below the deductible when no loss claim is filed
© Maintaining adequate internal controls and good security 
practices (for example, locking safes)
• Reporting changes in the accounting system
• Reporting changes in the nature and scope of operations 
that may affect risk
b. Does the organization review its fidelity coverage on at least 
an annual basis to ensure that the coverage remains adequate 
and continues to meet acceptable cost-benefit criteria?
c. Does the organization assess its risk and its financing through 
fidelity insurance on at least an annual basis?
3. Discovery of Dishonesty and Fidelity Insurance Claims
a. Immediately upon suspicion or discovery of a loss incident, 
has the organization implemented the following steps:
• Protection of assets from further loss
• Preservation relevant documentation and other evidence
© Notification of the underwriter by hand delivery or 
registered (certified) mail (“return receipt requested”)
• Involvement of legal counsel and a claim coordinator
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Risk Financing Checklist Yes No NA Ref
Never ignore this issue; you must act as if there is no 
insurance
b. Internally, or in cooperation with the underwriter (or both), 
are adequate resources in place to undertake a thorough and 
timely investigation?
c. After establishing reasonable suspicion of a criminal act, has 
management called in the police?
d. Has management ensured that no actions are taken to 
prejudice the insurance claim, or the underwriter’s ability to 
make recoveries, or both (for example, obtain underwriter’s 
permission before reaching settlement with third parties or 
suspected perpetrators)?
e. Has management considered initiating legal proceedings to 
ensure maximum recovery?
f. Are adequate personnel and procedures in place to perform 
the following:
0 Document the insurance claim (that is, the Proof of Loss)
• Follow up with the underwriter as required until the claim 
is settled
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CHAPTER 4:
Computer Security and System Recovery
4.1 The Role of Computers in Modern Corporations
It is impossible to overstate the importance of computers in the modem corporation. 
Computers track all assets, manage accounting, handle word processing, operate phone and 
voicemail systems, and control communications. Computers have evolved from large 
mainframes to networks of PCs—each of which has capabilities greater than those 
mainframes from the sixties and seventies—to provide a wide range of services to the 
modern corporation.
If those computers fail or are compromised, whether by accident or by deliberate action, 
the company is in trouble. Preventing an incident is infinitely preferable to dealing with 
one. If an incident occurs, however, the corporation must have a way of recovering 
operations quickly and efficiently. Therefore, the establishment of appropriate computer 
security and system recovery is a vital function of any organization.
Make no mistake—computer security is a complex subject that is growing and becoming 
more complex every day. Businesses spend many billions of dollars each year on hardware 
and software to control access to computers, to secure the data they contain, and to detect 
intrusions. They invest hundreds of millions more in systems that permit efficient recovery 
should a problem occur. There are firms, some with thousands of employees, specializing in 
computer security. Clearly, this is a highly specialized field. One chapter in a Handbook 
cannot make you an expert in computer security, and it is not intended to do so.
This chapter orients you to the field of computer security so that you, as a CPA, can be 
certain not only to handle computer security and systems recovery appropriately, but also 
to consider the major risk factors.
4.2 Management’s Security Issues
In the modern, global business environment, the computer has evolved from being a 
number cruncher used by the accounting department and tended by a priesthood of 
mathematical geniuses in a glass-fronted fire-protected computer room, to infiltrate virtually 
every facet of the corporation. The computer has replaced typewriters with word 
processors, adding machines with spreadsheets, and voluminous physical files with 
database programs. In many companies, all significant information concerning assets, 
transactions and operations are held on one or more computers. Today’s organization likely 
makes use of hundreds of computers connected in local area networks (LANs) and wide 
area networks (WANs). An organization may have dozens of these networks, each using 
servers ranging from PCs to mainframes.
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4.2.1 Components of Security
Data Communications
Businesses do not exist in a vacuum. Increasingly companies are dedicating more resources 
to data communications. Many companies—perhaps most, by now—have moved onto the 
Internet, both as a way of distributing information (usually on the World Wide Web) and of 
transmitting information between people or units: this includes electronic mail (email) and 
the use of File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to move files across the Internet. The space on 
business cards that formerly held a Telex address now has an email address.
Some companies are developing and fielding what are sometimes called extranets, which 
link their suppliers and distributors through Internet connections. Other businesses, seeking 
more security than is provided on the global public Internet, have turned to private 
network providers who operate worldwide data communications networks that use the 
same tools and protocols as the Internet, but are limited in use to subscribers.
Security and System Structure
Before computers, businesses achieved information security by installing locks on file 
cabinets and file-room doors, and by restricting access to various files and documents. 
During the initial period of centralization, organizations used mainframe computers with 
attached terminals; effective access control existed on the central system. Today, the 
situation is different. How is it possible to secure computer networks and data 
communications structures that are not only complex, but also may exist on a global scale?
As businesses increasingly rely on computers and networks, they have an increased need to 
secure their information-processing infrastructure against accidental or deliberate damage 
and to provide an efficient, effective and secure system for backup of data and programs on 
a regular basis. Organizations need security systems to restore information following an 
incident or outage. Systems are virtually impossible to manage and keep secure if they are 
not properly organized and structured. As a key aspect of security and recovery, and as a 
measure of preventative maintenance, businesses should implement a structure for 
organizing and storing information (for example, data files, spreadsheets, word processing 
documents, and so on). In developing an effective information storage structure, you should 
consider issues, such as file nomenclature and file access privileges.
External Versus Internal Security
As people recognize information to have enormous value, sometimes a value greater than 
anything else in the organization, their need to safeguard this information has increased. 
However, the risks inherent in the processing, storage and transmission of that data have 
also increased, particularly as the Internet has flourished. There have been many 
documented cases of industrial and economic espionage designed by organizations 
attempting to jump-start their business activities by stealing proprietary information.
Companies have also been victimized because management believed the major risk they 
faced was from outside the organization. They spent substantial resources on firewalls and 
very little on other forms of security. Unfortunately, every study indicates that where crime 
against business is concerned, 80 percent or more of that crime is perpetuated within the 
company and hence, from inside the firewall.
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As systems grow more complex, with increasingly greater speed in connecting to the 
Internet, it is important when assessing security that you consider a wide range of threats 
and a wide range of ways in which to thwart those threats. Although an outsider can hack 
into your network to gain access to a specific file, an insider might be able to pick up a 
carelessly stored backup tape and walk out with a copy of every file in your system, all 
recorded on a tape so small that it can be secreted in a shirt pocket.
Therefore no one should question the need for computer security and the ability to recover 
from problems both natural and human-generated. However, it is useful to focus on some 
of management’s key concerns.
4.2.2 Management’s Key Concerns
Managers in business and government have recognized the growing importance of 
computer processing to their organizations and, over the last few years, have expressed 
their concerns in a wide variety of publications. These concerns generally fall into one of 
the following three categories.
1. Theft of confidential information
2. Information integrity
3. System availability
Each of these concerns is addressed below.
Theft of Confidential Information
Recognizing that companies increasingly store more information in computer systems, 
management must have assurance that this information is well protected and that only 
appropriately authorized employees have access.
For example, theft of proposed pay scales prior to labor negotiations could be detrimental 
to the process and result in increased production costs. Theft of marketing or pricing plans 
might result in a loss of competitive advantage. Similarly, theft of personal or financial 
customer information could result not only in embarrassment, but also in a direct loss of 
business and possible litigation. The threat of the loss of valuable intellectual property has 
become so great that the government has enacted the Electronic Espionage Act, making the 
theft of intellectual property a federal crime, punishable with up to ten years imprisonment.
Information Integrity
Because of the large volume of information processed by computers, it is not usually 
feasible to confirm the validity or accuracy of processing results. Therefore, management 
seeks assurance on the integrity of computer-generated information: that the information is 
reasonably protected against unauthorized tampering by employees, computer viruses, 
hackers, or other forms of sabotage.
For example, tampering that results in inaccurate reporting of sales figures could, in turn, 
cause inappropriate production, excessive inventory levels, and lost product sales.
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Unauthorized altering of the accounts-payable records could result in incorrect mailing 
labels or inaccurate shipping amounts, and therefore, direct financial loss.
System Availability
Recognizing their organization’s dependence on the data processing service, management 
needs to be reassured, not only that everything has been done to reduce the likelihood of 
disruption, but also that there are plans in place for resuming data processing in the 
unlikely event of a major catastrophe. The total or partial loss of data processing services 
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for most organizations to perform routine business 
operations.
4.2.3 Effective Computer Security Systems
An effective computer security program can help to manage and, to an extent, alleviate the 
above concerns. The design of an effective computer security program must take into 
account the nature of the risk, and the nature and cost of the controls required to reduce 
exposure. Note that there is no such thing as 100 percent protection. The growth of 
networking and particularly of the Internet has materially increased the risk of computer 
crimes and incidents. The following areas are among those that management must address.
Accidental Versus Deliberate Events
The events that result in breaches in confidentiality, integrity or availability may be 
accidental or deliberate in nature, and may be the result of actions either internal or 
external to an organization.
On a day-to-day basis, management could trace most incidents to internal accidents, such as 
an employee entering incorrect data or inadvertently deleting an essential file. Accidents 
also include failures arising out of undiscovered program errors, or bugs.
Some systems are composed of software packages procured from manufacturers. Others are 
completely custom written. Others—perhaps most these days—are a combination of 
procured software and custom code. In any case, the systems that support an organization 
may consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of lines of code. It is virtually impossible 
to test every possible condition that might occur in these immensely complex systems. 
Program bugs exist in every major system. With the marketplace demanding speedier 
program development cycles, manufacturers have converted at least a part of their 
traditional testing procedures into beta testing, in which the manufacturers release an 
advance version of the software to customers to assess its capabilities.
It is important to understand the difference between beta testing and the more traditional 
system testing. In system testing, the software is stressed with deliberate input errors, 
processing problems and anything else the testing team can do to cause the software to fail. 
In beta testing, the users are not deliberately stressing the system in an attempt to make it 
break down. Nonetheless, commercial-software beta testing is valuable, and results in 
reports to the manufacturer of hundreds, or even thousands, of potential program bugs. 
Regardless of how thoroughly a program is tested, it can still fail, and fail disastrously, as 
the result of an accidental bug.
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Prevention, Detection and Recovery Controls
Prevention is the best and most effective way to minimize the impact of an unwanted event 
that could affect information confidentiality, integrity or availability. In the case of 
deliberate acts, preventive controls will reduce opportunity and thereby remove temptation. 
Another important factor in preventive control is the notion of deterrence, which forms a 
belief in the mind of would-be perpetrators that they are likely to be caught if they attempt 
a computer-related crime.
Preventive controls, however, cannot provide a 100 percent guarantee that a problem will 
not occur. As a result, organizations typically use complementary detective controls to 
highlight any actual or attempted security violation. For example, existing software features 
may prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to data. In these situations, the 
software is programmed to produce reports that document all attempts by unauthorized 
users—a feature known as detective control.
In addition to preventive and detective controls, organizations must prepare in advance for 
recovery from unexpected events. For example, the backup-copy feature used to retrieve a 
deleted data file constitutes a recovery control.
A well-designed security program includes elements of all three types of control:
1. Preventive
2. Detective
3. Recovery
The mix of controls used depends on the nature of the information stored on the computer, 
combined with the reliance placed on the computer, and management’s willingness to 
accept the associated risks. In the rapidly changing global environment in which we work, 
with Internet connectivity growing at an unprecedented rate, and new equipment and 
software becoming obsolete in months, it is no simple matter to keep security features up to 
date with potential threats.
4.3 Physical Security
Physical security is the generic term used to describe the protection of the computing facility. 
The controls exercised under the heading physical security are typically preventive and 
detective in nature.
Many may think that physical security has become unimportant in the age of the personal 
computer, when virtually every employee has a powerful workstation with a fast processor 
and access to company networks, which are often equipped with huge local storage disk 
drives. But the reality is that mid- to large-size organizations still use midrange computers 
(such as the IBM AS400, Digital Vax and Alpha systems, HP 9000s, and similar systems 
from other manufacturers) and mainframes (such as the IBM System 390 and large scale 
DEC, SUN, HP, and Unisys machines). Even managers at companies that base their 
computing on a LAN often realize that they best protect their servers by placing them in a 
dedicated and protected operating facility.
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Physical security primarily addresses the accessibility concern, and attempts to minimize 
the potential for system loss as a result of equipment damage. To achieve physical security, 
consider each of the following areas:
1. Computer Room Construction
2. Fire Detection and Suppression
3. Water Protection
4. Electrical Power Reliability
5. Environmental Control
6. Physical Access Controls
7. Physical Security for PCs
Details on each of the components of physical security follow.
4. 3.1 Computer Room Construction
The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) standards provide the most concise 
specifications for recommended mainframe, midrange and server computer room 
construction. In summary, to provide an appropriate level of protection, computer room 
perimeter walls should be constructed to a minimum of a one-hour fire resistance rating. 
These walls should extend from concrete ceiling to concrete floor (slab to slab). Obviously, 
slab-to-slab walls also serve to protect the facility against unauthorized entry from over a 
false ceiling or under a raised floor.
This construction minimizes the possibility of fires originating in general office areas 
migrating to the computer room before they can be extinguished. The use of glass partitions 
to segregate the computer room from the general office environment usually does not 
provide sufficient protection against a migrating fire.
Computer rooms have come full circle. During the sixties and seventies, the only 
computers in most organizations were large mainframes kept in presumably secure 
computer rooms. As companies changed from central computers to client-server 
environments, file servers, which had become the departmental version of a mainframe, did 
not need special environments. They were placed anywhere—on the floor, under a table, or 
sometimes in a closet. This led to a lot of problems. Often they were accidentally turned off 
or damaged. They did not always have power protection, and on more than one occasion, 
companies suffered when someone accidentally pulled the server’s plug from the wall. With 
servers in a closet or under someone’s desk, backup was sometimes forgotten, and even 
when carried out, the backup tapes were often stored adjacent to the server.
4. 3.2 Fire Detection and Suppression
Fire detection and suppression systems are essential in the computer room to protect the 
investment in computer equipment and the information stored thereon. These systems are 
designed to detect and suppress fire before it advances to a serious state. Security experts 
recommend automated detection and suppression systems because these systems reduce the 
dependence on manual fire- fighting techniques that may prove either unsatisfactory or late 
in arrival.
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The most common fire suppression systems axe water sprinklers and various fire­
suppressing gasses. A gas, Halon 1301, formerly the most popular fire suppression gas, is no 
longer manufactured because it turned out to be a significant environmental hazard.
Water sprinkler systems may be “wet” or “dry.” Wet systems contain water in the pipes at 
all times. Dry pipe systems, also called pre-action systems, do not contain water until an 
alarm situation occurs (usually involving a products-of-combustion detection unit), at which 
point a valve automatically opens to charge the system. A high-temperature event must also 
occur to open a sprinkler head.
Fire detection systems can also provide a direct linkage to other significant support 
functions, such as opening fire exits, shutting off equipment and fans, and providing 
immediate notification to an alarm company or the fire department via a communications 
link.
4.3 .3 Water Protection
Water and electrical systems do not mix, but both are generally found in computer rooms 
protected by sprinkler systems. Water can also enter computer rooms through leaks that 
may originate on another floor of the building. Therefore, it is vitally important to ensure 
that precautions are taken to detect and remove water leakage before it contacts the 
electrical supply. Water protection usually involves the provision of:
• Underfloor water detectors, normally in the vicinity of air-conditioning units. Water 
detection systems are usually monitored in the same manner as fire alarms.
• Floor drains to remove any water buildup. Unless specified during construction, floor 
drains typically are not provided in modem office towers.
• Waterproof equipment covers. Where sprinkler systems or other above-floor water 
sources are present, you should have available equipment covers or rolls of plastic that 
can be pulled over the equipment in the event of a problem.
4.3 .4 Electrical Power Reliability
Unless suitable precautions are taken, a disruption to the electrical power supply will result 
in the loss of computer service. The provision of backup power sources can be expensive, 
and it may not be cost justified if the computer center is located in an area where the 
electric power supply is reliable. If the electric power supply is unreliable, or the nature of 
processing critical, consider using uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and backup 
generators.
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
UPS provides battery backup in the event of power failures or brownouts. The regular 
power supply is monitored at all times, and battery power automatically provided when 
required. These systems have become increasingly affordable.
Backup Generators
Backup generators are recommended because UPS can only provide battery backup power 
for a limited time. In computer centers that provide critical processing services or in areas 
where electric power is unreliable, diesel generators that can produce electric power for an
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indefinite period, provided fuel is available, often support UPS systems. Finally, regardless 
of the local power supply outage record, it is likely that power conditioners will be used in 
larger computer installations, and surge suppressors will be provided for desktop PCs. 
Power conditioners and surge protectors monitor the electric power supply and remove 
voltage sags and surges.
4. 3.5 Environmental Control
Environmental control is an issue that primarily has been a concern for larger mainframe 
computer environments. Even the users of the smaller machines, whose manufacturers 
claim can operate in a general office environment, cannot totally ignore the following 
environmental issues:
1. Temperature
2. Humidity control
3. Environmental contamination
Temperature Control
Computers cannot operate in extreme temperatures. It is true that the range of operating 
temperatures has increased over the years. However, even when the specifications indicate 
that the machine will operate in a wide temperature range (for example, 59-90 degrees 
Fahrenheit or 15-32 degrees Celsius), it is not advisable to operate these machines near 
either the lower or upper limits. Air conditioning is usually installed to reduce the 
likelihood of system outage or damage as a result of overheating.
Humidity Control
The computer manufacturers normally indicate a range of humidity that is acceptable for 
their machines, for example a 20-80 percent humidity tolerance. Normally the air 
conditioning unit provides humidity control.
Environmental Contamination
Dust can cause major problems in a computer environment. If dust gets into a disk pack, it 
may cause a head crash, making information on that disk inaccessible. In addition, 
accumulations of paper dust from printers are a potential fire hazard. To minimize the 
potential for dust contamination, you should regularly vacuum the areas where dust 
normally accumulates.
4. 3.6 Physical Access Controls
The importance of physical access controls over all assets and related records is obvious. 
Such controls help to reduce the risk of fraud and commercial crime because—
• Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong 
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the 
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Perpetrators of many frauds must come into physical contact with either the asset being 
misappropriated or the related asset records in order to cover up the fraud. Reducing 
physical access reduces opportunity.
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® Access controls that fail to prevent fraud and commercial crime still often assist in the 
investigation process, for example, the determination of what actually happened and the 
narrowing of the list of possible suspects.
Physical security over computer installations and equipment is particularly important. 
Sometimes white-collar criminals and irate employees can resort to blue-collar crimes, such 
as arson and the willful destruction of property. When this happens, these blue-collar 
crimes may be classified as commercial or economic in nature.
The only employees who should require access to computer equipment are those 
responsible for its operation. Any third party engineers performing maintenance should be 
accompanied by operations staff at all times. Providing more access increases the potential 
for vandalism, mischief and human error; any of these threats could result in processing 
disruptions.
Limiting access to the computer room involves securing the doors and keeping them closed 
at all times. There are a variety of devices available for achieving this, the most common 
include—
© Key locks: These are the cheapest to install but are usually the least secure because 
duplicate keys can be made and distributed without control.
® Cipher locks: These are push button combination devices and are generally more secure, 
provided the combination is changed on a regular basis.
® Card access devices: These are probably the most secure mechanisms because cards cannot 
be readily duplicated and card distribution can be controlled.
4. 3.7 Physical Security for PCs
Much of the preceding discussion relates to computer systems of any size. Some especially 
important measures necessary to physically secure PCs follow:
® Restrict physical access. Lock doors during off hours or when an office is vacant, or 
both.
• Use the security features provided on many PCs, such as passwords, which prevent 
access by unauthorized individuals.
® Ensure that all employees watch for unauthorized personnel in areas where 
microcomputers are located.
4.4 Logical Security
Logical security is the term used to describe the protection of information stored on a 
computer system. The controls involved are usually a blend of preventive and detective 
controls. Organizations use logical security to address confidentiality and integrity 
concerns, and to reduce the potential for inappropriate information disclosure, modification 
or deletion.
Achieving an appropriate level of logical security involves giving thought to how the user 
gains access to information. In addition to the security controls for the data itself, you 
should consider the controls over the software that provide access to the data and to the 
system. In so doing, keep in mind the following:
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• Communications security
• Data security
• Software integrity
• Computer operations security
• Logical security for microcomputers
A description of each follows.
4.4.1 Communications Security
Communications security focuses on controlling the various methods of access to the 
computer system. Of course, communications security primarily serves to ensure that valid 
transmissions between computer systems are complete and accurate. As an added benefit, 
communications security also presents an obstacle to criminal activity.
Passwords and Administration
A valid user identification (ID) and password is the first line of access control on most 
computer systems. The validation of the ID and password by a computer program 
represents the preventive part of the control while the rejection and recording of an invalid 
ID or password represents the detection control. To be effective, the detective aspect of 
password control requires an investigation of all reported access failures.
For effective password controls, procedures should be installed to ensure that—
1. Users choose passwords that are not simplistic in nature; for example, because simplistic 
passwords can be readily guessed and the system compromised, never use initials, a 
spouse’s name, or other similar personal passwords.
2. Management distributes new user IDs and passwords to users in a controlled manner.
3. Users change passwords regularly, approximately every 30-90 days, depending on the 
nature of the information accessed.
4. Management revokes IDs and passwords of users who have left the organization. 
Similarly, when users move from job to job within an organization, management 
modifies their access rights so they can only access the data required for their current 
job.
Network Security Features
The programmed network security features that are available vary from system to system. 
Some of the common features include—
• A maximum number of log-on attempts. If the user has not successfully logged on in the 
specified number of attempts, the session is terminated and the incident is recorded on a 
log for investigation. On some systems, the user’s account is locked to prohibit further 
attempts until the operators or the security-officer function takes action. This feature is 
designed to prevent unauthorized users from repeatedly attempting to gain access.
• Automatic log-off of inactive terminals. If an employee leaves a terminal logged-on, 
anyone who gains access to that terminal has the access rights of the previous user, 
thereby breaching password security. Therefore, many systems automatically log off 
users when the terminal has been inactive for a defined period of time.
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• Restrictions of users to specific terminals, specific times of the day, or both.
• Echo checking of transmitted information to ensure the information is complete and 
accurate. This is achieved by a retransmission of the message to the source terminal for 
validation.
• Firewalls to provide the security necessary to control unauthorized access to the system 
from the Internet. Ranging from relatively simple hardware or software to complex and 
hard-to-maintain packages, firewalls have become a requirement for systems attached to 
the Internet. Careful installation is essential to prevent making unintended access points 
available to an invader.
Remote-Access Security
Hackers have received considerable publicity in recent years, after successfully gaining 
access to numerous computer systems. In response to the problems created by hackers, 
several companies have developed and marketed security devices to limit remote access to 
authorized employees.
One common device available to help control dial-up computer access is the callback 
device. When an employee dials in, the callback device intercepts the call, the employee 
enters a special code, and the device then calls back the phone number associated with the 
code entered. The communications link is then established and the user ID and password 
are entered in the normal way.
For both dial-up access and Internet access, there are a number of devices that provide 
security by effectively providing authorized users with a new password for every log-on. 
Some systems accomplish this by providing the user with a small key-chain-sized device 
called a token, which has a window that displays a new code every minute. The user must 
enter this code along with a memorized password to gain access.
Another version looks much like a calculator. When a user requests access, the system 
provides a random number (called a challenge) that the user then enters into the special 
calculator with a password. The calculator then displays another number (the response), 
which is entered into the system to gain access.
Another class of access control, based on biometrics, involves measurement of a physical 
characteristic. Currently manufacturers offer devices that can check identity based on 
fingerprints, hand geometry, iris or retinal pattern, or facial geometry. Systems based on 
voiceprint or signature dynamics are also under development.
4.4.2 Data Security
Unauthorized access to information can result in its disclosure, modification or deletion. To 
achieve efficient data security, you should implement a system capable of evaluating the 
sensitivity of the data to provide a level of protection commensurate with the nature and 
perceived value of the information. Data security addresses the issue of protecting 
information stored on computer files, magnetic media, and hard copy reports.
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On-line Data Files
On-line data files are those files stored on disk that users of a computer system can directly 
access. Two effective techniques are available to secure on-line data files:
1. Software restrictions. A program, or series of programs, that references established security 
tables to determine whether the user is allowed the requested access (for example, read 
or write) to the requested data file. If the request is valid, the user will be permitted 
access; if not, access is denied and the access violation is reported on a log file for 
subsequent investigation. The security software process is illustrated by figure 4-1.
Figure 4-1. The Security Software Process
On some computer systems, the software restriction facility is an integral part of the 
operating system, while on others a separate security software product that interfaces with 
the operating system is used.
2. Data encryption. This technique scrambles information using a predefined algorithm or 
key, so that the information is not meaningful to anyone who gains access to the disk 
file. There are a number of mathematical systems (algorithms) in use as the basis of 
encryption systems. These systems use keys of various length and complexity. Generally 
longer keys provide more security than shorter keys. On the Internet all browsers 
provide some level of security through encryption. Some have short-key capabilities
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(generally employing 40-bit keys) that provide a basic level of security, while other 
versions (often export-restricted) use much stronger 128-bit keys. Some data encryption 
packages (for example, PGP) can provide for even longer keys (often 1,024 bits in 
length), which provide incredibly robust security against unauthorized interception. 
Companies using the Internet to transmit confidential data should seriously consider 
using encryption to protect that information from unauthorized interception.
Off-line Data Files
Off-line data files are information stored in libraries on magnetic tape, exchangeable disks, 
and diskettes. Information stored on these media is as readily susceptible to inappropriate 
disclosure, amendment, and deletion as on-line data files unless it is properly controlled. 
The preventive controls usually applied include—
• Keeping the media library in a physically secure room where the door is locked 
whenever authorized staff are not present
• Adhering to media library procedures, which require that the files be issued from the 
library only for approved purposes, for example, production use and transport to off-site 
storage
The detective controls normally include an investigation of all materials borrowed, but not 
returned in a reasonable time, and the performance of periodic inventory checks. However, 
many smaller organizations consider the use of comprehensive library procedures 
impractical because of limited staff availability. In these situations and in microcomputer 
environments, you should regularly back up computer information (on hard disks and 
diskettes) and store it in a secure location away from the computers.
Reports and Documents
It is easy to become preoccupied with protecting information on computer systems while 
neglecting information printed on input forms and computer reports. Generally, people rely 
on internal controls exercised by user departments to ensure that data approved for input is 
not modified before it is entered into the computer. Frequently, however, people pay less 
attention to securing input documents before and after input. Yet these input documents 
contain all of the confidential information ultimately stored on disk.
You should also pay attention to printed output, including—
• Printing control Appropriately destroy any partially printed reports that result from 
printer problems.
• Distribution control Ensure that the appropriate staff distribute computer-printed reports, 
particularly reports containing sensitive or confidential information, only to authorized 
recipients.
• Storage security. Staff should secure computer reports in the user department for after 
office hours protection.
• Destruction control. Staff should appropriately destroy all reports when no longer required 
(this applies to all offices, not just computer areas). Even when information is outdated, 
improper disclosure may still prove embarrassing.
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4.4.3 Software Integrity
The integrity of information depends on the integrity of the programs that produce and use 
that information. Information’s integrity also depends on the integrity of the 
communications software, transaction processors, file access software, security software, and 
operating system—known collectively as the system software, which control the operation 
of, and may be used by, application programs. Software integrity refers to the protection of 
all system software stored on magnetic media and the migration of programs to production.
On-line Software Libraries
Computer programs are stored on disk files in libraries or software directories. The most 
effective means of restricting user access to these libraries is through security software 
restrictions as described earlier in the section, On-line Data Files, although library control 
software may also assist in restricting user access.
The programming staff require access to copies of the programs to perform their job 
functions. They do not, however, require access to the production versions. Providing 
programmers with direct access to production versions compromises software control and 
increases the possibility that unauthorized changes may be made. In general, only qualified 
production librarians should require access to the production programs, and those individuals 
should copy only new versions of programs into production, as required.
Off-line Software
Off-line software refers to the backup copies of program libraries or directories stored on 
magnetic tape, exchangeable disks, and diskettes. The controls required to secure these 
versions of the software are identical to those described earlier in this chapter in the section, 
“Off-line Data Files.”
Migration of Programs to Production
If a programmer can gain access to a program and make changes between the program 
tests being performed by the user and the program being put into production, the version 
used in production may not be the same version that was originally tested and approved. 
Changes may be introduced that could impact information integrity and expose the 
organization to financial loss. Organizations can address this problem in a variety of ways 
including—
• Restricting access to the test version of the program to the users who are running the test 
and the individual(s) who are performing the librarian function responsible for the 
transfer to production.
• Recording and monitoring the time when the last change was made, provided the 
system or library control software retains that information. The date of the last change 
should not be later than the date the tests were run and the software approved for use.
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4.4.4 Computer Operations Security
Improper operator intervention also can affect the proper operation of computer programs 
and, therefore, the integrity of information. In particular, computer operators can create 
problems by—
• Running the incorrect version of a program against the correct data files. This may 
introduce errors through the use of untested program code or the possibility of fraud 
through the use of unauthorized code.
• Running the correct version of the program against incorrect versions of data files. 
Obviously the results produced by this action would be incorrect and could have serious 
implications.
To effectively control operator activity, you should consider taking certain measures 
including—
• Restricting an operator’s ability to change the Job Control Language. Job Control 
Language directs the processing of a program and identifies the program to be run and 
the data files to be used.
• Using internal tape, disk-label checking, or both, to ensure use of the correct file.
• Providing detailed operating instructions to reduce accidental error.
• Monitoring operator intervention by reviewing the computer activity-console logs and 
investigating unusual activity.
• Reconciling data file totals from run to run, to ensure use of the correct version of the 
file.
4.4.5 Logical Security for Microcomputers
Some of the important points to note with respect to logical security for PCs include:
• Be wary of leaving sensitive information on hard disks. Consider using removable disk 
cartridge devices.
• Use cryptic passwords, and don’t leave passwords on or near computer workstations.
• Back up hard disks regularly to microcomputer diskettes or tape.
• Remember when erasing a hard disk that the normal erase procedures of some 
operating systems leave the file on the disk (that is, it may only remove the file from the 
directory). Even reformatting a PC hard drive does not make the data unrecoverable. To 
prevent any possible recovery of sensitive files, use the disk-wiping functions provided 
by commercial hard-drive utilities programs.
4.5 System Recovery
If properly applied, the preventive and detective controls provided by physical and logical 
security will minimize the possibility of problems occurring. However, problems do 
occur—either accidental or deliberate. System recovery procedures are intended to assist in 
implementing an orderly and controlled return to normal operations, in the event of a 
problem.
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You should consider using recovery controls to address any computer related availability 
concerns. These controls are necessary in order to address short-term problems as well as 
more catastrophic long-term events.
4.5.1 Recovery from Operational Failures
Operational failures are those problems that occur during the performance of day-to-day 
processing. Examples include:
• Incorrect file usage
• Disk files deletion
• Disk files destruction
• Job processing failure
• Computer equipment failure
Overcoming problems of this nature requires an appropriate combination of backup and 
written recovery procedures.
Data File and Software Backup
To protect against accidental or deliberate destruction, for example, by hackers, it is 
essential that you and your staff regularly make copies of all data files and software 
libraries-directories. How often is regularly? This will vary from installation to installation. 
In determining an appropriate backup cycle, you should consider the following factors:
• The frequency at which file managers update the file, library or directory. This will help 
managers determine when to make backup files. For example, for system software 
libraries that are rarely changed it may be more effective to make backup copies only 
after making changes.
• The number of transactions processed each time the file is updated. This total helps 
managers determine the amount of effort required to reprocess all transactions entered 
since the last available backup was taken.
• The amount of processing time available for backup.
In the past, a backup cycle was often determined on an application-by-application basis. 
Today organizations typically take a weekly copy of all files and libraries, and supplement 
this with daily incremental backups. Incremental backups take copies of only those files and 
libraries that have been updated during the day.
In many firms, employees frequently work off-line from their server, either away from their 
office or saving files directly to their local drives. To ensure that all necessary data is 
properly backed-up at appropriate times, you should establish guidelines that stress the 
importance of the employees moving their work to the server as soon and as often as 
possible. This not only provides back-up protection in the advent of a personal computer 
failure, but also maintains a complete data record on the server for back-up purposes.
To assist in recovery from day-to-day operational failures, keep a backup copy of the data 
files and software—on-site. In addition, send a copy off-site for use in the event of more 
catastrophic problems, such as when all on-site material is either unavailable or destroyed. 
(See section 4.5.2.).
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Recovery Procedures
In addition to providing backup copies of the files and libraries, provide the required 
detailed written instructions for the operators so that they may efficiently and effectively 
recover any necessary files. These procedures are described in most computer operational 
manuals, and should address issues such as:
• Application failure recovery measures. These measures are normally documented for each 
application and for each job step within the application. These measures describe how 
operators can restore processing at an earlier point, and reprocess transactions. In some 
cases when restoring and reprocessing is not possible, the manual should provide 
direction for obtaining programming or technical support to resolve the problem.
• Use of utilities to recover from backup copies. The involvement of operators in recovery 
varies from organization to organization. In some installations the operators copy the 
files and libraries to a predefined recovery area on disk, and it is a user or support 
group’s responsibility to copy them from the recovery area to the production area. 
Other organizations will recover directly to the production areas.
• Vendor support for equipment failures or head crashes. Users should document all equipment 
failures, including details of the request for vendor assistance and the vendor’s response.
4.5.2 Disaster Recovery Plans
Disaster recovery plans are intended to assist with recovery from a catastrophic event They 
are not intended to deal with day-to-day operational failures. The term disaster is used in the 
broadest sense—it need not be an act of God. As previously noted, white-collar criminals 
can also arrange disasters to cover up their crimes.
Definition
A disaster recovery plan is a documented description of the action to take, resources to use, 
and the procedures to follow before, during, and after a disruption of data processing 
capability.
Given the business communities current reliance on computers, many executives would 
probably find the loss of the computer center for a lengthy period of time inconceivable. 
However, the same executive’s organization has probably taken no action on developing a 
contingency plan. A survey completed several years ago suggested that less than 50 percent 
of the Fortune 1000 companies had disaster recovery plans, and for the companies that had, 
only half of the plans were feasible.
Elements of Effective Disaster Recovery Plans
Before disaster occurs, you should take action to ensure that off-site backup is capable of 
supporting recovery operations. Keep off-site backup copies of data files and software some 
distance from the principal site so that access to these vital records will not be inaccessible 
and, therefore, denied in the event of a disaster affecting the local geographic area.
Consider what happened when a train derailed in Mississauga, Ontario (a Toronto suburb) 
a number of years ago. In this case, the authorities closed access to a sizable city area for 
five days because of a dangerous chemical spill. Any organization housing both its data 
center and off-site storage in that geographical area would have had difficulty implementing 
its disaster recovery plan.
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In addition to keeping off-site backup copies of data files and software, consider keeping 
off-site the supplies of other materials required for processing. Examples include: check 
stock files, special invoice forms and forms for laser printers, operations documentation, 
and a copy of the recovery plan.
Perhaps documenting detailed recovery procedures and implementing regular tests of the 
recovery plan are the most important actions to take before the advent of a disaster. 
Disaster recovery operations require the channeling of information to management to assist 
in decision making during the chaos of a disaster. Without clearly identifying reporting 
channels and decision points in advance, employees may later take inappropriate action.
Similarly, prepare detailed procedures for system recovery because operations staff may not 
perform standard procedures as expected when affected by the stress created by a disaster. 
Remember that in a disaster personnel who might be expected to participate in the 
recovery—either on the operations team or the management team—may be victims of the 
disaster, so the plan must make allowances by designating one or more alternates for each 
recovery position. Regular testing ensures that the plan is workable, and helps to keep the 
plan current.
During the disaster, the staff with recovery responsibilities should follow documented 
procedures to—
1. Notify all necessary parties that a problem has occurred.
2. Assess the extent of the damage and the expected period of system outage for 
communications to the recovery team.
3. Report to a predetermined emergency control center.
After invoking the disaster recovery plan, the recovery staff should follow the documented 
procedures for—
1. Recovering the critical systems at the identified alternative processing location.
2. Operating at the alternative site.
3. Refurbishing or replacing the damaged site.
4. Returning to normal operations once the damaged site has been refurbished.
Most organizations plan to recover only the critical systems at the alternative-processing 
site. These are the application systems needed to ensure continued business operations. If 
sufficient resources exist at the alternative site to run other systems, do not recover them 
until the critical systems are running.
See figure 4-2 for a schematic of an approach to developing a disaster recovery plan.
4. 5.3 Insurance
For most businesses that rely heavily on computer processing, an effective disaster recovery 
plan is likely the only effective means of ensuring continued business survival following a 
major computer system disruption. However, it is possible to mitigate some of the financial 
loss through insurance coverage. Some examples of the kinds of insurance coverage 
available include:
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Figure 4-2. The Disaster Recovery Planning Process
• Data processing equipment coverage: These policies assist in defraying the cost of 
replacement computer hardware and air conditioning equipment. Some policies also 
cover the cost of removing the debris from covered equipment.
• Data, computer programs, and media coverage: These policies cover only data and programs 
in computer format, not hard copy. Organizations can take out insurance to cover the 
estimated potential loss if data and programs are destroyed.
• Extra expense coverage: These policies cover the extra expenses involved in continuing 
data processing operations if the equipment, air conditioning, or building housing the 
equipment is damaged.
• Business interruption: These policies cover the business losses incurred following a disaster 
in the computer department, subject to limits on the amount to be paid per day and a 
total amount payable.
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• Fidelity coverage: These policies may cover costs associated with the unlawful acts of a 
dishonest employee. There are various new forms of crime coverage that may extend 
cover to certain acts by outsiders as well.
4.5.4 System Recovery for Microcomputers
Equipment failure for microcomputers generally is not a major concern for organizations, 
particularly compared with similar situations associated with larger computer systems; 
however, considering the dependency of many businesses on PCs and local area networks, 
it should be given more attention. If a PC fails, normally another machine is available or 
can be obtained with relative ease. Local area network (LAN) file servers and the 
communications gear associated with connecting LANs to private and public networks, 
including the Internet, may be highly specialized and take one or more days to replace and 
reconfigure. The biggest concerns are the potential loss of communications (which would, 
for example, cause a loss of electronic mail functions) and the loss of data stored on hard 
disk or diskettes.
Good PC and LAN security should be a priority in order to avoid situations requiring 
recovery. However, as noted earlier, disasters occur. Therefore, a regular policy of backing 
up hard disks is advisable. Consider using Norton Utilities (a system diagnostic-detection­
recovery software) or a similar program because under certain conditions this specialized 
software enables the recovery of files that have been accidentally erased.
4.6 Management’s Responsibilities in a Security Program
Management is responsible for providing protection for the organization’s assets, including 
protection against dishonest employees and outside criminal acts. The information asset, 
administered in most organizations by the information systems or computer department, is 
as vital and vulnerable as any other asset. Although many organizations have invested 
heavily in the development of computerized systems to support their business operations, 
they have not invested sufficient effort to establish a security program that would properly 
protect that investment. Computer security is often neglected because of pressures to deal 
with day-to-day operating needs first, yet security can be fundamental to business survival.
You can implement effective security by identifying—
• The information in your organization that requires protection.
• The level of protection currently provided for that information.
• The risks and exposures that currently make that information vulnerable.
Using this approach, you can achieve a level of security that is appropriate to your 
organization’s requirements. The objective is to provide sufficient security without going 
overboard and making security more complex than necessary. After taking the steps 
outlined in this chapter, your organization can implement a security program to address the 
exposures. This program should incorporate the development of policies, standards, 
guidelines, and procedures; the assignment of security responsibilities; and the monitoring 
of progress.
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4 .6.1 Policy, Standards, Guidelines and Procedures
It is generally unwise to assume that employees will act in a security-conscious manner 
particularly if the organization’s expectations in this regard have never been 
communicated. Companies can communicate policies through the development and 
implementation of policy statements on computer security and should emphasize security 
and fraud awareness.
Effective policies must be short and succinct. If policies are too detailed and lengthy, they 
probably will not have the desired effect (especially with junior-level employees). For 
brevity, simply cross-reference the more-detailed standards, rather than attempting to 
include this material in the policy statement itself. The policy, standards, guidelines and 
procedures provide a framework for effective security in any organization.
Many organizations, in consultation with legal counsel, have determined that it is important 
to have employees sign a security and confidentiality agreement that defines the person’s 
responsibility for safeguarding information in all forms. Indeed, many organizations have 
also developed agreements to be completed by contractors, vendors and temporary 
workers who require access to confidential and proprietary information.
4 .6.2 The Security Function
Having recognized the importance of computer and information security to the 
organization, management must assign responsibility for this function. The person 
identified to take on the security function will usually be responsible for—
• Assisting in the development of policies, standards, guidelines, and procedures.
• Developing a formal security program to improve the level of security in accordance 
with management’s expectations.
• Raising security and fraud awareness.
• Reporting on progress to senior management.
• Liaising with specialists in the event of crisis (for example, police, forensic accountants, 
computer forensics experts, and specialists in computer viruses).
Depending on the size of the organization, this may be either a full or part-time 
responsibility. Initially setting up the program probably will require a full-time position.
4.6.3 Policing
Once the security program is underway and the policy, standards, guidelines and 
procedures are in place, an organization must ensure compliance with expectations on an 
ongoing basis. This is a policing function.
Most organizations have an internal audit department that performs the policing function 
for controls that operate in other areas of the business. As such, internal audit may be an 
ideal candidate to become involved in testing compliance with corporate security 
expectations. Alternatively, external auditors or consultants can fill this role.
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4 ,6.4 Evidence Recovery
If a security incident occurs, computer and security personnel may find they have different 
objectives. In an actual case in which a company’s electronic mail servers suddenly 
reformatted their hard disk drives, the computer operations department saw as its objective 
repairing the damage and restoring email services within the company as quickly as 
possible. In contrast, the security people regarded the data center as a crime scene, and 
wanted to collect evidence to determine if the incident had been a technical accident or the 
deliberate act of a perpetrator. The two groups had to work together to ensure that 
technical personnel, who were assigned the task of restoring service (including outside 
consultants who were quickly brought in), would understand the importance of identifying 
any evidence of wrongdoing and call in the security people to gather and secure the 
evidence so that it would be admissible in court.
In cases where the crime scene is, in fact, the surface of a hard drive, the collection of 
evidence becomes critical. As with any other evidence, it is necessary to ensure that the 
process of collecting and safeguarding the evidence also preserves that evidence from any 
changes. Courts will not turn a blind eye when recovery technicians have made changes 
and later claim that the hard drive bears evidence of a crime. Under these circumstances, 
how is it possible to prove that the purported evidence of a crime wasn’t planted to 
incriminate an innocent person? In complex or important cases, this task is often assigned 
to experts in the field of computer evidence recovery—a discipline known as Computer 
Forensics.
4.7 Computer Security Checklist
Table 4.1, Computer Security Checklist is designed to assist CPAs in dealing with computer 
security in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all No answers require 
investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. Use the Ref column 
to cross-reference the checklist to any additional work papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist 
does not guarantee the adequacy of computer security, and it is not intended as a substitute 
for audit or similar procedures. If computer security is an especially vital concern or if 
computer fraud is suspected, seek the advice of a knowledgeable computer professional.
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Table 4.1 Computer Security Checklist
Computer Security Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Physical Security
a. Computer Room: Most medium and larger organizations 
will have dedicated computer rooms for their mainframe 
computers or file servers. The following are basic questions to 
answer when looking at such a facility.
• Are adequate fire detection and suppression systems in place 
(for example, does the computer room construction have a 
minimum one-hour fire resistance rating, in addition to 
smoke detectors, fire alarms, and sprinklers)? | | | | | |
• Where sprinkler systems are in use, are adequate systems in 
place to protect against water damage (for example, 
underfloor water detectors, floor drains, waterproof 
equipment covers)? | | | | | |
• Where power supplies are unreliable or the nature of 
processing is critical, are suitable precautions in place (for 
example, battery-equipped Uninterruptible Power Supplies 
(UPS) or backup generators, and surge protectors for PCs)? | | □
• Are appropriate environmental controls in place with respect 
to temperature, humidity and dust particles? □ 1 1 | | —
• Is access to especially sensitive computer installations 
appropriately restricted (for example, through key locks, 
combination or cipher locks, or card access systems, along 
with access-control policies and procedures)? 1 1 1 1 | | __
• Is overall physical computer security on the premises
adequate? 1 1 1 1 1 1 —
b. PCs and Workstations
• Are PCs and workstations in areas where theft is a threat
secured by cables, locks or other antitheft devices? 1 1 1 1 1 1 —
• Are PCs and workstations secured with screen-saver
programs that require passwords to unlock? 1 1 1 1 1 1 —
2. Communications Security
a. Is a user ID and password system in place? 1_ 1 1_ 1 1_ 1 —
b. Is the ID and password system properly administered (for 
example, is the distribution of new IDs controlled, and are 
terminated users promptly deleted from the system)? 1 1 1 1 1 1 —
c. Are users aware of the responsibilities associated with their 
password (for example, are they required to sign computer-use 
and confidentiality agreements, and are they instructed to 
maintain password secrecy and not to choose simplistic or 
easily guessed passwords) ? 1 1 1 1 1 1 __
(continued)
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist Yes No NA Ref
d. Are passwords changed regularly (for example, every 90 
days)?
e. Does the system monitor and control use (for example, by 
restricting users to specific terminals or specific times, 
automatically logging-out inactive users, limiting the number 
of log-on attempts, and recording all usage for later follow-up 
and investigation if required)?
f. For especially sensitive systems, is security to control remote 
access in place (for example, callback devices or one-time 
password devices)?
3. Data Security
a. Is access to on-line data limited to authorized individuals only, 
through built-in software restrictions or screening?
b. For extremely sensitive data, has data encryption been 
considered as a security measure?
c. Are data files stored on magnetic media (including all 
backups) kept in a physically secure location away from the 
computers, to which only authorized persons are allowed
access?
d. Are all printed reports subject to appropriate control and 
appropriate destruction (for example, shredding) when no 
longer required?
4. Software Integrity
a. Is access to production versions of all software tightly 
controlled by a production librarian or similar authorized 
person?
b. Is access to all software programming code controlled so that 
programmers or others cannot subsequently alter tested and 
approved software?
c. Are appropriate policies in place to guard against computer 
viruses (for example, prohibiting the installation of any copied 
or borrowed software, and screening all software with virus 
detection programs)?
d. Are controls in place to ensure that the organization is not 
using unlicensed (pirated) software?
5. Operations Security
a. Do detailed operator instructions (for example, manuals)
exist?
b. Is computer activity logged and is any unusual operator 
activity investigated?
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist Yes No NA Ref
c. Are computer-operations personnel prohibited from altering 
the program code and the Job Control Language, which 
matches the program and data files to be run?
d. Are all software and data storage media clearly and correctly 
labeled, including dates, to avoid errors?
e. Are data files reconciled from run to run?
f. Are all data storage media (including hard disk drives) erased 
(wiped clean) before being disposed of?
6. System Recovery
a. Are copies of all data files and software made on a regular 
basis (for example, weekly, with daily backups of transaction 
files)?
b. Are guidelines in place to ensure that all employee work is 
saved to the network-server to ensure a complete backup of all 
data files?
c. Is at least one backup copy of all data files and software stored 
off-site?
d. Has training been provided and do written instructions exist 
for the disaster recovery procedures?
e. In the case of catastrophic failure, do alternative processing 
arrangements exist?
f. Have the backup plans been tested in a realistic simulation to 
provide assurance that they can work if needed?
g. Is adequate insurance in place covering computer equipment, 
software, recovery expenses and business interruption?
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CHAPTER 5:
Internal Fraud
5.1 Asset Misappropriation from Within
As difficult as it is to believe, many experts are convinced that the worst threat to business is 
from the people who work there. Fraud committed against an organization by a perpetrator 
from within that organization is probably the most common form of fraud. Certainly it is 
the most widely recognized.
It is estimated that at least one-third of all employees steal to some degree. In retail 
organizations, shoplifters are responsible for only thirty percent of retail losses; employees 
steal the remainder. Probably the worst case of insider misappropriation is the infamous 
U.S. Savings and Loan scandal; the billions of dollars stolen by trusted insiders has no equal 
in history.
5.1.1 Classification of Fraud
Regardless of the industry, you can classify internal fraud in several different ways. One 
way is by the method of concealment, including on-book and off-book frauds.
On-Book Fraud
On-book fraud principally occurs within a business when an employee creates an audit trail 
(which is sometimes obscure) that inadvertently aids the employer in detection. Examples 
include phony vendors and ghost employees. On-book fraud is normally detected at the 
point of payment.
Off-Book Fraud
Off-book fraud occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit trail is likely to 
exist. Examples include bribery and kickbacks. If an employee receives a bribe for selecting 
a certain vendor, that payment would be made by the vendor and, therefore, would not be 
reflected on the books of the affected company. These frauds are detected in an indirect 
manner (that is, responding to other vendor complaints, investigating the life-style of the 
person receiving the bribes, and so on). If you suspect that an employee is receiving illicit 
payments, examining the employee’s personal finances should prove this.
5.1.2 Cycles
You can classify fraud occurring within the business environment by one of the five cycles 
in the accounting system. These cycles are:
1. Sales and collection
2. Acquisition and payment
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3. Payroll and personnel
4. Inventory and warehousing
5. Capital acquisition and repayment
All of these cycles flow through the cash account. Accordingly, cash misappropriation is 
discussed separately in this chapter. The following sections discuss the more common 
frauds occurring within each cycle.
5.2 Sales and Collection Cycle
The sales and collection cycle deals with the billing of goods or services to customers’ 
accounts receivable and the collection of funds relating to those receivables.
5.2.1 Functions
The functions of the sales and collection cycle include:
• Receiving orders from customers
• Administering credit approvals
• Invoicing customers
• Collecting receivables
• Adjusting sales and receivables for allowances, returns and write-offs
5.2.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Sales revenue on the income statement and accounts receivable and cash on the balance 
sheet are affected by the sales and collection cycle.
5.2.3 Perpetration
Frauds in the sales and collection cycle most commonly involve the theft of cash, the theft 
of other assets, and kickbacks to customers. It can also involve off-book fraud in a situation 
described as front-end fraud, that is, when an employee diverts company revenue before 
entering it on the books.
Theft of Cash
By far, the most common sales-cycle fraud is the theft of cash. The main schemes include: 
not recording sales, under-ringing sales, lapping, theft of funds from voids and returns, 
overbilling and keeping the difference, simple theft of cash, writing off receivables as 
uncollectible, and issuing bogus credit memoranda.
For example, in one lapping fraud, a cashier was able to misappropriate cash receipts 
totaling over $35,000 and cover the shortage by subsequent receipts. The prelisted receipts 
were not compared to the deposits by an independent person, allowing the fraud to go 
undetected over time. This scheme was eventually discovered as a result of a CPA 
following up on the clearing of deposits in transit listed on the year-end bank reconciliation.
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Theft of Other Assets
These schemes include ordering and shipping company goods to the residence of the 
employee, and ordering goods for personal use.
Kickbacks to Customers
The most common schemes for kickbacks to customers include underbilling for 
merchandise and splitting the difference, and writing off receivables owed to the company 
for a fee.
Front-End Fraud
A front-end fraud occurs when a company’s customers are improperly directed to take their 
business elsewhere, thereby depriving the company of profits it could otherwise have made. 
Another example is the receipt of a purchase rebate that is misappropriated and not 
deposited to the company’s bank account.
5.2.4 Detection
Generally, CPAs can best detect frauds in the sales and collection cycle by analyzing cash 
or inventory, or both.
Theft of Cash and Front-End Fraud
Following are some methods for detecting the theft of cash and front-end fraud:
• Investigate customer complaints.
• Insist that customers examine receipts.
• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices.
• Compare receipts with deposits.
• Follow up on deposits in transit at the end of each period.
• Account for consecutive sales orders and cash register transactions.
• Compare volume of credit memos by period.
• Verify independently customers who don’t pay.
• Examine gross margin by product.
• Use a computer to—
— Identify missing invoices by number.
— Match shipping documents, sales invoices and customer orders.
— Verify numerical sequence of documents.
— Analyze sales volume by employee.
— Match daily deposits with customer credits.
For example, in one fraud case, a CPA for a retail client noted a skip in the perpetual 
transaction count for one of the cash registers. During a one-year period an employee had 
destroyed sections of cash register tapes totaling $17,000. The irregularity was directly 
related to the company’s failure to institute and maintain adequate internal controls and 
procedures over cash register tapes.
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Theft of Other Assets
You can detect theft of other assets by using the following methods:
• Resolve customer disputes.
• Conduct periodic surprise inventory counts.
• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices, including examining the shipping address.
• Use a computer to—
— Match sales invoices with customer orders.
— Compare customer names and addresses with employee names and addresses.
— Verify delivery addresses against addresses of customers.
Kickbacks to Customers
You can use one or a combination of the following to detect the common schemes in 
kickbacks to customers:
• Follow up on customer disputes.
• Conduct statistical sampling of sales invoices by contacting customers regarding prices 
and terms.
• Conduct computer analysis of—
— Prices charged by product to customer.
— Credit granting approval versus actual sales to customers.
— Customer balances versus sales.
— Customer balances versus length of time doing business with the customer.
— Receivable write-offs.
— Credit memos to customers.
— Time between order and delivery.
— Discounts to customers in descending volume of purchase.
5.2.5 Prevention
Employers can generally prevent sales and collection frauds by using adequate internal 
controls. More specifically, the following methods typically form part of an overall 
prevention strategy:
• Honesty testing
• Separation of duties
• Physical safeguards over assets
• Proper documentation
• Proper approvals
• Independent checks on performance
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Honesty Testing
The legality of using certain kinds of honesty testing as part of the hiring process varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, since the advent of the U.S. Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988, generally it has been unlawful to require preemployment 
polygraphs of prospective employees. A number of companies have turned to pencil and 
paper honesty tests, which their designers tout as accurate.
Separation of Duties
Employers can prevent most frauds by properly segregating the custody, authorization, and 
record-keeping functions. In the case of sales and collections, it is important to separate the 
functions of credit granting and sales. In addition, the functions of sales, record keeping, 
and cash handling should also be separate.
Physical Safeguards over Assets
If assets and records have physical safeguards, misappropriation is much more difficult. In 
the area of computers, physical safeguards such as restricted access, locks, and similar 
controls are especially important.
Proper Documentation
Proper documentation requires adequate records, including prenumbered checks and 
invoices, to make fictitious entries more difficult. Documentation in sales and collections 
should include the following prenumbered documents:
• Sales orders
• Shipping documents
• Sales invoices
• Credit memos
• Remittance advices
Proper Approvals
Approval should be sought and evidenced before each of the following:
1. Granting credit
2. Allowing write-offs
3. Shipping goods
Independent Checks on Performance
In addition to a necessary independent review of employee adherence to internal controls, 
you should make the potential perpetrators aware that their performance is being 
monitored. Independent verification steps include reconciling bank accounts, audits and 
supervision.
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5.2.6 Sales, Receivables and Receipts System
The sales, receivables and receipts system is the part of the accounting system that records a 
company’s sales and revenue collections. Individuals can use false books and supporting 
documentation for sales, receivables and receipts to perpetrate a fraud on a company. This 
section covers three such methods:
1. Front-end fraud
2. False sales invoices
3. Lapping
Front-End Fraud
As discussed in section 5.2.3, employees may divert company revenues before that money 
ever reaches the sales, receivables and receipts system, thus circumventing the accounting 
system entirely. This is commonly called front-end fraud.
A front-end fraud occurs when company products are sold for cash, the sale and the receipt 
of the cash are not recorded, and the cash is diverted—usually, directly into the pocket of 
the perpetrator. A front-end fraud also occurs when a company’s customers are improperly 
directed to take their business elsewhere, thus depriving the company of profits. Finally, a 
front-end fraud occurs when an employee receives and misappropriates special or unusual 
revenues and cost reductions, such as a purchase rebate.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are:
1. Do recorded sales represent all company sales? Where no sale has been recorded, there 
is nothing in the sales accounting system to red-flag an unpaid or overdue account. As a 
result, unrecorded sales are difficult to detect; however, actual inventory on hand has 
been depleted. Therefore, if the company has a good inventory accounting system, 
unrecorded sales may be detected.
2. Has the company unexpectedly lost some of its oldest and best customers?
3. Are all revenues recorded? Service businesses, such as parking lots, theatres and movie 
houses operate primarily with cash sales and have no inventory systems. Front-end 
frauds in these kinds of businesses, therefore, are extremely difficult to detect.
When allowed under local law, a review of a suspected perpetrator’s personal bank 
accounts may reveal unexplained cash deposits, which could be important in establishing 
circumstantial evidence of front-end cash skimming. Otherwise use of the net worth 
approach may be necessary to establish that the suspected perpetrator has benefited.
Investigators should analyze the sales records and other supporting documents of the victim 
company for the period both before and after the assumed occurrence date of a front-end 
fraud. When possible, the investigators should interview customers as well.
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“Taxes ‘R Us” Case Study
Jane Brown and Jack Smith were cashiers who worked at a county tax office. 
Investigation revealed that, over a two-month period in 1997, thirteen individuals 
apparently paid tax for vehicle tags and did not receive an official receipt.
On a review of all the official receipts issued during this period of time it was found 
that:
1. The numerical continuity of the prenumbered receipts was complete; that is, all 
of the issued receipts were accounted for in the bureau’s records.
2. There were no receipts to support the thirteen payments made by those 
individuals identified as exceptions.
The county tax office’s banking records were then reviewed for the days on which 
people reportedly paid for their tags but did not receive a receipt. The review 
disclosed that the amount of cash and checks relating to the tax deposited to the 
county bank account totaled only the amount of receipts issued for that date.
Five of the individuals who reportedly paid for their tags, but were not issued an 
official receipt, paid by check. In the case of each of these five individuals, the 
checks were deposited to the county bank account, but the checks, upon deposit, 
were applied to cover actual receipts issued. With respect to those individuals who 
were known to have paid for their tags by check, but who did not receive an official 
receipt, it was noted that a like amount was included on the county tax office 
deposit slip.
During the same period, cash totaling $4,600 was deposited to the known bank 
accounts of Jane Brown. The source of that deposited cash was not identified.
Front-end fraud of this type is very difficult to detect. Larger frauds may be uncovered if the 
perpetrators become too greedy because the resulting unusually low daily deposits may 
highlight the problem. In fact, skimming of small amounts may be detected only through 
customer complaints: as in the case study, by the lack of an official receipt. This illustrates 
the need to thoroughly investigate similar complaints and any other irregularities.
False Sales Invoices
Employees can alter a company sales invoice to show a lower sale amount than what was 
actually received. They can misappropriate the difference between the real sale amount and 
the adjusted lower amount without the accounting system showing a red flag.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud include:
1. Are recorded sales amounts the actual sales amounts?
2. Can customers confirm the sales?
3. Are sale amounts reasonable in the circumstances?
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Investigators should obtain and examine all original copies of invoices and all the related 
books of original entry. Again, the investigator must become familiar with the accounting 
system in effect and understand the accused’s position within that system. Did the accused 
have the necessary authority to perpetrate this crime? Did the accused have the 
opportunity?
“Ms. Wanda Cash” Case Study
Wanda Cash was the bookkeeper for Anytown Animal Center. She looked after all 
customer records including preparing bills and collecting payments. The owners of 
the business became suspicious when daily bank deposits were not as high as 
expected considering the level of business. Upon investigation by the owners, the 
police and forensic accountants, it was discovered that Wanda Cash, through 
altering sales invoices, had misappropriated approximately $11,700.
The investigation revealed that:
1. The 183 customer copies of sales invoices showed a total-charge amount higher 
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash receipts journal. The customer 
copy of sales invoices indicated total charges to be higher by $2,579 than the 
amount recorded in the cash receipts journal.
2. The 549 office copies of the sales invoices indicated a total-charge amount higher 
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash-receipts journal. The office 
copy total-charge amount was higher by $8,941 than the amount recorded in the 
cash-receipts journal.
3. Approximately 68 office-copy invoices were apparently altered so that the total 
charge after alteration balanced with the total charge recorded in the cash­
receipts journal.
To uncover this fraud and measure its magnitude, investigators compared the 
following:
• Customer copies of invoices obtained by the investigating officer
• Office or accounting copies of the company’s sales invoices
• Entries in the customer ledger cards and the cash-receipts journal
The result was that the amount of the total charge on the customer copies of sales 
invoices exceeded the amount of the total charge recorded in the cash-receipts 
journal by an aggregate amount of $2,579. An examination of these documents 
disclosed that in 54 separate cases the corresponding office copy of the invoice was 
altered so that the altered amount agreed to the total-charge amount recorded in the 
cash-receipts journal.
Investigators compared the office copies of the sales invoices with the total charge 
recorded for those invoices in the cash-receipts journal and found that the total 
charge amount on the office copy exceeded the total charge amount recorded in the 
cash receipts journal. In aggregate, the excess was $8,941.
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This case illustrates the need for close supervision in small businesses, in which adequate 
division of duties is difficult to achieve.
Lapping
Lapping occurs when cash receipts from Customer A are misappropriated and the 
misappropriation is subsequently concealed by recording the receipt of monies from 
Customer B to the credit of Customer A (to the extent of the earlier misappropriation).
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are as follows:
1. Are the amounts recorded as owing to the company actually still owing to the company?
2. Are deposits from Peter being used to cover Paul’s debts?
To handle these questions, the investigator should understand the organization’s system for 
receiving customer payments, making bank deposits, and preparing entries to customer 
accounts. The following is a guide to understanding an organization’s account management.
1. Who first received the payments?
2. Who prepared the company bank deposit?
3. Who updated the customer accounts?
4. Has an individual written off any accounts?
5. Who approved the write-offs? (It is also often necessary to contact customers and obtain 
their records of payments, including paid checks and remittance advices.)
6. Do the customer’s records show payment of specific invoices that are shown as unpaid 
in the victim company’s records?
“Ms. B. A. Lapper” Case Study
Jones Transport Company operated a trucking terminal in Norcross, GA. Their 
accounts receivable clerk, Ms. B.A. Lapper, had been a loyal employee for over 
eight years. The terminal manager often complimented her for the extra effort she 
put into the business, evidenced by the amount of work she frequently took home. 
This employee was so loyal that her only time off was attributable to sickness.
Ms. Lapper was responsible for preparing the day’s deposit to the bank and for 
preparing input to the computer systems for updating payments on accounts 
receivable. (The processing of the sales invoice as an account receivable was outside 
her control.) Every month the head office in Atlanta forwarded aged listings of 
accounts receivable to the manager’s attention at the terminal. He gave the analysis 
to the accounts receivable clerk—Ms. Lapper—satisfied that the aged analysis was 
relatively current.
Investigators determined that Ms. Lapper had conducted a lapping scheme over a 
period of six years. The lap grew so large during this period that she had to take the 
aged receivable analysis home in the evenings, along with the paid and unpaid sales 
invoices. There, she would set aside invoices for payment during the next day to 
ensure a favorable aged receivable analysis in the following month. As the lap grew,
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the new cash receipts were no longer sufficient to cover the previously 
misappropriated funds. Accordingly, Ms. Lapper began to apply checks received 
from the larger customers of the company to cover up the already-paid sales 
invoices.
Investigators examined the known personal bank accounts of the accused and her 
husband. An amount of $35,000 was found deposited to these bank accounts over 
and above personal income during the relevant period.
Accounts Receivable Routines: Ms. Lapper’s main function each day was to 
balance the cash with the pro-bills (sales invoices) and prepare a cash deposit for the 
bank in Norcross and a cash report for processing by the head-office computer. She 
would process all incoming checks from charge account customers by matching 
checks to the applicable pro-bill control copies and preparing a deposit for the bank 
in Norcross and a receivable report for the head office. She would present the 
deposit slips and receivable reports to the manager for his signature, along with the 
customer’s checks and cash in an envelope.
The supporting documents were always in sealed and stapled envelopes for each 
report. The envelopes were not opened and verified by the manager. If the total of 
the bank deposit agreed with the total of the receivable report, he would sign the 
report. One copy of the report, the bank deposit slip, and pro-bills were then 
forwarded to the Atlanta head office, while a second copy of the report and the 
remittance copies of pro-bills were retained on file at the Norcross terminal.
Ms. Lapper would work on the company’s Accounts Receivable Aged Analysis, a listing 
of all outstanding pro-bills prepared at the Atlanta head office, and would appear to 
question certain delinquent accounts for payment. She would often take the analysis 
home because she said she was too busy during the day to perform this function.
The Atlanta terminal manager would look at the receivable analysis printout and 
tell Ms. Lapper to question certain delinquent customer accounts, which she 
appeared to do. She would inform the manager of checks arriving after her contacts 
with the customer. For instance, in regard to the Best Quality Cheese account, she 
informed the manager that Best Quality was having serious problems converting to 
a computer accounting system and as a result had requested that Jones Transport be 
patient with the amount of old outstanding receivables.
Jones Transport hired a new person to replace Ms. Lapper when she became 
seriously ill. Her replacement began the collection work on the two largest charge­
account customers, Best Quality Cheese and Anyco Inc. Successful collection of 
these accounts would immediately reduce the analysis’ sixty- and ninety-day totals, 
which had become very high.
Customer Best Quality: Best Quality was advised that their pro-bills dated July 
and August were still outstanding on the receivable analysis. Ms. Brown asked Best 
Quality if they were having computer problems and the response was negative. 
Subsequently Best Quality informed Jones Transport that the pro-bills mentioned as 
outstanding were all paid by checks issued in July and August.
12
Jones Transport then examined copies of the reports around the dates of the Best 
Quality checks, together with check stubs and supporting pro-bills. Although the 
pro-bills that were paid with the Best Quality checks were all Best Quality, all were 
dated April and May. Jones Transport wondered if Best Quality had made an error, 
because their August check, which was paying July and August pro-bills, did not 
appear to apply to the pro-bills in the deposit that were all dated May and June. 
Best Quality responded that there was no error on their part, and they could not 
understand how there could be a mistake because they had attached all the 
applicable pro-bills with their remittances.
Customer Anyco: Jones Transport then called Anyco Inc. and asked when they 
would be paying certain outstanding pro-bills. Anyco indicated that these bills had 
been paid by checks that had been issued and received as paid. When Jones 
Transport checked their copies of the reports, they found that Anyco checks were 
deposited, but that the checks were applied to older Anyco pro-bills and other 
customer pro-bills and not to the pro-bills submitted by Anyco with its checks.
The outstanding pro-bills totaled about $47,000 at Best Quality and about $12,000 
at Anyco. At this point Jones Transport recognized that the customer checks were 
not applied to the pro-bills as intended by the customer. Instead the checks were 
applied either to the customer’s older pro-bills or to other customers’ pro-bills. 
Further investigation revealed that these other customers were normally cash­
paying customers.
Examination of the Amount of Money Due Jones Transport: To determine the 
correct amount of money owing to them by all their customers, Jones Transport 
communicated directly with each customer, based on their accounts receivable 
analysis. For each customer, Jones Transport prepared from their analysis a list of 
pro-bills by number, date, and amount that the customers had not paid and 
requested verification that the information concerning the outstanding pro-bills was 
accurate.
A reply made by all customers indicated that several pro-bills shown in the analysis 
of Jones Transport were, in fact, paid and were, therefore, not outstanding. This 
finding confirmed the evidence of the samples and the discussion by Jones 
Transport with both Best Quality and Anyco, that a customer’s check was applied 
not to his current pro-bills as intended by the customer, but rather to a combination 
of the customer’s older pro-bills and other customer’s pro-bills that had been paid in 
cash.
From the information provided by the customers, the investigators determined that 
the dollar value of the pro-bills, which had been paid by these customers, was 
$115,132.
Jones Transport fell victim to a fraudulent scheme commonly called lapping. Cash 
and checks were received at the Hamilton terminal of Jones Transport and 
controlled by Ms. Lapper. The cash was removed from Jones Transport while the 
checks were applied to the pro-bills that were to have been paid by the cash. 
Consequently, the pro-bills remitted with the checks remained outstanding on the 
accounts-receivable analysis published at the end of each month.
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As a result, the amount of the outstanding pro-bills, which Jones Transport found 
through direct communication with their customers to have been paid, represented 
that amount of the cash that had been misappropriated over the time period under 
investigation, that is, $115,132.
Victims most often detect lapping frauds through accounts-receivable reconciliations or 
confirmations, or both. Supervision is also important. Organizations can prevent lapping by 
appropriately dividing duties (for example, assigning someone other than the accounts 
receivable clerk the duty of handling cash receipts). You should also consider establishing a 
policy of mandatory vacations, which could be helpful.
5.3 Acquisition and Payment Cycle
The acquisition and payment cycle includes the procurement and payment of all goods and 
services except for payroll and capital acquisitions. This cycle is especially vulnerable to 
fraudulent transactions because this is the point where funds flow out of an entity.
5.3.1 Functions
The functions of the acquisition and payment cycle include:
• Processing purchase orders and dealing with vendors.
• Receiving and recording goods and services.
• Accounting for the liability of items or services purchased.
• Processing and recording cash disbursements.
5.3.2 Financial Statements Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment cycle:
• Cash
• Inventories
• Prepaid expenses
• Land
• Buildings
• Equipment
• Accumulated depreciation
• Accounts payable
• Deferred taxes
• Other payables
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Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment 
cycle:
• Cost of goods sold
• Advertising expenses
• Travel and entertainment expenses
• Miscellaneous expenses
• Income tax expenses
• Professional fees
• All expense accounts
• Gains and losses on sales of assets
5.3.3 Perpetration
By far the most common fraud in the acquisition and payment cycle involves the 
purchasing agent (buyer), who is especially vulnerable to the temptation of accepting 
kickbacks and gifts from outside vendors.
One study revealed that companies who caught employees accepting small gifts were 
hesitant to discharge their employees. Two percent suspended the employees, while only 
12 percent fired them. Sixty-six percent reprimanded the employees and made them return 
the gifts.
There are three general kinds of acquisition and payment-cycle frauds:
1. The buyer-employee acts alone, and without outside assistance.
2. The vendor acts alone.
3. The buyer acts in collusion with the vendor. As is the case with other methods of 
prevention and detection, the collusion between both parties is the most difficult to 
prevent and detect.
Buyer Acting Alone
Noncollusive purchasing frauds usually involve the use of a nominee entity, that is, an 
apparent third party owned by the buyer. Examples include the use of a nominee entity to 
submit fictitious invoices (the most common fraud), or to order goods for personal use.
In one case, a 61-year-old employee of a major department store was indicted for allegedly 
stealing $2 million from the company. His responsibilities included leasing buildings to 
house the retailer’s stores. On twenty-two leases over a two-year period, through a nominee 
company, he altered leases to receive overpayments, and forged invoices billing the 
company for fictitious legal and building services.
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In another example, an executive was indicted for defrauding a large cosmetics company of 
$1.1 million over four years. During this period, he allegedly approved more than 150 
vendor invoices for services that were never rendered in connection with a newsletter the 
company was going to publish. The executive (whose salary was $124,000 per year) helped 
set up two nominee printing companies, which bilked his employer with the fraudulent 
invoices.
Finally, a director of customer-service technology was able to defraud his employer of over 
$2 million in one year by taking advantage of defects in internal control. The fraudster set 
up a legitimate agreement with a legitimate vendor to provide certain equipment. Then he 
set up a fake distributorship and told the vendor the company would purchase only from 
this one distributor. The vendor was content to have the business and proceeded to invoice 
the distributor. The fraudster, through his nominee distributorship, then inflated the 
invoices and billed them to his employer. The fraud was possible because the employee 
had the authority to set up the agreement, and to approve invoices for payment. The fraud 
was discovered by a manager who thought it was strange that the employee was delivering 
the invoices to accounts payable by hand.
Buyer and Vendor in Collusion
Nearly all collusion between buyer and vendor involves some form of secret commission or 
kickback from the vendor to the buyer. In these cases, secret benefits are given by a vendor 
in order to buy business, or are requested by the buyer for direct financial benefit. Collusion 
fraud often involves more than one kind of scheme perpetrated over time. Of course, there 
is always the question of who took the initiative, that is, the buyer or the vendor.
For example, one case started out involving inferior goods and later graduated to inflated 
invoices. A county purchasing agent was responsible for acquiring a long list of janitorial 
supplies, including mops, pails, soap, plywood, rakes, and paper goods. Area paper 
jobbers—experienced connivers—approached the purchasing agent with a deal. “Without 
changing our invoice price,” they told him, “if you agree, we can deliver a cheaper brand of 
paper towels. Half the extra is for us; the other half is for you.” Once the purchasing agent 
accepted a lesser brand, the vendor began squeezing for more by raising the price on the 
invoice and billing for five times the amount of merchandise actually shipped.
Monetary payments are not the only benefit that can be offered. Other common ways of 
corrupting a buyer include products or services; gifts, trips, or sex; promises of subsequent 
employment; reduced prices for personal items; and employment of friends or relatives.
Vendor Acting Alone
Common schemes used by vendors include product substitutions, billing for work not 
performed or services not provided, undershipping, padding overhead charges, and 
courtesy billings.
5.3.4 Detection
Because of the difficulty of detection, fraud awareness and prevention is the best policy, that 
is, know your vendors, and have an effective tendering process for all contracts. Fraud in 
procurement contracts always poses special problems, and detection is difficult. Common 
red flags include sole source contracts, unhappy purchasing agents, significant price 
changes or changed orders (especially after a contract is awarded), and vendor complaints.
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In one case detected through vendor complaints, a buyer with six years’ seniority obtained 
purchase requisitions from various departments at his plant. He then created a nominee 
company and placed orders with this firm. The nominee company would place real orders 
with a legitimate vendor and have them ship the merchandise to his employer. The 
merchandise would be billed through the buyer’s company at 150 percent of the real 
amount. The scheme was unraveled when the buyer failed to pay one of the vendors, who 
then complained to the buyer’s employer.
Sometimes you can also detect schemes through a computer analysis of the following:
• Timing of bids
• Patterns of bids
• Amount of work performed by vendors
• Patterns of hiring new vendors
• Vendors with post-office-box addresses
In an example involving post-office-box addresses, a junior buyer, who had been with his 
company for two years, created five nominee companies that he then placed on an 
approved vendor list. Thereafter, he did business with these phony companies, placing 
various orders with them. The scheme was unraveled when the auditors noticed that these 
particular vendors all had post-office boxes for addresses and were not listed in the 
telephone book. The amount of money lost was in excess of $250,000 over a period of 
more than a year.
If you suspect that a buyer and vendor are in collusion, consider the following items:
• Assessment of the tender process, if any
• Patterns of business and bids
• Noncompetitive pricing
• Products of inferior quality
• Buying unnecessary goods or services
• Lack of competitive bidding
5.3.5 Prevention—Key Controls
As previously noted, prevention of procurement fraud can be achieved best through fraud 
awareness, effective tendering and budgeting, and knowledge of your vendors. Other 
prevention controls include proper documentation, approvals, and segregation of duties.
Proper documentation includes prenumbered purchase requisitions, purchase orders, 
receiving reports, and checks. Proper approvals should include detailed background 
information on the vendor; ideally, purchase contracts should include a right-of-audit-access 
clause to the vendor’s books. In addition, conduct both irregularly scheduled audits of the 
purchasing function as well as assessments of the performance and happiness of the 
purchasing agent.
5.3.6 Prevention—Policies
Organizations should have established prevention and detection policies. The following are 
some policies to consider implementing.
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Accepting Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the acceptance of gifts and gratuities:
“Employees, and members of their immediate families, should not accept gifts, 
favors or entertainment that might create or appear to create a favored position 
for someone doing business with the company. Advertising novelties or trinkets 
are not considered as gifts and are excluded from these restrictions.
Gifts that are received by an employee should be returned to the donor and may 
be accompanied with a copy of this policy. Perishable gifts should be donated to 
a charitable organization and the donor notified of the action taken.
It is not the intent of this policy to preclude the acceptance by the company’s 
employees of occasional meals or refreshments that are provided in the normal 
course of business-work relationships, with other individuals. Discretion must be 
used, however, in the limited acceptance of meals, refreshments or incidental 
hospitality to avoid situations that could create a conflict of interest or appear to 
do so.”
Providing Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the giving of gifts:
“Occasionally, it may be appropriate for employees, acting for the company, to 
provide people outside the company with promotional items, meals, refreshments, 
transportation, lodgings or incidental hospitality. Expenditures for such purposes 
should be moderate and should be done only within the framework of good taste. All 
expenditures are subject to the overall company policy that an employee shall avoid 
constituting improper influence over others.”
Use of Hotlines
You should study the feasibility of installing hotlines to monitor complaints by employees 
and other vendors.
Disposition of Materials
The purchasing department normally should not be in charge of disposing of obsolete 
inventory, scrap, or fixed assets.
Rotation of Jobs
Rotate buyers frequently within a department to keep them from getting too close to 
vendors. In addition, enforce a mandatory vacation policy.
Competition in Bidding
Ensure that bidding policies and procedures are thoroughly reviewed. Whenever possible, 
enforce competitive bidding.
Compensation of Buyers
Buyers should be well paid to reduce the motives and rationalizations for fraud.
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5.3.7 Purchasing, Payables and Collection Systems
The purchasing, payables, and collection systems are part of the accounting systems that 
record a company’s purchases and expense payments. Employees can falsify books and 
supporting documentation for purchases, payables and collections to perpetrate a fraud on 
their employing company. This section covers three categories of perpetrating fraud:
1. False expense reports
2. False supplier invoices
3. Other false information
False Expense Reports
Expense reports prepared and submitted to the company for payment are false if they 
include any of the following:
• Overstated items
• Fictitious items
• Duplicate items
An employee could use a company credit card for personal items. If the company pays the 
entire amount of an employee’s account, that employee may be committing a fraud. 
Ultimately, the answer depends on the first accountability for the disbursements.
Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Is the expense item an allowable business-related expense? It is necessary to determine 
the company’s policy regarding allowable business expenses.
2. Is the expense amount the actual amount incurred? It is necessary to obtain the 
suppliers’ copies of the original expense vouchers and compare them with those 
submitted in support of the expense report.
3. Is the expense ultimately charged directly to the business? If yes, is there evidence of 
any reimbursement?
It is also necessary to understand the approval and payment system in effect. Who 
approved the expense reports? How were the expense reports categorized in the accounting 
records? Were the expense reports adjusted at a later date to reflect those items of a 
personal nature? Was there any pattern in the submission, approval or recording (or any 
combination thereof) of the fraudulent expense reports?
“Manny Miles” Case Study
Manny Miles had been the Business Administrator and Secretary-Treasurer for The 
County Hospital since shortly after it was formed in 1983. In addition to overseeing 
the administration of the hospital and its 145 employees, Miles’ duties included 
preparing budgets. He had check-signing authority and payment approval for the 
hospital’s annual budget of about $5 million.
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The governing body of the hospital consisted of a board comprised of twelve 
members; eight were elected and four were appointed as representatives of the 
county. In 1993, the board members hired Dr. Jane Wilson as Medical Officer. 
Almost immediately Miles and Wilson developed a severe personality conflict; 
accusations and negative feedback caused a division between the personnel of the 
hospital and members of the board. Attempts to terminate Dr. Wilson’s services 
failed due to the intervention of the hospital board members on her behalf. The 
hospital conducted studies to improve conditions but never implemented any 
recommendations.
In mid-1996, during its audit, the auditors found irregularities in travel claims 
submitted by Manny Miles, and the hospital referred the matter to the police for 
investigation. In December 1996, and January 1997, the police executed search 
warrants not only on the hospital but also on the residence of Manny Miles. They 
seized the hospital’s financial records along with Miles’ personal banking records.
Examination of the records revealed that from 1993 to 1996, Miles had continually 
made claims for travel expenses while using a hospital car. Additionally, he claimed 
mileage from both the hospital and the county for the same trips. Furthermore 
Miles had used his hospital credit card to repair his own vehicle and purchase 
numerous personal items, including restaurant meals on weekends, when he was 
not working. The card was in Miles’ name but the hospital paid the bills.
As business administrator, Miles could approve his own expenditures and authorize 
the checks. To conceal his spending, Miles had authorized the listing of these 
expenditures in the hospital’s financial records under other categories. Invoices 
were missing for some checks issued and for credit-card expenditures. The financial 
records of the hospital did not show any reimbursement by Miles to cover the vast 
majority of his personal purchases, although on several occasions he had made 
restitution for small purchases on the hospital card.
The Manny Miles case shows that independent approval and division of duties is essential 
in the payment of all travel claims and other expenses. Employees should not be able to 
approve their own expense reports. In addition, check signers should not be the same 
people approving expense reports.
False Supplier Invoices
Suppliers’ invoices prepared and submitted for payment to the company are false if either:
1. No goods have been delivered or services rendered
2. The quantity or value (or both) of the goods are inflated
The delivery of goods or services to a location other than a business location (for the use 
and benefit of the perpetrator) is a common technique, as is the payment to a friendly 
supplier when no goods or services were actually provided. Payments of inflated amounts 
to suppliers often reflect the existence of secret commissions.
20
Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Were goods and services actually provided? Find out, first, whether the supplier 
company actually exists and next, whether any goods or services were in fact provided. 
If they were provided, determine to whom.
2. Did the company receive the benefit? It is often necessary to obtain the bills of lading, 
that is, the freight companies’ proof-of-delivery slip, to confirm where the goods and 
services were delivered.
3. What was the approval and payment system? As with false expense reports, you should 
understand the approval and payment system.
“Credit To You Inc.” Case Study
In January 1993, Jones and Smith signed an agreement to start Smith Construction, 
a business that primarily consisted of erecting service stations. It was agreed that 
Smith would provide the financing while, for a salary of $600 per week plus 
expenses, Jones would manage and operate the business. Smith and Jones were to 
share equally any profits from the business. The business progressed well and 
showed a profit for the first three years.
Smith did not take an active part in the construction business, as he continued to 
operate his own plastering company. Smith Construction operated as a division of 
Smith Plastering Corp. Smith initially invested $42,000 as capital to start the 
construction business, and as sole signing officer, would attend the Smith 
Construction office regularly to sign checks, some of which were blank when 
signed.
Jones tendered and obtained contracts, hired subcontractors, hired and fired 
employees and purchased the goods necessary to operate the business, without 
interference from Smith. Jones could also purchase material he required for himself 
through the construction business and charge these amounts to himself on the 
business books as a form of salary.
Smith was aware that over the years Jones had erected a barn on his farm, 
renovated other buildings including his residence, and continued to operate the 
farm. Jones informed Smith that he had obtained a grant from the government of 
$300,000 to finance these endeavors.
In 1998, Smith Construction had difficulty paying its suppliers (creditors) and was 
eventually forced into bankruptcy by creditors in June 1998. The company’s debts 
exceeded $300,000. Jones gave no explanation for the shortage of funds except to 
say that he had miscalculated the actual cost of various construction jobs. An 
examination of Smith Construction’s books, canceled checks and available 
supporting documentation revealed that Jones had defrauded Smith Construction of 
$861,000 by various means.
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As general manager, Jones was responsible for the day-to-day operations and in this 
capacity, he was afforded a degree of trust. At the same time, Smith, the absentee 
owner, retained signing authority over all checks and, thus, thought he had control 
over all policy decisions.
In his private life as a farmer, Jones incurred debts with suppliers who also dealt 
with him as general manager of Smith Construction. Jones personally owed one of 
these suppliers, Credit To You Inc., more than $25,000. In June 1997, Jones 
purchased a $12.30 item, documented by the supplier invoice made out in pencil. 
Later, the penciled information on this invoice was erased. Information was typed 
onto the invoice, indicating instead that the company, Smith Construction, had 
purchased $9,500 worth of material for a job then in progress. On the strength of 
this typed document, Smith signed a check for $9,500 to the supplier, believing, of 
course, that the disbursement was for the benefit of Smith Construction. When the 
supplier received the check, on Jones’ instructions, he credited Jones’ personal 
account, reducing the debt to $15,500. This altered document was the prelude to a 
fraud of more than $861,000.
The alteration of documents (erasures, stricken information, or both) is at times the 
only indication of a fraud as it can disclose a change of mind (intent) by the person 
making the entry. Such alterations frequently occur in the earlier stages of a fraud as 
the perpetrator has yet to perfect the scheme.
Acme Products Inc. invoiced Smith Construction for the sale of roof trusses, with 
delivery scheduled for a gas station being built by Smith Construction. However, a 
description of the route to Jones’ farm appeared on the back of the invoice. The 
building of Jones’ barn required roof trusses. A review of the bill of lading 
confirmed the redirection.
Investigators can also review delivery instructions as another technique for identifying 
fraudulent transactions.
Other False Information
A business receives vast amounts of information, and subject to the existing systems of 
internal control, relies on it in making decisions, initiating, executing and recording 
transactions. If this information is false, a business can be deceived, resulting in deprivation 
of some sort and hence the company is put at economic risk.
Examples of false information that businesses may rely on include:
• False financial statements
• Overstated accounts receivable listings
• Overstated statements of income and net worth
• False general journal entries
• Altered internal company records
• Fictitious customer credit information
• False asset valuations
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Is the summary information presented (accounts receivable listings, financial statements) 
consistent with the underlying books and records, and are the real assets on hand? It is 
necessary to determine the representation made by the person or entity under 
investigation and the understanding reached between that person or entity and the 
victim. Once accomplished, you can examine the books and records supporting the 
summary financial information in question from the appropriate perspective.
2. Have the correct authorities properly approved entries in the general ledger? Are the 
entries appropriate and consistent with the facts?
3. Can customers confirm transactions?
To address the second and third questions above, you should understand the accounting 
systems in effect. Also, you should contact third parties to review and discuss with them 
their books and records, and then compare that information to the victim’s information.
“Ms. I. O. Much” Case Study
Ms. I.O. Much was the office manager of Anyco Inc. from May 1995 to May 1998. 
As office manager, Ms. Much, together with the general manager and president of 
the company, had check-signing authority for the company payroll account.
While Ms. Much was office manager, the company’s auditors frequently had 
difficulty completing their audit work primarily because of the poorly maintained 
books and records. Finally, Ms. Much was replaced with a new office manager, who 
found irregularities in the company’s bank reconciliations. After the company, 
police, and forensic accountants completed an investigation, they determined that 
I.O. Much received unauthorized payments from the company totaling at least 
$11,195. These payments were covered up in a variety of ways.
After examining banking records for the payroll account of Anyco Inc., 
investigators noted all checks payable to the order of I.O. Much. They found that 
eight checks totaling $9,126 were paid to I.O. Much but were not recorded in the 
payroll journal.
June 15, 1997: A check dated June 15, 1997, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to 
I.O. Much but not recorded. Attached to the December bank statement was a note 
dated June 15, 1997, which stated, “This is to certify that I.O. Much received a loan 
of $2,500 from Anyco Limited to be repaid before the end of the year.” The bottom 
of the note had a legend stating “paid Dec. 28/97.” It appeared that no record had 
been made of this apparent loan transaction until December 1997.
A review of relevant accounting records disclosed that on December 28, 1997, a 
deposit of $2,500 was made to the Anyco general bank account. The deposit slip for 
this $2,500 showed that the deposit consisted of three checks, as follows: $350, 
$178, and $1,971. The sources of the three checks noted on the deposit slip 
appeared to be as follows:
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1. William Smith—$350: A check was issued to Anyco on the account of William Smith, 
dated September 8, 1997. The current office manager at Anyco stated that this check 
was a repayment to Anyco as a result of an over-advance of funds to Smith, an Anyco 
employee.
2. Anybank—$178: A check was issued from Anybank to Anyco Limited.
3. Bank draft—$1,971: The check was a bank draft purchased from Otherbank. When this 
deposit was recorded in Anyco’s records, someone apparently recorded it as a reduction 
of the company loan to I.O. Much. This loan was reflected in the books as having been 
advanced and repaid in the same month, that is, December 1997.
March 1, 1998: A check dated March 1, 1998, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to 
I.O. Much but not recorded in the payroll journal. It appeared that a journal entry 
was prepared to record this check. This journal entry suggested that the $2,500 was 
paid with respect to five different accounts as follows:
1. Account #99-6, salespeople’s salaries, Boston
2. Account #99-2, salespeople’s salaries, Dallas
3. Account #99-7, salespeople’s salaries, Washington, D.C.
4. Account #199-12, delivery salaries, New York
5. Account #99-8, salespeople’s salaries, Seattle
The journal indicated that this entry was “to record checks cashed but not recorded 
or deposited.” The only check apparently not recorded in March 1997 was check 
#2000 for $2,500 payable to I.O. Much.
It is significant that the checks paid to I.O. Much in 1997 and 1998, which were not 
noted in the payroll journal, were not available in the corporate records. 
Investigators obtained copies of these checks from the microfilm files at Anybank.
A review of the payroll records indicated two apparent discrepancies related to I.O. 
Much. The April 7, 1997, payroll records indicated “income tax withheld” of $200 
more than apparently had been withheld from I.O. Much’s pay. Similarly on 
August 11, 1997, payroll records indicated $1,000 more income tax withheld than 
apparently had been withheld to date. In that time period an offsetting adjustment 
was made to the net pay figure, thereby indicating that the net amount of money 
paid to I.O. Much was $1,000 less than apparently had been paid to her at that 
time.
The effect of these adjustments was an apparent benefit to I.O. Much of $1,200. Her 
W2 for the year ended December 31, 1997, indicated that she paid $1,200 more 
income tax than she had actually paid. The Anyco Limited employee deduction 
account was not reconciled at the time of the investigation, and thus it was not 
readily apparent how the $1,200 tax benefit was accounted for in the company’s 
books.
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While the amounts involved were not terribly large, this case points out a number of 
internal control weaknesses that can result in fraud, including lack of supervision, 
inadequate division of duties, and failure to perform appropriate accounting 
reconciliations.
5.4 Payroll and Personnel Cycle
The payroll and personnel cycle handles the hiring, firing, and payment of employees, 
along with timekeeping, expense-account and travel reimbursements, and insurance 
matters.
5.4.1 Functions
The functions of the payroll and personnel cycle are as follows:
1. Personnel and employment
2. Preparation of timekeeping and payroll
3. Payment of payroll
4. Payment of payroll taxes and other withholdings
5. Reimbursements of expense accounts and travel expenses
6. Processing and payment of employee insurance, pension withholdings, and other 
employee benefits
5.4.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle:
1. Cash
2. Salaries payable
3. Payroll taxes payable
4. Other withholdings payable
Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle:
1. Travel and entertainment expenses
2. Salary and commissions expenses
3. Payroll tax expenses
4. Medical and insurance expenses
5. 4.3 Perpetration
Payroll is particularly ripe for internal fraud. Common schemes include nonexistent or 
ghost employees, fictitious hours and overtime abuses, overstating expense accounts, and 
fictitious or overstated medical claims.
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In one case, approximately one month after the payroll check date, Mr. Smith attempted to 
pick up his check from Ms. Doe, who was responsible for all departmental check 
distributions. Ms. Doe stated that the check was lost and that she would process the paper 
work necessary to obtain a new check. She then entered false payroll data in order to 
generate the check. Within a few weeks, Mr. Smith received a new check. However, upon 
reviewing his year-to-date earnings, he discovered that the lost check amount was included 
in his earned income. When confronted with the situation, Ms. Doe admitted to her 
supervisor that she had forged Mr. Smith’s name and cashed the check for personal 
reasons. Ms. Doe, who had been with the company for seven years, had her employment 
terminated.
Expense accounts are easily and frequently abused. For example, the president of a 
subsidiary submitted requests for business travel and entertainment advances with the 
parent company. The chief accountant issued the checks for the requested advances. After 
one-and-a-half years, the president had not repaid the advances. When pressed, he could 
not support the advances with proper business receipts. He confessed that he had none. 
The president who had ten years of service, had his employment terminated. The amount 
involved was $120,000.
5. 4.4 Detection
Organizations typically discover ghost employees when payroll checks are hand-delivered, 
and extra checks are left. For businesses employing vigorous payroll fraud detection 
procedures, investigators can perform significant computer and statistical analysis. For 
example, time card approvals, which are the same as signatures and endorsements on 
checks, can provide items for further investigation. Computer-generated detection methods 
could indicate:
• Payments to employees not on the master lists
• Payments to employees versus those not authorized for payment
• Write-offs of employee accounts
• Duplicate payments to employees
• Overtime by employee
• Password use during vacation
• Social security numbers listed in descending or ascending order
• Employees with no withholding
• Each kind of withholding in descending order
• Salary expenses in descending order
• Hours worked in descending order
• Time-card hours versus authorized job orders
• Hours worked by employee by pay period
• Pay rates in descending order
• Dates of employment versus authorized dates of payment
• Travel reimbursement by employee overtime
• Travel reimbursement compared to other employees
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• Travel reimbursement for specific function by employee
• Travel reimbursements by kind of expense, that is, rental car, hotel, airfare, and so on
• Date of travel reimbursements compared to dates employee worked
• Numerical sequence of employee travel reimbursements
5.4.5 Prevention
Proper Documentation
Proper documentation for payroll purposes includes time cards for appropriate employees, 
prenumbered travel reimbursement forms and payroll checks, and verification of medical 
services.
Proper Approval
Proper approval includes hours worked and wage rates, hiring and terminations, overtime, 
medical benefits, and travel allowances.
Separation of Duties
At a minimum, you should consider separating the following duties to reduce the possibility 
of one employee acting alone.
• Accounting for hours worked and processing checks
• Processing and distributing paychecks
• Hiring and firing from timekeeping
• Claims processing, approval, and payment
• Travel expense approval and payment
Independent Verification
Independent verification is especially important for preventing payroll and personnel fraud, 
and includes the following:
• Using time clocks wherever possible, and verifying the hours worked against the clock
• Ensuring hours worked are approved by someone other than the employee
• Conducting surprise audits of the personnel and payment cycle
5.5 Inventory and Warehousing Cycle
The inventory and warehousing cycle includes functions relating to the purchase and 
warehousing of merchandise for manufacture and resale. Because of the volume of activity 
and funds involved, fraud represents a significant risk.
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The functions of the inventory and warehousing cycle include:
• Processing purchase requisitions.
• Receiving raw materials and finished goods.
• Storing raw materials and finished goods.
• Cost accounting.
• Processing goods for shipment.
• Shipping finished goods.
5.5.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Inventories on the balance sheet and cost of goods sold on the income statement are 
affected by the inventory and warehousing cycle.
5.5.3 Perpetration
The more common frauds in the inventory and warehousing cycle include: ordering 
unneeded inventory, appropriating inventory for personal use, theft of inventory and scrap 
proceeds, and charging embezzlements to inventory.
For example, a loading-dock employee and delivery-route driver were able to steal 
$300,000 of inventory through collusion over a six-month period. The load sheets at the 
dock were either not filled out or inaccurately completed by both employees (control 
procedures required the dock employee and route driver to verify the quantities loaded and 
sign a load sheet). The products were transported to an independent distributor and 
subsequently sold. The defalcation surfaced when outside sources informed the company 
that certain products were being stolen as the result of collusion between particular 
employees and an independent distributor.
In a case involving a theft of inventory, an inventory records supervisor and a security 
guard colluded to steal $400,000 from a jewelry warehouse over a two-year period. The 
security guard stole the merchandise, and the supervisor concealed the theft by 
manipulating inventory records. An undercover investigator, who was hired because of a 
significant increase in year-end inventory shortages, eventually discovered the theft. After 
this experience, and following a consultant’s recommendation, the company started to 
perform surprise physical inventories at varied times during the year.
5.5.4 Detection
The three primary ways for detecting inventory and warehousing frauds are: statistical 
sampling of documents, computer analysis, and physical counts.
Statistical sampling includes looking for inconsistencies and discrepancies in purchase 
requisitions, as well as receiving reports, perpetual inventory records, raw material 
requisitions, shipping documents, job-cost sheets and similar documents.
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Computer analysis includes identifying the following items:
• Purchases by item
• Purchases by vendor
• Inventory levels by specific kinds
• Inventory shipped by address
• Costs per item over time
• Direct labor per inventory item
• Direct materials per inventory item
• Overhead per inventory item
• Disposals followed by reorders
• Shortages by inventory item
• Shipments by address
5.5.5 Prevention
Prevention is critically important in the case of inventory and warehousing fraud because of 
the amounts of money involved and the relative ease with which this kind of fraud can be 
concealed. Prevention includes: receiving reports, keeping perpetual records, using 
prenumbered and controlled requisitions, raw material requisitions, shipping documents, 
and keeping job-cost sheets.
Someone independent of the purchase or warehousing function should handle approvals of 
purchasing and disbursement of inventory.
Separation of duties becomes critical in preventing this kind of fraud. Authorization to 
purchase should be handled by someone not performing the warehousing function.
Someone other than the individual responsible for inventory should handle the receipt of 
inventory.
Independent checks on performance are also important prevention measures. Someone 
independent of the purchasing or warehousing functions should conduct the physical 
observation of inventory.
Physical safeguards include ensuring that merchandise is physically locked and guarded, 
and that entry is limited to authorized personnel.
5.6 Capital Acquisition and Repayment Cycle
The capital acquisition and repayment cycle, sometimes referred to as the financing cycle, 
includes borrowing money and accounting for the debt of an entity.
5.6.1 Functions
The functions of the capital acquisition and repayment cycle include: borrowing funds and 
accounting for debt, accounting for and paying interest, accounting for and paying 
dividends, accounting for stock transactions, and equity financing.
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5.6.2 Financial Statement Accounts
The following balance sheet and income statements are most often associated with the 
capital acquisitions and repayment cycle:
• Cash
• Notes
• Mortgages
• Accrued interest
• Capital stock
• Capital in excess of par value
• Retained earnings
• Dividends
• Dividends payable
• Interest expense
5.6.3 Perpetration
The common schemes in this cycle include borrowing for personal use, misapplication of 
interest income, and theft of loan and stock proceeds.
In one case, a factoring company obtained a credit facility from a regional bank to fund the 
purchase of qualified assets, primarily accounts receivable. The vice president of the 
company, in collusion with a customer, purchased fictitious accounts receivables with the 
proceeds of the credit facility. Part of the purchase proceeds was wired to offshore bank 
accounts beneficially owned by the vice president. The activity was discovered when the 
bank manager reviewed the bank account of the factoring company and saw wire transfers 
made to Caribbean tax havens. He hired forensic accountants who discovered the bank had 
been defrauded of $9.5 million over a two-year period.
5.6.4 Detection
Most frauds in the capital acquisition and repayment cycle involve tracing the proceeds of 
loans to ensure that all of the proceeds go to the benefit of the company. This can be 
accomplished by tracing loan proceeds to the bank deposits, and tracing authorization for 
borrowing from the minutes of the board to the loan ledgers. In addition, a computer 
analysis can do the following:
1. Compare addresses of interest payees.
2. Match borrowings with repayments.
3. Check the schedule of late repayments.
4. Check the schedule of authorization of loan proceeds.
5. Check the list of loan recipients.
6. Check the list of addresses where loan proceeds were delivered.
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Proper documentation of loan documents, journal entries, interest coupons and stock 
certificates can aid in prevention of capital acquisition and repayment frauds.
Proper approvals include receiving approval of the board of directors for: borrowing, 
paying dividends and refinancing debt. Physical safeguards include keeping stock 
certificates and loan documents under lock and key. Also, conduct independent checks on 
the transfer agent and registrar.
Segregation of duties is also important in prevention. The authorization to borrow should 
be separate from handling cash and accounting. Authorizations to issue stock should be 
separated from the handling of cash; and accounting should be separated from handling 
cash, and dividends and interest.
5.7 Cash Misappropriation
Although not a cycle, cash is the focal point of most entities. All other cycles flow through 
the cash account. Because there are so many different ways to misappropriate cash, this 
section covers cash exclusively.
Most organizations can divide their cash into two major categories: petty cash and demand 
deposits. Petty cash consists of cash on hand that is accounted for separately. It is 
reimbursed periodically, and the expenditures are then booked to the various accounts. 
Demand deposits consist of checking accounts maintained by the entity; savings or interest 
bearing accounts; and certificates of deposit and all other liquid investments that can be 
easily converted to cash.
5.7.1 Perpetration
Frauds perpetrated on the cash accounts are normally committed in conjunction with other 
cycles. The most common are the theft of petty cash and the theft of bank deposits.
Theft of Petty Cash
Petty cash thieves usually forge or prepare fictitious vouchers for reimbursement from petty 
cash. As an alternative, perpetrators frequently borrow from the petty cash account and 
fraudulently represent that the petty cash account is intact.
For example, the head security officer had custody of petty cash. He had altered legitimate 
receipts—primarily for postage—to reflect higher amounts. Postage is an overhead item that 
was loosely monitored. At a surprise count of the fund, only about $700 in currency and 
receipts were on hand of the $4,000 fund. Polygraph examinations were given to all 
security officers, but the head officer resigned before his test. A promissory note for the 
approximately $3,300 shortfall was executed by the former head officer. He had been with 
the company for seven years. The company estimated the loss at $12,000 but was unable to 
prove that this amount had been stolen.
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Theft of Bank Deposits
Many times employees steal cash receipts prepared for deposit. In some instances, they 
change the amount reflected on the deposit. In other cases, they make no attempt to 
conceal the theft.
In one case, an employee of a food services business received daily receipts from sales 
along with the cash register tapes from two or three cashiers. The employee mutilated the 
tapes so they could not be read, then prepared the transmittal of funds for the comptroller, 
but kept the difference between the amount transmitted and the amount submitted to her 
by the cashiers. She sent the mutilated tapes to the comptroller with the deposit. The 
comptroller’s office did not compare the deposit with the cash register tapes. The fraud was 
detected when one of the cashiers noted that the transmittal to the comptroller was small for 
a comparatively busy day. When questioned about tracing the transmittal amount to the 
cash register tapes, the perpetrator was unable to show completed tapes. The employee, 
who had been with the company two-and-a-half years, was fired but not prosecuted.
Employees, officers, and even outsiders can steal checks, both blank and signed. One case 
involved an employee—a grandmother—who was the sole bookkeeper for an electrical 
supply company in Omaha, Nebraska. She wrote the company’s checks and reconciled the 
bank account. Over a period of five years she stole checks totaling $416,000, which she 
spent on herself and her family. In the cash receipts journal, she coded the checks as 
inventory; in fact, however, she wrote the checks to herself using her own name. When the 
checks were returned with the bank statements, she would simply destroy them. She 
confessed after she had a nervous breakdown, caused by continuous guilt from stealing, 
which she knew was wrong.
5.7.2 Detection and Prevention
Because cash can be counted exactly, most detection methods involving cash relate to its 
timely counting. The proof of cash is a standard audit technique that compares cash in the 
bank to reported cash on hand. Properly done, the proof of cash can not only account for 
theft, but also show overstatements or understatements by expense classification.
Timely bank reconciliations by a person not responsible for handling cash will frequently 
reveal discrepancies. Good reconciliation methods include examining endorsements and 
dates.
For example, a misappropriation of funds was detected through a reconciliation of bank 
deposits with a collection log, which was normally kept by the accounting clerk, who at the 
time of the reconciliation was absent on sick leave. Because the accounting clerk prepared 
the collection log, the daily cash report, and the bank deposits, she was able to alter 
individual accounts receivable records and misappropriate almost $24,000. She 
accomplished this by preparing daily cash reports that reflected fewer cash receipts 
collected than were actually received, and depositing the lesser amount in the company’s 
bank account. The accounting clerk processed virtually the entire accounting transaction. 
After the discovery of missing funds, she was fired, prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was 
sentenced to ten years’ probation. She had been with the company three-and-a-half years.
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Auditors frequently use cutoff bank statements to ensure that expenses and income are 
reported in the proper period. Surprise cash counts sometime turn up situations of 
employees borrowing or floating small loans. It is critical that these counts be done on an 
irregular basis.
Cash thefts are sometimes reported by customers who have either paid money on an 
account and have not received credit, or in some instances when they notice they have not 
been given a receipt for a purchase.
As an example, a client of a branch of a large bank complained that there had been a 
$9,900 forged savings withdrawal from her account. The client indicated that she had 
recently made a $9,900 deposit at the branch and suspected that the teller who accepted the 
deposit may have been involved. The employee was interviewed and admitted to forging 
and negotiating the savings withdrawal. The teller had obtained the client’s mother’s 
maiden name and birthplace, fabricated a duplicate savings receipt book, and on an 
unscheduled work day went to the domiciling branch and posed as the client. The 
employee did not have any identification, yet was persistent enough to obtain an approval 
on the savings withdrawal.
Computer analysis of the following categories can sometimes turn up fraud in a cash 
account: checks that are missing, checks payable to employees, checks that are void, 
comparisons of deposit dates to receivables, and listings of cash advances.
It is absolutely imperative to implement tight control of cash and to maintain the duties of 
accounting, authorization, and custody.
In one case a fraud occurred at one of several campus cashier’s offices maintained by a 
university for collecting and processing student tuition bills and other related charges. The 
perpetrator was employed as a teller for approximately five years before being promoted to 
head cashier. This position required reconciling daily cash register receipts to the cash 
transmittal and bank deposits, as well as preparing deposits for funds received from outside 
departments, such as the bookstore or dining service operations. These deposits involved 
substantial amounts of cash. As head cashier, the employee also prepared the initial 
accounting documents that served as the input to the various general ledger accounts, 
including accounts receivable.
The perpetrator’s extensive knowledge and experience, coupled with the employer’s trust, 
resulted in diminishing supervision, particularly of the cash register reconciliations. As a 
result, the perpetrator was able to manipulate the documentation and the control 
procedures necessary to conceal the continued embezzlement of funds. The employee, who 
had six-and-a-half years’ service, was fired and prosecuted for stealing an estimated 
$66,000.
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CHAPTER 6:
External Fraud for Personal Gain
6.1 Fraud Perpetrated by Outsiders
Fraud is not merely the product of internal thieves acting against their employers. Fraud in 
the accounting records may originate with outside suppliers and service providers as well.
It is not possible to determine the number of persons and bogus business operators engaged 
in crimes of this nature. Suffice it to say that the problem is extensive. By some estimates, 
nearly everyone at one time or another has been either a direct victim of such a crime, or 
an indirect victim through higher fees or income taxes.
6.1.1 Classification of Internal and External Fraud
As introduced in chapter 1, for the purposes of this Handbook, commercial fraud can 
generally be classified into two categories:
1. Internal fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by its employees, 
officers, or directors
2. External fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by arms-length parties 
(either individuals or corporations) who are outside the organization
Noncommercial fraud and other forms of white-collar crime also exist in which the 
fraudster is unrelated or external to the victim (an individual).
The Impact of Collusion
Some forms of external fraud can also be committed with the help of an internal 
fraudster—someone internal to inside the organization who is willing to assist the external 
fraudster commit his or her crime. Generally, internal personnel would need some form of 
an incentive—often in the form of a secret commission, kickback, or bribe—in order to be 
induced to assist in this manner.
Fraud involving parties both internal and external to an organization are sometimes 
referred to as collusive frauds. Another form of collusive fraud involves fraud committed by a 
group of people within an organization. Both kinds of collusive frauds exist because most 
internal controls are based on the principle of segregation of duties—this is circumvented 
by collusion.
6.1.2 Reasons for Classification
Without some form of classification, the numerous kinds of fraud would overwhelm and 
confuse the student of this topic. Learning is enhanced when long lists are grouped and 
classified—for instance, students of a foreign language don’t start at a in the English 
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translation dictionary. Instead they start by studying the common elements of verb 
conjugation, pronouns, nouns and adjectives so that they can grasp a wider cross section of 
the language, and then put it all together when they begin to speak it. Of course, languages 
have many exceptions to the rules. Similarly, most foreign-language pocket guides present 
phrases by topic. For instance, phrases relating to money are separate from phrases relating 
to restaurants, travel, shopping and health; however, certain phrases could be applicable to 
more than one situation.
Much the same way, this Handbook’s approach to grouping and classifying fraud enhances 
the CPA’s ability to learn about the numerous kinds of fraud. As a result, you should have a 
greater appreciation for the wide variety of fraud that can occur, and should be better 
equipped to recognize the signs of fraud at first sight. However, some frauds are difficult to 
classify, fall into more than one category, or don’t exactly fit into any of the established 
categories. These instances are mentioned as appropriate within the body of this 
Handbook.
6.1.3 Classification of Fraud in this Handbook
In chapter 5, we discussed a restricted group of frauds—those committed against an 
organization by its employees, officers or directors—otherwise known as internal fraud.
External frauds cover all remaining forms of fraud and represent a wide variety of frauds. 
This chapter covers those external frauds that can be classified by perpetrator. These frauds 
include:
1. Fraud committed primarily by individuals against a company, government, or other 
individuals; this is referred to as external fraud for personal gain.
2. Fraud committed primarily by a company against another company, government, or 
individuals; this is referred to as commercial crime.
Note that individuals using a corporate veil could also conduct certain of the frauds 
presented in this chapter. Similarly, chapter 7, which primarily covers fraud by 
corporations, includes fraud that could be conducted by individuals directly.
6.2 Individuals versus Individuals and Corporations
Individuals can commit many kinds of fraud against other individuals and corporations. Most 
of the victims of the crimes described in this section are generally manufacturers, retailers, 
wholesalers, service companies or other individuals; however, in some instances, victims 
can also include governments, financial institutions, and insurance companies.
6.2.1 Lawyers' Schemes
Overbilling for Time
Lawyers can easily commit fraud, largely because of the nebulous nature of the services 
provided. As one commentator indicated: the law lends itself to confidence scams. 
Contrasted to a plumber, for example, whose failure to make the contracted repair is 
quickly noticed, a lawyer’s performance of an agreed to service is not always discernable. It
4
could be merely some advice, a brief phone call or any number of innocuous, 
commonplace actions.
The victims of overbilling can include the lawyer’s clients who are unable to assess whether 
the time billed by the lawyer is reasonable, and can also include government funded legal 
aid programs whose organizers are unable to assess whether the services billed were 
actually performed. When in doubt, a lawyer’s invoices can be vetted; that is, they can be 
assessed by another lawyer for reasonableness regarding whether the services billed needed 
to be performed, and whether the time taken to perform the services was excessive or not.
Misappropriation of Trust Funds
Lawyers have access to funds provided to them by clients in trust to complete transactions. 
There are many cases of lawyers borrowing client funds because they are in personal 
financial difficulty. The most common crime associated with lawyers’ trust funds is the 
misappropriation of client funds held in trust and the use of the money for the lawyer’s 
personal purposes (for example, to subsidize a business, pay gambling debts, or support a 
life-style).
There are three kinds of misappropriation:
1. Single transaction: Client funds can be traced to an unauthorized disbursement 
(one-shot).
2. Several transactions: All trust-account activity is analyzed to determine which clients funds 
were used for unauthorized disbursements (lapping).
3. Trust-account chaos: Usually, this kind of misappropriation is caused by poor record 
keeping. Actual misappropriation of funds may or may not be found. Is the chaos the 
result of poor bookkeeping practices? Are there reasons for the failure to account (such 
as bad health, bankruptcy, intent to defraud, or loss of control due to numerous 
misappropriations)? The answers to these questions may emerge after a complete 
analysis of the trust account’s activity has been made. According to the ethical rules of 
most states, if not all states, any use by an attorney of funds held in a trust account other 
than that for which the funds were placed in trust is considered a serious breach of 
professional conduct that may lead to disbarment, suspension or possible prosecution. 
There can never be a legitimate misappropriation of funds that an attorney holds in a 
trust account.
To uncover a case involving misappropriation of trust funds, the accountant should realize 
that lawyers regularly maintain two sets of bank accounts and related records, consisting of:
1. One or more bank accounts, books of account, and supporting documentation for the 
law practice itself.
2. A trust account together with any records reflecting the trust-account activity carried out 
on behalf of the lawyer’s clientele. These are the most relevant records for investigating 
alleged misappropriation of trust funds. The primary documentation required for trust­
account activity consists of bank statements and bank reconciliations for the trust bank 
account; the client’s ledger, which outlines all receipts and disbursements made by the 
lawyer on behalf of the client concerning a particular transaction; and the client’s file, 
which contains evidence of the transactions (for example, correspondence, the lawyer’s
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reporting letter, statement of receipts and disbursements, statement of adjustments, 
mortgage documents, out-of-pocket vouchers, and billings).
CPAs conducting an investigation of an attorney’s trust account might also want to review 
the financial statements for the law practice. These records can be used to assess the 
successfulness of the lawyer’s practice, and are most relevant when the lawyer is a sole 
practitioner.
See table 6.1, below, for an example of a misappropriation that would only be uncovered 
by a detailed investigation of the banking transactions conducted within a trust account.
Table 6.1 Evidence of a misappropriation of a trust fund.
January 1, 1991 Deposit of $30,000 Agrees with client file
January 5, 1991 Withdrawal of $10,000 Unauthorized by client
January 29, 1991 Deposit of $10,000 Unauthorized by client
January 31, 1991 Balance of $30,000 Agrees with client file
At the end of the month the trust liability to the client, as disclosed in the client file, is 
$30,000. However, $10,000 was temporarily removed during the month by an 
unauthorized transaction. Thus a misappropriation of the trust fund occurred.
Skip Towne, Esq. Case Study
After twenty years in practice, a lawyer, Skip Towne, Esq., had built up a large 
client base, including friends, business people and fellow church-goers. Mr. Smith, 
who was selling his home, retained Mr. Towne’s services. At the time the 
transaction closed on August 3, 1998, Mr. Towne received $176,574 from the 
purchaser’s attorney for deposit into the Skip Towne, Esq. trust account. Mr. Towne 
disbursed $5,000 of the funds in his trust account to cover various closing 
adjustments including outstanding utilities and tax bills. Mr. Towne also distributed 
$21,176 to his own account to cover the legal fees and other disbursements related 
to the closing. The balance ($150,398) due to Mr. Smith, as shown in the Closing 
Statement, was apparently paid in two distinct disbursements to Mr. Smith: an 
initial amount of $65,000 on August 10, 1998, with the balance of $85,398 on 
October 13, 1998. This final payment to Mr. Smith was, however, financed by the 
deposit into the trust account of funds that Mr. Towne received from new clients 
and other nefarious acts.
The specific funds in question, that is, $85,398 on hand as of August 10, 1998—were 
not paid to the benefit of Mr. Smith. Between August 10, 1998, and October 13, 
1998, Mr. Towne made a payment of $80,000 to himself that he used to invest in his 
own real estate venture, and a payment of $5,398 to his other clients, to replace trust 
funds that had already been spent on unauthorized disbursements. To keep the ball 
rolling, Mr. Towne had to misappropriate funds from a number of other clients in 
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order to repay Mr. Smith, in addition to producing false mortgage documents, 
forging signatures, and resorting to other acts of deceit.
Ultimately, Mr. Towne cleared out his trust account, abandoned his law practice, 
and disappeared, leaving behind at least eighty-five clients who had been 
defrauded. He has not been heard from since.
6.2.2 Directory Advertising Schemes
Perpetrators of directory advertising schemes usually target businesses. In this scheme the 
fraudster sells advertising in a nonexistent magazine or directory, and absconds with the 
proceeds. Many directory advertising schemes are perpetrated out of storefront operations. 
A fake (or in some instances, real) directory is presented to the potential victim. The victim 
contracts for the display or classified advertising, which will appear some months hence. By 
that time, the fraudster has collected the funds and disappeared.
6.2.3 Property Improvement Schemes
Fly-by-night operators, promising repairs to property at bargain rates, are a particular 
problem for elderly victims. The typical fraudster is a professional con artist who obtains 
business primarily from door-to-door solicitations. The tools of the trade are not hammers 
and saws, but bogus business cards and counterfeited or preprinted contracts involving the 
payment of up-front money. Note that these property improvement scams are a subset of 
procurement fraud, which is covered in more depth in chapter 7. Various forms of this 
scheme include substituting products, charging for false labor or overhead charges, and 
absconding with retainers and down payments.
Substituting Products
In a product substitution fraud, the fraudster typically promises a property owner a 
particular product or brand, and charges him or her for it but then substitutes an inferior 
brand without an appropriate price reduction. Thus the perpetrator reaps a windfall profit 
through this deception.
Charging for False Labor or Overhead
Many repair contracts call for labor, materials or overhead to be charged at cost, plus a 
specified contractor’s profit as a percentage of that cost. Obviously the more the repairs 
cost, the more the contractor makes. By fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of 
bogus labor charges or overbilling of materials, the fraudster not only increases the profit 
but also can keep the difference between the actual and inflated costs.
Absconding With Retainers and Down Payments
The preferred method that seasoned professionals use is to simply negotiate money in 
advance, then disappear. This is essentially an advance fee swindle perpetrated specifically 
in the property-improvement or repair market. This method is advantageous to the 
perpetrator because it requires the least amount of capital: no storefront, props, or other 
accoutrements necessary—-just “get the money and run.”
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6.2.4 Personal Improvement Schemes
The term personal improvement fraud covers the many schemes that prey on people’s natural 
tendency to want to improve their job skills, appearance, education, or position in life. 
Fraudsters in this category primarily use mail order as an integral part of the scheme. Some 
common forms of personal improvement fraud are described below.
Vanity- and Song-Publishing Schemes
Vanity- and song-publishing schemes are common, and rely on the victim believing that he 
or she has talent in a particular area, such as art or song writing. These schemes are 
normally advertised in magazines or by direct mail. They usually offer to evaluate, for free, 
the victim’s talent. Of course the victim is told after the evaluation that he or she is the 
newest undiscovered artistic genius. And for a hefty fee, the talent company will promote 
the artist’s work. The artist then remits the fee, and the fraudster uses the funds for personal 
benefit, providing little or no services in the process.
Modeling Schools
Modeling schools appeal to the natural vanity of some people. Typically, the modeling 
school tells the student that he or she must have a portfolio of portraits to send to potential 
customers, ostensibly to enhance the victim’s potential for getting modeling assignments. 
The victim is then charged greatly inflated prices for a photographer to take the pictures for 
the portfolio. Many modeling schools are not legitimate. They sometimes tout connections 
to famous people, or claim they have placed famous people, when in fact they have not. 
These schools get most of their business through mail order or newspaper advertising. 
Once a particular area is fleeced, the school pulls up stakes and moves on.
Diploma Mills
For a fee—usually a hefty one—a diploma can be granted to those persons who apply. The 
fraudsters usually claim the heavy fee is for processing the application or for verifying the 
experience necessary to acquire a degree. The hallmark of a diploma mill is the ease with 
which the degree is obtained, and the related cost. Victims usually apply for an advanced 
degree to enhance their career skills; however, diploma mills are not accredited, and their 
diplomas are therefore essentially worthless. Given the nature of this kind of business, there 
is usually some culpability on the part of the so-called victim.
Correspondence Schools
Legitimate correspondence schools offering advanced education do exist. However, there 
are also many correspondence schools with the same modus operandi as diploma mills, 
providing substandard education at superior prices. They are generally not accredited and 
offer little hope of job advancement.
6.2.5 Insider Trading Schemes
Insider trading involves the use of nonpublic information to make stock trades on a 
securities or commodities market. It could include purchasing shares prior to a good news 
release and can also include selling shares prior to a bad news release. The perpetrators of 
such crimes get rich, while other investors are unable to share in the wealth. Some might
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argue that this is a victimless crime, while others would say that the victims are the market 
as a group, because each and every trade is part of the market.
Criminal charges for insider trading have become the trademark of economic crime 
enforcement efforts during recent years. These efforts seek to encourage the confidence of 
investors in the fairness of the markets.
A surge of prosecutions for illegal insider information transactions began in the late 1980s 
when stock transactions were first subjected to sophisticated computer review, enabling 
investigators to identify unusual stock movements. Soon afterwards, when some meaningful 
piece of financial information about a company was released, investigators could quickly 
determine who had traded the stock heavily before the news release. If, for instance, a 
firm’s president executed a transaction, it seemed likely, (though not assured), that he or she 
had acted on the information before it was publicly disseminated. The insider trading laws 
require that specified officers or directors of a corporation must report their trading 
activities. The fraudster, however, conveniently forgets to file the required information.
Of course, the notable cases of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken remain the most infamous, 
and illustrate the staggering sums of money to be made from illegal stock trades. Boesky, 
the Wall Street arbitrage king, was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $100 
million. In his plea agreement, he gave information that led to the indictments of so-called 
junk bond king Michael Milken, who eventually pled guilty to insider trading and was fined 
$600 million.
6.2.6 Homicide-for-Profit Schemes
Homicide cases are quite different from white-collar crime cases in that the perpetrator is a 
violent criminal, whereas most fraudsters are not violent. The tools of a murderer are guns, 
knives, ropes, water (for drowning), fire (for arson) and poison, whereas the tools of a 
fraudster are documents, books and records, computers, and calculators. The victim in a 
homicide case loses his or her life, whereas a fraud victim generally only loses some money.
But there is one main similarity, particularly when there is a financial motive for the 
homicide—the use of forensic accounting in homicide cases is similar to its use in fraud 
cases and may involve corporate- or personal-financial assessments, or both.
Generally, forensic accounting may be applied in homicide investigations for one or any 
combination of the following three purposes:
1. To analyze and determine a possible financial motive for murder.
2. To analyze financial documentation for possible investigative aids that may assist in 
proving murder.
3. To identify possible payments on a contract for murder.
Assessing Financial Motive
In determining a possible financial motive, the investigator must direct the accounting 
analysis primarily toward establishing and measuring any financial benefit to the accused as 
a result of that person’s association with the murder victim. Benefit may be shown in any 
one or combination of the following methods:
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• Payments by the victim to the accused (extortion).
• Assets such as real estate, collectibles, or antiques transferred to the accused.
• Insurance proceeds paid to the accused as a beneficiary under a policy.
• Other benefits, such as obtaining equity in a business or transferring of a partnership 
interest to the accused.
• Other motives that don’t equate to a direct financial benefit, such as the imminent loss of 
assets, involvement in drug trafficking, or marital infidelity.
Accounting evidence is not generally as significant as viva voce evidence. It may, however, 
provide circumstantial evidence of a financial motive.
Assessing Financial Evidence to Assist in Other Ways in the Investigation
When assessing the financial matters of the victim in order to assist in a police investigation, 
the forensic accountant may seek to determine:
• The victim’s business and social relationships and the identity of people with whom he 
or she had dealings.
• The existence of any debts owed either by or to the victim, and whether evidence exists 
to suggest the victim or debtor was resisting payment on them.
• The possibility of eliminating financial matters as a direction in which to pursue in the 
investigation.
Investigators should examine business and personal financial records, as well as financial- 
related evidence from the local real estate deed-mortgage recording office, lawyers, the will 
of the deceased, and insurance policies.
Robert Kilbride Case Study
On March 29, 1998, Mary Kilbride, wife of Robert Kilbride, a veteran police officer, was 
found dead outside her condominium complex. She had fallen from the twentieth floor 
balcony of their condominium. Eight days later, Robert Kilbride flew to the South Pacific to 
join Ms. Cathy Smith, whom he later married in May 1999 in Europe.
Ms. Sleuth, a forensic CPA, was called in to assist with the investigation. The police 
suspected Mary’s death was not an accident—there was a $275,000 life insurance policy on 
her life that was paid to Robert Kilbride in late September 1998.
By way of background, Ms. Sleuth was told that in July 1997, Kilbride resigned his 
position from the police force. Friends and acquaintances said that about this time it 
was evident that Robert and Mary Kilbride were having marital problems.
Ms. Sleuth then worked with the investigating officer to determine all she could 
about the Kilbrides’ life-style. The primary objective of Ms. Sleuth’s accounting 
assistance was to summarize Robert Kilbride’s financial activity for a period of 
approximately one-and-a-half years prior to Mary Kilbride’s death, because of the 
allegation that Robert had murdered his wife Mary for the insurance proceeds. No 
summary books and records were available, a not uncommon situation in 
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investigations of personal finances. Therefore, Ms. Sleuth had to reconstruct the 
financial facts before they could be interpreted.
The volume of financial documents was considerable. Kilbride had numerous credit 
cards, bank accounts and brokerage accounts in the United States, Canada and 
Europe. Kilbride was also involved in numerous business deals of varying nature 
and purpose.
In order to prove Kilbride’s financial affairs, Ms. Sleuth completed the following:
1. A summary of Kilbride’s financial history.
2. An analysis of the Kilbride’s estimated net worth as of the end of July 1997 and 
September 1998, based on bank statements, brokerage statements, 
correspondence, contracts, appraisals, loan applications and other financial 
documentation.
3. A source and application of funds analysis of Kilbride’s financial activity from 
March 1997 to December 1998, primarily based on Kilbride’s banking 
documents, credit card statements and brokerage statements.
4. A report on Kilbride’s monthly deficiency based on the information in the 
source and application of funds analysis.
5. Graphs showing the cumulative deficiency from just prior to Mary’s death to late 
September 1998, when the insurance proceeds were received.
These analyses revealed the following, which the investigating officer corroborated 
by viva voce evidence from former coworkers, friends, neighbors and other people 
who knew the Kilbrides.
1. When he left the force, Kilbride had no known source of steady income.
2. The Kilbrides’ combined annual salaries were less than $60,000, yet they lived in an 
expensive condominium and had a leased luxury sports car.
3. After leaving the force, Kilbride’s net worth declined considerably. He began to borrow 
heavily and sell off certain assets, including a rental property. He was also involved with 
various unsuccessful business ventures.
4. By March 1998, substantially all of Kilbride’s net worth was represented by assets he 
owned jointly with his wife. These assets included the equity in their condominium, 
furniture, furs, jewelry and household effects.
5. Between the time of Mary’s death in March and his receiving the life insurance proceeds 
in September, Kilbride spent more than $100,000 traveling throughout the United 
States, Canada and Europe. Although Kilbride had no known employment income, he 
and Ms. Smith rented a villa on the Mediterranean coast. He had approximately 
$15,000 in other income during this period. Kilbride financed his life-style primarily by 
selling more assets, obtaining further loans and making heavy use of credit cards.
6. In late September 1998, Kilbride received the $275,000 in life insurance proceeds from 
Mary’s death.
7. Also in September 1998, Kilbride sold the luxury condominium; he and Ms. Smith 
continued to live in the Mediterranean villa until he returned to the United States in 
January 1999, when he was arrested.
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In summary, the accounting evidence revealed that Kilbride enjoyed a life-style he 
could not afford. He was living well beyond his means—his expenses so greatly 
exceeded his income during the months before and after Mary’s death that he 
would have been virtually bankrupt if he had not received the insurance money on 
Mary’s life.
This evidence was very useful in establishing a motive for murder, and weighed 
heavily at Killbride’s murder trial at which he was found guilty.
6.3 Individuals versus the Government
Fraud against the government is a general term for several kinds of schemes perpetrated 
against federal, state, and local governments or government agencies. Typically, frauds 
against the government committed by individuals involve one of the following: income tax 
fraud and benefit-program fraud. (See chapter 7 for a discussion of frauds against the 
government committed by corporations.)
6.3.1 Income Tax Fraud
According to some estimates, most taxpayers do one of the following:
1. Fail to disclose all their income
2. Take deductions to which they are not entitled
The most common income tax frauds involve categories of individuals who receive their 
compensation in cash. These categories include waiters, restaurant owners, bartenders, and 
bellhops.
For the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be successful with a claim for income tax fraud, 
intent must be proven—it is perfectly legal for taxpayers to manage their affairs to minimize 
their taxes—it is illegal for them to do so in a deceitful manner.
6.3.2 Benefit-Program Fraud
Another major category of fraud against the government generally involves making false 
statements of various kinds in order to obtain funds. The United States and other countries 
with strong social assistance programs are easy targets for fraudsters. The specific programs 
targeted include:
• Welfare benefits
• Medicare and Medicaid benefits
• Unemployment benefits
• Disability programs
• Student loan programs
• Housing programs
Often, rings of fraudsters apply for government benefits, resulting in very high losses to the 
government, and ultimately to the taxpayer through increased taxes.
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6.4 Individuals versus Financial Institutions
Fraud committed externally against a financial institution can take many forms and can be 
committed by anyone who deals with such organizations, including individuals and 
corporations. The most common offenses committed by individuals—and sometimes 
corporations—are credit fraud, loan fraud, false mortgage security, real estate fraud, money 
transfer fraud, money laundering, and check fraud. These and other frauds against financial 
institutions, committed by individuals, are described below.
6.4.1 Financial Institutions and Fraud
Definition of a Financial Institution
For the purposes of this Handbook, a financial institution is any organization, whether 
domestic or international, that is engaged in receiving, collecting, transferring, paying, 
lending, investing, dealing, exchanging, and servicing money and claims to money. This 
also includes safe deposit facilities, custodianships, agencies and trusteeships.
Under the broadest concept, the term financial institution may be applied to institutions, 
such as cooperatives, export-import banks, investment bankers and mortgage bankers.
Legal Aspects of Bank Fraud
In most jurisdictions, financial institutions are insured by an agency of the government and 
are governed by related criminal statutes. For example, in the United States the broadest of 
all federal statutes is Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1344. It covers all assets owned or 
controlled by a bank, as well as employees and outsiders. It prohibits any action that would 
defraud the financial institution, such as embezzlement, misapplication, false statements and 
related fraudulent behavior.
6.4.2 Credit-Card Fraud
Generally, credit-card fraud can be divided into two categories. In some instances, the 
fraudster uses credit information from one individual to obtain credit for use by another. 
For example, John R. Fraud, with bad credit, obtains the credit information of John Q. 
Smith, and applies for a credit card under the name of John Q. Smith, using John R. 
Smith’s address. John R. Fraud then makes charges on the account. When John Q. Smith 
protests, the credit-card company attempts to locate the real user of the credit card, John R. 
Fraud, who has since absconded.
The other common credit-card fraud involves duplicating credit cards and then using them 
to purchase high-value merchandise, for instance, jewels, furs, and other items that can 
easily be resold before the credit-card company catches up with the fraudster.
6.4.3 Loan Fraud
Borrowers sometimes provide false information to a lending institution in order to obtain 
funds to continue business activity, or simply to fraudulently get money that they have no 
intention of repaying. Some of the most common schemes include loans to nonexistent 
borrowers, false applications with false credit information, bribery of a loan officer, 
borrower misapplication of funds, and single family housing loan fraud.
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Loans to Nonexistent Borrowers
In a loan-to-a-nonexistent-borrower fraud, the borrower uses a false identity to obtain a 
loan. This scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower, or with the assistance of 
an insider, such as a loan officer.
Fraud committed by individuals can be difficult to detect, particularly if the identity 
documents of the fraudster match his or her details as provided on the loan application. 
Warning signs include:
• The borrower is unknown to bank personnel.
• No public credit report is available.
• The borrower or loan officer requests unusual loan terms.
• Loan application information does not check out.
• The proposed security has an inflated value.
• The proposed inventory (security) has an unrealistic value.
• There is no CPA associated with the financial statements.
• The loan officer’s bonus is based on volume of loans funded.
• The proposed collateral is located outside the bank’s market area.
• The loan proceeds are distributed prior to the loan’s closing.
False Applications with False Credit Information
False information on the credit application can include overstated assets, nonexistent assets, 
understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue and understated expenses. For example, 
a borrower with marginal net worth might inflate the asset and income figures on his or her 
personal financial statements to convince the loan officer of his or her credit worthiness. 
The loan officer and others involved in the bank loan approval process can often detect 
these schemes by observing one or more of the following:
• Appraisals-valuations that defy common sense and local knowledge
• Appraisers who are paid on basis of appraisal amount
• Large loans beyond experience and expertise of the loan officer
• Borrowers who default on the first payment
• Numerous payment extensions, or payments that are placed on nonaccrual status
• No audit trail for verifying application information
• Applicant reports receiving loans from many other banks
Bribery of Loan Officers
Statutes (for example, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 201) prohibit any officer, director, 
employee, agent or attorney of a bank from knowingly soliciting or receiving things of 
value in connection with bank transactions. In the usual scheme, a borrower offers an 
officer an inducement to grant a loan that would not otherwise be made (for instance, 
because the borrower has little or no credit, or because the borrower is not using his or her 
real name).
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Senior loan officers can often detect these schemes by observing one or more of the 
following:
• The life-style of the originating loan officer is beyond the means provided by normal 
compensation.
• The loan officer has unreasonably high productivity.
• The loan officer’s compensation is based on volume productivity.
• Loan agreements contain terms unreasonably favorable to the borrower.
• There is a pattern of disbursements to particular agents, brokers, appraisers, finders, and 
so on.
• There are multiple loans to the same borrower with the same agents involved.
• The loan or other bank officer has a financial interest in the customer’s project, or 
stockholdings in a bank subsidiary profiting from the business.
Borrower Misapplication of Funds
Borrower misapplication is most common when the borrower has little or no personal risk 
in the collateral, for example, real estate. The highest risk real estate loans are those in 
which the lender provides all the funding on a nonrecourse basis. The most common ways 
borrowers misapply loan funds are as follows:
• Kickbacks or profit interests in construction activities
• Brokerage or real estate fees
• Property management fees
• Related-party vendors
• Closing-statement prorations of rent, taxes, and other items
• Land flips
• Sale of property rights, such as laundry or cable TV
• Misappropriation of operating proceeds or loan proceeds
• Misappropriation of escrow payments
Single Family Housing Loan Fraud
One variation of the misapplication-of-funds fraud is the borrower who purchases single 
family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality as rental property or in some 
instances for resale. When applying to a financial institution, the fraudster usually 
misrepresents his or her ability to finance the property and make payments. Usually loan 
officers uncover these frauds by observing one or more of the following:
• There is an unrealistic change in commuting distance.
• A high-income borrower has little or no personal property.
• New housing expense is 150 percent or more of the previous expense.
• Bank deposits are listed in round amounts on application.
• The borrower reports overlapping dates of current and prior employment.
• The previous employer is listed as out of business.
• A high-income borrower does not use a professional tax preparer.
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• The appraisal shows a tenant as the contact person on an owner-occupied house.
• The initial title report shows delinquent taxes.
6.4.4 Real Estate Fraud
Real estate fraud is essentially a specialized form of loan fraud committed either by 
individuals or corporations. Financial institutions, especially the savings and loan 
associations in the United States, were badly hit in the 1980s due to fraud committed in the 
real estate area. These schemes are often perpetrated in concert with the insiders of 
financial institutions.
Land Flips
A land flip is the practice of buying and selling a parcel of land very quickly, often in a 
single day or month, at a successively higher price to related parties, until a lender—who 
believes the transaction is at arm’s length—provides financing on an unrealistically inflated 
loan amount. The key components of the scheme in sequential order are as follows:
1. The same piece of property is sold back and forth between a borrower—the fraudster— 
and dummy or shell corporations.
2. Each time the land is sold, the price is inflated.
3. To support each sale, the borrower secures an appraisal based on an unrealistic or 
favorable set of assumptions, or performed by a friendly, incompetent or dishonest 
appraiser.
4. The borrower goes to a financial institution—the victim—and mortgages the property 
for its appraised value, keeping the grossly inflated loan proceeds.
5. The fraudster defaults on the loan.
False Appraisals
Fraud perpetrators use false and inflated appraisals to support loans larger than the true 
value of the property. Appraisers are either parties to the fraud or paid off, or they are 
merely unqualified—that is, easily fooled by bogus transactions like land flips—to perform 
the appraisal.
Nominee Loans
Nominee loans are those made in the name of a straw (dummy) borrower or agent—that is, 
a borrower having no substance—while the identity of the real borrower is undisclosed to 
the lender.
Double Pledging Collateral
This scheme involves fraudulently pledging the same collateral with different lenders, 
before the related liens are recorded and registered. This obviously hinders the lender’s 
ability to look to the collateral as a source of recovery when the borrower defaults.
Real Estate Fraud Detection
Lenders or other interested parties can often detect real estate fraud by observing one or 
more of the following warning signs:
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• A single borrower has received multiple loans.
• The same appraiser has appraised two or more different properties for the same 
borrower within a short period of time.
• The same appraiser has made successive appraisals of the same property at high values 
in a short period of time.
• The property was bought or sold many times in a short period.
• The borrower is a shell with no real substance or a holding company whose substance 
lies hidden in its numerous subsidiaries.
• The buyer is obviously shopping for a loan instead of a long-term banking relationship.
• The seller of the property is another bank.
• The borrower has a prior default history.
• The borrower has a history of loan payoffs by obtaining other, larger loans.
• The loan application contains requests for several loans to different persons on the same 
property.
• The borrower requires the loan as a condition before delivering large deposits to the 
bank, with the loan being the inducement for establishing a continuing banking 
relationship.
6.4.5 Money Transfer Fraud
Wires totaling two to three times a bank’s assets may be processed every business day. It is 
rare that wires do not at least equal a bank’s total assets, and they can sometimes be ten 
times the assets for banks that have a large correspondent network. The process is highly 
automated at most banks.
In the most common money transfer fraud, an outsider or bank employee with access to the 
correct identification numbers needed to wire transfer funds, steals the funds. In one case in 
Chicago, a bank insider with knowledge of the wire transfer codes and procedures 
conspired with his friends to wire nearly $70 million out of the country. The scheme was 
detected (early enough to avoid a loss to the bank) when the transfer was made from a 
customer’s account, thereby overdrawing the account balance.
Warning signs for this kind of fraud include:
• Clerks rather than more senior personnel perform actual processing.
• Managerial personnel conduct frequent overrides of the established approval authority 
controls.
• There is evidence of wires to and from offshore banks in countries known for their bank 
secrecy laws.
• There are routine high volume, high dollar transfers.
• There are frequent wires for persons with no account at the bank.
• Access to the wire room is often not properly restricted.
• Employees become very comfortable with the routine of the job and with their 
coworkers.
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Variations of these schemes involve misrepresenting the customer’s identity. The fraudster 
will use pretext telephone calls to obtain correct account information from the bank. Then 
the fraudster obtains the codes from an insider. Thereafter, the fraudster makes a telephone 
call to transfer the funds out of the bank.
6.4.6 Money Laundering
Money laundering refers to the process of turning dirty money into clean money. The primary 
objective is to conceal the existence, source or use of illicit money and thus the underlying 
offence—whether the offence is trade in illegal narcotics, robbery, fraud, illegal political 
contributions, tax evasion, prostitution or any other criminal activity. Money launderers 
may also want to obstruct investigative efforts, preserve assets from forfeiture, and evade 
taxes.
Perpetrators may launder money in the country in which the crime is committed or where 
the funds originated; more often, however, they send the money across an international 
border. Usually they deposit the money in a bank or other institution in a tax haven and it 
comes back clean in the form of salaries, loans, fees or services.
Money Laundering Methods
There are three main methods for laundering money:
1. Through legitimate fronts
2. Through couriers and smurfs
3. Through the cooperation of a bank insider who ignores the reporting guidelines
Each of these methods has certain unique characteristics; however, they also have some 
common characteristics:
1. Large cash shipments
2. Large volume of wire transfers to and from offshore banks (However, not all offshore 
wire transfers involve money laundering—see below.)
Legitimate Fronts. Many money launderers open a legitimate front business that handles a 
great deal of cash—for instance, a casino, restaurant, parking lot, vending machine 
company, or pawnshop—and then deposit the ill-gotten gain along with the legitimate 
income of the business. Perpetrators then commingle the illegal cash with the legitimate 
receipts thereby disguising any illegal sources. They then withdraw the cleaned money or 
wire-transfer it to a final destination.
Interested parties, for example a bank or bonding company, can usually detect this kind of 
fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• Accounts accumulate deposits that are subsequently transferred out.
• Cash deposits from sources are not identified as customers of the business.
• There is a sudden and unexplained increase in the volume of cash deposits.
Money launderers can use gambling casinos. The ill-gotten cash is used to purchase chips. 
Later the launderers exchange the chips remaining at the end of a controlled (carefully 
limiting losses) gambling session for money and receive the proceeds in the form of a check 
from the casino, thereby creating a seemingly legitimate paper trail.
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Smurfing. One variation of the money laundering scheme is to use special couriers, called 
smurfs, to make relatively small deposits and withdrawals. For example, cash deposits of 
$10,000 or more must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a special form 
called a Currency Transaction Report (CTR). To avoid this reporting requirement, smurfs 
make deposits or withdrawals just below this threshold amount.
Banks and other interested parties can usually detect this kind of fraud by observing one or 
more of the following warning signs:
• Withdrawals made in numerous transactions just under $10,000.
• Customers who are not account holders exchanging large amounts of small bills for 
large denomination bills.
• Inquiries as to policies of the bank regarding reporting currency transactions.
• Large dollar volume of cashier’s checks and money orders sold for cash to customers 
who are not account holders.
• Persons shown as unemployed and self-employed on a CTR.
Breaches of the Reporting Guidelines. In still another variation, the money launderer conspires 
with a bank insider, who agrees to make deposits for the money launderer and forego the 
reporting mechanisms. The bank gets free use of the deposited funds, and in some 
instances, the bank officer is compromised through a bribe or kickback. Banks can usually 
detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• An account with many different individuals making deposits, and only a few making 
large withdrawals.
• Accounts with accumulated deposits that are subsequently transferred out.
• High dollar limits and large numbers of bank customers exempted from CTR 
requirements.
• An incorrect or incomplete CTR.
Money Laundering Mechanics
Although laundering and offshore banking conjure up images of financial wizardry and 
international tax lawyers and accountants, most illegal activity involves the simple addition 
of some layers to the basics common to ordinary business transactions. In essence, 
laundering works like this.
Party A, who has come by the dirty money (or legitimate money that needs to be 
laundered) gives it to Party B, who is the laundryman. Party B sends the money offshore 
where it is deposited and funds are subsequently disbursed or laundered and then returned 
to Party A for use.
During the laundering, Party B, having received the money from Party A, sets about 
concealing it. Having the money in currency upon receipt makes the job easier. If the 
money is in paper (checks, and so on), Party B may have to first start the laundering process 
by converting it to local currency. Party B has, or sets up, one or more local companies, of 
which he or she is the owner, manager or employee, depending on the relationship to Party 
A.
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Now the offshore part of the process begins. Party B goes to a tax haven lawyer and 
establishes an offshore company: loan companies, finance companies, or trusts are 
preferable. Party B’s name does not appear anywhere in the legal documents.
The company in the tax haven opens an offshore bank account. Party B travels to the 
haven with the currency, and Party B or the lawyer buys a cashier’s check at the bank with 
the tax haven company as remitter. The lawyer then draws up the necessary loan 
documents to show a loan from the haven company to Party B’s local company. Party B 
then returns home with the cashier’s check. Thus, the money is brought back home as a 
loan (which being capital, not revenue, is not taxable) and is clean.
Party A on his own, or through Party B, now makes use of the laundered funds by drawing 
out salaries, obtaining loans from Party B’s local company, paying dividends, opening a 
corporate expense account, using a company car, and so on.
Party B’s local company files appropriate tax returns and makes note of payments, or at 
least interest payments. Interest is deducted on the company’s tax return. If the company 
loses money, it has a tax offset. Party B does nothing illegal in the local country and, of 
course, makes interest payments on the loan payable to the offshore company, allowing 
further funds to be moved.
If a law enforcement agency questions the loans, the company will obtain full 
documentation from Party B’s attorney in the tax haven. Inquiries beyond documents will 
be blocked by the haven’s secrecy requirements.
Offshore Banks and Tax Havens
There are many reasons, some legitimate and some not, why money launderers transfer 
money and other valuable securities from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that has 
secret banking privileges. These foreign jurisdictions are commonly referred to as tax 
havens because, in addition to bank secrecy laws, they had no income taxes so people or 
companies first used them to (legally) minimize or to (illegally) evade taxes.
Tax haven is now a misnomer, since funds may be deposited for reasons other than escaping 
tax. Tax havens have grown in popularity in recent times as one of the few means of 
placing funds beyond the reach of creditors or other investigators. It did not take long for 
criminal organizations and individuals to exploit the sanctuary of the tax haven. With the 
development of multinational banking systems and international business and commerce, it 
became easy to put together sophisticated laundering schemes to move the proceeds of 
crime to foreign banks protected from intrusion by law enforcement officials.
The World’s Tax Havens. Switzerland has a long history as an international tax haven, 
imposing little financial regulation and strict secrecy laws. Many other countries have 
jumped aboard the bandwagon. The key tax havens include—
• Bermuda and the Caribbean: Antigua, Bahamas, Caymans, Montserrat, Netherlands 
Antilles, St. Vincent, and Turks and Caicos.
• Central America: Panama and Costa Rica.
• Channel Islands: Guernsey and Jersey.
• Pacific: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vanuatu.
• Other locations: Liberia, Bahrain, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Cyprus.
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Offshore Facilities. Typically, the tax haven’s biggest domestic industries are banks, financial 
institutions, companies, trusts, agents, accountants and attorneys who collectively constitute 
offshore facilities. Facilities that are available in tax havens include—
• Banks. There are two classes of banks. Class A banks conduct local business transactions 
in the tax haven. Class B banks exist on paper only, as they conduct no local business 
transactions.
• Companies and trusts. Companies can be incorporated in the tax haven; trusts (such as 
family, estate, or other kinds) can be set up.
• Offshore agents, accountants and attorneys. These are an essential element of the offshore 
facilities in a tax haven.
The Tax Haven’s Rationale. Tax havens encourage offshore facilities for economic, political 
and social reasons, all of which benefit their residents. For example, offshore facilities 
generate up to 20 percent of the Caymans’ revenues, balance the budget in Montserrat 
(through licensing fees) and have a huge impact on local economies, particularly those of 
economically emerging countries.
For example, in 1964 the Caymans had one or two multinational banks and virtually no 
companies. By 1981 they had thirty multinational banks, 300 Class B banks, and about 
13,600 companies, the latter handled by a small number of lawyers, accountants and 
agents. The Caymans’ total population in 1981 was about 15,000.
Many havens claim that the United States blames them for problems that it is unable to 
solve domestically. Furthermore, offshore competition is so stiff that it is estimated that if 
one country were to cease being a tax haven three more would start. (When Switzerland 
relaxed its secrecy laws, Bahamian and Caymanian business grew at a rapid rate.) Also, 
bank brokers move from island to island as laws tighten or loosen.
A local Bahamian bank executive summed it up when he said
The Bahamas must do things which are not allowed in the United States because 
to do things which are allowed in the United States is noncompetitive, since in 
every instance the United States does it better than the Bahamas do. The 
Bahamas are therefore compelled in banking and trust operations to appeal to 
unallowable activities and by inference to appeal to activities disallowed in the 
United States.
Secrecy. The vital characteristic of a tax haven is that it allows offshore facilities to conduct 
their affairs behind a veil of secrecy. Tax havens offer not only secret, numbered bank 
accounts but also corporate laws and secrecy provisions that prevent law enforcement 
officials from intruding. In addition, lawyers from tax havens offer a further level of secrecy 
because they too are shielded by the haven’s secrecy laws, they maintain attorney-client 
privilege, they sometimes do not know who their clients are, or they may be coconspirators, 
or any combination thereof.
Tax havens view secrecy as a necessity for keeping offshore business. Business people from 
various parts of the world (the Middle East and South America, for example) consider 
secrecy to be a normal characteristic of business affairs. Flight capital (money being sent out 
of politically unstable countries) has to be transferred secretly. Thus, it is not only criminals 
but also politicians and governments to whom secrecy is attractive.
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Civil secrecy exists in common law as the result of a British case, Union v. Tournier (1907). 
This case established that a banker had a duty to treat his customer’s affairs as confidential. 
Many havens follow this law. Some jurisdictions have passed stringent, criminal laws to 
buttress Tournier—for example, the Bahamas and the Caymans. Corporate laws in the 
havens also aid secrecy by permitting nominee owners and bearer shares, prohibiting 
disclosure of the beneficial owner, not requiring financial statements and audits, and 
allowing the purchase of companies off the shelf.
Quite apart from the law, secrecy prevails in some tax havens by virtue of inadequate 
records, unskilled administrators and corruption.
Vehicles Used to Transfer Funds to Tax Havens. Individuals or businesses can use several kinds 
of institutions to transfer funds to tax havens. These include banks with international 
branches or facilities, smaller trust companies and banking institutions, shipping companies, 
real estate companies, travel agencies, money changers, insurance companies, finance 
companies, brokerage and investment companies, international trading companies, holding 
companies, and multinational corporations. The transfers themselves may be legal or 
illegal. The transfer can be accomplished by means of letters of credit to a bank in a tax 
haven, a bank draft, a wire transfer, or the transport of cash itself.
File Folders. Money launderers can purchase a set of legal papers in tax havens—for 
example, legal documents, financial statements, and banking documents dated some years 
before they are purchased. These documents make it appear that the company has been in 
business for several years. In reality, of course, it never previously existed. These 
companies have no substance.
Tax Havens and Law Enforcement. The combination of offshore corporate entities and secret 
bank accounts in tax havens permits entities to construct a maze of financial transactions. 
The tracing of assets becomes a very complex task. The transferring of questionable funds 
from one tax haven jurisdiction to another greatly compounds the complexity.
Enforcement problems are pervasive, affecting not only criminal but also civil actions (such 
as divorces, bankruptcies, and so on). Investigating cases takes a tremendous effort, and 
conviction is by no means certain. There is no central clearing house to handle offshore 
inquiries.
Investigations into Narcotics Trafficking
Narcotics trafficking is currently the primary source of laundered funds. The sophistication 
and complexity of laundering schemes are virtually infinite and are limited only by the 
creativity and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs who devise the schemes. Organized 
crime uses banks and other financial institutions in the course of laundering as routinely, if 
not as frequently, as legitimate businesses use banks for legitimate purposes.
Previously, much of the investigation into narcotics trafficking occurred on the street in 
which the drugs were followed to identify the dealers. Although this led to many successful 
prosecutions, it seldom exposed the leaders of the organizations. The problem with a street 
investigation is that the authorities generally cannot make a buy from, or a sale to, the top 
person in the organization without the use of an informant, who is generally unreliable. 
Furthermore, because the sentences received by drug traffickers were often so light,
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perpetrators considered the risk worth taking—and the leaders of the organizations 
continued to be insulated.
Currently, law enforcement authorities obtain financial documentation during seizures in 
order to establish that certain individuals possess goods that far exceed their known sources 
of income. This technique has made possible the successful prosecution of the leaders in 
drug trafficking schemes. Generally investigators use two methods to prove the flow of 
funds obtained from narcotics trafficking:
1. Net worth analyses
2. Sources and uses of funds
6.4.7 Check Fraud
Check fraud is a general term for the attempted negotiation of bad checks at a financial 
institution. Typically con artists prey on banks in an attempt to negotiate fraudulent or 
fictitious instruments. Common kinds of check fraud include forged, altered, and stolen 
checks; new account fraud; and check kiting.
Forged, Altered, and Stolen Checks
Most attempts to defraud banks involve one or more of the following:
1. Checks bearing the forged names of makers, endorsers or payees.
2. Altered checks showing increased amounts.
3. Counterfeit checks.
4. Stolen checks passed by others.
Bank officers and other investigators can detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more 
of the following warning signs:
• Obvious written alterations on checks
• Illegible maker, endorser or officer signatures
• Checks imprinted with a maximum amount, or the term void, or nonnegotiable
• Unprofessional printing
• Business checks presented for cash instead of deposit
New Account Fraud
Check fraud is much more likely to occur in new accounts than in established accounts. 
Bank employees must make special efforts to properly identify the potential new customer, 
without offending existing customers. Banks should establish screening criteria that must be 
enforced by everyone handling new accounts. These employees must take prompt, decisive 
action to manage or close (or both) apparent problem accounts.
Most perpetrators of new account fraud use false identification. Examples include 
fraudulent birth certificates, fraudulent passports, duplicate social security numbers, 
fraudulent voter registration cards, stolen credit cards, stolen driver’s licenses, stolen 
paychecks, front (shell) businesses, fraudulent student-identification cards, and disguised 
identities (including post office box mail address, lock box rental, mail forwarding, 
telephone answering service, and rented office space).
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New-account criminals are professionals. They use false identification to open new accounts 
and steal money before the bank collects the funds. Bank officers can normally detect new- 
account fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
1. The customer resides outside the bank’s normal trade area.
2. The customer rushes to open an account and obtain a loan.
3. The customer’s dress or actions, or both, are inappropriate for his or her stated age, 
occupation or income level.
To help prevent this kind of fraud, banks should consider adopting the following 
procedures:
1. Implement well-defined procedures for increasing employee awareness of new-account 
fraud.
2. Establish specific guidance about acceptable identification and its reporting.
3. Require detailed verification of customer’s information, including—
— Previous checking account history (internal and external investigation).
— Credit reports and credit scoring systems.
— Dun & Bradstreet reports.
— Better Business Bureau reports.
— Special requests for no mail contact.
— Post office box or hotel address.
Check Kiting
Check kiting is a term for building up large apparent balances in one or more bank accounts, 
based on uncollected or floated checks drawn against similar accounts in other banks. As 
banks decrease the amount of time taken to clear checks, this kind of fraud is becoming less 
common. Although many individuals engage to some degree in kiting, a commercial 
customer can perpetrate this scheme by using several bank accounts to increase available 
cash reserves.
The brokerage firm, E.F. Hutton, committed one of the most significant check-kiting 
schemes perpetrated in the United States. They engaged in a $20-million kiting scheme to 
decrease the cost of their funds during the late 1980s. The resultant bad publicity eventually 
led to the company’s demise.
Check Kiting, Illustrated. In commercial bank accounts established over a period of time to 
avoid suspicion, a fraudster starts with little or no money in Bank A and Bank B, and writes 
$5,000 in checks on each for deposit in the other:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $5,000 $5,000 $10,000
Actual Balances -0- -0- -0-
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The process is quickly repeated (for example, the next day) with $8,000 in deposited 
checks:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $13,000 $13,000 $26,000
Actual Balances -0- -0- -0-
A $6,000 down payment is made on a Mercedes from a check written from Bank A.
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $7,000 $13,000 $20,000
Actual Balances ($6,000) -0- ($6,000)
The next day additional checks for $4,000 each are written and deposited into each 
account:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $11,000 $17,000 $28,000
Actual Balances ($6,000) -0- ($6,000)
The balances are then paid to a travel agent, and the fraudster takes a long trip:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances -0- -0- -0-
Actual Balances ($17,000) ($17,000) ($34,000)
Check Kiting Characteristics. Bank personnel usually uncover check-kiting schemes by 
observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• Frequent deposits and checks in same amounts.
• Frequent deposits and checks in round amounts.
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• Frequent deposits of checks written on the same paying bank, which is not the deposit 
bank.
• Little time lag between deposits and withdrawals.
• Frequent Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) account balance inquiries.
• Many large deposits made on Thursday or Friday to take advantage of the weekend.
• Large periodic balances in individual accounts with no apparent business explanation.
• Low average balance compared to high level of deposits.
• Many checks made payable to other banks.
• Bank willingness to pay against uncollected funds (note that not all payments against 
uncollected funds are check kites, but all check kites require payments against 
uncollected funds).
• Cash withdrawals with deposit checks drawn on another bank.
• Checks drawn on foreign banks with lax banking laws and regulations.
Slowing the Bank-Clearing Process. Before the days of sophisticated computer systems, a 
check-kiting scheme could develop using less paper, fewer financial institutions, and smaller 
amounts than are commonly used today. Banks can still be hit with large losses when a 
fraudster slows down the bank clearing process. Typical fraudsters’ procedures include—
• Using counter checks without any computer or Magnetic Ink Character Recognition 
(MICR) coding.
• Providing insufficient information on checks (for example, using an incomplete name of 
a bank and branch, leaving out the account number, giving an illegible signature).
• Making errors on the face of checks such as date and figures.
• Defacing the check (for example, by using staples).
• Placing stop payments on certain documents.
• Having accounts in institutions other than chartered banks (that is, trust companies and 
credit unions).
New Techniques. It is now very difficult to effect a check-kiting scheme employing the same 
procedures as in the past. Banks are reluctant to accept counter checks; more significantly, 
checks usually take only one day to clear. This is true even for checks issued on out-of-town 
or out-of-state banks. The financial institutions claim that, in the near future, checks will 
clear instantaneously. To counteract the tightening of bank procedures, the fraudster has 
had to increase the number of financial institutions used, the dollar amounts, and frequency 
of checks issued.
Check-Kiting Scheme Investigations. The main issues to be addressed when investigating a 
check-kiting scheme are as follows:
1. The loss does not necessarily occur at the time of detection. Banks are usually put at 
increasing financial risk over a period of time.
2. Accounting evidence must show that—
a. Control was exerted over a number of accounts.
b. A loss did occur.
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c. Economic risk has increased as shown by day-by-day analysis.
d. Every time the perpetrator withdraws money from the system of accounts (in excess 
of the deposits put into the system), the bank incurs a loss or risk of loss.
e. The volume of inter-account checks is high.
3. The bank must determine whether it gave implied credit to the accused through daylight 
overdraft privileges, which allow an overdraft balance at the end of a business day to be 
cleared up before the close of the next business day to cover the previous day’s 
overdraft.
4. The timing of the investigation and the availability of legible microfilm documentation 
are important.
5. Documentation of the modus operandi needs liberal use of visual aids.
Accounting Assistance. When investigating check-kiting, the CPA should—
• Identify the fraudster-controlled accounts because the financial institutions where they 
are maintained risk suffering economic losses.
• Identify and demonstrate the loss. This task is difficult because there is a mistaken 
tendency to regard loss as occurring at the termination of the check-kiting scheme. In 
fact, however, the risk of loss usually builds up day by day, over a period of several 
months. Recognition of the economic loss occurs when the perpetrator abandons the 
fraudulent activity for whatever reasons (this is equivalent to the game of musical 
chairs—the loss isn’t recognized until the music stops).
• Perform a day-by-day analysis to show both the buildup of the loss and the increase in 
economic risk to the financial institutions.
• Recognize that a check-kiting scheme could take place over an extended period of time 
without the knowledge of the bank. This is an issue that is frequently raised in court. 
This component is an educational aspect for many: lawyers, police, bank officials, 
laymen, and even CPAs find check kiting difficult to understand.
• Try to accomplish the difficult task of demonstrating to a court of law that this case was 
not merely an unbroken circle of checks and that this shell game, which was apparently 
tolerated by the financial institutions, resulted in economic loss to them.
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Mr. I.M. Kiter Case Study
Recently, between January and the middle of March, an extremely busy, well- 
respected professional, Mr. I.M. Kiter, operated a massive check-kiting scheme that 
employed at least eight bank accounts at three separate financial institutions. For 
two-and-a-half months he was able to falsely inflate the value of his accounts by 
issuing checks to or from his various accounts.
About four weeks before the scheme was uncovered, one of the financial institutions 
was sufficiently concerned about the status of Mr. Kiter’s accounts that it would 
only accept certified checks for deposit. This had the effect of reducing the clearing 
time to zero days or in certain instances to minus one day (the check was certified
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the day before it was deposited). Despite these restrictions, Mr. I.M. Kiter was able 
to continue his check-kiting scheme for the following reasons:
1. The other financial institutions did not require deposited checks to be certified.
2. Some overdraft privileges were permitted.
3. Mr. Kiter spoke with the financial institutions daily and explained away his 
suspicious conduct.
4. Checks were not return marked not sufficient funds (NSF), as required by bank 
policy, because the bank’s normal policies were changed for Mr. Kiter, a good 
customer.
5. The bank permitted daily daylight overdraft privileges.
Forensic accountants performed an analysis of the deposit and disbursement activity 
in the various bank accounts. With the exception of the closing bank overdraft, the 
deposits totaled about $87.5 million, of which more than $85 million represented 
money circulated among the eight accounts controlled by Mr. Kiter. The total 
amount of actual deposits from noncontrolled accounts only amounted to about 
$2.5 million. The ending balance in one of Mr. Kiter’s accounts at Anytown Bank 
was a negative $1.7 million. This overdraft balance resulted in a loss that was fully 
absorbed by Anytown Bank. Forensic accountants also performed an analysis of an 
account maintained by Mr. Kiter at Bigtown Bank for the period March 1 to March 
10. This analysis indicated that Bigtown Bank permitted ongoing overdraft 
privileges to Mr. Kiter in amounts up to almost $1 million. Closer inspection 
revealed the extent of Mr. Kiter’s abuse of the daylight overdraft privileges.
This practice was confirmed by the review of Bigtown Bank’s credit 
correspondence, and demonstrated that the departure from Bigtown Bank’s policy 
allowed Mr. Kiter to continue the check-kiting scheme in an uninterrupted fashion. 
In fact, when the kiting scheme fell apart, it provided Mr. Kiter with a defensible 
position for court purposes (that is, his conduct was condoned or blessed by Bigtown 
Bank).
The practices of Bigtown Bank also raised the questions as to whether the economic 
loss suffered by Anytown Bank was because of the check-kiting scheme, or because 
of the conduct of Bigtown Bank. Evidence introduced during the trial did not 
establish that the banks were aware of the kiting scheme. However, there was 
evidence that Bigtown Bank knew that Mr. Kiter was having some cash flow 
difficulties pertaining to closing a number of real estate deals. Handwritten 
comments from the Bigtown Bank branch manager to his credit department 
indicated that—
1. The bank closely monitored Mr. Kiter’s account.
2. The bank allowed certified checks to cover the overdraft daily.
3. The bank tolerated daily overdraft amounts of approximately $ 1 million.
4. The bank received substantial revenues via overdraft and service charges (an 
example of the bank greed factor).
5. The bank indicated at a meeting held with Mr. Kiter on February 25th that it 
would permit the overdraft arrangement to continue for another sixty days.
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6. Mr. Kiter had social connections and was a source of business for the bank.
Although Mr. Kiter was found guilty, the judge’s ruling implied that prior 
knowledge of the check-kiting scheme on the part of one of the banks weakened the 
prosecution’s case.
6.5 Individuals versus Insurance Companies
Insurance fraud generally consists of a presentation to an insurance company of a 
materially false or misleading written statement relating to either an application or claim for 
insurance. Fraud occurs not only when there is an actual loss (that is, a claim is made based 
on bogus information), but also when there is a risk of loss. This distinction is important for 
insurance fraud because insurance policies relate to risks. Accordingly, if an insurance 
policy based on a material misstatement is placed, the insurance company is the victim of a 
fraud because there was the risk of a claim, even if no claims are made on the policy.
Some insurance policies relate to risks faced by individuals, whereas others relate to risks 
faced by corporations. This section deals with both kinds.
6.5.1 Life Insurance Fraud
Life insurance is a policy that pays the insured’s beneficiary a predetermined amount of 
money in the event of the insured’s death. Common life insurance frauds include homicide 
fraud, staged-death fraud, preexisting health condition fraud, and double-indemnity fraud.
Homicide Fraud
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy may commit homicide to collect benefits. In these 
cases, there are actually two victims—the person who has been murdered (see section 
6.2.6), and the insurance company, which is required to make a payment on the policy.
Staged Death Fraud
An insured might fake his or her death in order to collect benefits. A variation of this 
scheme occurs when a policy is taken out on an insured who is already dead.
Preexisting Health Condition Fraud
An otherwise uninsurable person obtains a life insurance policy through false health 
statements on the application describing preexisting health conditions. The normal, 
minimal medical examination would not be sufficient to expose the condition. The insured 
hopes to die of causes unrelated to the feared condition—that is, a condition that would 
otherwise prevent the policy from being issued—and without an autopsy being performed, 
so that the insurer will pay the policy benefits.
Double Indemnity
In some cases, a beneficiary of a life insurance policy will report the death as having been 
accidental in order to obtain twice the face value of the policy. A variation of this scheme 
occurs when a beneficiary attempts to make a suicide appear to have been accidental.
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6.5.2 Casualty Insurance Fraud
Casualty insurance covers the personal injuries and property damage that result from an 
accident or other covered occurrence. While accidents can occur anywhere and at any 
time, a large number of casualty claims involve injuries sustained in traffic accidents. The 
following are the common casualty insurance frauds:
• Staged accidents
• Mortgage insurance fraud
• Legitimate accidents with false claims
• Personal injury insurance fraud
• Fraudulent claims
Staged Accidents
A staged accident is one in which, for example, an individual will purposely pull out into 
the path of an oncoming vehicle or will allow themselves to be rear-ended in order to cause 
a collision. A fraudulent claim is then made for nonexistent personal injuries or a falsely 
inflated claim is made for real injury. These kinds of insurance fraud usually involve rings of 
individuals, including unscrupulous doctors, attorneys and claim adjusters.
Mortgage Insurance Fraud
Mortgage insurance is a policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the 
purchaser of the property defaults on those payments because of death or disability. A 
typical mortgage insurance fraud is a variation on a staged accident fraud—for example, an 
employee who is laid off from work claims that he is disabled, so his mortgage is paid via 
his mortgage insurance policy.
Legitimate Accidents with False Claims
In many cases, an individual is involved in a legitimate accident and later exaggerates his or 
her personal injuries (usually soft-tissue injuries) to bilk the insurance company.
Personal Injury Insurance Fraud
Personal injury insurance fraud usually involves lying about the circumstances of the cause 
of an injury so as to bring it within the insurance coverage. For example, a worker covered 
by workers compensation insurance injures his back while working at home but reports it 
as a job-related injury to come within the workers compensation insurance coverage.
Fraudulent Claims
A fraudulent claim is one in which, for example, an insured’s auto is brought into a body 
shop for repair after a legitimate accident. The body shop inflates the claim, typically to 
cover the deductible. The body shop may then pay a cash bribe to the claims adjuster or 
intentionally cause additional damage to the car to maximize its profit.
In another example, an insured seeks the cooperation of a scrap yard that has the capability 
to crush autos. The insured has his auto crushed and files a theft claim. If the auto is not 
recovered within a reasonable span of time, the claim is paid. The insured then pays the 
scrap yard for destroying the vehicle without a trace.
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In still another variation, a wrecked vehicle is located and insured. A bogus accident is 
concocted and a fraudulent claim is filed. Using the same vehicle, this scheme is often 
repeated with different insurance companies.
6.5.3 Health Insurance Fraud
Health insurance is a policy that covers someone’s health in the event that the person is 
injured or becomes ill. Common health insurance schemes include mobile labs, bundling 
and unbundling claims, and collusion between an insured and a provider.
Mobile Labs
In the usual mobile lab scam, a group of people set up a lab in a storefront located in a blue- 
collar, low income area, often where English is the second language. They then pass out 
fliers in the parking lot of a minimum wage manufacturing firm, offering free physicals to 
people who have medical insurance. After filling out a family history, the insured is 
subjected to extensive tests for a variety of maladies, and the average physical ends up 
costing the insurer three to four thousands dollars. When the insured returns for the results 
of the tests, the lab is gone.
Bundling and Unbundling Claims
Bundling and unbundling claims is the practice of physicians or clinics billing separately for 
medical services performed at the same time. For example, an insured woman has a 
hysterectomy performed and at the same time she also has her appendix removed. The 
physician, however, bills the insurance company as if the appendectomy was a completely 
separate procedure.
Insured-Provider Collusion
In collusion between an insured and a provider, the provider furnishes the insured with a 
bill for services not actually rendered. The insured makes an application for reimbursement 
to the insurance company, and the proceeds are divided between the insured and the 
provider.
6.5.4 Property Insurance Fraud
Property insurance is a policy that covers an individual or corporation’s property from loss 
(whether stolen or destroyed), up to a predetermined amount of money. Common property 
insurance schemes include: staged false theft, repossessed household goods, pawned 
personal property, and arson.
Staged False Theft
In staged false theft, an insured secretes property he or she owns and reports it stolen, or 
alternatively reports property stolen that he or she never owned.
In a recent case involving Michael Jackson CDs, a music distributor had misjudged the 
demand for the CD and had excess inventory on hand. A theft was then staged in order to 
offload the excess stock, which was then destroyed. When forensic accountants revealed the 
lack of demand and the excess inventory, the distributor dropped his claim.
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Repossessed Household Goods
Repossessed household goods fraud occurs when, for example, household items (furniture, 
appliances, and so on) are repossessed, and the insured reports the property was stolen.
Pawned Personal Property
When pawning personal property, a fraudster may inflate the value of his or her personal 
belongings, insure them, and then pawn them for a lesser amount of cash. The fraudster 
then reports them stolen and files a claim. Once the insurance payment is received, the 
fraudster then redeems the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance 
payment, and pockets the difference. These schemes can be risky to the perpetrator, 
however, because in most states pawnshops are required to check customer identification 
and keep records of their transactions, in order to facilitate police investigations of reported 
thefts.
Arson
Arson is the purposeful destruction of property by fires, sometimes for profit. For example, 
an insured may be about to lose his or her house, car, or business due to an inability to 
make loan payments. The insured sets fire to the property to collect the insurance proceeds. 
Alternatively, an insured may replace an item with something less expensive when he or 
she remodels after the fire.
Arson can also be committed by companies, which then file claims under their property 
insurance policies as well as their business interruption policies. This is covered in 
chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7:
Commercial Crime
7.1 Overview
7.1.1 Definitions
The terms white-collar crime, economic crime, and commercial crime are not legal ones and are 
often used interchangeably. This chapter covers the distinctions between these terms.
White-Collar and Economic Crimes
Although scholars differ widely in their definition of white-collar crime, the Dictionary of 
Criminal Justice Data Terminology, published by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, defines 
white-collar crime as: “non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of 
deception by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi- 
professional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also non­
violent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by anyone having special 
technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the 
person’s occupation.” This definition includes most if not all of the crimes and behaviors 
described in this Handbook.
Economic crime has a similar definition regarding its objective and methodology, that is, 
crime committed for economic gain by means of deception; however, economic crime is 
broader in its scope than white-collar crime: it could also include violent crimes committed 
by people without any particular occupational status—for example, armed robbery.
Commercial Crime
The term commercial crime is frequently used as a substitute for the terms white-collar 
crime and economic crime. However, for purposes of this Handbook, a more restrictive 
definition is adopted: that is, commercial crime is white-collar crime committed by an 
individual or a group of individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and, 
indirectly, themselves.
This distinction, that is, between fraud committed against a business or commercial entity, 
and commercial crime committed by a business or commercial entity—is a useful one. 
Historically, our legal system, institutions, and even the procedures adopted by auditors 
have tended to focus more on conventional fraud committed purely for personal gain. In 
recent years, however, awareness has been heightened to the possibility of the business or 
commercial entity itself being the perpetrator.
Frauds against investors and environmental crime are two examples that have received 
increasing, media attention.
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7.1.2 Victims of Commercial Crime
Victims of commercial crime can include—
• Customers—for example, through false advertising and price fixing.
• Competitors—for example, through industrial espionage and intentional copyright 
infringement.
• Creditors—for example, through a planned bankruptcy.
• Investors—for example, through false financial statements and other securities fraud.
• The general public—for example, through environmental abuse.
In addition, the practice of organizational bribe giving may victimize any one of the above 
groups—for example, the general public when a bribe is given in the awarding of a 
government contract.
7.1.3 Extent of Commercial Crime
Two decades ago commercial crime received much less media attention than today, largely 
being confined to a short paragraph or two in the business section of the nation’s 
newspapers, if it was mentioned at all. Today’s front-page stories are a testimony to the 
current widespread public interest in and concern about commercial crime. Scholars 
attribute this growing emphasis to, among other things, a greater skepticism about the 
behavior of persons in authority. The alleged crimes of Whitewater involving President 
Clinton and his associates only deepen the mood of distrust of those in prominent places.
Statistics suggest that there is some reason for distrust. For instance, KPMG Peat Marwick’s 
1998 Fraud Survey reported that false financial statements caused losses of $1 million or 
more in 42 percent of the reported instances, whereas in the 1994 survey, losses of this 
magnitude represented only 24 percent of the total losses.
While it is true that surveys only deal with reported crime, what is clear is that the extent 
and value of reported commercial crime is on the increase. Many experts believe that many 
frauds go unreported and that the extent of unreported commercial crime is also on the 
increase.
7.1.4 Responsibility for Commercial Crime
Some scholars debate whether individuals should be held responsible for crimes committed 
on behalf of their organizations. Although some direct benefit accrues to the perpetrator, far 
more benefit accrues to the organization.
Regardless of whether the organization is held liable, the frauds are a direct result of some 
human action or interaction: if a business is like a dynamite charge, someone must push the 
plunger.
Most criminal statutes require that the guilty person have the required criminal intent. 
However, an organization can be held liable even if it were unaware of or did not 
participate in the fraud. The law recognizes two theories of organizational responsibility:
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1. The identification theory. The organization is held liable when the employees and 
organizations can be viewed as one and the same, for example, a small business owner 
who has incorporated.
2. The imputation theory. The organization is held responsible for the actions of its 
employees through the doctrine of respondeat superiour, a seventeenth century doctrine 
that means “let the superior respond.” The legal theory was developed from civil 
lawsuits to prevent employers from denying financial responsibility for the acts of their 
employees.
7.1.5 Characteristics of Commercial Crime
While commercial crime can take many forms, often it is distinguished by one or more of 
these characteristics: tolerance, diffusion of harm, and rationalization.
Tolerance
While awareness of commercial crime has increased in recent years, there still remains a 
somewhat greater tolerance for this form of crime as compared to violent crimes such as 
armed robbery, or those involving drugs. This greater tolerance may stem not so much 
from the nature of the crime itself, but rather from the perception of the perpetrator as 
being somehow more civilized. Anybody with strength, decent aim, or access to poison, can 
commit murder, but only a limited number of respectable corporate executives or directors 
are in a position to violate antitrust legislation.
Diffusion of Harm
Another notable characteristic of most kinds of commercial crime is that there are often 
numerous victims who are frequently unaware that they have been harmed. Death from 
smog or asbestos poisoning is very likely to be slow and insidious, and its victims will be 
hard-pressed to relate their terminal illness to its precise cause, given the complicated 
nature of other possible contributing factors. A factory worker with cancer is not likely to be 
certain whether it was the toxic chemicals that he handled for fifteen years, the fact that he 
smoked too many cigarettes, or bad genes or bad luck that will shorten his life.
In many other cases of commercial crime, the harm tends to be widely diffused and, for 
each person, rather insignificant. But these can still be significant crimes. Companies can 
earn millions over the course of a year by charging higher prices for products that do not 
meet the standards they are alleged to attain. Few people who pay for a package of one- 
hundred thumb tacks will take the time and energy to count the contents of the package to 
be certain that they have gotten their money’s worth; it would be an easy and safe venture 
to put ninety-two tacks in each package, and some merchandisers find the temptation 
irresistible. Similarly, a customer will most likely remain unaware that the gasoline pumps 
at a service station are calibrated so that they get fewer gallons than those for which they 
are charged. Even if they come to know about these kinds of issues, most customers would 
shrug them off as not worth the trouble it would take to do something to remedy the 
situation; at most, they might take their business elsewhere.
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Rationalization
Perpetrators of white-collar crime are known for providing elaborate excuses for their 
crimes, and the nature of such explanations may be a major distinguishing mark between 
them and street offenders. It has been posited that embezzlers typically claim that they are 
only borrowing the money; they intended to repay it once they had covered the bills and 
other financial demands vexing them. Commercial criminals will similarly rationalize their 
behavior; for example, antitrust violators usually maintain that they are seeking to stabilize 
an out-of-control price situation when they conspire with others to fix prices, and they are 
likely to insist that power-hungry prosecutors and investigators are singling them out.
7.1.6 Investigation and Prosecution of Commercial Crime
The diffuse nature of most commercial crime poses a particular law enforcement dilemma. 
Without complaining witnesses, policing has to be proactive instead of reactive; that is, the 
enforcement officials themselves have to decide where the offenses are being committed 
and how to go about stopping them. Enforcers obviously cannot cope with all the violations 
and must decide on rules to guide their efforts. Should they go after the behaviors that 
cause the most harm? Should they take on the bigger offenders, or concentrate on the 
smaller fry, where their chances of success are much better? They can readily accumulate ten 
convictions in a year against ten insignificant companies, whereas it might take three years 
to win a victory over one huge corporation. Besides, the resources of the large organization 
might allow it to win its case, regardless of the lawless nature of its behavior.
7.1.7 Causes of Commercial Crime
Because businesses are bottom-line driven, it has been posited that they are inherently 
prone to committing crime, yet not necessarily criminal. Without necessarily meaning to, 
organizations inherently invite commercial crime as a means of obtaining goals. For 
example, a department manager’s concern with reaching assigned goals, may lead the 
manager to maximize his or her department’s own interests to the detriment of the 
organization, or to the detriment of society as a whole.
Organizations can also be criminogenic—prone to producing crime—because they 
encourage loyalty. Accordingly, this is because—
1. The organization tends to recruit and attract similar individuals.
2. Rewards are given out to those who display characteristics of a team player.
3. Long-term loyalty is encouraged through company retirement and benefits.
4. Loyalty is encouraged through social interaction such as company parties and social 
functions.
5. Frequent transfers and long working hours encourage isolation from other groups.
6. Specialized job skills may discourage company personnel from seeking employment 
elsewhere.
These reasons in turn cause company personnel to sometimes perceive that the 
organization might be worth committing crime for.
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Another aspect that makes companies criminogenic is their compensation structures, 
particularly for corporate executives who are most likely to be the perpetrators of 
commercial crime. Compensation packages for senior personnel usually include a 
component based on the results of their company or department, either through stock 
options or bonuses. Typically, senior executives have a greater amount of compensation 
tied to results than do other employees. Because commercial crime is so diffuse, and the 
likelihood of being caught is low, senior executives may perceive that the incentives to 
“enhance the success of their organization” through commercial crime will outweigh the 
risks.
7.2 Forms of Commercial Crime
Today, the realm of commercial crime can be said to primarily involve offenses against 
laws that regulate either one or both of the following: the marketplace or the established 
standards of conduct for professional and political life. Some of the most common forms of 
commercial crime are described in this section, along with Case Studies and other 
examples that illustrate the salient features of such crimes.
The first two cover shams, which Webster’s Dictionary defines as “.. . an imitation or 
counterfeit purporting to be genuine [noun]....” and “to act intentionally so as to give a 
false impression [verb].”1 Shams are the result of the activities of a confidence trickster or 
con artist who has been able to obtain money from the public by various means. Generally, 
there are two kinds of shams: corporate shams and investor fraud.
Although these shams are discussed separately in this chapter (due to the size of each 
section), in many cases the perpetrator (the corporate con artist) and the victim (individuals) 
of the shams have similar characteristics, as does the way in which the sham is operated. 
However, they have two major distinctions:
1. In the corporate sham a corporation exists from which the pitch is made. This is in 
contrast to an unincorporated individual making a pitch, not on a corporation’s behalf, 
but on his or her personal behalf.
2. In investor sham the nature of what is being sold to the victim differs. For example, an 
investor sham typically involves making a speculative investment, whereas a corporate 
sham typically involves the purchase of something tangible.
The remaining sections of this chapter include the following kinds of fraud as committed by 
companies: procurement fraud, industrial espionage, finance fraud, securities fraud, 
environmental abuse, economic extortion, health care fraud, and possession of property 
obtained by crime.
7. 2.1 Corporate Shams
Corporate shams generally involve something counterfeit or false. In this case the corporate 
sales pitch appears to offer something genuine, yet there is no underlying substance. The 
perpetrator of the crime is often a con artist acting through a corporate entity. In fact, by 
using the corporate veil as a shield from the public, the con artist gains an appearance of
1Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, 1993.
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respectability and substance that he or she would otherwise lack. The con artist’s wares may 
consist of one or more of the following:
• Products oriented to individual consumers (as opposed to products that companies 
would buy) that are sold by false advertising.
• Franchises or distributorships that the victim purchases in order to run a business.
• Solicitation of money donations towards a charitable or religious cause.
Generally, shams that are carried on through an incorporated business involve pyramid 
sales schemes, mail order sales, advertising to be placed in charitable programs or flyers, or 
donations to charitable organizations. Newer forms of corporate shams that are becoming 
more common are the selling of franchises, and other get-rich-quick schemes, such as the 
selling of vending or arcade game machines: the purchasers then set up their own business 
using the franchise or the equipment bought.
When a con artist hides behind a corporate veil, some or all of the following characteristics
may apply:
1. The con artist uses expensive letterhead, emblazoned with a worldly name and a classy 
address, to impress potential victims.
2. The company has a very informal corporate structure, and a very short life span.
3. The company’s accounting systems are primitive or nonexistent.
4. The company conducts an extensive and appealing advertising campaign.
5. If a product is offered, the product itself may be of questionable value, and there is 
seldom, if any, post sale servicing.
6. The customer is expected to pay for the product via cash or readily negotiable checks on 
(or before) delivery.
7. Once received, the cash is quickly removed from the company through the payment of 
commission expenses, salaries, bonuses or management fees, so that the con artist can 
reap the immediate benefits of the scheme.
The key to the corporate sham, as with any sham, is the effectiveness and the speed with 
which the sales pitch brings results. The method of delivering the sales pitch may range 
from telephone solicitation (via a boiler room operation), to either cold calls, or advertising 
in local newspapers, or both.
Possible red flags for a corporate sham include elaborate representations that demonstrate 
the quality of the product, proposed earnings that are excessively high for the franchise, or 
an apparently hard-sell pitch to raise money for a purported charitable purpose.
Finally, you should be aware of the arguments put forward by defense counsel in corporate 
sham cases. Some of the issues defense counsel might raise include:
• Caveat emptor—let the buyer beware.
• Some of the money received was in fact directed to the promoted charitable purpose.
• The investor is at fault: that is, for not working hard enough at a franchise operation to 
make it succeed, or for not waiting long enough to receive the goods that would have 
eventually been shipped, and so on.
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Merchandise Swindles or False Advertising
Merchandising frauds include all frauds perpetrated against purchasers of merchandise and 
services. If you have ever paid for an item and received something less than advertised, you 
have been the victim of a merchandising swindle or false advertising.
These frauds generally fall into one of the following four categories:
1. Representations that the purchase is a bargain when in fact it is not—for example, 
department stores raise the price of a product significantly one day and then the next 
day drop it back to where it had been, maintaining in their advertising that it now is on 
sale.
2. Collection of money for one product and substitution of another of lesser quality or 
cost—for example, claims have been made that shoes are alligator when in fact they 
were made of plastic.
3. Misrepresentations regarding the quality of the product—for example, a company 
selling glass demonstrated in television commercials that its car window product was so 
perfect that when you looked through it you could hardly believe there was anything 
between you and the outside scene; it was later proved that the ads were filmed from 
inside a car with the window rolled down.
4. Failure to deliver the product or service—for example, in bait and switch tactics, stores 
advertise a specific product at a strikingly low price, but then, when the customer tries to 
buy the item, it is no longer available. It is the customer’s presence and attention they 
want to attract—once they have him or her listening, they assume that slick sales tactics 
can accomplish the rest of the deceit.
Defraud You in Writing Case Study
Between September 1997 and June 1998, Smith and Jones, partners of Defraud You 
in Writing Inc. committed fraud by obtaining funds from the public for goods they 
did not intend to supply.
Smith and Jones operated the business through telephone solicitation whereby 
books were offered for sale, and customers’ names were entered into a drawing for a 
trip to the Caribbean via Acme Tours. Door-to-door sales people would follow up 
on the calls and try to obtain orders for the books. The orders set forth the terms, 
the method of payment, the time and method of delivery, and an announcement for 
a drawing on a certain date. The drawing date was inserted in a blank on the order 
form, the first draw being December 31, 1997.
From the evidence of Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, during the period between 
October 1997 and May 1998, the actual net cash receipts from orders by members 
of the public totaled $75,291 (after allowances for returned checks) on 1,867 orders.
Defraud You in Writing’s suppliers were not paid during this period, so the total 
number of orders filled was 311. In fact, during the three months with the largest 
sales, (December, February and March) no books were ordered from Defraud You’s 
9
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
suppliers. Instead, substantial effort was being made to increase the sales force (and 
thus the revenue), and new premises were being sought
The judge in this case believed that Defraud You in Writing used the 311 orders to 
create a camouflage for the business’ real activity: to obtain funds for orders they 
never intended to fulfill.
As for the drawing, no arrangements had been made with Acme Tours to enable 
the winner to take the trip.
Franchise and Distributorship Frauds
Both franchise and distributorship frauds are characterized by a get-rich-quick business 
opportunity that involves a large up-front purchase of equipment, supplies, and 
promotional materials. Many such schemes are part of a pyramid scam.
Cookie Vend & Run Inc. Case Study
Cookie Vend & Run Inc. was incorporated in March 1997 to sell cookie vending 
machines. CookieVend’s headquarters were located in New York City. Its office 
staff generally consisted of the president, general office manager, secretary­
treasurer, bookkeeper, and three typists.
Shortly after CookieVend’s incorporation, a series of ads were placed in newspapers 
across the country. These ads offered a substantial guaranteed income, which could 
be earned for an investment of $3,000 to $9,000. Although the ads differed 
somewhat from paper to paper, they all offered a part-time job that could net the 
right person an income of $2,000 per month or more.
In addition to the office staff, CookieVend employed a sales staff of approximately 
ten people to interview the respondents to the ads. These sales reps traveled 
independently of each other and were provided with a corporate brochure and 
other material that instructed them on what to promise the new distributors.
Some 180 people purchased these distributorships for an investment of between 
$3,000 and $9,000 each, depending on the number of vending machines purchased. 
Supplies of cookies and insurance were also purchased. CookieVend’s total sales 
from April to December 1997 were approximately $1.2 million.
In the ensuing year, not one distributor was successful in his or her business. The 
complaints were generally as follows:
1. The quality of the vending machines was very poor.
2. Three distributors never received their vending machines (twenty-three 
machines in all).
3. Cookies were stale when received by the distributor.
4. The price of cookies increased from fourteen cents to twenty cents each soon 
after the distributors purchased their machines.
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5. The company did not honor claims of damage to machines in accordance with 
the insurance protection policy on the agreement.
6. The company did not honor its three-year repair warranty on vending machines.
7. The company did not attempt to address any reasonable complaints.
Evidence of Fraud. All of Cookie Vend’s management personnel were found guilty of 
fraud and received jail sentences. The evidence that formed the basis for the case 
against them was as follows:
1. CookieVend’s revenues and expenses showed that its level of profitability was 
directly attributable to the sale of machines. This also showed that the sale of 
cookies resulted in losses, thus Cookie Vend had a motive to sell machines rather 
than cookies.
2. CookieVend’s primary disbursements were for commissions, advertising, travel, 
and business promotion. These expenditures occurred during a period when the 
distributors’ complaints about product quality fell on deaf ears.
3. The profit-loss experience of the distributors was much worse than the profit-loss 
statements represented in the newspaper advertisements. One of the highest 
performing distributors realized a gross profit, assuming all cookies were sold, of 
$375, on an investment of $7,941 over a period of eighteen months.
4. Cookie Vend never purchased a liability policy although the distributors’ 
purchase agreements represented that a policy did in fact exist.
5. The distributor agreement set out a nonrescission clause specifically stating, “The 
distributor is not relying on any oral or written expressions, promises or 
warranties made by anyone to consummate this transaction.”
Charity and Religious Fraud
Jim Bakker, former head of the defunct PTL (Praise the Lord Club) has brought 
international attention to religious fraud. The essence of his scheme was to sell “lifetime 
partnerships” in a luxury hotel, which his followers could use for life. Prosecutors were able 
to show that Bakker’s plan was completely unworkable, because many more partnerships 
were sold than could ever be accommodated. Bakker used the money to pay himself and 
his lieutenants millions of dollars in salaries and bonuses. He was convicted under federal 
mail fraud statutes.
Other kinds of charity and religious groups resort to fraud as a way of obtaining 
contributions. In the most common of the schemes, fraudsters operating in boiler rooms call 
unsuspecting victims and raise funds for allegedly good causes or for worthwhile 
organizations. The funds collected are not used for their intended purpose, or the fraudsters 
fail to disclose that they keep the majority of the funds raised for administration costs and 
give the sponsoring charity or religion only a small portion of the money collected.
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Rob M. Blind Case Study
Between January 1997 and July 1998, Rob M. Blind and I. Swindle committed 
fraud by developing a scheme through the medium of telephone solicitations that 
induced the public to contribute funds allegedly for charitable purposes—to benefit 
the blind.
The operation, Help the Sightless Associates, carried on by Rob and his associates, was 
reasonably simple. They hired three or four blind musicians, who joined other 
sighted employees for a tour of several cities. In each city they planned to visit, they 
conducted a telephone solicitation campaign: literally by going through the yellow 
pages and calling every business listed. The firms solicited were asked to buy an ad 
in a program, which was to be distributed at a concert to be held in that city.
If the firm refused to advertise, it would be asked to buy tickets to the concert that it 
could use, give away, or allow to be given away on its behalf.
The Help the Sightless Associates was not a charitable organization and never applied 
for registration as such. There is no record of them donating anything to the blind 
other than paying the musicians who gave the concerts.
As for the dollar amount of the fraud, according to Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, the total 
gross receipts for 1997 and part of 1998 were $252,327. These funds were used in the 
following manner:
Payments to the blind musicians -50 percent
Payments unaccounted for -48 percent
Expenses -2 percent
Total 100 percent
7.2.2 Investor Frauds
Like corporate shams, investor frauds use techniques designed to produce a quick return or 
benefit to the company that is the subject of the con. The techniques generally used are 
telephone solicitation, personal cold calls, or spreading the sales pitch by word of mouth 
among a particular group of individuals, such as doctors or dentists—who typically have 
high incomes or high net worth, or both, but possess limited financial or investment 
expertise. The con artist may succeed in persuading a member of the group to introduce 
him or her to other members, thus creating confidence in both the scheme and him- or 
herself. The investors are actively encouraged to spread the word to their close friends 
about this opportunity for an investment. These activities are often perpetrated through a 
pyramid or Ponzi scheme—both of which are described below.
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The key to the con is generally a direct pitch to the investors’ greed—that is, promises of 
high returns within a short period. The scheme may entail investment in precious metals or 
precious or semiprecious gems, and has been known to embrace items, such as antique 
coins and commodity futures. Investor frauds have even extended to what is commonly 
known as flips of real estate.
Although many of the characteristics of a corporate sham discussed in section 7.2.1 apply 
equally to investor frauds, there are two characteristics that are unique to investor frauds:
1. An extensive and appealing get-rich-quick advertising campaign is conducted, 
suggesting to the victims that easy money can be made with very little effort.
2. Investors, once the investment is determined to be a con, do not want any publicity that 
would expose the foolishness of their investment.
Chain Referral (Pyramid versus Ponzi) Schemes
Chain referral schemes are based on the same idea as the well-known chain letter. This is a 
particular kind of sham, which could involve products, or may involve only investments. In 
one example of a chain letter, the con artist starts the chain letter by sending a letter to five 
or more people requesting (on some pretext—often preying on people’s superstitions) the 
recipients to mail money to the con artist. The letter also instructs each recipient to send the 
letter to a further five people with the request that money be sent to the names in the first 
two tiers of the pyramid. The third tier recipients in turn repeat the process of mailing the 
request for money and adding themselves to the bottom of the pyramid. Often there is an 
instruction that only four or five tiers should receive the money; the top name dropping out 
with the addition of a new name(s) at the bottom. By the time the chain reaches the seventh 
or eighth level (if the chain continues that long), the multiplier effect creates enormous 
wealth to those higher up in the chain, because they receive money from the geometrically 
growing lower tiers.
Of course, things other than money can be the objects of chain letters. Some involve 
recipes, Christmas cards, and other harmless items. However, chain letters don’t work 
indefinitely. That is because someone in the lower level inevitably fails to mail out his or 
her five letters, and the chain is then broken; usually only those in the upper levels profit.
Chain referral schemes, also called pyramids or Ponzi Schemes (after the notorious Charles 
Ponzi who successfully employed the scheme in the early twentieth century), are based 
largely on the same principal. The difference is that some are legitimate and some are not. 
Pyramid sales structures are generally legitimate, and Ponzi schemes are usually 
illegitimate.
For example, many products sold exclusively in the home, such as Amway merchandise, 
can be legitimate forms of pyramids. Individuals are recruited to sell merchandise. They in 
turn recruit their friends and colleagues to sell, and get a cut of their commissions. This 
recruitment continues on down, with those in the upper levels receiving a portion of the 
commissions from several different layers of sales personnel. However, because of the 
turnover in sales personnel, most people fail to achieve a sufficient level in the chain or 
pyramid to make the touted commissions. They often get discouraged and quit, further 
depressing the chain.
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Illegal pyramids (Ponzi Schemes) exist as well. One common variation is for a fraudster to 
place mail order ads promising wealth to individuals for performing work in their homes 
for services such as stuffing envelopes. When the victim responds to the ad, they are 
informed that the opportunity requires sending in money. In return, he or she receives a 
letter suggesting the victim place a similar ad and collect money in the same way, using the 
same letter. In other words, the fraudster is telling the victims in effect, “do the same thing 
to others that I just did to you.”
Another typical Ponzi scheme involves the diversion of investment funds. This fraud words 
as follows: A company will open its doors as an investment firm, promising better than 
average returns on its investment. When the company receives money from investors A 
through G, the money is diverted to the personal benefit of the principals. When additional 
money is received from investors H through L, those funds are used to pay off investors A 
through G. When funds are received from investors M through Z, this money is used to pay 
off investors H through L, or at least to pay interest, and so on. The money paid out to the 
early investors, therefore, is not from returns achieved on investments, but rather a 
diversion of new investments. This pyramid continues until the scheme collapses.
Many operators simply set up a mail or telephone operation, collect funds, then close the 
operation and move, only to reestablish a similar operation and repeat the scheme. Law 
enforcement officials acknowledge a significant problem with chain referral schemes, but 
readily admit that they are incapable of adequately controlling the problem.
These schemes, or variations of them, cannot go on indefinitely because they require a 
constant stream of money to cover the diverted funds. When the flow of new investments 
fall below that level, there is insufficient cash to pay off old investors, and the scheme 
collapses. The chain referral schemes are not dependent on a particular product or service, 
but rather on the method of diverting funds. Common chain investment schemes include 
franchising, sales distributorships, investment and securities of various kinds, and 
merchandise.
Finally, it should be noted that many chain referral schemes involve small amounts of 
money that are taken from many victims. Because victims typically feel foolish about being 
fleeced, they frequently do not file charges. And even when complaints are made, the 
police do not give these crimes priority because of staffing and budgetary commitments. As 
a result, many chain referral operators stay around a long time.
7.2.3 Finance Fraud
False Mortgage Security
False mortgage security is a term used to refer to security that turns out to be nonexistent or to 
have a value far lower than was represented. This is a kind of loan fraud whereby the 
perpetrator is usually an individual acting through a sham corporation, and the victim could 
be a bank, but is more likely an individual or another corporation.
The usual characteristics of false mortgage security fraud are as follows:
• An investor is persuaded to make a loan or invest funds on the assurance that repayment 
of the loan or investment will be fully protected and secured in some way.
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• When the touted investment fails to materialize, the investor discovers that the assets 
supposedly securing the investment do not exist, are worth much less than the investor 
had been led to believe, or were pledged to numerous other investors rendering them 
virtually worthless.
• The investor is often a financially unsophisticated individual who does not review the 
transaction papers in detail and may not understand them but is persuaded to invest by 
the prospect of a high return (for example, a well above average interest rate).
• The investor usually relies on the promises of the perpetrator or the apparent protection 
afforded by the security.
It should be noted that some assets pledged as security (that is, land or stock) may lose 
value for legitimate reasons such as fluctuations in their market values. In cases of false 
security, however, there is intent to deceive on the part of the person soliciting the funds.
Accounting evidence in most cases can establish and document the funds’ flow in situations 
of this nature. It is more likely that evidence establishing the intent to deceive will be 
obtained by conducting interviews (viva voce evidence) than through the analysis of the 
accounting records. It is often through the interview process that the true nature and intent 
of the transactions are revealed. The nature of the documentary evidence required to 
establish the economic benefit to the fraud perpetrator, and to trace the flow of funds are 
dictated by the nature of the fraud scheme.
Trust Our Paper Inc. Case Study
Trust Our Paper Inc. commenced its syndicated mortgage program in 1995. The 
program expanded rapidly, particularly during 1998, to include loans for property 
development in Plainville. The company solicited—in appropriate private 
offerings—funds from the public for investment in specific mortgages, with certain 
representations made about the nature of each loan and the mortgaged property. 
Unbeknownst to the investors, the mortgaged property was not as marketable or 
valuable as had been represented because it did not have the necessary local 
governmental approval for development.
During 1998, the period of its most rapid expansion, Trust Our Paper experienced 
an increasingly severe negative cash flow from operations. This condition persisted 
until March 1999, when Trust Our Paper went into receivership primarily as a 
result of—
1. The apparent inability of the mortgagors (borrowers) to make interest payments.
2. The apparent inability of the mortgagors to pay principal amounts upon 
maturity.
In reality, the face amount of the mortgages were much higher than the underlying 
value of the property secured by the mortgages.
The problems in this case are best illustrated by a transaction that commenced in 
the summer of 1998, when Trust Our Paper purchased land in Plainville at a price 
of $400,000. It planned to build a 300-suite apartment complex on the land. Before
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the closing of the transaction, Trust Our Paper had been unsuccessful in obtaining 
mortgage financing through normal channels because of an inability to get zoning 
approval for its plans. The location of the land and environmental concerns proved 
to be insurmountable obstacles.
Trust Our Paper then provided a loan of $1 million to ABC Developments Ltd., the 
developer of the property, secured by a first mortgage on the property. Funds were 
solicited from the public—in a properly registered offering—for investment in this 
mortgage. Trust Our Paper represented to the investors that it had used the 
mortgage proceeds for interim construction of a 300-unit residential complex.
However, an examination of the mortgage proceeds revealed a different story. Out 
of the proceeds, $400,000 was used to reimburse Trust Our Paper for the cost of the 
property. Thus, the purchase was financed entirely by the investors through their 
loan to Trust Our Paper. Of the remaining funds, $115,000 was disbursed in 
November 1998 to Green Investments Inc., a troubled company with a deficit of 
$296,000. The balance of $485,000 was disbursed in a similar manner.
The underlying security given to the Trust Our Paper investors was highly 
questionable in light of the following:
1. The mortgage for $1 million was on land purchased for $400,000.
2. The mortgage guarantor advised that the property was unsuitable for financing.
3. The property remained undeveloped.
4. The developers were unable to obtain alternate mortgage financing.
5. The mortgage proceeds were not used as purported.
Thus, the proceeds raised from the public offering were diverted from their 
intended use, that is, to develop the property. This diversion diluted the value of 
the security and jeopardized the achievement of the appraised potential that was 
offered as security.
Advance Fee Fraud
Generally, advance fee schemes involve paying bogus corporations an up-front finder’s fee 
in exchange for a promise to receive an advance on a loan. The victims of these kinds of 
schemes can be both individuals and corporations. Often if an individual is seeking loan 
funds but for whatever reason cannot obtain funding from traditional sources, he or she will 
turn in desperation to these fraudsters.
Once the fee is paid, the perpetrator disappears. In some cases, desperate institutions are 
offered access to illegal money, and they typically do not report the loss of the advance fee 
when the deal falls through. General characteristics of these schemes include one or more 
of the following:
• Deals too good to be true often are not true.
• The agent requests documents on bank stationery, or signatures of officers, or both.
• The bank is asked to give nondisclosure agreements to protect the agent or other parties.
16
17
Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime
• The agent asks for an irrevocable agreement to pay commissions, expenses, and a fee.
• There are several complex layers of agents, brokers, and other intermediaries.
• The perpetrators often describe the offerings as special one of a kind offers and state that 
the deal will be killed if anyone is contacted to verify the deal.
• The deal often involves foreign agents, banks, and other sources, such as an unnamed 
wealthy person or government
Debt Consolidation Schemes
People who find themselves hopelessly in debt frequently turn to debt consolidation 
agencies out of desperation. Debt consolidation agencies do not advance loans, but rather 
act as an intermediary between the debtor and creditor. Some are legitimate, but many are 
not. Bona fide debt consolidation agencies make money by organizing the debtor’s affairs 
and collecting a percentage of the money handled on the debtor’s behalf.
In the typical scenario, the debtor contacts the consolidation agency, and provides a 
complete list of their creditors and the amount of monthly payments currently owed. The 
agency then usually writes letters to the creditors, requesting a debt work-out plan 
providing for lower monthly payments spread out over longer periods of time. The 
creditors are often motivated to accept the arrangement provided they think that the entire 
debt, or the major portion of it, will be repaid or that the debt consolidation plan will 
prevent a bankruptcy filing or default by the debtor. The debtor then makes a lump sum 
monthly payment to the consolidation agency, which then distributes the money to the 
creditors.
Unscrupulous debt consolidation schemes are perpetrated when the agency collects money 
from the debtor but does not forward it to the creditor. In some instances, it is months 
before the debtor finds out that the money has been misappropriated. The victim debtor 
has not only lost money to the unscrupulous agency, but still owes the original debt.
Bankruptcy Fraud
Bankruptcy is designed to give every corporation or individual encumbered by mountains 
of debt a fresh start. In a liquidation or Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all assets and liabilities are to 
be listed on the bankruptcy petition and a trustee is appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Trustee’s Office in the district where the petition was filed. The role of the trustee is to 
liquidate the assets of the estate and distribute the funds to the creditors pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Code.
Generally there are three common kinds of fraud committed by companies or individuals 
filing for bankruptcy, they are:
1. Fraudulent conveyances. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, cash or other assets 
are transferred to friends, relatives or business associates. Once the bankruptcy court has 
discharged the debtor’s debts, these assets are then transferred back to the debtor. This 
kind of transfer is often referred to as parking assets. These prepetition transfers are often 
disguised to appear as bona fide business transactions.
2. Concealing assets or asset stripping. The debtor could: convert assets to his or her own 
benefit, simply fail to disclose certain assets in the bankruptcy schedules, or deny the 
existence of such assets when meeting with the trustee or at hearings before a 
bankruptcy judge.
3. Planned bankruptcy. The debtor’s affairs are structured in a way that gives the appearance 
of a failing business, but is actually a lucrative business that needs to avoid the 
circumstances of a particular obligation, litigation, or labor dispute. This is often 
accomplished through the use of transfer pricing or management fees from related 
companies, which may or may not be disclosed to the trustee.
Planned Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can be attributed primarily to one or a combination of the 
following causes:
• Incompetence of management
• Lack of managerial experience
• Neglect
• Severe economic recession or depression (macro or market sector)
• Disaster
• Fraud
Fraud is not the cause of most business failures.
The victims, regardless of the cause of a business failure, are customers and creditors: 
customers who have ordered or paid for goods that are undelivered at the time the business 
goes belly up, and the various creditors of the business that remain unpaid at that time. On 
many occasions the employees are also victimized because they lose their jobs or are 
unable to collect unpaid wages or both.
A business experiencing financial difficulties can pursue several remedies either to rectify 
the situation or to conclude the operation of the business. The owner may cease business 
voluntarily, or an unpaid creditor may precipitate the closing down of the business through 
the initiation of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.
Ask the following questions when considering whether a bankruptcy was planned:
1. When did the company realize it would fail? A business failure may appear to be the 
result of management incompetence, inexperience and neglect. Notwithstanding the 
reasons for the financial difficulties, it is crucial to establish whether management carried 
on the business after a point in time when they knew, suspected or should have known 
that business failure was imminent. In that case, the fraud occurs when they solicit funds 
from the public, including creditors, in spite of knowing or suspecting that the company 
might be unable to fulfill the representations and commitments made. The business, 
however, may have continued in the honest belief that it would turn around (the rainbow 
syndrome).
Establishing the point in time at which management knew, should have known, or 
suspected that business failure was imminent requires a detailed review and analysis of 
the financial position of the business. Financial statements, accounting records and 
banking records have to be scrutinized. The examination would disclose not only the 
financial position and any deterioration in it, but also the level of management’s
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knowledge about the situation. Correspondence and other documents from customers 
and creditors, expressing concern or demanding delivery or repayment, together with 
viva voce evidence may also be useful.
2. Did the company pursue remedies? In determining whether fraud exists, the forensic 
accountant must consider whether the remedies available to the business in financial 
difficulty, as noted above, were pursued. In addition, the accountant must ask if honest 
attempts were made to resolve the difficulties or merely to give the impending business 
failure the appearance of legitimacy.
3. Has the business committed an act of bankruptcy? Bankruptcy law defines specific 
activities on the part of a debtor as constituting an act of bankruptcy. These activities 
include one or more of the following:
• The transfer of assets to a trustee or other third party for the benefit of creditors
• A payment to one creditor in preference over another
• The fraudulent conveyance or transfer of property
• An attempt by the debtor to abscond without paying debts
• A failure to redeem goods seized under an execution order issued against the debtor
• The presentation at a meeting of creditors of a statement of assets and liabilities 
indicating insolvency, or a written admission of the debtor’s inability to pay his or 
her debts (the filing of a bankruptcy petition), or both
• An attempt to move or hide any of the debtor’s property
• Notice to any creditors that the debtor is suspending payment of his or her debts
• A failure to meet liabilities, generally, as they become due
• Default in a proposal made as part of the bankruptcy proceedings
4. Was the business failure planned? A planned business failure occurs where management 
has converted the assets of the business to its own, that is, personal benefit and then tries 
to conceal the conversion through formal bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, the 
debtor induces vendors to sell goods on credit when the debtor knows that it has neither 
the intent nor the capacity to pay the creditors. Characteristics of a planned failure 
include one or more of the following:
• The business has developed a reputation for trustworthiness in the business 
community. This reputation may have a short history, and may have been 
established for the express purpose of inducing companies to sell goods to the 
business on credit.
• The business sells tangible and highly marketable products.
• The business seeks to sell, or convert the goods to cash as quickly as possible with 
little care about the selling price because they have no intention of paying the 
suppliers for the goods.
• The proceeds from operations are moved out of the business so as not to be 
identified as an asset of the business at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.
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• The business has little net worth.
• The business has not been a financial success.
• The business departs from its normal business practices with regard to purchasing, 
payments to suppliers, sales, and the granting of credit to customers.
The typical changes in business conduct of a planned failure include:
• The volume of inventory ordered from existing suppliers increases significantly. The 
suppliers will probably extend credit up to sixty days, largely as a result of their wish 
to retain the customer and the established reputation of the company.
• The unsuspecting suppliers will receive little or no payment. They may receive 
payment for the initial order but not for subsequent shipments. The scam will 
probably be completed within sixty days of the date of purchase of the inventory. 
After that time, the suppliers are likely to become suspicious and might take action of 
some kind.
• The company will refuse to sell the inventory to its customers on credit; that is, it will 
sell on a cash-on-delivery (COD) or other cash-up-front basis only. To get customers 
to pay cash, the selling price per unit is commonly at or below the company’s cost 
price per unit, as shown on the supplier’s invoice.
• If inventory still remains after the company has approached its usual customers, the 
inventory may then be offered to new customers. These sales tend to be non-arm’s 
length and may be in cash. Although the sales invoices may indicate the payment 
was made in cash, the deposit of the cash into the business’ bank account does not 
necessarily follow.
• If, after all these efforts to sell, inventory is still left at the site, it can be physically 
removed. The trail will be covered to prevent obvious detection.
A planned bankruptcy is designed, of course, to benefit those in control of the debtor 
entity. The fraudster will make every effort to ensure that no trail is left behind to enable 
the trustee in bankruptcy to retrieve the proceeds of the fraud and return those proceeds 
to the creditors. The techniques employed to block the path of the trustee are limited 
only by the perpetrator’s imagination and will vary according to the circumstances.
7.2.4 Arson for Profit
Arson and a planned bankruptcy share some similar characteristics. In both situations, 
business problems exist and are acknowledged to exist by management. Arson, like 
planned bankruptcy, can become the means of a criminal making the best of a bad 
situation. The perpetrator will, of course, seek to commit the crime without leaving a trail of 
criminal conduct.
The following are the chief characteristics of cases of arson:
1. The fire is of an incendiary nature.
2. An insurance policy is in force.
3. There is a financial or other business-related motive.
4. The financial motive may not be readily apparent.
5. Exclusive opportunity to commit arson may or may not be evident.
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6. The prosecution’s case will often be based on circumstantial evidence.
7. Efforts may have been made to destroy some or all of the accounting and business 
records.
Without a confession or an eyewitness, the evidence in a case of arson is almost always 
circumstantial in nature. The prosecutor usually must depend on circumstantial evidence, 
which must be sufficient to rebut every reasonable hypothesis other than a willful and 
intentional burning. However, evidence supporting the incendiary origin of a fire is often 
interwoven with other evidence that tends to connect the accused with the crime. The 
connection to the accused is often the presence of a motive and the opportunity of the 
accused to perform the act.
Historically, insurance companies have been reluctant to challenge the veracity of loss 
claims arising from major fires that have damaged or destroyed commercial, industrial, 
recreational or residential establishments. The reasons given for this reluctance include the 
following:
• Court proceedings are protracted and expensive, and the ultimate decision is often 
favorable to the insured.
• The insurance company (like a bank) is often perceived as the big, bad guy, thus, the 
insured sometimes gets the benefit of reasonable doubt because they are perceived as 
the little guy.
• The punitive damages awarded to a claimant often far exceed the loss claim if the courts 
feel that there has been an unreasonable delay.
• The only evidence is circumstantial.
• The alleged arsonist has been acquitted in a related criminal proceeding.
Accounting Issues and Evidence
The forensic accountant in arson-related matters should differentiate the business position 
of the company and its owners from the financial position. Although the financial position 
may have a considerable bearing on motive, motive is better understood in the context of 
the business itself and the owners, through an overview of all aspects of the operations and 
ownership of the business.
Ultimately, the financial analysis is designed to determine the mindset of the company, the 
money of the company, and the worker in the company. Accordingly, it is usually appropriate 
to obtain as much background information as possible. A starting point may be the 
acquisition of a business or the commencement of a new business venture. A review of the 
annual financial statements and associated working papers will disclose the company’s 
yearly performance and any underlying business problems. Motive not apparent from an 
analysis of the company’s financial transactions may become apparent from an 
investigation of the social relationships found within a business.
Any review of the status of a business must be objective. It should identify not only matters 
that are unfavorable to management and the owners of the company, but also matters that 
are favorable. The unfavorable matters may well be obvious, for example, a steady decline 
in sales, worsening creditor relations, or a significant withdrawal of funds immediately 
before the fire. On the other hand, an owner may have put a substantial amount of his or 
her own money into the business shortly before the fire.
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Accounting evidence is likely to be extremely significant in establishing motive. The fire 
may have destroyed some or all of the accounting and financial records, as well as 
correspondence and file material that could have a bearing on the case. These records will 
have to be reconstructed to the extent possible; thus, third-party documentation will have to 
be obtained and interpreted.
Issues and Sources of Information. A review of several recent judgments shows that the main 
characteristics in an arson investigation to consider, investigate, and establish in evidence 
are as follows:
1. Ownership, including business structure, style, and relationships
2. Financial motive, that is the financial position of the owners and business, and existence 
of an insurance policy
3. Current events at or around the time of the fire, including the establishment of exclusive 
opportunity, and the origin of the fire as incendiary
Information will be sought from people directly and indirectly connected with the business, 
possibly including its bankers, lawyer, accountant, customers, suppliers, insurers, 
government agencies, and realtors.
The owner should always be given the opportunity to volunteer any personal or business 
records that he or she might have.
See below for a list of questions to consider and documents to examine.
Accounting Evidence. Forensic accountants can assist by investigating several issues, in 
particular those involving ownership and financial motive. They can analyze information 
from several sources and construct a chronology of the financial events leading up to the 
fire. They can analyze the financial records of the owner, the business, and third parties, 
and demonstrate the company’s position at the time of the fire, comparing it with earlier 
periods.
The forensic accountant looks for significant detail when attempting to determine whether a 
financial motive exists. If little or nothing is available in the way of accounting books and 
records and supporting documentation, the forensic accountant will pursue other third 
party sources to secure information for the examination.
Obviously, any financial and accounting records of the business that are available will have 
to be examined and analyzed. As previously noted, it is important to provide the owner the 
opportunity to volunteer whatever personal or business records he or she has. Beyond this, 
the forensic accountant will seek information from others directly or indirectly connected 
with the business.
Key questions to consider include the following:
1. Who maintained the accounting records?
2. What accounting records would have been available?
3. What is the ownership structure?
4. Is the financial position of the owner solid?
5. Does the business support the owner?
6. Does the owner support the business?
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7. Have the essential matters been established?
8. Is the potential defendant cooperative?
9. What is the history and pattern of earnings?
10. Could ownership benefit from selling out to the insurance company?
11. Did any significant events occur at or around the time of the fire?
12. Who are the major suppliers and what were the business’ relations with them?
13. Who are the major customers and what were the business’ relations with them?
14. Who are the bankers and what were the business’ relations with them?
15. Who is the external auditor?
16. Who is the outside legal counsel?
17. Is the business for sale and are negotiations currently being conducted?
18. Have there been any recent changes in insurance coverage?
Third-party documents to investigate include:
• Government (usually the Secretary of State of the state of incorporation or of a state in 
which the corporation is registered to do business) business registration records
• Recorded documents (for example, for land or other property)
• Work papers and files of accountants, auditors, or both
• Any secured transactions registered under the commercial code of the relevant state
• Tax returns
• Correspondence with customers and suppliers
• Bank credit files
• Credit files from other creditors
• Bank statements, canceled checks, deposit slips, credit memos, and debit memos (paper 
or microfiche records)
• Payroll information
• General ledger records
• Real estate listings
7.2.5 Procurement Fraud
All organizations including manufacturers, financial institutions, governments, and retailers, 
as well as private individuals are involved in the procurement process to acquire goods or 
services. For each and every kind of purchased item, ranging from commodities and 
equipment to a professional’s time via a consulting services contract, there is a different 
kind of procurement fraud that can be perpetrated by the provider of the goods or services.
The risks and warning signs associated with each kind of procurement fraud vary 
depending on what is being purchased, and also by the kind and stage of the procurement 
process: Questions to ask when examining procurement fraud include:
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• Is the purchase competitive or noncompetitive?
• What pricing method was used: fixed fee, cost per unit, cost-plus, or a combination 
thereof?
• Did the fraud occur at the requirements definition stage, the bidding and selection stage, 
or the contract performance and evaluation stage?
Some of the more common kinds of procurement fraud include:
• Bid rigging or price fixing
• False invoices
• Inflated costs
• Product substitution
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
Bid Rigging or Price Fixing
Bid rigging or price fixing, is the process of setting the price or terms of the contract 
between the various bidders without the knowledge or consent of the purchaser.
For example, bidders on a highway construction project may secretly meet before bids are 
submitted. During their meeting, they decide who will submit the low bid and what the bid 
should be. They may also decide who will bid on what jobs. This is known as bid rotation.
Bid rigging is usually characterized by the lack of independent competitive bids, or by prices 
that are close together. The entity seeking the bids is victimized by having to pay higher 
prices than the amount that would have been charged had there been no collusion.
False Invoices
Invoices submitted by a contractor for goods that have not been delivered, or for services 
that have not been performed are false.
Inflated Costs
Contractors often use a pricing method in which they invoice on a cost-plus basis. That is, 
the contractor receives payment for the actual cost of the job, plus a certain profit based on 
a percentage of the costs. Clearly, the successful bidder has a vested interest in keeping the 
costs high: the higher the cost, the higher the profit.
Typically, in order to obtain inflated profits, contractors falsify the cost of the product or 
service. This can be done through simple or complex means. Examples of the former 
include adding labor charges for nonexistent (ghost) employees or adding charges for 
materials not actually used. In the more sophisticated schemes, the costs are inflated 
through overhead allocations.
Product Substitution
Procurement contracts sometimes call for very exacting specifications on the materials used 
on the job. Contractors frequently believe the contract specifications are too rigid and, 
therefore, feel justified in substituting a less costly product or service, and keeping the 
difference.
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In one scheme, a contractor bid on a new runway for an airport authority and won the bid. 
The contract called for the depth of the concrete covering the runway to be a certain 
minimum. After hearing rumors from competitors that the contractor was pouring less 
concrete than the minimum, the authority’s auditors checked the work orders and 
discovered that the paperwork reflected the concrete depth to hundredths of an inch. The 
auditor reasoned that concrete could not be poured so exactly, checked the actual work, 
and found the depth to be less than the contract specifications. The auditors concluded that 
the contractor was submitting false reports to the airport authority, and was reaping excess 
profit because it was supplying less material than that called for in the contract.
Secret Commissions and Kickbacks
Secret commissions and kickbacks are one of the most common forms of procurement 
fraud, and also one of the most difficult to detect. It involves the receipt of a secret 
payment, usually from one company (the vendor-payer) to a corporate executive (the agent) 
of another company (the procurer): the agent then exercises influence on the decision­
making of his or her employer in a way that favors the vendor-payer. For example, a 
vendor submits false or inflated invoices for payment, which the procurer’s corporate 
executive knowingly approves. This process is often described visually by the triangle of 
dishonesty shown in figure 7-1.
The key point to note is that secret commissions and kickbacks are a kind of fraud that 
generally accompanies other forms of procurement fraud (such as those described in this 
section).
Vendor
Figure 7-1. Triangle of dishonesty
Influence
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7.2.6 Organizational Bribe Giving
The two main kinds of bribes that benefit organizations are:
1. Bribing politicians and giving illegal campaign contributions.
2. Implementing commercial bribery as related to procurement fraud. Also included here 
are bribes for industrial espionage—that is, paying someone to reveal trade and other 
secrets about competitors.
Political Bribery
There are three generally recognized characteristics of political bribe giving:
1. Government benefits are often extremely valuable (or, for penalties and sanctions, very 
costly), but the demand for benefits can exceed the supply.
2. The government is the sole purveyor of the benefits and sanctions; you must do business 
with the government.
3. The bribe is an attempt to both bypass and guarantee the result of the normal processes, 
which are often lengthy, costly, and uncertain in result.
The most common form of political bribe giving is illegal campaign contributions, which 
have made headlines during the Clinton Administration.
Paying foreign politicians and governments was (and perhaps still is) common in order to 
conduct business in many countries. Since the mid-seventies, when the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was enacted, paying bribes to foreign officials except in cases of national 
security has been unlawful.
Commercial Bribery
Commercial bribery involves making payments in exchange for the award of a contract, for 
industrial espionage, or for both.
In the triangle of dishonesty, a payment from a vendor to an employee would encourage 
the employee to influence the decision regarding the recipient of a lucrative contract.
Several federal and state laws address the practice of commercial bribery. Both the act of 
asking for or the making of a payment constitutes an offense. In some instances commercial 
bribery may also be a violation of the restraint-of-trade laws. For example, certain industries— 
notably the liquor industry—are specifically prohibited from paying for business. Over the 
years, many well-known, major businesses have been guilty of commercial bribery (a listing 
of names would not add learning other than the giants of industry are involved from-time- 
to-time in nefarious activities).
Industrial espionage can involve direct payments to third parties to secure valuable 
competitive information. It can also be accomplished indirectly, for example, through the 
hiring of a competitor’s employees. In one case, several U.S. military procurement agents 
were charged with giving defense contractors information on more than $500 million in 
Navy purchases that were going to be the subject of the competitive bidding process.
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7.2.7 Industrial Espionage
Industrial espionage is a term that is broadly applied to activities whose main purpose is to 
obtain information or related assets from competitors or potential competitors. The classic 
forms of industrial espionage are trade-secret theft and copyright piracy.
Trade Secrets
There are three basic elements to a trade secret: novelty, value, and secrecy. Secrecy, 
concerns whether an organization handled its alleged secret in a protective manner. If a 
judge deems that an organization failed to protect a secret, that organization will not win 
judicial support if it charges an employee with theft of that secret
Patent laws seek a compromise between capitalistic self-interest in a trade secret and social 
well-being by granting a seventeen-year monopoly to developers of innovative ideas. The 
U.S. Supreme Court, in its only ruling on trade secrets (Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
1974), declared the likelihood “remote indeed” that a company would not patent valuable 
information that it had developed. However, the Court overlooked the advantage, well- 
known to most companies, that trade secrets can be hoarded far beyond the seventeen-year 
patent limitation, a matter well documented by the success and secrecy of the formulas for 
Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken, among others.
Leakage of trade secret information is said to be particularly likely from employees who go 
to work for competitors, careless secretaries, gregarious field sales personnel, and high-tech 
computer whizzes who often are more loyal to their equipment than to their fellow 
employees or employer. Temporary help is regarded as especially vulnerable: these 
employees do not have any company loyalty and can be planted for purposes of trade­
secret theft. Sharing sensitive information among two or more individuals, neither of whom 
knows the full secret, is one way to reduce the possibility of compromising sensitive 
information. Another method can be used to protect mailing lists. By including at least one 
decoy address in a list, if the list is compromised, whoever uses it will be sending material 
to a fictional person at an address that actually is the list-owning company’s mail drop.
A review of court cases on trade-secret theft shows that defendants are typically smaller 
corporations that have hired scientists from larger organizations where they had previously 
worked for six to ten years. There also appears to be an unusual amount of trade-secret 
theft from family-owned businesses. The defendants in these cases claim that because they 
were outsiders, they believed their chances of advancement were hopeless, so they stole the 
proprietary information to benefit (ingratiate themselves with) their new employers.
Copyright Piracy
Copyright piracy is defined as the infringement of another’s copyright or other business 
rights. It is an activity usually undertaken by manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers that do 
not have any legal right to manufacture or copy the product, but who want to earn a quick 
profit (greed motive) or to ease a financial difficulty (need motive).
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Bigtown Video Case Study
From August 1997 to May 1, 1998, John Smith was the owner, principal 
shareholder, director, president, and general manager of Bigtown Video Inc., a 
video store with three retail outlets. During this time Jack Brown was also a 
shareholder and secretary-treasurer of the company.
Bigtown Video’s business included the sale and rental of prerecorded videocassettes 
as well as the sale of blank cassettes. The videotapes sold and rented by Bigtown 
Video fell into two categories: legitimate and “counterfeit.” The legitimate tapes 
were obtained from sources authorized to manufacture and distribute the tapes in 
compliance with all copyright and distribution rights. They were packaged with 
stylized printed jackets showing the nature and content of the particular film. The 
counterfeit tapes had been duplicated from legitimate tapes, many of which had not 
yet been released to the public in videocassette form. The packaging of the 
counterfeit tapes was like that of a blank cassette package with the title of the film 
handwritten on the side panel. The legitimate tapes were displayed in the front of 
the stores. The counterfeit tapes were kept in the back rooms of the stores in a closet 
or in a drawer.
When cross-examined at trial, Mr. Brown testified that he and Mr. Smith had jointly 
decided to deal in counterfeit videocassettes in late 1997. The decision was made as 
a result of customer demands and financial difficulties. Mr. Brown would buy 
counterfeit cassettes from various sources and make duplicates of them. These 
actions were done with Mr. Smith’s knowledge and consent. Mr. Smith rented the 
counterfeit videocassettes at rates of $5 or more and sold them for prices ranging 
from $60 to $100 or more. From January 1998 until May 1998, the gross profit 
made by the company from each of the three stores was approximately $1,500 per 
week, of which about 60 percent was attributed to the distribution of the counterfeit 
videotapes.
In Mr. Smith’s cross-examination, he revealed that he was fully aware of the 
illegitimate origins of the counterfeit videocassettes supplied to him and that neither 
he, his suppliers, nor Bigtown Video had the right to distribute, rent or sell the 
cassettes. Mr. Smith knew that by dealing in these counterfeit tapes he was 
effectively depriving their owners of copyright and distribution revenues, which 
they would otherwise have been likely to earn but for the use of these illegitimate 
tapes: he was prejudicing the economic interests of the real owner. Mr. Smith made 
no attempt to contact the owners of the copyright or distribution rights in order to 
contribute revenues for his counterfeit use, to obtain these rights, and he had no 
intention of so doing.
Bob Green, a vice-president at Star-Studded Studios, testified about the effect of 
pirated videocassettes on the revenues of his company. He focused on four areas of 
impact and said:
1. That the inferior quality of pirated or counterfeit videocassettes tends to provide 
the viewer with a poor opinion of the film and the consequent negative publicity 
is harmful to the theatrical market.
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2. That people who have seen a counterfeit videocassette are unlikely to buy the 
legitimate cassette upon its release.
3. That for extremely high-grossing films, much of the profit arises out of repeated 
viewings of the film by the public. The effect of a counterfeit videocassette in 
such a situation is to diminish the theatrical value of the film by eliminating the 
possessor’s desire to return to the theater.
4. That with respect to distribution in other territories, the markets for legitimate 
cassettes have vanished due to the heavy influx of counterfeit videocassettes in 
those territories. In cross-examination Mr. Green admitted that he could not 
quantify the loss of profit by theatres from counterfeit videocassettes, nor could 
he reliably estimate the extent of loss for a given film or a given year.
7.2.8 Securities Fraud
There are four main kinds of securities fraud that fall within the category of commercial 
crime:
1. Knowingly providing misleading or false information in financial statements of a traded 
business enterprise.
2. Churning: An activity of brokers who buy and sell their clients’ securities for the sole 
purpose of generating commissions.
3. Mixing (commingling) of funds.
4. Manipulating the market for a stock by altering the stock’s price through influencing the 
factors that affect the market price or. by controlling the pool of shares available for sale 
or purchase.
Misleading or False Financial Statements
In large companies, upper level management, whose intent is not necessarily to steal, often 
manipulates financial statement information. These managers wish to manipulate data to 
enhance profitability and thereby earn higher bonuses, or to impress the brass at 
headquarters, or to impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to comply with the goals 
imposed by senior management. In small companies, where false financial results can 
create a direct benefit for senior management, the intent of management is often sinister.
Intentionally falsifying financial statements can be accomplished by one of the following 
methods:
1. Misstatement of financial information by arbitrarily raising profits or lowering costs 
using techniques such as plugging sales or ending inventory, incorrectly capitalizing 
current expenses, deferring necessary repairs, falsifying sales invoices, and altering cost 
invoices.
2. Misrepresentation or omission of significant information.
3. Misapplication of accounting principles.
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In the MiniScribe fraud, the company knowingly inflated inventories to deceive the 
auditors as to the value of assets on hand; the primary goal was to maintain and drive the 
share price of the company up in the public market.
In more recent instances, particularly in the high tech environment, channel stuffing (that is, 
just before year end, shipping inventory to distributors and dealers whether or not ordered, 
and booking the shipments as sales) was a popular method used to inflate sales to achieve 
projected and expected revenue goals. In many instances, product recorded as sold was 
returned shortly after year-end.
Heinz Catch-Up Case Study
Heinz has been a household name representing quality food products for more than 
one hundred years. The company had been well managed, profitable and socially 
responsible. But in the late 1970s, it received considerable unfavorable publicity for 
accounting irregularities. Some of its profit-center managers engaged in reducing its 
profits to create a cushion for the next year. The total amount of these pseudo-profit 
reductions was quite small ($8.5 million) when compared to overall sales ($2.4 
billion). However, annual sales and profits were not what were reported to the IRS, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and company stockholders.
The disclosure of these irregularities occurred as a result of an antitrust suit brought 
by Heinz against Campbell Soup. In Campbell’s discovery efforts, it snagged 
evidence that Heinz’ advertising agency was billing for services that had not yet 
been rendered. When a Heinz executive was questioned about the matter, he 
pleaded the Fifth Amendment.
The antitrust suit was settled shortly afterwards, but the disclosure caused Heinz 
headquarters’ personnel to launch an investigation into the accounting practices of 
several subsidiaries. Being highly decentralized, headquarters’ personnel claimed 
they were unaware of the lower-level fudging. Headquarters monitored 
performance through budget forecasts of sales and expenses and an incentive 
compensation plan that paid off if high-end profit goals were met. Headquarters also 
monitored consistent growth in profits. Top management was committed to that 
overriding goal and, the company’s earnings did rise consistently: for example, 
1978 marked the fifteenth consecutive year of record profits.
Heinz had an explicit policy that prohibited its divisions from having any form of 
unrecorded assets or false entries in its books and records. And Heinz didn’t 
measure short-term performance alone. The top nineteen executives, including 
division general managers, had long-term incentive plans in addition to the one- 
year plan.
What existed here initially were income transferals aided and abetted by vendors 
who supplied invoices one year for services that were not rendered until the next 
year. When that wasn’t enough, false invoices were submitted one year and then 
reversed in the following year. But the amounts involved did not have a material 
effect on the company’s reported profits.
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Strangely, the problem at Heinz started in 1974 when it appeared that profits in the 
Heinz USA division would exceed those allowed by the wage and price controls in 
effect at the time. World headquarters sought a way to reduce the division’s profit 
Losses in commodity transactions did not reduce profits enough, so the division 
booked $2 million in advertising services. Yet, instead of treating the expense as a 
prepaid item, the company charged the advertising expenses off immediately. 
Despite the lower profits of the division, world headquarters decided that the 
division had achieved its goal and paid the relevant bonuses.
By 1977, the following practices had evolved at the Heinz USA division:
1. Employees delayed year-end shipments until the beginning of the next year to 
ensure accurate invoicing dates.
2. Employees handled customer complaints about the delays by making the 
shipments, but misdating the shipping and invoice documents.
3. Employees did not record credits from vendors until the following year.
4. Income management became a way of life. One employee was given the task of 
maintaining private records to ensure the recovery of amounts paid to vendors 
on improper invoices.
5. The practice of delayed shipment and prepaid billing to assure that departmental 
budgeted amounts were met permeated the division down to the departmental 
level.
6. Ten separate vendors joined in supplying improper invoices.
7. Employees used other questionable tactics to manipulate income including 
inflated accruals, inventory adjustments, commodity transactions and customer 
rebates.
What can be learned from this case? First, exerting pressure for continuous growth 
in profits may foster improper accounting practices, particularly if coupled with an 
incentive compensation plan that rewards and reinforces continuous growth on the 
high side. Second, autonomous units with independent accounting capabilities 
might be tempted, under the above circumstances, to manipulate performance data.
Heinz isn’t the only case in which autonomous accounting or pressure for performance led 
to manipulations of records. There were similar episodes in the 1980s at McCormick and 
Company, J. Walter Thompson, Datapoint Corporation, Saxon Industries, Ronson 
Corporation, Pepsico, AM International, U.S. Surgical, and Stauffer Chemical. More 
recently, companies like Sunbeam and Cendant have been in the news for the same kind of 
earnings manipulation.
Churning
Churning occurs when a broker buys and sells stock for a client to generate fees, rather 
than to protect the best interests of the client. Broker discretionary accounts are especially 
ripe for churning because they can be used to generate fees for both the brokerage firm and 
the broker, without much involvement or control by the actual investor.
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In one case, two sisters gave brokers $500,000 each to be held in discretionary brokerage 
accounts. The brokers executed more than 1,400 stock trades, allegedly earning themselves 
$400,000 in commissions, while leaving the sisters with $70,000.
Mixing of Funds
Another scheme involves mixing (commingling) client funds with the funds of the 
brokerage firm, or broker, or both. In these cases, brokers will use the client’s stock as 
collateral for corporate or personal loans, and post the winning trades to themselves, while 
posting the losses to their clients. Some brokers also resort to out-and-out embezzlement of 
their client’s money and stock.
Manipulating the Stock Market
Stock market manipulation is a crime perpetrated by a promoter who artificially influences 
the market price of shares in a company for self-benefit or for the benefit of his or her 
holding company at the expense of the investing public. In most cases, the promoter flogs 
his or her holdings to the public, the public pays an artificially high price for the stock, and 
the resulting increase in price lines the pockets of the promoter.
Promoters of the stock are usually self-styled financiers who start off owning the majority of 
the stock. Often other conspirators join the promoter, forming a control group consisting of 
financiers, warehousers, or brokerage salespersons, some or all of whom might be acting 
under a corporate umbrella.
To increase the stock’s price, the promoter subjects it to a multipronged attack. The 
promoter uses such weapons as influencing the demand for the stock and controlling the 
supply of the stock, warehousing the stock (parking), paying secret commissions, wash 
trading, and issuing fictitious press releases, all of which are intended to stimulate more 
trading than would otherwise occur.
The victim is the investing public. In many ways this particular fraud is similar to other 
investment scams that rely on telephone solicitations (boiler room operations) and high 
commission rates (which are often secret).
Reasons to Study This Kind of Crime. It has been argued that stock market manipulation is a 
very specialized kind of crime, restricted to the larger financial centers and, therefore, few 
CPAs are likely to come across them. Nevertheless, because of the great increase in stock 
market investments, residents anyplace in the country may become victims of stock market 
manipulation and may look to their CPA for advice. Further, an increasing number of 
CPAs are providing financial planning services, including investment advisory services, to 
their clients. These CPAs must be aware of stock manipulation schemes to protect both 
their clients and themselves.
In addition, stock market manipulation and the modus operandi may resemble other kinds of 
scams in which the price of an investment is influenced by the laws of supply and demand. 
Therefore, CPAs should be aware of this kind of crime. They could be called upon to speak 
to the public about prevention of white-collar crime in general or investment scams in 
particular. Also, they may become an investor in the stock market themselves.
Possible Red Flags. Red flags possibly signaling stock market manipulation, with the possible 
exception of churning and commingling of funds, are not as readily apparent as they are in
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some other kinds of economic crime. Most red flags seem to originate from an informant 
close to or aware of the control group. In contrast, the regularly required reports investors 
receive should be reviewed on receipt to assure that there are not patent red flags, that is, 
there is no churning or commingling of funds. Of course, if the fraud involves falsifying 
these reports, discovery will probably be delayed until the fraudster is caught, by which 
time, the investor could well be wiped out.
The SEC and stock exchanges usually carry out investigations to detect this type of crime 
and the investigations are mainly analytical. Unusual price increases or large commissions 
earned by salespeople may be investigated, as may press releases or assets reported on 
financial statements.
Price as Determined by the Law of Supply and Demand. The law of supply and demand states, 
in essence, that the price of an item will rise when demand for the item exceeds the 
available supply of that item, and the price will fall when supply exceeds demand. 
Throughout a stock manipulation, the promoter attempts to control both the supply of, and 
the demand for, a stock in order to move the price higher. As supply is restricted, the price 
increases. As demand is stimulated, the price increases.
A stock market is a composite of the interests of many individuals and corporations offering 
to buy and sell shares. Individuals, however, are influenced not only by information 
(whether accurate or not), but also by motives such as greed or fear and by perceptions that 
may have little to do with facts or reason. Investors are capable of changing their 
investment decisions quickly, purchasing recklessly in a down cycle or staying out of the 
market entirely in anticipation of disappointing financial information. The common desire 
is to make profits and to prefer investments that are perceived as likely to produce profits, 
whether or not these perceptions are based in reality.
Thus, investors will often overreact in seeking to take advantage of price changes or in 
attempting to correct their errors. A single item of speculative news may dramatically 
change the number of people who are willing to purchase, hold or sell a particular 
investment, dramatically changing the demand for the shares. It is important to note that 
large volumes of shares are often exchanged. Accordingly, time is of the essence in keeping 
losses to a minimum and gaining the greatest possible profits. Precisely when a buy or sell 
transaction takes place can make a big difference in the value of the purchase or sale.
Market prices are generally influenced by the release of corporate information, such as 
news about profits, the announcement of a new product line, or the discovery of a new oil 
reserve, as well as by changes in government policy, forecasts, prospectuses, and in general, 
matters that occur in the ordinary daily conduct of a business.
In summary, the investing public, through the medium of publicly held stock, whether 
traded on an exchange, the NASDQ or over the counter, is able to place a value on a share 
and to decide to buy or sell accordingly. As more people seek to buy shares, the price of a 
share will increase if the number of shares for sale on the market remains the same. 
Conversely, the price will fall if an excess supply of shares is available or if the public 
demand for the shares drops.
The Manipulation Process. Generally, a manipulation begins with the promoter falsely 
increasing demand and restricting or controlling the supply. The combined effect of this 
process is an increase in price. After a certain point, called the blow off, the promoter
33
Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
attempts to increase supply and dampen demand in order to reduce the price, allowing the 
promoter to repurchase at a profit. Throughout, the promoter must act as a control valve in 
releasing the stock in order to control the market price, and hence the profits.
Manipulation may be motivated not only by a promoter wanting to make more money, but 
also by the desire to make the asset side of an investor’s balance sheet look good or to 
improve the performance of an investment portfolio.
A promoter may use any combination of the following tactics to encourage the public to 
buy stock at higher and higher prices:
• Using buy or sell pressure by stock brokers who may be receiving secret commissions
• Distributing false press releases and rumors
• Releasing false ownership information
• Promoting fictitious or grossly exaggerated profits, assets or future prospects (or any 
combination thereof)
• Warehousing to help restrict the supply of shares
• Using wash trading (that is, trading that results in no change in beneficial ownership) to 
stimulate public interest due to high trading volumes
• Controlling the first or last trade of the day in order to set the highest possible price for 
the stock
• Dumping into foreign markets
Some or all of the activities generally used in the manipulation process are shown in figure 
7-2.
Figure 7-2. Activities frequently used in the cycle of manipulating the stock market
Price Increase: Price Decrease: 
• Obtaining control • Backdooring
• Setting up a distribution network • Blowing off
• Warehousing • Short selling
• Using wash trading • Issuing bad news releases
• Issuing good news releases • Repurchasing
A promoter who wanted to manipulate the price of a stock might use any combination of 
the activities listed below
7. Obtaining Control: The first step that a promoter usually takes is to gain control over an 
existing company’s shares of stock to ensure that the public’s selling off large quantities 
of the stock does not undermine his control over the supply of shares. Generally, 70-to- 
90 percent of the voting shares that are issued and outstanding must be acquired to 
exert effective control. The promoter can gain the necessary control by using one or a 
combination of the following:
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• Buying the shares of an inactive company that is already listed on an exchange 
(commonly known as cleaning up the market). The shares of the promoter’s unlisted 
company (which do not meet the requirements for listing on an exchange) can then 
become listed by merging the corporations and exchanging the unlisted shares for 
shares of the listed company.
• Buying a shell company that may have been inactive for a number of years.
• Underwriting an issue of new shares of a somewhat controlled company. This 
underwriting usually consists of a new issue of shares in an amount that far exceeds 
the original number of outstanding shares. To a promoter, this is the least desirable 
method, as it requires a prospectus, financial reporting, and an insider trading 
report. In addition, the promoter will have to arrange for his friends to purchase the 
new shares and hold them (park them) on his behalf an unequivocally fraudulent 
transaction.
2. Setting up a Distribution Network. A distribution network is set up with the promoter at 
its head. Immediately underneath the promoter are several distributors in cities that 
have stock traders or brokerages. Each of these distributors has access to a brokerage 
house’s salespeople who then have access to the active traders. Via this network, the 
promoter now has control over what happens in the promoted stock’s market. Secret 
commissions are sometimes paid to ensure that the network complies with the 
promoter’s demands.
The traders let the salespeople know when trades are pending and keeps them 
informed as to the price movement of the promoted stock so that the promoter can 
take compensating action. The salesperson’s job is to give the public a sales pitch as to 
why they should buy the stock and, once in, why they should stay in. In addition, the 
salesperson’s activity will affect the daily trading volume. What members of the public 
do not know in this situation is that the shares they are purchasing are those of the 
promoters.
3. Warehousing: Warehousing places shares into the hands of people who are friendly to 
the promoter. This is essential in order to maintain control of the shares and continue 
to restrict and regulate the supply of shares available. This is often accomplished by 
having friends buy new offerings of the stock and continuing to hold these shares until 
the promoter instructs them to sell.
4. Wash Trading. To promote the public’s interest and increase demand for the promoted 
stock, the promoter manipulates the volume of stock traded through wash-trading. 
Essentially, this procedure consists of a stock purchases and sales with no change in 
beneficial ownership. Wash trading can be accomplished through nominee accounts: 
accounts at banks or trust companies set up under the names of trustees, friends, 
aliases, or false company names. The promoter sells a block of shares and at the same 
time a nominee enters a buy order to match the sell transaction. While the stock is kept 
out of the public’s hands, this active, ostensibly normal trading is reflected in the 
volume numbers the public sees. Hence, the market in the manipulated stock appears 
to be an active one in the public’s eyes.
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5. Issuing Good News Releases: One or more timely news releases may be issued to promote 
the stock, attracting further public interest. The news releases may include verifiable 
information but may also consist of unsubstantiated rumors, such as:
• Anticipation of good results from drilling tests in resource-based companies
• Expectations for a likely acquisition of rights to explore property close to existing 
known resources
• Plans for diversification into a glamour industry
Generally the good news may be described as an intangible promise of future results. 
There is nothing of immediate value today. These good news releases are designed to 
stimulate the public interest and encourage them to buy shares, even at a high price.
6. Backdooring: Backdooring occurs when friends operating as a warehouse, which the 
promoter has previously set up, start selling their shares while the price is still 
increasing—contrary to their agreement with the promoter—before getting the word 
from the promoter to sell. The friends are backdooring the promoter, effectively 
double crossing the promoter. In order to sustain public demand, the promoter has to 
buy the backdoor shares at the market price if the existing public demand is not 
sufficient to support these sales.
7. Blowing Off. After the promoter has successfully stimulated demand, members of the 
public buy significant numbers of shares and then wait for the price to continue its 
anticipated rise. The promoter has already picked a tentative price at which he wants 
to dispose of his holdings. He starts selling his shares, as well as those of his nominees 
and friends. In these circumstances, the sale of unusually large amounts of stock is 
referred to as a blow off. The public, expecting a continued price rise, buy the 
promoter’s shares over a relatively short period of time.
The price at which the promoter actually begins to blow off his holdings depends 
primarily on how much public demand the distribution network has created and how 
long the demand is sustained. By blowing off, the promoter has withdrawn all active 
support of the stock price. He ceases wash trading, the reported trading volume 
decreases, and the price begins to fall quickly as supply far exceeds demand.
8. Short Selling. Short selling is the act of selling stock that one does not yet own and is a 
legitimate market activity. The seller is gambling that the price will decrease and that 
he or she will be able to buy back the shares at a price lower than the current-selling 
price. In this situation, the promoter can safely sell short, because he or she knows that 
the price will go down. Thus, the promoter realizes a profit both as the price of the 
stock goes up and again as the price goes down.
9. Issuing Bad News Releases: At this point, the promoter often issues a news release about 
the company’s misfortunes. The exact reverse of the good news release, the promoter 
intends the bad news release to drive down the price of the stock rapidly.
10. Repurchasing. The stock price has now reached rock bottom, and the public is willing to 
sell at any price. The promoter often buys back control of the company when the 
shares reach this low price and changes the name of the company in order to start the 
process again. The same company, under a new name, will go through the cycle again 
in a period of one to two years.
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Secret Commissions. Secret commissions were previously mentioned in the distribution 
network discussion. Generally, secret commissions or bribes are given to people in the 
securities industry to induce them to push or promote the shares in the promoter’s 
company and to advise the promoter of orders to purchase shares before the orders are 
entered. Secret commissions may also be paid to the wash traders in order to keep their 
support. Generally, secret commissions are paid in one or more of the following ways:
• By a check drawn on either a personal or a corporate bank account and payable to the 
recipient, to cash, or to a third party. If the check is paid to a third party, it will be 
endorsed by the named third party and cashed, with the cash being passed on to the 
true recipient of the secret commission.
• By a free delivery to the recipient of stock in signed-off or street certificate form, which 
can then be sold by the recipient on the market.
• By the issuance to the recipient of call options on the stock at a fixed price below the 
current market price.
• By selling a block of stock to a salesperson or another recipient at a fixed price and 
allowing that buyer to sell that block back at a higher price.
The Significance of Accounting Evidence. Accounting evidence is generally very significant in 
the prosecution of stock market manipulation cases because—
• The accountant can perform an analysis to determine whether change in beneficial 
ownership occurred (a wash trading analysis).
• Accounting evidence may be instrumental in identifying payments or receipts of secret 
commissions, if any.
• Accounting evidence can be used to establish the percentage of the public’s participation 
in buying and selling shares when compared to the total transactions in the stock by the 
control group.
• Accounting evidence may assist in establishing that the perpetrators have benefited from 
the sale of the stock.
However, accounting evidence may not be as significant as viva voce evidence in initially 
identifying the control group, establishing the secret commission structure, and identifying 
who was paying and receiving these commissions.
Possible Preventive Measures. Perhaps the most significant stock manipulation preventive 
measure is to make the investing public aware that a salesperson’s pitch will be persuasive, 
will play on the investor’s greed, and will convey a sense of urgency. The following are 
questions that an investor should ask a salesperson to answer on the record concerning the 
specific representations being made about the investment. The answers given should help 
in identifying poor or fraudulent investments.
1. How risky is this stock?
2. What direct costs are paid out of the investors’ funds, such as for commissions, or 
advertising, or both?
3. Can I get written documents (the prospectus at a minimum), and can you mail them to 
me?
4. What is the specific destination (that is, bank account, brokerage account) of my funds?
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5. How can I sell the stock if I choose to do so, and how long will it take to dispose of the 
investment?
6. What are the names of the principal owners and officers of the salesperson’s firm, and 
what are the names of the owners and officers of the company in which the investment 
is being made?
Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. Case Study
In early 1998, Jack Smith started to promote a company called Acme Mines Co., a 
shell company listed on the Westville Stock Exchange. Smith had effective control 
of the outstanding shares. In order to promote public interest and buying, Smith 
made announcements—through investor bulletins and statutory statements to 
regulatory bodies—to the effect that Acme was about to diversify into the movie 
production business and other ventures. The announcement touted:
• An investment of $175,000 in the production of a movie, which would return 25 
percent of the profits to Acme
• A purchase yielding 58 percent control of a movie theater business called 
Everytown Theaters Ltd.
• An acquisition of distribution rights to Krazy Kandy, a confection that would be 
sold from automatic vending machines across the country
On February 4, 1998, Smith changed the name of the company from Acme Mines Co. 
to Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. (GPY-Movies) to reflect its new objectives.
Smith’s next step was to stimulate trading activity in GPY-Movies’ stock on the 
Westville Stock Exchange. To accomplish this, offices were maintained in Bigtown 
and Westville and were operated by Mike Jones, a securities desk-trader, and the 
controller, Dave Brown. Their objectives appear to have been to maintain the 
market with effective control, match orders to create activity (wash trading), and 
systematically sell off the stock for profit.
Smith would tell Jones when to buy or sell. Jones would follow through via a series 
of controlled nominee accounts. Brown’s job was to keep track of all the accounts, 
meet corporate requirements, and generally manage the money and the office in 
Bigtown. The nominee accounts were all in corporate names and could be traded 
by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones or Mr. Brown.
The office in Bigtown was in the name of Anyco Investment Corp. The accounts at 
brokerage firms in both Westville and Bigtown were in the following names:
1. Metro Trading Associates.
2. Oakville Investments Co.
3. Pineville Trading Ltd.
4. Anyco Investment Corp.
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At this time Smith was either an officer or director of each company and effectively 
controlled them. Stock positions in GPY-Movies were established through 
numerous Bigtown and Westville brokerage firms.
The eventual objective was to sell off or distribute the stock for a profit without 
causing an obvious decrease in the market price. To achieve this goal, Smith hired 
Robert Green who started to work out of the Bigtown Office around April 2, 1998. 
Smith instructed Green to sell stock through the accounts of Anyco and Metro 
Trading and to limit the price to $1.26 until an underwriting was effected, which 
was to occur on April 18, 1998.
Green’s procedure was to prearrange all the buy orders so that they could be 
matched with any one of Smith’s selling accounts. Whenever Green learned of a 
buy order, he would notify Jones of its size, price and the name of the brokerage 
firm. This meant that Green had to be in contact with sales reps or their distributors 
who would notify him of forthcoming buy orders. In order to secure their 
cooperation, Smith specifically authorized Green to pay sales reps a 15 percent 
commission over and above the amount sales reps would normally receive. In 
addition, Green, with the assistance of Smith and Brown, arranged for Wally 
Chang, a brokerage house manager, to use his sales force to distribute 300,000 
shares of GPY-Movies throughout the United States for a 12½ percent commission.
On occasion, Smith arranged to provide cash to Green in order to make payments 
to sales reps. Brown made the checks payable to cash and drew them on one of the 
companies’ accounts. Green made his own arrangements as to where and when to 
pay the sales reps.
Smith convinced two sales reps, Black and White, to set up an account in their firm. 
Whenever Black and White were able to persuade one of their clients to buy GPY- 
Movies shares, the offset would come out of Smith’s account in the name of Metro 
Trading. In this way, Smith was able to sell off his position and pay Black and 
White with shares that they in turn sold through nominee accounts. Paul Wilson, an 
analyst, provided Smith with inside information on who was bidding or offering, as 
he was indebted to Smith for a substantial loan.
Thus, Smith and Jones, in an effort to generate personal gain, created a misleading 
appearance of active public trading in shares of GPY-Movies, both by wash trading 
and by the use of secret commissions. The result was a loss to the investing public.
7. 2.9 Environmental Abuse
Generally there are two main kinds of environmental abuse that a company can commit:
1. Pollution
2. Misuse of natural resources
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Pollution
While a certain level of pollution is tolerated by today’s society, media attention has 
recently focused on companies that have gone too far. Society is, as a whole, becoming less 
tolerant of all forms of pollution, and this is reflected all the way down to the consumer— 
for instance, aerosol spray cans and cigarette smoking in restaurants are no longer tolerated 
in many jurisdictions. Laws have been passed to limit the levels of pollution, but not all 
companies comply with the laws, usually because of the added costs incurred.
Amount of Pollution. The amount of pollution and how it is determined depend on the 
nature and source of the pollution. For example, a perpetrator may have dumped garbage 
at an authorized site but in quantities greater than the dumping license permits. Or, a 
perpetrator may have dumped garbage at an unauthorized site. Or, a perpetrator may have 
polluted the environment in some other way, for example, dumping toxic substances into a 
river, or exceeding the specificed limits of emission of certain substances into the 
atmosphere.
Regardless of the nature and source of the pollution, the alleged offender’s accounting and 
administrative records are likely to yield pertinent information about the physical quantities 
of substances that are themselves pollutants or that result in pollution. Financial records can 
also provide useful evidence as to the alleged offender’s knowledge and intent. For 
example, an accounts receivable listing would reveal the names of the company’s 
customers, but additional documents would be needed to assess the extent of the polluting 
activities. These documents might include invoices, bills of lading, weigh tickets, contracts, 
production reports, and so on.
Depending on the nature of the abuse, the financial records may help to put a dollar value 
on the cost of the damage done. For example, if you can establish that a company dumped 
in excess of the 5,000-ton-garbage limit permitted by its license, the courts can calculate the 
cost of the excess from the company’s accounting records. This cost provides the judiciary 
with a yardstick against which to determine damages.
Dumping Unlimited Case Study
Dumping Unlimited was a carting company that had a license to dump waste 
material at a landfill site near Anytown. The company’s license permitted dumping 
a maximum of 150 tons of material per day at the landfill.
Dumping Unlimited maintained a fleet of garbage trucks, which dumped the 
company’s waste at the landfill site, and they also accepted waste material from 
other haulers on a daily basis.
Based on an analysis of weigh tickets, it was clear that the company was dumping 
quantities in excess of the permitted amount. To determine the value of these 
quantities, the excess tonnage was priced at the highest and the lowest price charged 
by the company, giving a range of values attributable to this offence.
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Financial Capacity. Companies that are fined for noncompliance with antipollution laws 
often claim that they cannot afford either the costs of compliance at the time when the 
pollution was generated or the costs associated with cleaning up the after effects of the 
pollution.
Both of these issues are best examined by a CPA and involve examining financial 
statements and budgets.
There are relationships between various components in the financial statements, which help 
to identify historical issues relating to both profitability and viability. A review of the 
financial statements for a number of accounting periods will be helpful in determining 
trends that would enable a CPA to compare the company’s financial results with the costs 
required to comply with antipollution laws.
In order to assess whether a company can afford the costs of cleanup (particularly when 
that company claims it cannot), a CPA would need a crystal ball. In the absence of a crystal 
ball, the CPA should examine the company’s budgets.
Management predicts the future by way of the budgeting process. Most enterprises that take 
the time to prepare budgets use them as tools for making financial and operating decisions. 
The range of budgets include operating budgets, capital budgets and cash flow budgets. A 
comprehensive operating and cash flow budget enables management to plan future 
operations and to decide how the company will pay for them. Access to past budgets, 
together with the corresponding historical results, allows the forensic accountant to interpret 
the proficiency of the company’s budgeting process and to determine whether a company 
can or cannot afford the cleanup costs.
Mine Cleanup Case Study
In the 1990s the federal government filed suit against Mine Cleanup, a uranium 
mining company, for failure to clean up a former site. The mining company 
claimed it would be put out of business if it was required to pay the $30 million 
required to clean up the site. Mine Cleanup management was attempting to set 
aside the clean-up order.
A thorough review of the company’s financial statements, operating budgets, long 
term forecasts, and cash flow budgets revealed that the company was unable to pay 
the costs in the short term, but that it was possible for the company to comply with 
the cleanup order over an extended period. A negotiated agreement was reached 
between the federal government and the company wherein the government 
essentially provided the long-term financing for the cleanup so that the cleanup 
operations could commence immediately.
Natural Resource Abuse
Laws with respect to natural resource abuse (over-fishing, hunting, logging, mining, and so 
on, as well as neglecting the endangered-species legislation) vary from jurisdiction to 
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jurisdiction and generally apply to both noncommercial and commercial harvesting of 
animals, marine life, and endangered species. Accounting evidence has little relevance to 
noncommercial activities; thus the focus in this section is primarily on commercial activities 
involving the following three areas:
1. Fur trapping and fur dealers
2. Commercial fishing
3. Endangered species
Note that companies that are involved in these commercial activities need to be aware that 
conservation officers appear to have a much broader right of access to business premises 
than that available to law enforcement officers. Generally, the legislation allows the officers 
to search any aircraft, vehicle, vessel, camp, or office, without the requirement of a search 
warrant, if they believe that any fish or game has been killed or taken in contravention of 
the applicable state laws.
Fur Trapping and Fur Dealers. Fur trappers must be licensed to practice their trade in each 
state in which they operate. They are assigned maximum quotas for different kinds of wild 
life. They are generally required to have each pelt examined and registered, at which time a 
stamp is affixed to the inside of the pelt. The trapper is not required to submit written 
reports to the state; the next level in the distribution system does that.
The fur dealer obtains a license to purchase, receive, sell, or otherwise dispose of fur pelts. 
With a few limited exceptions (domestic animals, road kill, and so on) the fur dealer must 
ensure that the pelts being purchased have been examined and suitably stamped. Monthly 
reports are generally required from the fur dealer specifying:
1. The pelts purchased or received, including the name of the trapper or hunter from 
whom the fur dealer purchased or received the furs; the date on which such pelts were 
obtained; and the number and the kinds of animals, for example, beaver, mink, lynx, 
and otter.
2. The pelts sold or disposed of, including who the pelts were sold to by name, address, 
and license number; the date on which the pelts were sold, tanned or disposed of; and 
the number and kinds of animals.
The most common form of abuse is the handling of unauthorized pelts, which are 
purchased from a trapper or hunter, that are typically excluded from both of the monthly 
fur dealers’ reports—that is, they are excluded from the report of pelts purchased, and from 
the report of pelts sold. These pelts typically bear no authorized stamp. The transactions 
often involve some financial consideration to the purchaser, for example, lower prices or 
secret commissions, which could be ascertained upon a review of the fur dealer’s books and 
records. The unauthorized pelts are typically disposed of by being included in bundles of 
authorized fur pelts submitted to a fur auction outlet, or by being directly supplied to a 
tanning operation owned by the fur dealer.
Commercial Fishing. Commercial fishermen are generally licensed to work in designated 
regions within the United States and its waters, and are assigned maximum quotas by fish 
species and poundage. These fishermen are generally required to submit a monthly report 
that accumulates information on the port where the fish were landed, the weight of the 
catch by species, and the average price of fish sold.
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Unlike the far dealer, the commercial fisherman is not required to submit a report stating to 
whom the fish were sold.
The most common form of abuse involves the fisherman exceeding his quotas and failing to 
report the excesses in his monthly reporting. A review of the cash receipts, disbursements, 
and sales journals of the commercial fisherman should detect the abuse even though many 
purchases and sales are cash transactions that take place off the company’s books. Because 
the reporting required is done by weight rather than by supplier or number of fish, it is 
necessary to reconcile the weight of fish caught to the weight of fish purchased by 
customers after allowing for wastage.
Endangered Species. In most jurisdictions, endangered species of fauna and flora are 
protected by laws that prohibit the killing, injuring, interfering with, taking, or attempting to 
do any of the above to any of the identified species of fauna or flora or their natural 
habitats.
Currently one of the major abuses is the exporting of certain endangered species of wild 
birds, particularly falcons, to other countries at an exorbitant profit to the perpetrators.
7.2.10 Economic Extortion
Economic extortion is a crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through 
intimidation or persistent demands.
Some of the forms of crime described in this section of the Handbook could involve an 
element of economic extortion. For instance, bribes could be required in order to obtain a 
lucrative contract; an owner of a company could be squeezed out by one or more of its 
creditors for reasons other than insolvency; an employee could be forced to divulge an 
employer’s trade secrets; or a company could be forced to pay a contractor to keep quiet 
about its environmental pollution problem. The common element in each of these 
situations is that the likely outcome of noncompliance with the extortionist’s demands is 
perceived to be worse than the actual outcome of compliance.
Often, an extortionist’s methods involve threats of physical violence, public disclosure of 
something that the victim would rather keep private, or financial ruin.
A Piece of the Action (Sport Megaplace) Case Study
In early 1994, Sport Megaplace was established as a state-approved organization to 
control the sale of lottery tickets in Megaplace and to apply the net proceeds from 
these sales to the development of amateur sports within Megaplace.
At that time the sale of lottery tickets included the sale of Tinylotto tickets, which was 
under the control of Mr. Johnson, and the sale of Biglotto tickets, which was under 
the control of Mr. Williams. These men were responsible for dividing Megaplace 
into wholesale distributorships so that both kinds of tickets could be sold regularly 
through wholesalers to retailers and then to the public.
However, Johnson and Williams only allowed others to obtain wholesale 
distributorships if they secretly agreed to pay 50 percent of the future profits to a 
43
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
holding company under the control of Johnson and Williams. The silent-ownership 
payments were structured as payments for management, consulting services and for 
office space.
The new distributors were led to believe that this arrangement was legitimate by the 
existence of a wholesale distributor agreement with Johnson and Williams’ 
company, a reporting letter from a lawyer’s office, a declaration of trust agreement, 
a power of attorney agreement, working papers from an accountant, banking 
resolutions and signature cards.
7.2.11 Customs Duty Fraud
Although customs laws vary from nation to nation, there are common threads and patterns 
of fraud that are inherent in transborder transactions. The following material describes 
typical customs fraud scenarios in Anyland.
The Customs Act applies to goods imported into Anyland. The Act categorizes imported 
goods by tariff schedules and prescribes rates of duty applicable to each item depending on 
its nature, the country of origin, and international treaty arrangements.
The duty payable to Anyland’s Customs Service is a percentage (the duty rate) of the 
imported item’s Value for Duty. Prior to January 1, 1998, the Customs Act based its 
determination of the Value for Duty amount on the fair market value of the goods at the 
time of export in the exporting country. In practice, this fair market value was usually the 
amount indicated on the commercial invoice. Customs officers did, however, have the 
option of disregarding the commercial invoice amount and determining a fair market value 
to be used for Value for Duty purposes using other information sources.
This fair market value determination for applying duty rates to imported goods did not 
comply with international trade agreements to which Anyland was a party. Thus, effective 
January 1, 1998, a revised procedure for determining the Value for Duty amount was 
introduced. The new basis, called the Transaction Value Method, specified the Value for 
Duty amount to be the price paid or payable to the exporter where the exporter and 
importer are dealing at arm’s length. For imports between related parties, the onus is on the 
importer to prove that there was no influence on the commercial invoice price. In these 
situations, Value for Duty is determined on the following sequential bases:
1. Transaction value of identical goods
2. Transaction value of similar goods
3. Deductive value based on a gross profit reduction of the importer’s selling price
4. Computed value
The abuse generally arises when the importer causes the Value for Duty of the imported 
product to be falsely understated, thereby reducing the amount of customs duty paid.
Importers abusing the customs regulations may vary in size of operation, ranging from 
small sole proprietors to large national distributors. The benefits from understating Value 
for Duty amounts can be enormous. In one case, the fine paid totaled $25,000,000, arising 
from a conviction of evading customs duties over a fifteen-year period. There was also a 
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civil court claim for $105.2 million against the same company for unpaid duties on goods 
imported over a period of years. Even on a small scale, with duty rates ranging up to 30 
percent or more, understating the Value for Duty amount may provide the importer with a 
10-to-15 percent cost saving and a trade advantage over its competitors.
Because the Value for Duty amount generally is supported by both a commercial invoice 
and customs invoice prepared by the exporter, the duty and sales calculations rely on the 
integrity of the exporter’s documentation. Many customs investigations have determined 
that the documents prepared by exporters understate the actual value at which the goods 
were sold.
Current customs practices continue to be conducive to fraud. Importers of legally 
importable goods are aware of the enormous volume of imports, the emphasis placed on 
illegal drug shipments, the shortage of customs officers, and the officers’ inability to fully 
inspect all entries that provide a perceived window of opportunity to perpetrate fraud.
Investigation Issues
Red Flags. Customs investigations have uncovered various schemes to falsely reduce 
collectible duties. The presence of one or more of the following red flags may assist in 
identifying a customs under valuation.
1, Apparent excess insurance: Insurance coverage for the in-transit goods substantially exceeds the 
declared Value for Duty of the same goods.
2. Competitor’s complaints: Competitor’s complaints to customs or any other agency 
governing fair trade that it cannot match the importer’s wholesale or retail prices.
3. Poor quality documents: The integrity of the exporter’s documents may be suspect if any 
invoice is: printed on tissue paper, hand typed, not preprinted, or not prenumbered.
4. Letters of credit or bank drafts: Payments for the imported goods exceed the declared 
Value for Duty amount.
5. Presence of blank invoices: If Anyland customs invoices or export declarations, or the 
exporter’s supplier invoices are known to exist at the importer’s place of business and 
are found to be blank except for the exporter’s authorization signature, the importer 
may be preparing such forms for presentation to Anyland’s customs.
6. Related exporter. The importer and exporter are related parties and, therefore, do not deal 
at arm’s length; there could be price collusion.
7. A and B Commercial Invoices:. Total costs for the imported goods may be apportioned 
between two separate invoices (often having consecutive invoice numbers, or having the 
same invoice number with A and B suffixes), only one of which is submitted to customs 
for purpose of Value for Duty determination.
8. Unreasonably high values allocated to nondutiable export costs: The dutiable cost of product is 
artificially understated and the nondutiable cost of freight, for example, is overstated on 
the commercial and Anyland customs invoices.
Significance of the Accounting Evidence. After performing an overview, the forensic accountant 
can provide details for each entry and a summary schedule for all entries. This schedule 
quantifies the apparent Value for Duty shortage and calculates the apparent duty shortages, 
thereby determining the amount withheld.
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In preparing this quantification, the forensic accountant assumes that documentation other 
than that used in the customs declaration in fact provides the true Value for Duty. The 
forensic accountant may need to obtain expert-witness evidence to substantiate this basis for 
valuation—perhaps a specialist from the Customs Service or from a lawyer.
In addition, in reviewing the importer’s accounting books and records, the forensic 
accountant may be able to provide further support for the alleged undervaluation and may 
be helpful in refuting possible defense claims.
Testimony: Viva Voce Evidence. The forensic accountant may seek evidence from various 
other sources. Employees of the importer may be interviewed to provide evidence as to the 
inner workings of the importer and to settle issues of ownership or control of the importing 
company. A customs’ broker may provide testimony that, if presented with the documents 
on which the forensic accountant’s calculations were based, a higher Value for Duty would 
have been declared.
7.2.12 Health Care Fraud
There are a wide variety of health care frauds that have recently been the subject of media 
attention. Many such cases are outside the scope of this section—that is, they relate to fraud 
committed by individuals rather than by corporations. Health care fraud committed by 
corporations typically involves one of the following:
1. Violations of occupational health and safety laws (OSHA).
2. Marketing of drugs that have not been adequately tested or for which the test results 
have been falsified.
7.2.13 Possession of Property Obtained by Crime
This offence refers to either the actual possession of property obtained by a crime, or to the 
possession of proceeds from the disposal of property obtained by a crime.
When a business is suspected to be in possession of stolen inventory, an examination of the 
financial records should be able to establish whether this inventory had been legitimately 
purchased.
A reconciliation of the inventory purchased and sold needs to be performed and compared 
to the inventory on hand at both the beginning and end of the period in question: the end 
date is usually set shortly after the date that the stolen inventory was allegedly obtained. 
The purchases and sales should be ascertained from the company’s purchases and sales 
records, and also from updated accounts payable and accounts receivable listings. If there is 
a positive variance, it could result from an accounting discrepancy, which would need to be 
examined further, or it could result from the possession of property obtained by crime.
If the purchases, on the accounting records, appear to be legitimate, then the integrity of the 
supplier invoices must be assessed. Often, stolen inventory can be made to appear 
legitimate through overstatements on supplier invoices.
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Don’t Fence Me In Case Study
Acme Industries was acting as a fence for stolen car parts. These parts were stolen 
by third parties and were sold by Acme to authorized car dealerships at prices 
considerably lower than normal wholesale prices. When Acme’s premises were 
searched on December 8, 1998, parts valued at approximately $667,900 were 
seized.
Forensic accountants were retained to determine, by means of the available books 
of account and supporting documents, whether these parts were purchased legally 
or otherwise. Here are the steps followed to make the requested determination.
1. The accountant began by performing a period examination. The disbursement 
journal disclosed that a payment had been made to a firm of CPAs for services 
rendered to Acme. An interview with this firm revealed the existence of a draft 
set of financial statements for Acme, dated February 28, 1998. These financial 
statements, which were never issued in final form, disclosed inventory valued at 
$16,500, with a note stating, “no physical inventory taken; inventory estimated 
for accounts.” The draft financial statements established the opening date of the 
time period. The closing date was determined by the date of search and seizure, 
December 8, 1998. The period March 1, 1998, to December 8, 1998, was, 
therefore, the period examined.
2. The accountant then updated the financial records of Acme to the date of search 
and seizure. This step disclosed purchases from various suppliers totaling 
$886,167. A similar updating of the sales of Acme resulted in a sales figure of 
$1,007,815.
3. To calculate the book value of inventory, the accountant created a schedule, 
identified as Apparent Inventory of Acme as of December 8, 1998. It set out the total 
value of the goods available for sale of $902,667 (opening inventory of $16,500 
plus the purchases made, during the period, of $886,167).
The schedule set out the updated sales figure and a gross profit margin (sales 
minus cost of sales divided by sales) ranging from 10-to-30 percent. By deducting 
the gross profit margin, an apparent cost of goods sold was calculated, ranging 
from a high of $907,000 at the 10 percent level to a low of $705,470 at the 30 
percent level. A comparison of the apparent cost of goods sold to the value of 
goods available for sale showed that there should have been no inventory as of 
December 8, 1998 at a 10 percent gross margin. At a 30 percent gross margin, 
the value of inventory at December 8 would have been $197,197.
4. To perform a valuation of the parts seized, the accountant compared the goods 
seized to the inventory on hand calculated at the 10 percent gross margin level, 
indicating an excess quantity of physical parts on hand of approximately 
$672,200. When a gross profit margin of 30 percent was applied, the excess on 
hand was approximately $470,000. Based on the above procedures, Acme had 
in its possession an excess quantity of parts ranging in value from $470,000 to 
$672,200.
Interviews with three suppliers indicated that the invoices used in the calculation of 
purchases between March 1 and December 8, 1998 had been inflated or padded so
47
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
that the invoiced value of goods purchased by Acme was greater than the actual 
value of the goods received. The padded portion of the payments Acme made to its 
suppliers were paid to the wife of Acme’s owner in cash.
Padding the supplier’s invoices made the stolen goods on hand harder to detect or 
easier to explain away, or both. The inflated purchase prices also allowed cash to be 
removed from Acme, tax free, under the guise of an expense. The payments to 
suppliers were converted into cash with the excess (padded) portion of the invoiced 
price being returned to the owner’s wife as cash.
This disclosure made it necessary to revise the calculated value of inventory as of 
December 8, 1998, to reflect the alleged nonpurchases in Acme’s dealings with the 
three suppliers who were padding their invoices. These alleged nonpurchases 
totaled some $263,000, thereby increasing the value of the excess quantity of parts 
in the possession of Acme to a figure between $735,000 and $935,000. These 
findings not only placed the onus on the owner of Acme to explain the source of the 
excess quantity of parts seized but also disclosed the existence of a fraudulent 
scheme involving the three suppliers.
7.2.14 Coupon Redemption Fraud
Coupon redemption fraud involves the fraudulent collection and conversion of coupons 
designed to promote various kinds of merchandise. For example, a newspaper coupon for a 
box of cereal may require the purchaser to present it at a supermarket to receive twenty-five 
cents off the purchase price of the cereal. Normally, the manufacturer reimburses the 
supermarket for the discount it paid plus a token fee, perhaps several cents, to cover the 
cost of processing the coupon and returning it to the manufacturer.
Unscrupulous grocery and supermarket owners will collect coupons, in some cases from an 
intermediary, and redeem them as though merchandise has been purchased from them, 
when in fact, it has not been. Although the individual amounts can be small, the volume in 
most consumables can make it profitable for stores to engage in these schemes.
7.3 Prevention of Commercial Crime
Four forces can operate to reduce commercial crime:
1. Increased awareness—that is, decreasing the likelihood that a victim will be “taken.”
2. Formal deterrence—that is, the fear of formal, officially imposed sanctions (conviction 
and punishment by the government).
3. Informal deterrence—that is, the fear of informally imposed sanctions, such as the loss of 
respectability or a career.
4. Ethics—that is, the internalization of values that discourage violations of legal codes.
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7.3.1 Increased Awareness
Increased awareness is achieved through education and by experience. However, 
experience can be a costly way to increase awareness. With increased awareness, the 
investor, customer, competitor, and general public are more likely to closely scrutinize a 
situation and ask questions that would raise alarm bells and prevent them from suffering a 
loss. For instance:
• Investors should be wary of schemes pitching high rates of return in a short time.
• Investors also should be wary of schemes with foreign intrigue.
• Investors should thoroughly examine franchise opportunities before any funds are 
invested. Brochures and marketing pitches should be viewed with skepticism, 
particularly in the case of new or unconventional franchisers. Detailed financial 
information, including costs and profit margins of the franchiser for any goods and 
services they are contracting to provide, should be reviewed to determine the motives of 
the franchiser.
• Investors should ask stock promoters a series of questions about the stock the promoter 
is pushing to determine the extent to which that promoter is tied to the stock.
7.3.2 Formal Deterrence
A crime control strategy has little chance of success unless offenders are punished. 
However, formal levels of current enforcement are, by all measures, extremely low. One 
novel approach is enforced self-regulation. Under this idea, the government would compel 
each company to write unique rules for itself or its employees. A governmental agency 
would monitor compliance. Two examples of successes in the noncriminal area are the 
Federal Aviation Administration, which monitors self-regulation for the U.S. airline 
industry, and the Federal Trade Commission, which monitors rules that the U.S. 
advertising industry has largely set for itself.
However, there are problems with self-regulation, and the industries that attempt to 
regulate themselves have spotty records at best. In one study of the 320,000 physicians in 
the United States, an average of only seventy-two medical licenses per year were revoked.
It may be that increased enforcement can only come at the expense of a complete and total 
revision of the criminal justice system. Many commercial criminals have little fear of 
detection because of the constant barrage of information that demonstrates the police and 
courts simply cannot keep up with the pace of criminal offenses. Until potential offenders 
have the perception that they will be caught and punished, we should not expect a reversal 
of this crime trend.
However, many researchers believe there are better deterrents to commercial crime than 
incarceration of the individuals who are directly involved. They argue that the most 
effective deterrents are:
• Monetary penalties
• Adverse publicity
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The following remedial steps could be adopted to deal with commercial crime:
1. Strengthen consent agreements and decrees (under which companies do not admit that 
what they were doing was wrong, but agree to stop doing it) to provide substantial 
remedies for violations of the agreement and to include systematic follow-ups.
2. Increase fine ceilings, assessing fines according to the nature of the violation and in 
proportion to the company’s annual sales.
3. Enact stiff criminal penalties for violations of health and safety or environmental 
regulations that recklessly endanger the public or employees.
4. Introduce stronger statutes to prohibit companies that previously had violated federal 
laws from receiving federal contracts.
5. Promote mandatory publicity for corporate civil and criminal violations.
6. Increase more extensive use of imprisonment with longer sentences. Replace 
community service with incarceration, except for unusual circumstances.
7. Prevent convicted corporate offenders from being indemnified by their companies.
8. Prohibit for three years management officials convicted of criminally violating 
corporate responsibilities from assuming similar management positions in their 
company or others.
9. Make directors liable, but not criminally, for being derelict in their duty to prevent 
illegal corporate actions.
10. Enact a new commercial bribery statute to help prosecute corporate executives who 
receive kickbacks from their customers or suppliers.
7.3.3 Informal Deterrence
Most commercial criminals, compared to more traditional offenders, perceive the informal 
sanctions of the loss of career and prestige to be a greater deterrent. They are, therefore, 
theoretically more deterred from misbehaving by those consequences than by 
incarceration.
For example, a bank president, who was told he was about to be indicted, spent most of his 
time asking whether the charges were going to be made public. When told that indeed the 
charges would be public, the banker, promptly committed suicide.
Informal sanctions often exist without formal sanctions. The imposition of formal sanctions, 
however, will usually lead to additional informal sanctions.
7.3.4 Ethics
Behaviorists generally conclude that one of the single most important factors influencing 
group behavior is the attitude of management, who—in many reported instances—have 
been claimed by employees to have exerted pressure on them to engage in unethical 
behavior.
One prime example is the famous Equity Funding Case, which occurred in the early 1970s. 
It was uncovered when a disgruntled former employee went to the authorities. For nearly 
ten years, the Equity Funding Corporation falsified more than 56,000 life insurance policies 
and overstated their assets by $120 million. It was estimated that fifty to 75 employees, who 
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managed to keep the scheme a secret for several years, were involved. The trustee 
appointed to sort out the massive fraud, Robert Loeffler, said, “Of almost equal importance 
was the surprising ability of the originators of the fraud to recruit new participants over the 
years.”
Teaching people that certain behaviors are illegal and therefore inappropriate is 
uncomplicated and extremely effective in reducing crime. Moral education that discourages 
illegal behavior, from the top to the bottom of an organization, must be continuous. Simply 
put, people must be informed as to what behavior is acceptable and what is not so that they 
can alter their actions appropriately.
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CHAPTER 8:
Computer Crime and Computer Criminals
8.1 Overview
The advent of the computer has made certain kinds of crimes more efficient, harder to 
detect, and very difficult to prosecute. Add to this the fact that, in a global corporation, 
computers are likely to be operated all over the world; even where a company operates in 
only one country, access to the Internet connects the company to the world.
A computer-related crime is simply one in which a computer is used either to commit a 
crime, or as the target of a crime. Crimes committed using computers may include: 
embezzlement, larceny (theft of property and proprietary information), fraud, forgery and 
counterfeiting. Crimes committed targeting computers may include sabotage, vandalism, 
electronic burglary, wiretapping, and the gaining of illegal access, either by impersonating 
an authorized user or by exceeding one’s authority.
Some people incorrectly assume that in order to commit a computer crime, which carries 
with it the risk of a substantial prison sentence, a person must be a computer scientist, 
information technology specialist or programming genius. However, anyone with access, or 
who can gain access, to a computer managing assets or confidential information is in a 
position to commit the crime.
Until a few years ago, computer crime was something most people considered to be in the 
realm of science fiction, or one that involved cyber-wizards in lab coats doing 
incomprehensible things to giant computers. Today, nothing could be further from the 
truth. Surveys show losses from computer crimes in the billions of dollars. The high 
valuation that the investment community places on companies providing computer security 
solutions is testimony to the importance that computer security plays in the modem 
organization.
8.1.1 Security
Assuring security for a computer system is no different than having appropriate security for 
manual accounting files. Because of the disparity in technology, each system requires its 
own particular tools and methods to implement security, but the objective is the same: to 
achieve a reasonable and cost-effective control environment in which an unauthorized act is 
likely to be detected.
Of course, that technology has changed radically over the last decade, as companies have 
moved from large central systems to interconnected local and wide area networks (LANs 
and WANs), and since the Internet has made email and communications a part of almost 
everyone’s lives. Security measures from years past that were accomplished by locking up 
the room containing the mainframe don’t work today. One central machine has been
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replaced by hundreds of PCs (each probably exceeding the power of that old mainframe in 
many ways) connected into internal networks, and likely interconnected to the outside 
world as well. Terms such as firewalls (programs designed to prevent invasion of a system 
by an outsider), which had no real applicability to the world of computers as little as five 
years ago, are now essential requirements for any reasonably managed corporate or 
government computer operation.
8.1.2 Evolution of Computer Crime
In looking at computer crimes, it’s important to remember that computers are just machines 
that carry out instructions programmed into them. When a crime involves a computer, it 
isn’t the computer suddenly deciding to become a criminal, but the person manipulating 
the program or using the computer to perpetrate an act that has been defined in law as 
being criminal. Computers are an instrument of the crime, in the same sense that a phone 
or fax machine can facilitate the commission of an insider trading offense. And while 
certain kinds of crime would not be possible without a computer-for example, planting a 
computer virus, others are new versions of old crimes that are facilitated by modem 
computer technology. As technology advances, those with a criminal mindset will, 
inevitably, continue to look for new ways to exploit the computer for their own ends.
For example, consider the theft of a new computer chip design. Printed out, the details of 
the design might require a dozen thick notebooks and a large roll of detailed circuit 
diagrams. That same information in computer form would easily fit on a small tape cassette, 
smaller than the common audiocassettes used for music. Or, in minutes, the information 
could be transmitted via the Internet, either as a file or as an attachment to one or more 
email messages.
Most experts agree that computer crime is a growing problem, and that the tools to prevent 
it are evolving, but so are new ways of committing those crimes. Feeling confident that your 
systems are 100 percent secure is never a good idea, but given the speed of computer 
evolution, today, it is downright dangerous!
This chapter should provide you with an understanding of computer crime, how it has 
evolved, and the ways that computer criminals are likely to attack organizations like yours.
8.2 Computer-Related Crimes
In today’s organizations, virtually every asset, from money to proprietary and confidential 
information, is likely to be recorded on some computer’s hard drive, on a computer tape or 
on a disk. Every day trillions of dollars are transferred between bank accounts relying on 
computerized records. Millions of individuals essentially never see the inside of a bank. 
Their pay is deposited directly into their accounts, and when they need cash, they head for 
the nearest automatic teller machine (ATM). Yet money may not be the most valuable 
commodity on the computer.
8.2.1 Intellectual Property
Intellectual property, which can range from business plans to trade secrets, can have 
immense value. There are unique differences between stealing information and stealing 
almost anything else. If $100 is stolen from you, the thief has deprived you of your money.
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Similarly, if your car is stolen, the thief has it and you don’t. With information, however, 
particularly information stored on a computer, a thief can steal the information and you can 
still have it. If the thief is a really good crook, your information can be stolen without you 
ever knowing that an incident has taken place. So computers can be used to facilitate the 
theft of money (for example, by manipulating banking or accounting records), the theft of 
goods (by manipulating inventory, shipping records or receivables records) or information 
(usually by copying it). This category includes computer-based implementations of 
traditional crimes (theft, insider trading, and so on) and of newly defined crimes such as 
economic espionage in which company secrets are stolen for the benefit of another 
organization, or computer intrusion, which criminalizes the unauthorized access into 
another organization’s computers.
8.2.2 Computer Hardware
Another class of computer crime attempts to target the computers themselves. If a 
perpetrator can put a computer virus into your computer, the virus can cause a huge 
disruption of your business when it is triggered to destroy data (particularly if you haven’t 
been backing up that data regularly). In some cases, criminals may take more direct action 
to damage your computer. These attack profiles are sometimes referred to as denial of service 
attacks, because they are designed to deprive the rightful users of the use of their systems’ 
resources.
8.2.3 Computer Crimes and the Law
Whether a target of an attack is the computer itself or the information residing in the 
computer, the attempt may well be a crime. But what if it isn’t?
To be a crime, there has to be a law that declares a particular course of action to be a 
criminal act. Until the passage of specific computer crime laws over the past twenty years, 
prosecutors had to find ways to apply traditional laws, such as, wire fraud or mail fraud, to 
high-tech crimes. And it is important to remember that laws only apply within the state or 
country in which they are promulgated. Because the Internet can be accessed from 
anywhere in the world, perpetrators can carry out crimes from anywhere, including from 
countries that have weak computer crime laws, or from which extradition is unlikely. Some 
laws specifically require the victims to show that they had safeguarded the information 
stolen or provided notification that the information was not in the public domain.
Unfortunately, in our society, there are too few law enforcement and prosecution personnel 
who are specialists in computer crime investigation. There are very specific procedures that 
must be followed in handling and analyzing computer files and equipment if the evidence 
of the offense is to be admissible in a court of law. Failure to do so may cause a prosecution 
to fail. Corporations should be aware that attempts of their in-house technical or 
investigative personnel to examine computers involved in an offense, however well 
intentioned may result in evidence being rendered inadmissible. Once a crime occurs, a 
court is going to apply the rules of evidence to determine whether any actions taken could 
have modified the evidence or otherwise damaged its credibility.
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8.3 A Brief History of Computer Crime
No one knows who the first computer criminal was. However, computer-related crimes 
certainly have been around since the early 1970s. Throughout the rest of that decade, 
computer crimes tended to focus on the manipulation of computer records to obtain 
money. In the 1980s, we began to see cases in which the target of the crime was the 
information on the computer. Insider trading was facilitated by the relative anonymity with 
which information could be accessed in many systems.
In one of the largest early cases, an insurance company took advantage of its accounting 
firm’s computer naivete to perpetrate a huge fraud. The insurer created thousands of bogus 
policies, which it could identify through special policy numbers. When the auditors, as part 
of random checks, wanted to see some of these nonexistent policies, they were told the 
policies would be available the next day. That evening, the perpetrators busily created the 
appropriate documentation to prove the validity of the policies. Millions of dollars were 
funneled out of the company through this scheme. This case marked the period when 
auditors learned that it was vital to include computer systems in their audit plans.
In another noteworthy case, the chief teller of a bank located in Brooklyn, NY, devised a 
plan to manipulate dormant accounts using the bank’s new computer system. He 
discovered that he could move money in and out of those inactive accounts simply by using 
his supervisor’s key. He withdrew several hundred thousand dollars. Even though the 
manipulations all showed up on accounting reports, there were so many thousands of 
irregularities as a result of the complex new systems that the internal auditors were not able 
to keep up with the volume, and ignored what they considered low-priority items, like 
dormant account transactions. Unfortunately for the perpetrator, he was a dedicated (but 
spectacularly unsuccessful) horse-player. When the Attorney General of New York State 
conducted a raid on his bookmaker, the volume of his gambling was discovered, and the 
source of his funds uncovered. He was convicted of theft and imprisoned.
In another case, in California, a young man discovered that the phone company had 
installed a system that permitted their employees to order equipment to be delivered to job 
sites using a push-button phone. He obtained the requisite code numbers from manuals 
recovered from the phone company’s trash. Using the codes, he ordered the computer to 
arrange the delivery of equipment to downtown manholes. He then collected the valuable 
materials with his own truck, and eventually sold the valuable equipment to foreign phone 
companies. His scheme was discovered when he refused to give his truck driver a raise, and 
the driver turned him in. It was shown that he had stolen about $1.1 million in equipment. 
He was tried, convicted, and after a short 90-day stay in jail, promptly established a 
business as a consultant to attorneys who defended computer criminals. His ads proudly 
proclaimed that he had “actual courtroom experience.”
Today, computer crime has progressed from crimes committed by individuals against 
individuals and companies to a topic of great concern to governments: information warfare 
has emerged as a real threat to national infrastructures.
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8.4 Computer Crime Today
Computer crime is in the news. Whether it is the arrest of the creator of a damaging 
computer virus or a person using computers to sell child pornography, the media has 
realized that our society has become worried about technology failures. This media 
attention has had an unintended effect that can be a problem.
If you were to believe the media, hackers are the number one cause of computer crime 
problems. In fact, however, the major problem is computer-facilitated crime committed by 
employees and others who have been granted access to a system. Because the common 
perception of threats is one of the key inputs people use for deciding how to spend their 
security dollars, this misperception may lead to an inappropriate distribution of resources, 
so that risk does not match security measures. Today many companies are realizing that this 
may well be the case.
The problem of preventing computer crime is no different than that of preventing any other 
crime against a business. After all, crimes were committed against business long before 
computers. Accountants worked to discourage these crimes by requiring separation of 
duties between people handling cash or other assets and those making the entries in the 
books of the company concerning the assets. By dividing access to assets and the records of 
those assets, the theory was that two or more people would have to conspire to carry out a 
fraud, thus increasing the likelihood of detection.
Along with separation of duties, accountants have traditionally depended on the paper trail 
of records that document transactions. This paper trail required that all transactions be 
entered into journals that would be backed up by source documents, such as invoices, 
purchase orders, receiving reports, canceled checks, sales receipts and vendor invoices.
Of course, in spite of the best efforts of the accountants, fraud did occur. Accounting 
systems are neither foolproof nor fraud proof. Determined criminals could still find ways to 
circumvent or override controls.
Computers haven’t really changed anything. A crook is still a crook. Fraud, theft and 
embezzlement are still possible in the age of computers. Indeed, some argue that crime has 
become more likely, as traditional paper trails are replaced by computerized trails, which 
are not as easily verified by traditional methods. The speed of processing took precedence 
over effective control, according to some writers. CPAs should determine how and what to 
do to validate the information stored in computer systems. And that has become more 
difficult as computer architectures have evolved from central mainframe computers to 
networks of hundreds or even thousands of PCs and file servers distributed throughout the 
company.
As stated earlier, surveys, including those conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the Computer Security Institute, and the American Society for Industrial Security, show 
that computer crime is responsible for billions of dollars of loss each year. Many of these 
surveys indicate that the average loss in a computer crime is higher than in noncomputer­
based crimes. It is often more difficult to prosecute a computer crime than a traditional 
crime. Evidence on a computer is very difficult to connect to an individual because 
computer data can be manipulated; therefore, providing proof not only that the crime 
occurred but also how it was accomplished can be a complex process. Part of the problem 
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is that there are a limited number of police and prosecutors who are trained in the 
investigation and prosecution of computer crime.
In fact, new opportunities for theft, fraud and embezzlement have been created by 
computer technology. Accounting records, once kept under lock and key in the accounting 
department, are now stored on computers that can be accessed remotely. Not only are the 
systems available to authorized users (employees who have a job-related requirement to 
access and use the accounting system) but also by data entry clerks, computer operators, 
systems analysts and programmers. If the computer’s access control security system is not 
set correctly, unauthorized employees or even outsiders could gain access to the system. 
With the proper skills and a criminal inclination, systems can be manipulated, and 
programs changed to eliminate records of the fraud.
8.4.1 Classification of Computer Fraud
Generally, there is no accepted chart-of-accounts for computer fraud. If there were, it would 
constantly be changing. But certain computer-fraud activities that could affect a business’ 
chart-of-accounts should be recognized: manipulating computer inputs, manipulating 
programs and tampering with outputs.
Manipulating Computer Inputs
One of the most frequent bases of computer crime involves the falsification of computer 
inputs. Those inputs may involve putting false transactions into the system, modifying 
actual transactions, or in some schemes, not putting information into the system.
From an accounting standpoint, the main reasons for manipulating inputs are to overstate 
or understate revenues, assets, expenses and liabilities. The objective of the perpetrator 
determines the manipulation necessary. Sometimes the objective is to provide false data to 
managers, stockholders, creditors or government agencies. Sometimes the manipulation is 
part of an embezzlement, for example, entering false invoices into an accounts payable 
system. There can be little question that the manipulation of data is the most common form 
of computer-related fraud.
Input fraud should be among the easiest to detect and prevent with effective supervision 
and controls. These include:
• Separation of duties
• Audit trails
• Control totals and access controls (both those that limit access to data entry screens and 
those that place limits on values that can be entered)
Manipulating Programs
Another major class of computer crime involves altering the instructions that computers use 
to manipulate input files and databases. These can range from schemes in which programs 
are designed to process fraudulent entries without making audit trail entries, to those 
featuring deliberate miscalculations (for example, to shortchange depositors of a bank of 
fractions of a cent of interest, which can be accumulated and stolen).
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Yet another category of computer fraud involves tampering with the results of computer 
activity: reports and files. This category includes theft of confidential or proprietary 
information (customer lists, research and design [R&D] results, company business plans, 
employee information, secret formulas, and so on). According to the previously mentioned 
surveys these intellectual property thefts are apparently escalating as competition increases 
globally. Computers have undoubtedly facilitated the thefts, because they have provided 
the capability for fast copying of huge databases, and at the same time provided, through 
data communications, the capability for moving the copied data globally at tremendous 
speeds. Intellectual property theft by computer is a unique crime: someone can steal your 
data, but it’s still where it originally was, and there may be no record of the crime.
8.4.2 The Most Common Computer Crimes
With all of the hype concerning hackers, you would think they represent the major threat of 
computer crime, but nothing could be further from the truth. Regardless of the evolution of 
computer technology, the manipulation of inputs and outputs is still the most common form 
of computer-related crime.
Computers are frequently manipulated to get to assets, the most popular of which are either 
cash or information that can be converted to cash, or both. In terms of cash, input is 
frequently manipulated through submission of falsified documents, such as invoices from 
vendors, suppliers or contractors; claims for government benefits; refund or credit claims; 
or fraud involving payroll or expenses. The phony claims can involve anyone from clerks 
to senior executives, although employees in either the claims approval or accounting 
functions are most often involved. From an accounting viewpoint, the false claim is a fake 
debit to an expense so that a corresponding credit can be posted to the cash account to 
cover the issuance of a check or funds transfer.
Executive Computer Crimes
In the higher levels of an organization, the nature of fraud changes. Rather than simply 
grabbing cash, fraud may be designed to overstate profits by fabricating data such as sales 
(which are simply overstated or which are booked before the transaction is really 
completed), or by understating expenses (either by simple reduction of the numbers or in 
improper deferral to a later accounting period). There is a nearly infinite range of variations 
on these themes, based on the ingenuity of the perpetrators. For example, profits may be 
overstated by increasing ending inventory of manufactured goods or merchandise held for 
sale. That results in understatement of the cost of goods sold and raises the net profits.
Manipulation of operating results is probably more highly motivated today than ever 
before. With increasing market volatility as well as an insistence on continuous growth and 
on beating analyst expectations every quarter, managers may turn to manipulation to 
borrow time in order to turn around what they may believe to be temporary problems. 
With so much of their personal wealth tied up in company stock, there is a tremendous 
motivation to keep the numbers where the market perceives they should be. Or it may be 
done to make the company a more attractive merger or acquisition target, with the 
assumption that in the course of the merger the falsification would be overlooked or 
attributed to some undefined error. Or it may be done for personal greed; in some 
companies, the executive compensation plan is directly tied to reported results.
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8.5 Computer Criminal Profiles
Who commits computer crime? It would be useful to have a profile of the offender so that 
we could perhaps predict who will commit the crimes.
8.5.1 Predictions
In the 1980s, criminologists, who focused their attention on white-collar crime, argued that 
the perpetrators tended to be trusted employees with unresolvable personal problems, 
usually financial in nature. These included indebtedness as a result of illness in the family, 
or problems with alcohol, narcotics, gambling, expensive tastes, or sexual pursuits 
(according to the police, the three Bs: booze, babes and bets).
At about the same time, various studies provided a profile of the computer criminal. In this 
profile the culprit—
1. Is male, white, and between 19 and 30 years of age.
2. Has no prior criminal record.
3. Identifies with technology more than with the employer’s business.
4. Is bright, creative, energetic, willing to accept challenges, and highly motivated.
5. Is employed in the field of either information processing or accounting.
6. Feels a desperate need for money because of personal problems.
7. Feels exploited by his or her employer and wants to get even. The culprit feels that 
promotions, salary increases, bonuses, stock options, and so on, are not fairly 
distributed. Others have gotten more than they deserve through various forms of 
favoritism.
8. Does not intend to hurt people, just the employer, who is perceived of as cold, 
indifferent, uncaring and exploitive.
9. Does not have a self-image as a criminal.
10. Believes that actions against the establishment are justified for political or social reasons.
11. Perceives beating the system as a challenge worthy of his or her efforts.
In addition, there are four frequently cited characteristics that are symptoms of trouble:
1. High living: Not too long ago, eyebrows were raised at the programmer who showed up 
in the company parking lot in a new Mercedes convertible. However, in the turn of the 
century marketplace, programmers who have been through one or two initial public 
offerings (IPOs) can easily afford any car they want. Nonetheless, a discrepancy between 
life-style and income must be regarded as suspicious.
2. Ultradedication to the job: The bookkeeper or computer programmer who never takes a 
vacation is either very dedicated (increasingly less likely in today’s business 
environment) or afraid that some scheme would come to light if he or she were not 
around to control things.
3. Aging: As some people age, they grow increasingly resentful of perceived wrongs; for 
example, the awarding of increased salaries and stock to younger employees. Therefore, 
they may feel justified in making a big score if they think they can get away with it.
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4. Chronic Lateness: The common wisdom held that people who were constantly late with 
their work were late because they were trying to fabricate or cover up something they 
were doing.
In today’s environment, how valid are these assumptions? We do know that most 
perpetrators who are caught committing computer crimes are male. They also tend to be 
young. But there are not a lot of reliable indicators in the above lists that provide any kind 
of predictive ability. Does this mean that the perpetration of computer manipulations is 
unpredictable?
Certainly, there is no simple test that will detect whether a person, who has never 
committed a crime in the past, will or will not commit one in the future, given the proper 
circumstances and motivations. However, a review of cases over the past few years reveals 
one interesting phenomenon: those who committed these offenses often had problems with 
former employers who were glad to be rid of them. Companies that do not perform 
background checks that include contacting former employers and checking for falsification 
on employment applications are the fraudster’s friend. The perpetrators can ignore their 
pasts and start anew at a company that appears to have weak security. Certainly, former 
employers can lie about an employee or refuse to give any reference beyond confirmation 
of employment, but a good background check should pick up at least some potential 
problem employees.
Three other things to say about perpetrators are important. First, an offender does not have 
to be a computer genius to pull off a major fraud. Anyone who can gain access to a system, 
either because he or she is authorized to use it, or because the security controls are weak, 
can potentially manipulate that system for personal advantage. Even if they cannot directly 
access the computer, if they can fake the data, they can manipulate it.
Second, it is easy to limit consideration of risk to employees. Many companies today, 
particularly in high-tech industries, make considerable use of temporary employees and 
independent contractors. All too often, because they are not carried on the books as 
employees, they are not subject to the same background checks and security measures. It 
should be clear that computers don’t care if they are manipulated by employees or 
independent contractors. If a person has access, they should be subject to the same controls 
as regular employees.
Finally, there are offenders you will never meet, who will never meet you, but who may 
cause you great difficulties. These are the virus writers and virus distributors who develop 
and spread them simply because they can.
8. 5.2 Reasons for Committing Computer Crimes
Criminologists, in looking at why crimes are committed, often use a four-element model, 
sometimes called Motivation, Opportunity, Means, and Methods, (MOMM).
Motivation represents the reason why one is willing to commit a crime. Motivation can be 
related to both personal (or internal) conditions and external conditions. Personal 
motivation factors include:
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• Economic Motivators: Economically motivated perpetrators act to fulfill the need or desire 
for financial gain, for money or for other assets (or information) that can be turned into 
money.
• Egocentric Motivators: Egocentric perpetrators have a need to show off their talents in 
committing what may be perceived by others as a complex crime. Money or other assets 
are sometimes part of the crime, but frequently they are not the underlying motivation. 
Certainly, assets symbolize a measure of the success of the venture, which is important 
in demonstrating the prowess and ingenuity of the criminal. Many hackers fall into this 
category. But for many others, their downfall is the need to brag about their exploits and 
thus gain favor in the eyes of their peer group.
• Ideological Motivators: Ideologically motivated perpetrators feel compelled to seek 
revenge against someone or something they perceive as oppressing or exploiting either 
them personally or other individuals possibly unknown to them. Terrorist bombings of 
computer centers is an extreme example of this mindset. Sabotage against systems by 
disgruntled employees or exemployees is a frequently encountered motivator.
• Psychotic Motivators: Psychotic perpetrators (that is, people suffering from mental disease) 
may view the company through a delusional state of mind that does one or more of the 
following: distorts reality, validates feelings of grandeur or of persecution, or exaggerates 
hatred or fear of the organization or of particular people in the organization (often direct 
superiors) to the extent that they may commit extreme actions against their perceived 
enemies to relieve their anxieties. One way of acting out these feelings is exemplified by 
the person who shows up at the office with a gun and kills those he or she believes are 
“out to get them.” Another way this kind of troubled individual may lash out at these 
imaginary adversaries is to attack the computer systems that may be perceived as 
facilitating the work of supposed enemies. The subject of workplace violence is an 
important one, but is outside the scope of this Handbook.
Environmental Motivators
Environmental motivators are those conditions in the environment of the company (or 
sometimes of society in general) that are claimed as motivators. But no external motivator 
forces anyone to commit a crime. It would be fair to say that environmental motivators may 
aggravate personal motives. These include the work environment, reward systems, levels of 
interpersonal trust, corporate ethics, stress and weaknesses in internal controls, or security 
systems that may make a person believe that they can get away with a crime.
It was indicated earlier that there are no guaranteed ways of spotting a computer criminal 
any more than any other kind of criminal, and that people commit offenses for many 
different reasons. Does this mean that there’s nothing we can do to prevent computer 
crime? Nothing could be further from the truth. We may not know specifically who will 
commit a crime, but we know that given the right circumstances, someone is likely to try. In 
the next section, we will look at the things a business can do to reduce the chance that it 
will be victimized by a computer criminal.
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8.6 Controls for Preventing and Detecting Computer Crime
It would be nice to assume that everyone associated with a business is honest. Certainly, it 
would eliminate the need for controls to prevent crime. Of course, that assumption is not 
viable. People will commit crimes for many reasons, some of which are rational, others of 
which may make no sense to the observer. The larger the organization, the more likely it is 
that someone is out to commit a crime. Managers who subscribe to this belief are not 
necessarily paranoid. In fact, most managers can name their disgruntled employees.
There are those who will steal under the best of employment circumstances. Others would 
not steal even if they were unfavored employees of Ebenezer Scrooge (before the events in A 
Christmas Carol, of course.)
8.6.1 Internal Control and Security Systems
Internal control and security systems are designed on the basis of past experience both in 
the company in which they are installed and in other companies. The challenge here is to 
build in enough controls to discourage and catch criminal behavior without breaking the 
bank in costs or going overboard on security. Companies that have been victimized often 
react by increasing controls to the point at which the controls can become oppressive and 
actually interfere with company operations. While rational companies set up rules to define 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior, too many constraints make people feel oppressed, 
distrusted, and under constant surveillance.
Our society is based on freedoms and rights. We highly value our freedoms of speech, 
religion and assembly, but these freedoms are not absolute. We can speak our minds, but 
we cannot freely slander or libel another individual. We cannot, as one famous jurist put it, 
feel free to yell “FIRE” in a crowded theatre. We cannot trade on inside information (unless 
we like prison food) or release secret company information (unless we like having the 
opportunity to spend time as a defendant in both the criminal and civil courts.)
Well-designed controls should provide similar checks and balances. We need to consider 
the risks, threats, and other vulnerabilities in today’s marketplace and technological 
environment, while simultaneously taking into account our responsibilities to employees, 
the value of their contributions, and their need for satisfaction in the workplace, including 
the provision of a work environment that encourages outstanding performance, 
profitability, and efficiency.
A competent systems analyst or information security specialist can design layer upon layer 
of controls. But controls in excess of those required by the nature of the risks are not cost- 
effective and can place undue burdens both on those who must work under them and those 
who must monitor and control them. So a company’s requirement for an effective internal- 
control environment does not represent a justification for a siege mentality or the 
construction of an impregnable fortress. Done effectively, the development of internal 
controls is a matter of proper balance and equilibrium, not of the implementation of 
paranoia.
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Looking at the potential for theft and fraud and the actions available to prevent crime, 
brings forth several conclusions:
• Most prevention efforts concentrate or focus on building more accounting and access 
controls or physical security controls.
• It is vital to recognize that there are limits to technological and procedural controls. 
Given the speed with which computer and data communications technology evolves and 
the complexity of modern systems, it is difficult for improvements in protection and 
detection mechanisms to keep pace.
• It is also important for companies to recognize that improvements in the working 
environment, including a positive ethical climate and strong interpersonal trust, help to 
discourage criminal thinking and behavior and, as a result, are a part of the control 
environment. Some factors in the business environment are likely to encourage 
computer crime. Other factors discourage crime. Clearly, we want to minimize the 
criminal behavioral motivators, and maximize the noncriminal behavioral motivators.
8.6.2 Factors That Encourage Computer Crime
The factors that enhance the probability that a company will be the target of theft, fraud, 
embezzlement and corruption, including computer crime, can be either motivational 
(related to the corporate reward system and company policies) or personal (relating to the 
personal character of a particular employee).
The following are motivational factors that encourage computer crime:
• Inadequate rewards including pay, fringe benefits, stock and stock options, bonuses, 
incentives, perquisites, job security, meaningful work and promotional opportunities.
• Inadequate management controls, including failure to communicate expected standards 
of job-related performance or on-the-job behavior, and ambiguity in relationship to 
work roles, relationships, responsibilities, and areas of accountability.
• Inadequate reinforcement and performance feedback mechanisms, including lack of 
recognition for good work, loyalty, longevity and effort; lack of meaningful recognition 
for outstanding performance; delayed or nonexistent feedback on performance 
inadequacies or unacceptable on-the-job behavior.
• Failure to offer counseling when performance or behavior falls below acceptable levels.
• Acceptance of mediocre performance as the standard.
• Inadequate support and lack of resources to meet standards, such as not providing 
authority to hire sufficient personnel to meet requirements for quality, quantity, and 
timeliness of work produced.
• Inadequate operational reviews, audits, inspections, and follow-throughs to assure 
compliance with company policies, priorities, procedures, and government regulations.
• Condonation of inappropriate ethical norms or inappropriate behavior.
• Failure to control hostility generated by promotion or destructive competitiveness 
among departments, offices, or personnel.
• Failure to control bias or unfairness in selection, promotion, compensation and 
appraisal.
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The following are personal or personnel-based encouragements of computer crime:
• Inadequate standards of recruitment and selection.
• Inadequate orientation and training on security matters and on sanctions for violating 
security rules.
• Unresolved personal financial problems.
• Unresolved problems relating to personal status.
• Failure to screen and background check personnel before appointing to sensitive 
positions. This includes verification of prior employment, verification of educational 
qualifications, verification of financial stability, and examination of character.
• Inadequate control of the level of job-related stress and anxiety.
8.6.3 Factors That Discourage Computer Crime
Computer crime can be discouraged through measures that are designed not only to 
prevent crime but also to detect attempts to engage in computer crimes. The recommended 
prevention measures are—
1. Internal accounting controls. These are the traditional measures that discourage crime, 
and they are as important in an automated environment as in a manual-processing 
environment. These include:
• Separation and rotation of duties. Remember that as personnel change jobs, it is vital 
to update the list of computer applications that they can access, so that their access at 
any given time matches their current job requirements.
• Periodic internal audits, surprise inspections and computer security reviews.
• Absolute insistence that control policies and procedures be documented in writing.
• Establishment of dual signature authorities, dollar authorization limits, expiration 
dates for signature authorizations, and check amount limits. These authorities also 
should be examined on both a routine and surprise basis.
• Offline controls and limits, including batch controls and hash totals.
2. Computer Access Controls. These controls may include:
• Authentication and identification controls, including keys or smartcards, passwords, 
biometrics, callback systems, one-time passwords, time and day constrained access, 
and periodic code and password changes.
• Compartmentalization, also known as need to know.
• Use of encryption to protect data while stored or in transit.
3. Use of firewalls and similar safeguards to prevent unauthorized access through the 
Internet.
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The measures to detect attempts to commit computer crime include:
1. Logging and follow-up of exceptions. The system should be designed to log unusual 
activities, and procedures should be in place to follow up on reported exceptions, such 
as—
• Transactions that are out of sequence, out of priority or otherwise out-of-standard.
• Aborted runs and entries, including repeated attempts to unsuccessfully enter the 
system.
• Attempts to access applications or functions beyond a person’s authorization.
2. Logging and following up on variances that indicate a problem may have occurred or is 
occurring.
3. Awareness of employee attitudes and satisfaction levels.
4. Sensitivity to reports that particular individuals are having problems, living beyond their 
means, or talking about getting even for perceived slights.
5. Use of newly developed intrusion detection systems that use artificial intelligence 
capabilities to detect unusual transactions flowing through a system. These are evolving 
and have the prospect of being an order-of-magnitude improvement in crime detection 
technology.
8.6.4 Security Countermeasures to Computer Crime
The focus of chapter 4 of this Handbook is computer security in general. The focus of this 
section is the specific measures that are often used to prevent computer crimes by those 
either inside or outside an organization. While some measures are applicable to almost all 
situations, it is vital that each organization consider those controls that are appropriate to its 
particular circumstances.
Security Holes
One of the unpleasant realities in today’s systems environment is that the systems we use, 
including operating systems, firewalls and security packages, and application systems, are 
not perfect when they are released by the manufacturers to their customers. On a continual 
basis, security problems are discovered. Information about ways to exploit security holes is 
quickly reported worldwide by independent bulletin board systems, government-funded 
sites (such as the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon 
University), and the manufacturers. Sometimes the problem and the ways to exploit it are 
reported before a repair patch can be developed. It has become, therefore, absolutely vital 
that every organization monitor these information sources to be certain that all relevant 
holes in security are understood and closed as soon as possible.
If the hole is not closed, and experience indicates that this is often the case, a company can 
continue to operate with known holes in its security. It is also vital that the internal auditors 
understand the importance of monitoring and closing software holes, and that this is 
included in the review plan.
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Computer Access Control
Controls that allow only authorized people access to sensitive systems include—
• Passwords. Use passwords that are long enough to be difficult to guess. Passwords 
should not comprise simple words, names of relatives, and so on, and should be 
changed regularly.
• Compartmentalization. Restrict users to the specific files and programs that they have a 
job-related need to access.
• Use of biometrics. Use fingerprints, iris recognition, hand geometry and other new 
technologies for added measures of control.
• Use of one-time passwords. Use hardware or software that generates a new password for 
each access.
• Automatic log off. Use this measure to prevent unauthorized access to the system when 
authorized users fail to log off.
• Time-day controls. Restrict personnel access to those times when they are supposed to 
be on duty. An extension of this concept for companies using automated time-clock 
systems is to deny access and report a violation if access is attempted when an 
employee is not shown in the time clock system as being present.
• Dial back systems. Use these systems when access is through a dial-up system. On 
accepting a user ID and password, the system hangs up and dials a preestablished 
number at which the approved user is standing by. This is very helpful when a 
person works at a predictable location, for example, the home office of a 
telecommuting employee.
• Random personal information checks. Implement this means of identifying unauthorized 
log-in attempts. The system randomly transmits a question that only the authorized 
individual could answer and denies access unless the right answer is received. If 
several dozen personal questions are on file, this technique can be very useful.
• Internet authentication. Use this control for telecommuting employees. With 
telecommuting on the rise, many companies are taking advantage of low-cost, high- 
bandwidth Internet connections, such as Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Lines, which 
offer download speeds of up to 1.5MB per second and uploads of 400KB per second 
for nominal monthly charges, which includes continuous access, twenty-four hours a 
day, seven days a week. This technology, which identifies a specific Internet user and 
sends information across the Internet securely, is rapidly evolving.
8.6.5 Solutions
When investigating computer crimes, investigators and forensic accountants often discover 
what could have been done to prevent the crimes. The following are some of the most 
frequently found items. The organizations failed to:
• Have written policies and security rules for the use of computers and systems.
• Have temporary employees and independent contractors follow the same security 
rules as regular employees.
• Adjust access as people changed responsibilities internally.
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• Keep up with and close security holes in applications, firewalls, and operating 
systems.
• Maintain virus protection on a fully updated basis.
Some of the suggestions to improve computer security include implementing:
• More effective policies for security over proprietary information.
• Better interaction between the human relations, systems and security functions.
• Better internal accounting controls.
• Better supervision of those with sensitive access to systems.
• Better education of computer users regarding security.
• Better computer audit software.
• Better software security.
• Better physical security in the workplace.
8.7 Selected Computer Crimes
8.7.1 Brief Case Synopses
It is useful to look at actual cases of computer crime to see the challenges businesses face if 
targeted by an offender. In each of these brief case studies, consider how your 
organization’s existing security system would have faired, how your own organization 
would have reacted, and how likely it is that your current system of internal controls would 
have identified the problem and traced it back to the guilty parties.
ER Fraud Case Study
A computer operator at a hospital was charged with embezzling $40,000 by 
submitting false invoices that were processed through the hospital’s computer 
system. At the same time, the hospital’s assistant data processing manager accepted 
a $41,000 bribe from a consultant who stole an additional $150,000 by submitting 
false invoices for computer services. Both the operator and the assistant manager 
had prior convictions for computer-related crimes. Because computer personnel 
were not directly involved in patient care, hospital policy did not require a 
background check. An inexpensive reference check with previous employers could 
have possibly prevented the crime because the offenders would probably not have 
been hired when it was revealed that they had falsified their employment 
applications.
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Even Experts Have Bad Days Case Study
A partner at a major international consulting firm received an anonymous call 
suggesting that one of the firm’s senior information systems managers was 
defrauding the firm through a scheme involving false invoicing for supplies like 
laser toner cartridges and backup tape cartridges. A confidential internal 
investigation was carried out and no problems were revealed. Every invoice could 
be shown to tie directly to the actual material that had been delivered. The report 
seemed to be false, but a member of the firm’s management committee decided that 
someone independent of the company should take a second look. Investigators 
were hired and they discovered that the material had been delivered, but they could 
find no record of the firm that supplied the materials. A simple background check 
on the vendor showed that it was just a shell formed by the senior information 
systems manager. He had developed a scheme in which he would place orders with 
the shell company (actually, with himself) and then order the same material from a 
reputable supplier who sent it to his home overnight. He would open the boxes, 
remove the original vendor’s invoices, insert his own invoices (which were exactly 
15 percent higher than what he had paid) and then he reshipped them. This simple 
scam resulted in a loss to the company of more than $300,000.
As shown in this case, vendor fraud can occur even in situations when all of the 
materials were actually received. No employees had questioned why so many 
orders were being placed with a company no one had ever heard of when major 
vendors could provide the same material in less time and at a lower cost.
The Invoice Looked Good Case Study
The scam was brilliant. The accounting manager had found a way to get his 
employing company to pay for his gambling losses in Las Vegas. Every time he 
needed to send a payment, he simply created an invoice for services at some distant 
office. The invoices were always from different companies, but on all of them he put 
a stamp on which he wrote their vendor number in the company’s system. Of 
course, the vendor number was one the accounting manager had assigned to the 
holding company that owned the casino. Of course the casino was always glad to 
see him on his quarterly visits: it didn’t care whether the check was made out to it or 
to its parent company. Because the computer system wouldn’t reject the invoice as 
long as the vendor number was valid, the computer generated the check in the 
weekly check run; it was signed by another machine, and mailed out with thousands 
of other checks.
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The scheme worked for years, until the outside auditors decided to conduct an 
internal control review, and determined that there was no match between vendor 
names on invoices and vendor numbers. In checking a vendor list, one of the 
auditors recognized the name of the casino’s parent company, and wondered why 
this unlikely organization would be a vendor. The manager told the auditor that the 
company held meetings at the casinos owned by the company. Unfortunately for 
the manager, the auditors checked his story, and the scheme was revealed.
Breaking the Bank Case Study
A European bank sustained losses estimated at $65 million over a two year period 
when the head of the foreign currency transfer department and her assistant, who 
had broken the bank’s computer transfer codes, were able to move money into 
outside accounts. The fraud was discovered through an audit, and the two 
perpetrators were arrested. Afterwards, everyone questioned how it was possible for 
such a large amount of money to be stolen with no one noticing and raising the 
alarm. Further investigation showed that the bank was involved in complex money 
laundering and tax evasion activities. Apparently the two managers believed that 
with all of the manipulation going on, no one would notice their independent 
scheme, and they were almost correct.
A New Form of Fraud Case Study
An employee of an insurance company in Florida had the dubious honor of being 
one of the first people convicted under that state’s computer crime law. The 
employee was a benefits clerk with the company, and used her expertise in the 
company’s systems and procedures to steal more than $200,000 in two years. She 
filled in the forms that benefits examiners used to approve claims and entered them 
into her computer terminal. She used a variety of names and policy numbers-all 
real-and created the paperwork to back up the claims. Her mistake was always 
using, as the mailing addresses for the checks, one of three addresses: her own, her 
father’s, or her boyfriend’s. The security department of the company discovered the 
fraud by looking for unusual patterns of payment addresses.
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Welfare? It Was for our Own Welfare! Case Study
It may be impossible to discover exactly how much they stole, but a State 
Department of Social Services learned that one of their supervisors worked in 
collusion with a clerk to steal $300,000. This was a simple matter of input 
falsification. The clerk and supervisor submitted dozens of false claims for benefits 
and collected the payments. The fraud was discovered when a data input clerk 
noticed that the authorization data on one of the forms she was entering was 
incomplete. She called the eligibility worker, whose signature had been forged by 
the supervisor, to check on the incomplete form. When that person denied 
authorizing the claim or signing the form, an investigation was performed and the 
fraud was discovered.
When Time Stood Still Case Study
Wouldn’t it be great to get the results of horse races before they ran? Imagine 
always betting on long shots when you know the winner. Just a dream? Not for the 
computer operator at a government-run betting agency in Australia. He figured a 
way to reverse time. Just before certain races, he reset the system clock to read three 
minutes earlier than it actually was. As soon as the race was run, he called his 
girlfriend, who was an off-track telephone betting clerk. She immediately entered 
bets on the winner. Because the computer believed that the race had not yet started, 
the bets were accepted. Then, the operator would reset the clock. Unfortunately, we 
can’t report that the scheme was uncovered by brilliant work by internal auditors, 
external auditors, corporate security personnel, or even brilliant police work. The 
operator’s girlfriend turned him in when she discovered he was seeing another 
woman.
8.7.2 Case Study: A Closer Look
There are thousands of cases of serious computer crimes on the books. Some were 
presented in the previous section. To provide a closer look at the way these cases are 
investigated, one full-length case study is included. This case involves deliberate actions by 
an insider who disrupted the email capabilities of an organization.
The Case of the Suicidal Computers Case Study
It happened, as do so many unpleasant things, in the dark of night. A dozen 
computers—each dedicated as an email router for a major financial services firm— 
apparently made a mutual decision, precisely at 5:00 A.M. one morning, to commit 
suicide. At that time, each of the computers suddenly and without warning, 
proceeded to completely reformat each of their hard disk drives. From that moment
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on, email within the huge global organization stopped. Any message that went 
outside of the local office was not going to be delivered.
Within an hour, the problem was noticed. Within two, it was apparent that the 
problem was not small and was not going to be easy to fix. Because many of the 
important daily operating communications of the company went through email, it 
was clear that a back-up plan would be needed to replace the damaged 
communications links. While one group of managers developed a plan to keep the 
organization functioning, the Chief Information Officer passed the word to the 
company’s communications manager to fix the problem. The data communications 
manager immediately contacted the manufacturer. Because the organization was a 
large and valued customer, the manufacturer put two systems engineers on the next 
available flight.
At the same time, the Director of Corporate Security recognized that, while it was 
possibly an accident—perhaps a programming bug—that caused this crisis, it was 
probably a deliberate act of sabotage. If it were, he knew he would need proof to 
determine who had caused it. The Director of Corporate Security also understood 
that proof requires evidence that could be admitted in a court of law. Unfortunately, 
the director had previous experience in computer fraud cases in which evidence that 
might have existed was destroyed in the attempt to fix software problems. 
Therefore, two calls were made: The first was to the CEO of the company, who 
gave him authority to investigate the incident and, if it were shown to be deliberate, 
to identify and punish the perpetrator. The second call was to a private 
investigations firm that specialized in high-technology incidents.
The investigators understood that they could not interfere with the repair efforts; 
nevertheless, they immediately went to the data center. They briefed the repair 
team, and made a simple request: Please don’t destroy or change anything that 
might be the cause of the incident without checking with us first, and keep detailed 
notes of your findings.
Over the two days it took to identify the problem and complete repairs, the 
investigators collected evidence, both in the form of software, and in written 
statements from the software engineers.
During the investigation, it was discovered that one email server had not 
reformatted itself. Because of a hardware problem, it had been shut down when the 
incident occurred. When the engineers discovered this, they examined the unit. 
One of the company’s technicians noticed that the program that controls the 
processing of daily backups indicated it had been modified a few weeks earlier.
The technician who was responsible for backup knew that she had not changed the 
program in months. Yet the program had been changed. It still performed its 
normal backup, but there was a new routine that checked the date every time the 
program ran. On a specific date, the program had just two lines of code to be 
executed, and those two lines instructed the computer to immediately reformat its 
hard drives without warning, and without any report being generated. The 
investigators took possession of the server, since it was now apparent that the act 
was deliberate.
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Over a forty-eight-hour period, the problem was solved, and all systems were 
checked for the existence of the deadly software. Before the engineers from the 
computer manufacturer left, the investigators assigned them one additional task. 
Using the notes they made during the previous forty-eight hours, each of the 
engineers wrote a memo documenting his or her findings in the context of what was 
now a potential criminal investigation. These statements were quickly reviewed, and 
then signed and sworn to before a notary. This action converted a memo into a 
sworn affidavit, which could have great value in any future court action.
With the email system back in operation, the data center management worked with 
the investigative team to determine who could have inserted the killer code into the 
dozen servers. Because of security measures built into the system, very few people 
had the authority to make those changes. In fact, the investigators were told, only 
four employees had that authority, and all were exemplary employees, so far 
beyond suspicion that no one could conceive of any of them having done this. Yet it 
had to be one of them. Who else could it be?
That was the question put to the head of the email management group, where the 
four suspects worked. She was convinced that none of the four employees were 
responsible; however, she had another candidate under consideration. He had 
resigned some weeks earlier, but, as a member of the group, he would have had the 
authority. Why had he left? Because he felt that he was misunderstood and 
insufficiency appreciated. He believed he knew far more than the others in the 
group, including the group head, about email technology. He had publicly gone to 
senior data center management to request a promotion to group head. When his 
managers decided that they would keep the present manager, this disgruntled 
employee had given notice, telling others that the company did not deserve him.
An examination of the former employee’s computer revealed evidence of the 
destructive code that had caused the shutdown. There were several versions of the 
code found, including the key line that delayed the destruction until several weeks 
after he left the company. On the evidence presented by the investigators, the case 
was referred to law enforcement. The police accepted the case and reviewed the 
evidence. The case was brought to the county prosecutor, who determined the 
actions to modify the computer’s program were a violation of the state’s computer 
crime laws and that he would prosecute.
8.8 Conclusion
One of the peculiar things about the field of computer crime is that one can say almost 
anything and go unchallenged. The only thing people seem to agree on is that most 
computer crime is probably never reported, either because it is never discovered or 
because the company is embarrassed and chooses to handle it administratively. Often the 
company will forego prosecution if the offender resigns and agrees to never discuss the 
incident. This is why people who commit computer crimes can, in effect, get away with it 
and go on to another company with their reputations apparently intact.
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In this chapter, we’ve tried to show that it does not require tremendous computer skills to 
commit a computer crime. Any employee, temp, or independent contractor with authorized 
access, as well as anyone with unauthorized access, can do it Since most computer crimes 
involve input or output manipulations, the individuals most able to commit these crimes are 
not developers but employees in departments that use the systems. This is not to say that 
systems people don’t commit computer crimes; they do but they are not typically likely to 
do so.
We have also tried to show that the commonly held belief that most computer crime is 
committed by outside hackers, who gain access to systems through almost mysterious 
abilities, is also a myth. Most of the incidents involve actions by insiders. Again, some 
occurrences do involve those outside of the organization, and defensive systems, such as 
firewalls, are absolutely necessary.
A third myth is that computer-related thefts, including fraud and embezzlement, are not 
detected by audit, but by accident. If that were true, and it is not, it would imply that the 
criminals are somehow more intelligent or more skillful, or perhaps more cunning than the 
noncriminals, and this is not the case. Good internal security, accounting and audit systems 
are very effective and do catch the bad guys. It is when these controls are not in place or 
when they are not implemented with sufficient resources, that the criminals get the upper 
hand.
As computer security becomes an increasingly important aspect of technology, it is likely 
that better mechanisms to prevent and detect computer crimes will evolve. But to gain the 
needed protection, it will be necessary for companies to adopt the technology and to 
implement it properly. Again, those who fail to assign sufficient resources to prevent the 
problem are destined for problems.
Finally, remember that once a security weakness is identified in a system, whether by 
hackers or security experts and the knowledge of the hole becomes public, it is important 
that it be closed quickly. There is nothing more discouraging than having to tell a victim 
that it was hit by a perpetrator who used a well-known hole to enter its system, and that all 
along there had been an easy-to-install, free patch out there, but that it was never installed.
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CHAPTER 9:
Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
9.1 Overview
9.1.1 Purpose and Scope
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention, not fraud investigation. Likewise, 
this Handbook is intended primarily for the CPA, whether in public practice or in industry, 
who is responsible for fraud prevention, rather than the full-time fraud investigator.
However, professional fraud investigators will also find this Handbook useful in many ways, 
and occasionally there may be some crossover between the two functions; nevertheless, the 
distinction between the two is an important one. Prevention cannot come without an 
understanding of how fraud is perpetrated and the means by which it is concealed. To 
reach this understanding, it is necessary to have a firm foundation in fraud investigation 
techniques.
The experienced fraud investigators achieve their status through professional training and, 
most important, extensive experience in the investigation of fraud. It is well beyond the 
scope of this Handbook—indeed, it would be a virtually unachievable goal for any text—to 
synthesize the knowledge and expertise gained by an experienced forensic and 
investigative CPA over many years. There is simply no substitute for experience.
Nevertheless, virtually all CPAs should be concerned with fraud prevention, investigation 
and reporting, whether internally to an employing company, to a client, or to a court. 
Occasionally and despite the best fraud prevention efforts, a known or suspected fraud 
situation may surface. It is important in such circumstances that the CPA—
1. Be capable of acting competently: that is, perform the acts that should be performed and 
avoid or not perform those acts that should not be performed.
2. Understand the role of the forensic accountant and others who may be called in as part 
of the fraud investigation.
This chapter should serve to introduce the CPA to fraud investigation and reporting. It is 
not intended as a substitute for professional expertise in fraud investigation. Until the 
requisite experience is gained, in all cases involving fraud or suspected fraud, the 
inexperienced CPA should seek the assistance of a lawyer knowledgeable about fraud and a 
CPA experienced in forensic accounting.
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9.1.2 Forensics and Forensic Accounting
The term forensic can be defined as, “belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of law.” 
This term describes the standards that are applicable to the discipline in question—that is, a 
forensic medical examiner would conduct autopsies to a standard required for court 
purposes, and a forensic accountant would conduct financial analyses to a standard 
required for court purposes. Thus, a forensic accountant may also be involved in civil 
litigation cases, which do not necessarily involve fraud.
But what is that standard? Generally, the forensic standard involves considering all the 
relevant evidence that could affect the professional’s opinion and yet withstand rigorous 
cross-examination from counsel who is keen to undermine or disprove the professional’s 
opinion so that the professional can properly assist the court reach its decision. It also 
involves a strong understanding of the legal system.
It follows then, that forensic accounting is a discipline involving accounting to a standard 
required by the court—the criminal and civil courts, as well as arbitration, mediation, and 
other forms of business dispute resolution that require expert evidence to a similar 
standard. It involves the application of financial skills and an investigative mentality to 
unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it 
encompasses financial acumen and a strong knowledge and understanding of business 
reality and the workings of the legal system. In the context of a fraud case, extensive fraud 
investigation expertise is essential. Its development has been primarily achieved through 
on-the-job training, as well as experience with investigating officers (in fraud cases), legal 
counsel and in the courts.
Accounting practitioners who concentrate their professional practice on matters requiring 
them to testify in court as to the findings from an investigation of accounting and financial 
evidence are termed forensic accountants. The ultimate test for the forensic accountant is 
acceptance by the courts of law—both criminal and civil—of him or her as an expert 
witness providing testimony in the area of accounting and financial matters.
While the American Institute of CPAs and the state Boards of Accountancy currently do 
not prescribe any standard specifically related to forensic accounting, it is clear that the 
standards for this practice are determined in the first instance by the courts of law. At the 
same time, a CPA is required to meet the general standards of professional practice as 
stipulated by the governing State Board of Accountancy and American Institute of CPAs.
9.2 The Five-Step Investigative Approach
Typically, there are five major steps in the forensic accounting and fraud investigation 
process:
1. Planning.
2. Gathering evidence.
3. Analyzing and testing.
4. Reporting and testifying.
5. Case Resolution.
For a more detailed checklist, see the table at the end of this chapter.
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9. 2.1 Planning
As with almost all endeavors, planning is critical. A well-planned investigation maximizes 
the chances of success; poor planning can lead to disaster. In the early stages of a forensic 
accounting or investigative engagement, it’s especially important to (1) establish the 
scenario, (2) identify areas of concern and uncertainty, and (3) define the nature and scope 
of the investigation.
Establishing the Scenario
The amount of information available during the earliest phase of an engagement will vary 
from case to case. Establishing what is known is of special importance. This is true because 
it has a direct impact on the nature and scope of the investigation.
A known or suspected fraud almost always comes to light through one of the following 
three broad scenarios:
1. Accounting irregularities. One of the most common irregularities is a discrepancy between 
the book value of an asset and its value as determined through physical counts or 
confirmations. For example, a physical inventory count may reveal a major shortage 
compared to the perpetual inventory records, or accounts receivable confirmations may 
reveal much lower values than the accounts receivable subledger. Other common 
examples include bank reconciliations that do not balance, and complaints from 
customers that their statements are incorrect. Any irregularity that comes to light during 
an internal or external examination would also fall into this category. The common 
theme in all of these examples is that the company’s records—its information system— 
have raised a red flag that signals the possibility of fraud.
2. Immediate physical evidence. Physical evidence may be readily apparent or uncovered 
upon inspection. Obvious examples include the aftermath of sabotage or arson. Human 
or electronic surveillance techniques might also yield immediate evidence (for example, 
with respect to employee theft or the diversion of inventory).
3. After-the-fact incriminating information. Incriminating information is a grab-bag category 
that comes in various incarnations: outright confessions brought on by guilt, anonymous 
tips, memos in brown envelopes, whistle-blowing employees, irate spouses looking to 
get back at their fraud-perpetrating husband or wife, honest citizens just trying to do the 
right thing, and so on.
In any fraud investigation the first step is to establish which of these three scenarios exists, 
and the nature and scope of the related evidence.
Identifying Areas of Concern and Uncertainty
The next step in the planning phase is a blending of the Boy Scout motto: be prepared and 
Murphy’s Law: whatever can go wrong, will Immediate areas of concern depend on the 
scenario identified in the previous step. Dealing with sabotage requires the immediate 
beefing up of security at other likely targets to prevent further damage. Dealing with a 
specific employee who is suspected of fraud—such as an accounts receivable clerk who 
might be perpetrating a lapping scheme, or a shipping department employee 
misappropriating inventory—you would want to secure all possible evidence and remove 
the suspect employee from the scene. Removing the employee from the scene need not be
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done in a direct, accusatory way. For example, if the fraud red flag is not common 
knowledge among the work force, the employee could be sent on a week’s training course.
Beyond the immediate concerns of asset protection and evidence preservation, it’s 
important, to the extent possible, to identify the uncertainties in the investigation—any 
pieces of the puzzle that are missing, so to speak. What are the major strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing evidence and supporting material? What additional evidence is 
likely to be available? What additional research, investigation and analysis are likely to be 
required to obtain any needed additional evidence and make it useful? Without at least a 
rough idea of where you’re going, you most likely will not arrive at any valid conclusions.
Perhaps most important, you should think of any constraints, obstacles and pitfalls you are 
likely to encounter along the way. Obviously, forensic accountants and investigators need 
to be concerned about legal constraints in conducting their investigation. For example, as a 
general rule, only law enforcement authorities in possession of a valid search warrant can 
legally search a residence or a vehicle. (There are several exceptions, but for practical 
purposes none of them would apply to a fraud investigation.)
Less clear may be situations such as searching employee lockers. Judicial authorities have 
established that if employees have been put on notice all along that their lockers are subject 
to inspection, they probably can be searched. If this notice is lacking, legal counsel should 
be consulted, which should be the rule followed in all cases. Other concerns of investigators 
include lawsuits for false accusations or wrongful dismissal, and constraints imposed by 
collective bargaining agreements. The point is that a fraud investigation can be a legal 
minefield that must be navigated very carefully and deliberately, not haphazardly. To keep 
from hitting a mine, the safest course to set is early consultation with appropriate legal 
counsel and an experienced forensic CPA.
In addition to legal constraints, factors such as the company’s reputation and relationship 
with its employees must be considered. For example, you would not want to alienate all 
your employees through hasty implementation of draconian investigative or security 
measures, just because of one bad apple.
Defining the Nature and Scope of the Investigation
The last step in the planning phase is to define the nature and scope of the investigation. 
This should be a fairly simple and straightforward process if the first two steps—establishing 
the scenario and identifying areas of concern and uncertainty—were properly thought out.
The nature and scope of the investigation are defined by several interrelated attributes 
including—
• The nature of the main objective—for example, prevention of further incidents, 
dismissal of the perpetrator, proving the case for criminal prosecution, establishing a loss 
claim, and so on—and the ranking of the objectives when there is more than one.
• If a criminal prosecution is envisaged, the point at which to involve the police.
• The level of secrecy or cover required in conducting the investigation.
For example, if the scenario involves an anonymous but seemingly credible tip implicating 
a purchasing employee in a kickback scheme, the objective may be to prove the case for 
criminal prosecution. The nature of the investigation will be fairly secret, because the
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parties involved are unlikely to confess and you would not want to alert them to the 
investigation. Because kickback (that is, secret commission) cases can be difficult to 
establish, the scope of the investigation could become extensive, including background 
investigations of both the bribe giver and bribe taker, surveillance, and possibly even 
setting up a sting operation.
9.2.2 Evidence Gathering
Once the planning phase is complete, the general objectives of the investigation must be 
translated into specifics, for example, identifying the documents and other information to 
analyze, conducting interviews, and obtaining third-party information required for 
corroboration.
Throughout the process, two important questions to keep in mind are what logical 
alternative interpretations exist for the evidence, and what eventual use will be made of the 
evidence. In particular, the forensic accountant must be able to understand the difference 
between relevant and irrelevant information, and must be willing to apply the standards of 
evidence required by the court.
Information Gathering Techniques
The forensic and investigative accountant is not a police officer. He or she does not have 
the resources of a police officer and, even when working to assist the police, must work 
within his or her own expertise, and within the rules governing professional conduct. 
Among the most important investigative tools are those that enable the forensic accountant 
to gather and analyze information available in the public domain in conjunction with other 
information gathered during the investigation.
For example, in investigating an individual, it may be possible to gather background 
information concerning certain aspects of an individual’s financial circumstances (for 
example, mortgages and other secured debts, old court judgments, and so on), educational 
and employment references, professional qualifications, and other details such as whether 
he or she has taken his or her annual vacation. Also worth exploring is corporate 
information such as jurisdiction of incorporation, authorized share capital, and the identity 
of all officers and directors since incorporation can often be obtained from the appropriate 
state office, usually the Secretary of State of the jurisdiction where the incorporation took 
place. In some jurisdictions, shareholder identities can be obtained. In many instances, 
private offshore corporations have less information available than publicly traded North 
American companies.
Public domain information may also provide critical clues or evidence. For example, 
comparison of a company’s statistics and trends to others in its industry, that is, 
benchmarking, may identify unexplained variances that alert the forensic accountant to 
possible questionable activities or that warrant further investigation. At the very least, the 
background data will provide context for the detailed findings from the examination of 
nonpublic data.
There are many sources of public information about organizations, industries, and 
institutions. Very often a university reference library or a government resource center can 
provide access to documents, reference textbooks, computerized databases, and other 
sources of information that can assist in understanding and analyzing a case.
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Documentary Evidence
At the beginning of any case involving documentary evidence, there are two key questions. 
What documents should be obtained? And where will they come from? These questions are 
usually resolved after discussions with available witnesses and an initial assessment of the 
findings to date. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to involve the 
authorities to obtain a search warrant or begin legal proceedings so that a court could order 
the seizing of documents.
The main goal is to gather all documents that might be useful, bearing in mind that 
irrelevant documents can always be returned to their proper place. It is necessary to decide, 
in consultation with legal counsel, whether to be selective (that is, review all documents but 
take only those deemed necessary), or whether to remove or secure all of the documents 
from the premises by taking the filing cabinets, and so on. It is difficult to lay down hard 
and fast rules, but clearly the primary purpose is to obtain all documents that might be 
relevant without resorting to a fishing expedition.
The minimum requirements for financial documentation, for the period under 
investigation, are likely to be the following:
• Books and records, management reports, and statistical analyses pertaining either to the 
management of the company or to an individual.
• Documentation pertaining to the movement of assets into and out of a company.
• Relevant correspondence.
• Personal documentation, such as bank-account records.
Documents, including seized documents, should be properly identified and catalogued. 
Documents must be handled carefully. They should not be written upon, altered, stapled or 
unstapled during the course of the investigation. The investigating accountants, in 
particular, should bear this in mind.
Documents should be examined in detail and categorized as follows:
1. Documents required for evidence.
2. Documents required for rebuttal of the defense arguments.
3. Documents required for other reasons.
4. Documents that can be returned.
Once the documents have been sorted into these groups, photocopies can be made to 
provide working copies for the investigating accountant to use when preparing schedules, 
and in general for the working paper files.
Documents will subsequently be selected, from among those photocopied, for use in the 
presentation of evidence in a court of law. They should be compiled and assembled into a 
document brief.
Admissibility of Accounting Evidence
It is important during the evidence gathering stage to consider the two forms of 
documentary accounting evidence that may be presented in a court of law:
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1. Primary, that is, the original, individual accounting documents obtained from the parties 
concerned or other sources.
2. Secondary, that is, summaries and schedules based on the original documents, which are 
produced by an accountant after examining the primary evidence.
The issue of whether secondary accounting evidence should be admissible has been argued 
in the courts for many years. Two opinions that allowed secondary accounting evidence, 
are described below.
In the first case, the court ruled, and was upheld on appeal, that a summary of documentary 
evidence was admissible. The court said, however, that the summary was in itself not 
evidence of the underlying facts; rather, it was strictly an aid to understanding primary 
evidence that had already been established. The judge made the following observations 
about the use of secondary evidence:
1. No more reliance could be placed on the survey than was placed on the primary 
evidence it was intended to summarize.
2. The summary did not prove the veracity and content of the primary evidence.
3. Any summary of primary evidence must show every weakness previously determined as 
existing within the primary evidence.
In the second case, the court ruled that an exhibit prepared by an accountant, based on the 
documentation before the court, be introduced into evidence because it helped to simplify 
and trace the many transactions previously discussed in the court. The defense was 
concerned that the exhibit expressed the independent opinions of the accountant who 
prepared the material and, therefore, was not objective. However, the judge ruled that any 
opinions reflected in the exhibit were opinions that were readily ascertainable from the 
documents themselves—the primary evidence.
Interview Techniques
One of the more important tools for the forensic accountant is the interview process—this is 
a complex subject area on which several books have been written, and which takes years of 
experience for forensic accountants to master.
For the purposes of this Handbook, rather than attempt to explain the entire process, this 
section provides highlights of a few of the skills involved:
• The interview process should yield evidence that is as clear, unambiguous and concise 
as possible.
• Each interview, in order to be effective, should be carefully planned regarding the issues 
to be examined. All supporting documentation relating to the issues in question should 
be readily available to the interviewer in the event that the documentation is needed for 
reference purposes during the interview.
• The forensic accountant should consider the timing of the interview in relation to the 
extent of evidence gathered to date. Usually, it is best to gather as much documentary 
and other evidence as possible before either confronting the suspect or suspects directly 
or alerting those suspects by interviewing a parade of witnesses in a highly visible 
manner.
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• The forensic accountant should consider all the physical aspects relating to the venue of 
the interview—including the size, temperature and lighting of the room; the size and 
positioning of the furniture within the room; and the seats to be occupied by those 
attending the interview.
• The forensic accountant should be skilled at asking both open-ended and closed 
questions, and should be able to distinguish when these kinds of questions would be 
most effective.
• The forensic accountant must be able to differentiate between an inarticulate 
explanation by a nervous individual and the evasive explanation offered by an 
individual who does not want to have his or her actions or motives identified and 
examined more closely.
• The forensic accountant must be able to control and direct the interview process to draw 
out further evidence, often from hostile or adversarial interviewees. Effectively, the 
forensic accountant applies his or her own knowledge of the human element to assist in 
this process.
• The forensic accountant must be expert at taking good notes.
Private Investigators
It may also be necessary to engage private investigators to conduct surveillance of 
suspected perpetrators, for example, to observe their activity and record their presence at 
various locations and times, including meetings with certain individuals.
Forensic accountants who regularly work with private investigators as part of their team 
should be consulted for a recommendation regarding how to use investigators effectively, 
and whom to use.
Search and Seizure Mechanisms
In criminal matters, law enforcement agencies often obtain a search warrant to obtain 
documentary evidence. The forensic accountant may assist them in specifying on the search 
warrant those accounting, banking and other records that are to be seized as evidence of 
fraudulent activity. Depending on the jurisdiction, the forensic accountant may also be 
named on the warrant to attend its execution at the premises to be searched, in order to 
help identify those documents that are to be seized as evidence.
In civil matters, depending on the jurisdiction, different search and seizure mechanisms 
may also be available. The forensic accountant could provide assistance in obtaining 
evidence through the use of a seizure order, granted pursuant to a court application. Under 
the court’s supervision, an order would permit counsel to recover documentary evidence 
from the other party. This evidence could otherwise have been destroyed or concealed.
Similarly if there is a concern that the assets of an individual under investigation may be 
dissipated, an injunction may be obtained from a court. This injunction would prohibit the 
individual under investigation from conducting his or her affairs in a manner that would 
financially prejudice the other party in a case prior to the court rendering its decision.
The rules governing civil suits in most jurisdictions allow discovery proceedings, which 
include answering either orally or in writing questions under oath and the production of 
documents, or some equivalent process. During discovery, the forensic accountant can
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assist counsel in requesting documents to be produced by the other party and in 
determining questions to be put to the witnesses for the other party.
The Role of Computers
Over the years, the role of computers in investigations has increased exponentially; for 
example, the use of the Internet as a research tool and the development of faster, more 
efficient software to assist in the investigative process.
Investigative software now includes many packages that are designed to assist the forensic 
accountant, investigator or lawyer with his or her work. For instance, scanners can be used 
to scan in huge volumes of paper evidence that can then be searched via keywords or 
phrases and organized using a database for quick reference later in the case. Queries can be 
generated in a matter of minutes, which search through databases of millions of 
transactions, to identify the proverbial needles in the haystack. Similarly, specialized 
software is now readily available for procurement fraud investigation and to recover file 
fragments from personal computers.
The work product of the forensic accountant is also generated by computers and generally 
includes a written report accompanied by various supporting information—for example, 
document briefs, chronologies of events, accounting schedules (either summaries or 
analytical schedules), graphs and charts.
9.2.3 Analyzing and Testing
During the analysis stage, the financial issues being investigated are evaluated in detail. 
Appropriate conclusions are drawn, either in terms of a finding of fact (for example, 
whether a particular transaction or event took place) or the resulting quantification of the 
alleged fraud. If the investigation has been properly planned and appropriate evidence is 
available and has been gathered, this step should go fairly smoothly.
The ultimate test of the evidence may come when the perpetrator is confronted with it. A 
trained interviewer in possession of all the facts can often elicit an immediate confession 
from an unprepared suspect. In many cases, the suspect is relieved that the matter is finally 
over because he or she no longer has to endure the stress of covering up the fraud.
Of course, there are many cases that are not resolved as quickly, proceeding instead to 
lengthy civil or criminal court challenges. The planning, evidence gathering, and analyzing 
and testing phases of the investigation must yield a product that, in the end, can withstand 
the court challenges.
9.2.4 Reporting and Testifying
The forensic accountant must be able to present his or her findings in a way that is 
understandable, and must do so in an appropriate format. The American Institute of CPA 
Practice Aids should be referred to when preparing the final report. In general, however, the 
appropriate format might be one of the following:
• A reporting letter, for example, a communication to counsel outlining the scope of the 
review and findings.
• An affidavit or deposition, that is, a sworn statement of findings with supporting 
documentation.
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• A formal communication to the court, such as a report that sets out the forensic 
accountant’s opinions and underlying findings, and that provides details as to how those 
findings are substantiated.
Often the findings must be communicated through oral testimony in court. Once again, that 
is why every phase of the investigation up to this point must be conducted with the legal 
evidence standards in mind. Forensic accountants must be prepared for examination under 
oath about all their activities. This examination can come at any time and in any form, for 
example, as an affidavit, a deposition, or oral testimony at the actual trial. They must be 
able to qualify as an expert witness based on their education, experience and knowledge. 
Finally, they must be prepared to respond to cross-examination and to the submission of 
different financial evidence and alternatives by the other side.
Keep in mind that conventional accounting evidence is only one part of a much larger pool 
of evidentiary material, which includes one or more of the following:
• Testimony of witnesses.
• Police witness interview notes.
• Statements of claim.
• Statements of defense and counterclaim.
• Examinations or production of documents relating to a civil matter or search warrants.
Additionally, the forensic accountant may carry out research to identify any precedents that 
may assist in reporting and presenting evidence.
Preparing and Presenting Accounting Evidence
Certain guidelines should be considered when preparing and presenting accounting 
evidence. Although set out primarily from the point of view of the investigator or legal 
counsel, forensic accountants (especially those who act as expert witnesses) should also be 
aware of these guidelines, which include:
1. Make yourself fully aware of the evidence, or lack of it, from an accounting standpoint:
a. Be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the case based on the available 
documents.
b. Be aware of any investigation that may be needed to complete the accounting 
picture.
2. Thoroughly familiarize yourself with the final accounting picture as set out in the 
accountant’s report, schedules, and document brief.
3. Decide what accounting evidence to call, if any.
4. Prepare evidence for the court:
a. Request that the accountant prepare the appropriate report, schedules, and document 
brief.
b. Request that the accountant prepare appropriate visual or other aids.
c. Make available, as required by the rules of procedure, to the other side accounting 
material including the report, schedules, and document brief.
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d. Accomplish the following at the meeting with the other side.
• Explain the accounting material.
• Ensure that there is an opportunity for explanation and production of documents 
by the other side.
• Consider the admissibility of accounting material without formal proof.
5. Conduct a final pretrial witness interview of the accountant:
a. Ensure that all documentation is introduced as exhibits.
b. Confirm that the accounting schedules are properly cross-referenced to the document 
brief.
c. Review the format of the examination of expert witnesses, including:
• Areas to be covered.
• Sequence of examination.
• Exact nature of opinion evidence, if any.
• Use of visual aids.
6. Make final preparations for tendering the accountant’s evidence in court:
a. Place exhibits in proper numerical order.
b. Index the accountant’s document brief with exhibit numbers.
c. Confirm the logistics of using visual aids.
d. Confirm the availability and legibility of copies of accounting schedules and visual 
aids.
Qualifying as an Expert Witness
The simulated testimony reproduced below shows how a CPA’s qualifications as an expert 
witness can be established.
Examination—of Mr. I.M. Sleuth, CPA by Jim Jones, Esq. (Prosecutor)
Q. Mr. Sleuth, where do you reside, sir?
A. I live in Bigtown, Megaplace.
Q. And what is your occupation?
A. I am a CPA and a Certified Fraud Examiner.
Q. And do you practice on your own or with someone else?
A. I practice in partnership with other CPAs under the firm name of Sleuth & 
Company.
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Q. And how long have you been operating the accounting partnership?
A. Close to twenty-two years now.
Q. And prior to that were you associated with any other firm?
A. Yes, prior to that I worked for a period of six years with a national firm 
following my graduation from school.
Q. And in what year did you qualify as a CPA?
A. In 1972.
Q. And since that date have you had occasion to testify in court with respect to 
accounting matters?
A. I have.
Q. And approximately how many occasions would that have occurred on?
A. An estimate of some fifty occasions.
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, I offer Mr. Sleuth as an expert witness on the basis of his 
qualifications that I have elicited.
Mr. Green (Defense Counsel): No objection, Your Honor.
His Honor: Thank you.
Q. Mr. Sleuth, I understand that you have prepared a number of documents 
relating to various transactions dealing with Acme Manufacturing?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Mr. Sleuth, I show you a document, a rather large document, marked Exhibit A. 
I would ask you to look at that document and tell me if you recognize it?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And did you prepare that document yourself?
A. Yes, I did, with the assistance of staff under my direct supervision.
Q. And I wonder if you would hold it in such a way that the jury will be able to see 
the structure of that document itself. It appears to consist of a number of 
columns, vertical columns, am I correct?
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A. That’s correct.
Q. And the document is headed what?
A. It’s headed, Analysis of Sales for the Period August 1, 1998 to October 5, 1998.
Observing the Accountant Witness: A Positive Approach
The following list presents the ideal a CPA should, under the direction of legal counsel, 
strive for when giving oral testimony.
• The answers given should be responsive to the questions and as brief as possible, 
without losing sense.
• The statement of qualifications as an expert witness should be well outlined, factual, and 
not overly laudatory.
• There should be no show of bias when describing the scope and purpose of the services.
• The accountant should indicate the source of all documentation and acknowledge that 
all documents used to support his or her findings are currently before the court.
• The accountant should be prepared to consider new evidence provided it is relevant to 
the case.
• The accountant should be specific about the time period covered and the dollar amount 
of his or her findings.
• The accountant should be able to articulate the basis for his or her opinion in an 
organized and logical fashion that is easy for the judge (and if it is a jury case, a lay jury), 
to follow.
• The accountant should make good use of visual aids.
• The accountant should speak slowly and deliberately, leaving sufficient time for the 
judge (and jury) to absorb his or her evidence.
• The accountant should periodically check that the judge (and jury) is following his or her 
evidence.
• The accountant should direct his or her answers to the judge (and jury) rather than to the 
lawyer conducting the examination or cross-examination.
• The accountant should make a clear presentation.
• The accountant should be certain that the terms of the engagement are well organized 
and clearly set forth.
• The accountant should see to it that the accounting schedules are well referenced, 
including the visual aids, and can easily be tied to the supporting documents.
• The accountant should be calm and collected.
• The accountant should demonstrate knowledge of the documents and the case, and an 
understanding of the testimony of the other witnesses preceding him or her; that is, there 
should be a positive demonstration and total commitment and understanding of the 
matter before the court.
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The Accountant Witness—A Negative Approach: What Not to Do
The following list presents the negatives an accountant can exhibit when giving testimony:
• Confusion.
• Lack of preparation.
• Self-described expert (that is, self importance: impressed with himself or herself and his 
or her credentials).
• The accountant demonstrates bias in the presentation and explanation of the scope and 
purpose of his or her services.
• Failure to present findings or conclusions.
• Lack ready notes in his or her file.
• Findings convey no definite time period.
• Findings convey no definite dollar amount.
• Poor visual image.
• Poor posture.
• Incomplete supporting documents.
• Argumentative and belligerent.
• Openly nervous.
• Off-hand answers to questions.
9.2.5 Case Resolution
Fraud is a crisis for an organization and its employees. Good crisis management demands 
that the investigative process not end with the reporting of findings or the giving of 
testimony. Briefly, this means the victim organization should—
1. Seek or enforce restitution from the perpetrator (for example, seize any assets pursuant 
to a court order).
2. Learn and adjust from the experience—in particular, ensure that controls are 
implemented to prevent a recurrence.
3. Keep channels of communication open between the crisis survivors—that is, the 
organization and its employees—to ensure the crisis does not damage their relationship 
or impair the organization’s ability to function effectively and efficiently.
4. Implement regular, diligent monitoring and follow-up on the above points.
9.3 Forensic Accountants
Forensic accountants must possess a range of skills in order to carry out their investigations 
in a professional manner. These skills include not only thorough accounting knowledge but 
also knowledge of business and an awareness of the legal process. With these skills, the 
forensic accountant can investigate, analyze, document, report on, and testify as to the 
financial aspects of an investigation into a fraud or other so-called white-collar crimes.
In many instances, the forensic accountant may be requested to quantify the amount of a 
fraud loss in a criminal matter or the financial damages in a civil matter. While a criminal
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matter must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a civil matter must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Both require a demonstration of similar techniques and 
skills from the forensic accountant.
9.3.1 Professional Skills and Attributes
The seven major categories of a forensic accountant’s professional skills and attributes are:
1. Accounting and audit knowledge, including good business knowledge.
2. Fraud knowledge.
3. Law and rules of evidence knowledge.
4. Investigative mentality and critical skepticism.
5. Psychology and motivation awareness.
6. Communication skills.
7. Computers and information technology comprehension.
A closer inspection of each category follows.
Accounting and Audit Knowledge
Professional training in accounting and auditing provides not only accounting and audit 
knowledge but also a practical understanding of business operations, business finance, 
corporate structure, industry practices, and standards of conduct.
The majority of those who identify themselves as forensic accountants are CPAs. These 
individuals have sought and found careers for themselves in an area that allows them to use 
their skills as CPAs, together with other personal attributes that are necessary in 
investigating business fraud and commercial crimes.
Audit skills are an important foundation for a forensic accountant. Due to the sensitivity of 
the work involved, forensic accountants must be able to focus on the need for a 100 percent 
substantive examination of all documentation related to a particular matter.
The accountant with good audit skills must have the ability to prepare and use complete 
and accurate documentation; thus the accountant must know how to catalog the available 
information. He or she must also be able to determine the other existing information 
sources, which initially may not be available but which can, with research and diligence, be 
uncovered, obtained, and utilized. With his or her accounting and audit skills, the 
accountant can inquire about, locate and identify investigation-related documents—whether 
they are present initially or obtained during the course of the investigation.
For most CPAs, audit experience includes both audit and nonaudit engagements covering a 
wide cross-section of business enterprises and their operations, from small sole 
proprietorships to large multinational corporations, both public and private. This familiarity 
with business enterprise is an important element in the forensic accountant’s investigation 
of business frauds and similar matters.
Fraud Knowledge
In addition to professional training in accounting and auditing, the most important aspect of 
the forensic accountant skills mix is exposure to and knowledge of many different kinds of
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fraudulent transactions. This will allow the forensic accountant to identify red flags and to 
piece together patterns and theories that may otherwise elude an accountant who has not 
had the same degree of exposure to fraud.
Forensic accountants do not merely compute, they analyze. The analytical process is not an 
easy one, as each case is unique and therefore calls upon the forensic accountant’s 
experience, formal training, and other important attributes. Specifically, he or she must be 
able to identify accounting problem areas, prioritize these problem areas or issues as 
required, and refine or change the focus of the investigation as new information is obtained 
and assessed. Often, an original theory may be only the beginning of an investigation, or it 
may be refined to a specific issue warranting further review. In providing assistance to the 
courts, this ability to properly focus the investigation is important.
The importance of experience cannot be overemphasized. The forensic accountant must 
also be able to look beyond the form of the documentation, to understand its substance and 
foundations, and to assess whether it is consistent with other business realities. The forensic 
accountant must understand the nature of the documents that he or she is reviewing and 
question their business reality. More than anything, a forensic accountant is distinguished 
by having “been there before.” Knowledge of many different kinds of fraud, based on first­
hand investigative experience, means a more effective plan of investigation, knowing when, 
how, and who to interview as well as the format for communicating findings in reports to 
clients and if necessary to the court.
Law and Rules of Evidence Knowledge
It is important for the forensic accountant to be knowledgeable about both criminal and 
civil laws, since these laws have a direct impact on matters involving the forensic 
accountant. Specifically, a forensic accountant must be able to understand both criminal 
and other statutes that may have been contravened, in order to identify possible issues. 
There is also a need to understand the rules of evidence to ensure that all findings are 
admissible in court, if necessary. Specifically, investigative accountants must have an 
understanding of the rules of evidence—for both civil and criminal matters—which consist 
of:
• What evidence is.
• How it is obtained.
• How it is preserved.
• How it is presented before the courts.
• How the forensic accountant’s own work can become part of the evidence brought 
before the courts or before some other tribunal responsible for determining what has 
occurred.
To provide accounting assistance in a matter involving fraud, the forensic accountant must 
possess a general understanding of the issues by which the courts can judge an act to be 
fraudulent. He or she must be knowledgeable as to the court’s tests for fraud—for example, 
the presence of dishonest intent as seen in the perpetrator’s actions, or more particularly, 
the mens rea or criminal intent of the perpetrator at the time the act occurred. He or she 
must review and analyze accounting, banking, financial and other business records, and
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identify both specific acts and patterns of conduct that are suggestive of dishonest intent to 
deprive a victim of an asset.
Investigative Mentality and Critical Skepticism
The forensic accountant must possess an investigative outlook, tenacity, and the ability to 
identify indicators of fraud. Collectively, these attributes could be termed as the 
investigative mentality. This mentality encourages the forensic accountant to seek substance 
over form—to identify and analyze data and to conduct interviews to determine what has 
actually occurred in a business transaction, rather than what simply appears to have 
happened.
The investigative mentality is sometimes manifested by the smell test—the ability to assess 
relevant transactions or events to determine their reasonableness and to the extent possible, 
their veracity. In other words, in light of all the known facts, does a particular action appear 
reasonable and logical? Is the action or pattern of behavior plausible in the circumstances, 
or is there an odor that begs for further investigation?
The investigative mentality can also be thought of as professional, critical skepticism. It is 
not a shotgun approach; rather, it is a specific and precise set of judgmental procedures 
suitable for the circumstances that allows the forensic accountant to identify and assess all 
relevant facts and develop hypotheses. These hypotheses can then be researched further 
and tested more extensively as the investigation proceeds. The forensic accountant never 
discounts any aspect of an investigation on face value: Only after examining all available 
evidence and weighing its totality will he or she determine an item to be irrelevant to the 
issues at hand.
Another analogy—that of the watchdog-bloodhound—further illustrates the forensic 
accountant’s investigative mentality attribute. A CPA is more akin to a watchdog—he or 
she looks for material misstatements in financial statements caused by error or fraud, but 
will respond affirmatively if warning signs of fraud appear through audit procedures. The 
forensic accountant, however, is more of a bloodhound—actively seeking out the presence 
of evidence, all of which when viewed together may indicate the occurrence of a fraudulent 
act.
While the investigative mentality requires a disciplined approach and a methodology, it 
also requires creativity in being able to identify and seek out further sources of evidence 
and to analyze this new information. Attention to detail is critical as the success or failure of 
the case may depend on the identification of evidence that, on initial review, may appear 
insignificant or irrelevant. The issues of materiality or sampling relevant in an audit 
assignment do not restrict a forensic investigation. Those restrictions may cause fraudulent 
acts to be overlooked, and they are inadequate in establishing evidence.
Psychology and Motivation Awareness
Another attribute of the forensic accountant is an understanding of the human element. 
Documents do not commit fraud; computers do not commit fraud; rather, people commit 
fraud. In assessing information, documentation and accounting records, one of the 
seasonings that the forensic accountant can apply to the mix is his or her understanding of 
individuals, including what motivates an individual to commit fraud and the attributes of an 
individual who commits fraud. This understanding, together with the ability of the forensic
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accountant to examine information not just from an accounting viewpoint, but also within 
the context of the overall picture or business reality, is important
In general, it can be said that individuals react to satisfy needs. The forensic accountant 
must recognize the presence of such needs during his or her investigation, whether it is the 
need of an employee for greater income to maintain an extravagant lifestyle or the need of 
a sales manager to maintain sales volumes in a declining market so as to ensure his or her 
continued employment. Such needs often provide the motivation for acts that an employee 
may label differently but which are, in essence, fraud.
In a situation where an individual has both the need and the opportunity, a fraudulent act 
may be the result.
Communication Skills
Forensic accountants, as expert witnesses to the court in findings of fact, must be able to 
clearly and effectively communicate information. This means that they must be able to 
communicate without bias in written form, including the use of accounting schedules, 
charts, and exhibits. They must also be able to communicate to others the nature and extent 
of the work undertaken and the findings that have evolved from that work so that it can be 
understood both in a court of law and in other forums.
When the forensic accountant testifies as an expert witness in court, he or she must be able 
to explain the procedures, analyses, and findings of the investigation in such a way that the 
basis for his or her expert testimony—both facts and, if necessary, opinion—is understood 
by the judge and, if there is one, the jury. The forensic accountant’s knowledge of the 
available evidence and possible alternate explanations of the events must be as complete as 
possible, to ensure that the findings are not compromised on cross-examination.
Understanding Computers and Information Technology
Today’s computers have replaced yesterday’s ledgers, and in fraud investigation it is 
important to be as up-to-date as the alleged perpetrators of fraud. Thus, the skills of a 
forensic accountant should include the ability to understand the opportunities computers 
provide to potential perpetrators of fraud as well as the ability to use computers in analysis 
and documentation of an alleged fraud.
Because succinct presentation to the judge and jury is so critical, knowledge of computer 
graphics is also helpful. The forensic accountant’s findings often include quantitative 
analyses that are conducive to presentation in the form of graphs and charts that depict and 
summarize the information. Typical graphs and charts include summaries of the source and 
use of funds, as well as flow charts showing the movement of assets at various times.
9.3.2 Ethics
Independence and Objectivity
Independence and objectivity are integral concepts in the ethical training of CPAs. While 
the need for these attributes is well established in the audit area, they are extremely 
important in investigative work. The forensic and investigative accountant is not an 
advocate; rather, he or she provides the skills and input of an independent expert. Even a 
bias with respect to a single, small matter—whether actual or perceived—may call into 
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question in the eyes of the court other unbiased evidence presented by the forensic 
accountant. He or she must therefore report objectively at all times.
Respect for Access to Information and Privacy Laws
One factor that must not be overlooked in the role of investigator is that the information 
that is gathered must be collected in an ethical and legal manner. One cannot misrepresent 
one’s self when gathering information, nor can the process of collecting information be 
abused.
Most important, the rights of an individual whose activities are being reviewed must not be 
abused.
9.3.3 Kinds of Services Offered
Proactive versus Reactive Services
Forensic accounting services can be proactive or reactive. Proactive services include 
training on fraud awareness and fraud prevention measures, presented elsewhere in this 
Handbook. Reactive services are investigative and analytical in nature and are rendered 
after the event. Much of the information in this chapter addresses reactive services.
Civil versus Criminal Services
Another way to identify the kinds of services that a forensic accountant renders is to 
consider the forum in which a dispute is finally resolved. For example:
• A criminal forum must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• A civil case has a less onerous burden of proof than a criminal case. The trier of the facts 
must reach his or her conclusion based on the preponderance of the evidence.
• A nonjudicial tribunal, for instance, an alternative dispute resolution proceeding 
(arbitration) can differ from a court of law by being either stricter or more lenient.
• Finally, if the circumstances are such that no reference is made to an outside tribunal, 
but rather two parties are to resolve a matter on their own, then the level of proof 
required is only what the other side will accept.
Other Categorizations
Services of a forensic accountant can also be categorized in other ways, for example by the 
type of procedures performed. These procedures can include—
• Performing an initial review of documentation to determine whether further research or 
investigation is required or necessary.
• Providing an affidavit or deposition outlining the results of a review of documentation.
• Providing a report identifying the scope of the work performed and findings.
• Assisting counsel in obtaining a search warrant (that is, in a criminal case).
• Providing expert testimony in court.
The nature of the industry in which a forensic accountant is performing an investigation can 
be another method of classification. For example:
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• Service industries could include transportation, banking, securities brokerage, retail, real 
estate, construction, professional services (such as services of CPAs and lawyers), 
mortgage brokerage, and telecommunications.
• Manufacturing industries could include construction, farming, food processing, all forms 
of manufacturing, mining, petroleum, and publishing.
The above classifications could then be further refined, and others added. For example, 
government and nonprofit sectors are other areas where forensic accountants are called 
upon to provide their services.
9.4 Checklist: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
CPAs can use the following checklist when dealing with a known or suspected fraud in their 
organizations or in those of their clients. No answers may require investigation and follow-up, 
the results of which should be documented. Use the column to cross-reference the 
checklist to the appropriate work papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If fraud is of vital 
concern to an organization or if serious fraud is suspected, seek the advice of legal counsel and 
a CPA experienced in fraud investigation.
Table 9.1 Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud Checklist
Dealing With a Known or Suspected 
Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Planning
a. Has the main scenario of the fraud been established, including 
the sources of information pointing to fraud (that is, 
accounting irregularities, physical evidence, or incriminating 
information)?
b. Have immediate areas of concern been identified, such as the 
need to protect assets from further damage (for example, by 
boosting security) and to preserve key evidence for further 
investigation (e.g., by removing the key suspect from the 
scene, through a leave of absence or other appropriate 
means)?
c. Have legal and other constraints been identified, (that is, the 
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement) and has 
legal counsel been consulted?
d. Has a preliminary assessment been made to determine:
• The quality of the information currently available
• Additional information that is needed
• How to obtain the information
e. Have the nature and scope of the investigation been defined, 
including: ___________________
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected 
Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• The main objective(s)
• Whether (and when) to pursue criminal charges
• The level of secrecy required
• Administrative matters (for example, engagement letters; or 
if external forensic accountants are used, budgets)
2. Evidence Gathering
a. Has a detailed list been prepared of the evidence that is to be 
obtained or seized?
b. Have all sources of evidence been considered (for example, 
books and records, documents, correspondence, public 
domain information, background financial information and 
personnel history, etc.)?
c. When evidence is obtained, is it assessed for:
• Relevance
• Alternative interpretations (for example, simple error)
• Eventual use and admissibility (for example, as court 
evidence)
d. Are proper evidence-handling procedures in effect, (for 
example, taking photocopies; not writing on, altering, stapling 
or unstapling originals)?
e. Especially for larger investigations, has evidence been 
categorized in a way that will facilitate its future retrieval and 
use?
f. Has the nature, timing and scope of any interviews (especially 
of suspects) been carefully considered?
g. Are interviews conducted by or with trained and experienced 
interviewers, with appropriate safeguards to prevent bogus 
harassment or other charges (for example, safeguards could 
include leaving the door ajar during interviews and having 
assistants interrupt at predetermined times)?
h. When appropriate, has the use of reputable private 
investigators been considered?
i. For any evidence to be seized, does the search warrant or 
court order have the proper scope so that all of the required 
evidence falls within its reach?
(continued)
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected 
Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
j. Especially for larger investigations, have computer databases 
and other appropriate tools been used to store and cross­
reference evidentiary materials?
k. Has security over all evidence been established, including, if 
appropriate, off-site storage of copies (electronic, paper, or 
both) for key evidence and documents?
3. Analyzing and Testing
a. Has all evidence been systematically analyzed?
b. Were appropriate conclusions drawn?
c. Has the evidence been thoroughly checked and tested and 
reviewed with legal counsel to ensure it is up to court 
standards?
4. Reporting and Testifying
a. Has a forensic accountant prepared a well-organized, 
unambiguous report, summarizing the findings of the 
investigation?
b. Has the report undergone a quality-control review?
c. Has adequate preparation been done for testifying in court, 
including a full run-through?
d. Is the person giving the testimony experienced, and if 
necessary, has he or she previously qualified as an expert?
e. For expert witnesses, have fairness and impartiality, and the 
appearance of such, been present throughout the process (for 
example availability to both sides)?
5. Case Resolution
a. Has a plan and process been put into effect to seek and 
enforce restitution from perpetrators?
b. Have controls and procedures been put into place to prevent a 
recurrence?
c. Have channels of communication been kept open and other 
appropriate steps taken to maintain good employee relations 
and mitigate any other adverse effects of the crisis?
d. Has a program been established to monitor the results of the 
above on an ongoing basis? __________________________
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Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector
1 Construction
1.1 Introduction
The construction sector includes entities conducting the following kinds of operations:
• Residential and commercial building construction
• Construction of roads, bridges and similar public works
• Residential and commercial renovations
• Installation of plumbing, electrical and similar infrastructure
This sector is highly cyclical, and competition for work can be fierce. The competitive 
pressure affecting construction firms, their employees, and sub-contractors can result in an 
increased risk of fraud.
1.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Contract bidding fraud (bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions and so on): 
Competitive pressures can lead to collusion among bidders on a contract, thus exposing 
the company to criminal prosecution. Alternatively, managers and employees who feel 
they have little stake in the company may accept kickbacks or secret commissions from 
either the company’s customers or its suppliers in exchange for under-the-table financial 
consideration or preferential treatment.
• Materials substitution: Subcontractors may substitute materials of lower quality than 
called for in the contract specifications, in order to (1) make a profit on contracts they 
have underbid on, or (2) increase their profits. The company itself may also engage in 
this practice, exposing itself to criminal prosecution or civil liability.
• Tax evasion (underground economy): Especially in residential construction and 
renovations, companies may solicit or accept “cash-without-a-receipt” business, in order 
to avoid sales taxes as well as reduce their income taxes.
• Employee misbehavior (theft, sabotage, and the like.): Depending on the nature of the 
employee-employer relationship and the construction contract, some employees may 
feel little loyalty to the projects they work on and have no inclination to complete work 
on time. Line employees may steal materials or intentionally create time and cost 
overruns to extend their own employment. As material and labor costs soar during the 
construction phase, support personnel (for example, accounting or purchasing) may 
concoct inventory or accounts payable schemes to defraud their employer or customers.
1.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the construction sector are described below.
• Corporate policies, particularly in the areas of employee relations and enforcement, are 
key to establishing an environment that minimizes the risk of fraud. If both management 
and lower-level employees feel they have a stake in the company and they also believe 
that (1) they are being fairly treated, for example with respect to compensation, and (2) 
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any employee will be severely dealt with for any breach of the law or the company’s 
policies, then they are less likely to engage in fraud, commercial crime or destructive 
acts.
• Physical access restrictions, for example with respect to construction materials and 
supplies at the company’s premises and at work sites, will deter theft or sabotage.
• Supervisory performance and independent checks will help ensure that the company’s 
work is up to contract standards and minimize the potential for materials substitution or 
other quality problems.
• Adequate insurance is especially important in this sector.
1.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the construction sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
4
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Construction Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management—Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the 
construction sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls 
include physical access restrictions and surveillance, 
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and 
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate 
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, audit [especially 
confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring 
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution (related controls include good 
corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including 
environmental crime, tax evasion, and violating 
occupational health and safety laws (related controls 
include good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal, audit 
functions)
• Other key risk management issues for this sector: insurance
(continued)
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Construction Sector Checklist (continued)
Construction Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the construction 
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids, 
been adequately addressed:
• Lapping frauds, such as accounts receivable lapping (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies, especially strict 
enforcement)
6
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(continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Construction Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
X
X
Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like 
Manipulation of financial statements by officers
X
X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers 
Employee sabotage or espionage X
X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution) 
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)
X
X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising
X
X
X
Insider trading
Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving X
X
X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Construction Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Construction Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
Fair performance appraisal and review system
Employee screening and testing before hiring
Management acting as a good role model
X
X
X
X
X
X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like 
Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both
No management override of controls
X
X
X
X
X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)
X 
X
X 
X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud
Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both
Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)
Auditors (internal, external)
Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)
X
X
X 
X
X
X
X
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2 Financial Services
2.1 Introduction
The financial services sector includes entities such as:
• Banks, trust companies, and credit unions
• Insurance companies and insurance brokers
• Stock and other investment brokers
• Mutual and pension funds
The extremely high liquid asset values in this sector make it a prime target for fraud, from 
both inside and outside. Indeed, Willie Sutton, the infamous bank robber, probably 
summed it up best when he was asked why he robbed banks. He responded: “Because 
that’s where the money is, stupid!”
2.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Employee frauds, typically involving cash or accounts receivable. These range from 
outright theft or skimming of cash to the setting up of phony customer accounts. For 
example, some of the largest bank frauds have involved loan managers who set up 
phony borrowers and diverted the loan proceeds to their own benefit.
• Frauds by customers: Banks are vulnerable to schemes such as check kiting, credit card 
fraud, or phony loan security. Insurance companies are particularly vulnerable to fake 
or inflated loss claims by their policy holders.
• Con artists see this sector as having deep pockets and frequently target it with a wide 
variety of schemes, both direct and indirect. A direct example is a scheme-in which a 
manager is approached with an elaborate, seemingly irresistible quick-profit 
opportunity. The catch is that he or she must put up a large amount of cash for a short 
period. An indirect example is the bank inspector fraud in which a bank’s elderly customer 
is persuaded by the con artist to help in the investigation of a teller. The catch is that the 
customer must withdraw a large amount of his or her savings.
• Computer-related fraud, since this sector tends to be heavily automated.
• Commercial crime involving breach of trust (for example, a stock broker or money 
manager absconding with a client’s funds, or churning a customer’s account with a series 
of unauthorized transactions in order to increase commissions), money laundering, or 
invasion of privacy.
2.3 Key Preventive Controls
Because of the large asset values at stake, there are many key fraud prevention controls in 
the financial services sector including:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong physical access controls.
9
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• Testing and screening of employees prior to hiring. At a minimum this should include 
checking all references, including education and work history. Some organizations in 
this sector go even farther, especially for more sensitive positions. This could include 
more extensive background checks, psychological testing, and even drug testing.
• Mandatory annual vacations. Ongoing schemes are common in this sector. These 
schemes often fall apart or are easily detected when the perpetrator is removed from the 
scene for even a few weeks.
• Prohibition of management override of basic controls. There have been many instances 
of branch managers in this sector who were able to circumvent or override basic 
controls, enabling them to perpetrate extremely large frauds sometimes running in the 
millions of dollars.
• Good computer security including access restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies, 
and control over software and program development.
• Supervisory controls including a well-defined review and approval process, test-checking 
and monitoring of employee performance, and thorough follow-up of any exceptions or 
customer complaints.
• A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.
2.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the financial services sector follows, along 
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that 
sector.
10
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Financial Services Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the financial 
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Customer and other outsider frauds, such as false loan 
applications, con schemes, and the like (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, good corporate policies, and strong internal 
audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of 
trust, money laundering, and violation of privacy (related 
controls include good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal audit 
functions and periodic external audits
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Financial Services Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others X
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like 
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) 
Frauds by competitors (sabotage, espionage, and the like)
X
X
X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information, and the like) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) 
False advertising
X
X
X
Insider trading X
Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving
X
X
Tax evasion
Violating occupational health and safety laws
Violation of privacy X
X
X
12
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Financial Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Financial Services Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) 
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
X
X
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring 
Management acting as a good role model
X
X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both X
Prohibition of management override of controls X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Internal-Audit Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud 
Supervisory review and approval X
X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints) X
Auditors (internal, external)
Forensic accountants and investigators
X
X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
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3 Government
3.1 Introduction
The government sector includes:
• Federal, state, and municipal governments.
• Government agencies and government-owned corporations.
• Organizations that receive most of their funding from government sources. For example, 
depending on the jurisdiction, this could include public elementary and secondary school 
systems; institutions of higher education (for example state university systems and local 
community colleges); municipal and state hospitals; and local ambulance services and 
volunteer fire departments.
Because of its tremendous size and the large budgets involved, this sector is especially 
prone to supplier and accounts payable frauds.
3.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Theft or diversion of government-owned inventory, for example office supplies.
• Accounts payable schemes by managers or employees, involving phony suppliers, 
inflated invoices, and so on.
• Overstated expense accounts.
• Acceptance of bribes (kickbacks, secret commissions) in exchange for contract approvals 
or inflated price approvals.
• Frauds by suppliers (overbilling, double-billing, product substitution, and so on).
• Computer-related fraud.
• Money laundering, for example, through government-run lotteries or pari-mutual 
betting facilities; bribe giving, for example through government-owned corporations or 
agencies seeking foreign sales.
• Violation of privacy, because of the extensive records on individuals kept by this sector.
Tax evasion is obviously also a major problem in this sector, with the perpetrator in this 
case being the taxpayer.
3.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the government sector include:
• Strong enforcement, that is, ensuring that employees are severely dealt with for any 
breach of either the law or the government’s policies.
• Good employee relations. This is especially important because of the large number of 
employees in this sector and the very high percentage who are unionized. Poor handling 
of this area can lead to a very antagonistic employer-employee relationship, which can 
not only lower productivity but also increase the risk of fraud, sabotage, and other illegal 
acts by some employees.
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• Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, including appropriate segregation of 
duties. For example, the responsibility for each step in the accounts payable cycle (such 
as contracts, requisition, purchase order, receiving, accounts payable, check preparation) 
should ideally be segregated to minimize the otherwise high potential for fraud in this 
cycle.
• Good computer security including access restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies, 
and control over software and program development. This is important not only to 
ensure smooth operations, but also to avoid breaches of confidentiality, or the misuse of 
information, or both.
• Supervisory controls including a well-defined review and approval process.
• A strong internal audit function.
3.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the government sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
16
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Government Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the 
government sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees, and expense report fraud 
(related controls include job descriptions and segregation of 
duties, audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good management policies [especially 
strict enforcement])
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls 
include physical access restrictions and surveillance, 
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and 
segregation of duties, supervision, and good management 
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good management policies and 
supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the government, including 
money laundering (for example, for government-run 
lotteries and pari-mutual betting operations), tax evasion, 
and violation of privacy (related controls include good 
management policies [especially strict enforcement and 
supervision], and strong internal audit functions [especially 
internal audit])
(continued)
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Government Sector Checklist (continued)
Government Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the government 
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids, 
been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good management policies [especially 
strict enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees or others (related 
controls include physical access restrictions, and good 
management policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
18
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Government Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or credits) 
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) 
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)
X
X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others X
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like 
Manipulation of financial statements by managers
X
X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) 
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders 
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like.
X
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information, and the like) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
X
Money laundering (for example, lotteries and pari-mutual betting 
operations)
X
Organizational bribe giving X
Tax evasion (that is, where the taxpayer is the perpetrator) 
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
X
X
Violation of privacy X
Government Policies:
Mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) 
Fair performance appraisal and review system
X
X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Government Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Government Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts payable X
variance)
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both 
No management override of controls X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both
X
X
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) 
Auditors (internal, external) X
X
Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)
X
X
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4 High Technology
4.1 Introduction
The high technology sector includes activities such as:
• Computer hardware and software development
• Biotechnology
• Defense and aerospace
• Other leading-edge scientific or industrial research and development
The common denominator in this sector is high research and development expenditures. 
The sector is not necessarily defined by the business entity alone. For example, the auto 
industry would be considered manufacturing in the conventional sense, but certain areas 
might be considered high-tech (for example, development of better vehicles powered by 
electricity, related battery technology, and so on).
In terms of its vulnerability to fraud, this sector also shares some similarities with the media 
and communications sector (section 6).
4.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Theft or diversion of inventory, for example small items, such as computer chips, with a 
high per-unit dollar value.
• Frauds by officers or directors such as fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting, and 
manipulation of share prices, insider trading, and other antitrust violations, or 
organizational bribe giving as part of the contract bidding process.
• Sabotage and espionage, both from inside and outside the organization.
• Con artists who may approach this sector with schemes requiring the payment of 
advances or upfront seed money, but then disappear or never deliver on their end of the 
contract.
• Copyright and patent infringement, which can be a problem for many parts of this 
sector.
4.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the high technology sector include:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach. Management example is also 
important.
• Strong enforcement, for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt 
with for any transgressions, such as antitrust violations (by both the company and society 
generally), and prosecuting copyright and patent infringers to the fullest extent of the 
law.
• Employee testing and screening.
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• Good computer controls, including physical and computer access controls to protect the 
company’s assets and trade secrets, disaster recovery contingencies and control over 
software and program development.
• Keen supervisor awareness of fraud and the possibility of fraud. While important in all 
industries, the high technology industry may be particularly vulnerable to supervisor 
complacency in this area because (1) there tends to be a very high focus on the product 
or technology, possibly to the exclusion of other management concerns, and (2) 
employees tend to be highly educated and skilled, possibly strengthening the erroneous 
bias that such employees are incapable of fraud.
4.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the high technology sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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High Technology Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the high 
technology sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion of computer 
chips (related controls include physical access restrictions 
and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts, job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and 
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements, 
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading, 
and the like, (related controls include good corporate 
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal 
audit function)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the organization, including 
patent infringement, antitrust violations, and organizational 
bribe giving (related controls include good corporate 
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision], 
strong internal audit functions, and periodic outside audits)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the high technology 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
(continued)
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High Technology Sector Checklist (continued)
High Technology Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, strong internal audit 
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
High Technology Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Interned Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (for example, front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers, or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (theft or diversion of computer chips)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)
X
X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like 
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
X
X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution) 
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage) X
X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders X
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) X
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
False advertising
Insider trading and antitrust violations X
X
Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving X
X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws X
Violation of privacy X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—High Technology Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
High Technology Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) 
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
X
X
Fair performance appraisal and review system 
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both X
No management override of controls X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud 
Supervisory review and approval
X
X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints) X
Auditors (internal, external) X
Forensic accountants and investigators X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft.) X
26
5 Manufacturing
5 . 1 Introduction
The manufacturing sector contains numerous varieties of businesses. A few of the major 
segments include:
• Auto and auto parts manufacturing
• Clothing and textile industries
• Production of other consumer goods (ranging from durable goods, such as televisions, 
washing machines, and furniture to everyday items such as soap and garbage bags)
• Food processing and packaging
This sector is fairly average in its overall susceptibility to fraud.
5.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Employee frauds, typically involving inventory, accounts payable, or payroll. These 
frauds are sometimes carried out in collusion with outsiders.
• Supplier frauds such as overbilling or materials substitution.
• Some forms of commercial crime, such as environmental crime, or violation of 
occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws, or both.
5.3 Key Preventive Controls
The manufacturing sector is fairly average across the board in terms of the importance of 
specific controls.
The best defense against the potential for inventory, accounts payable, and payroll frauds is 
a good segregation of duties and regular accounting reconciliations. Included in the latter 
should be periodic inventory counts for comparison with the perpetual records. Consistent 
unexplained shortages in raw materials, for example, may indicate the presence of fraud.
5.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the manufacturing sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the 
manufacturing sector, and related controls, as also set out on 
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls 
include physical access restrictions and surveillance, 
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and 
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate 
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, periodic external 
audits [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including 
environmental crime and violating occupational health and 
safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good 
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement], 
supervision, and strong internal audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the manufacturing 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash 
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions, [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist (continued)
Manufacturing Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements, 
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading, 
etc. (related controls include good corporate policies 
[especially strong enforcement, and strong internal audit 
functions])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring 
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Manufacturing Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
X
X
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) 
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)
X
X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders X
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising
X
X
X
Insider trading X
Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving
X
X
Tax evasion
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Manufacturing Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Manufacturing Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable, and inventory)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both X
No management override of controls X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) X
Auditors (internal, external) X
Forensic accountants and investigators X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
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6 Media and Communications
6.1 Introduction
The media and communications sector includes:
• Book publishing
• Print and broadcast media
• Music and motion picture industries
• Telephone, cable, and satellite industries
Although certain parts of this sector are in decline (for example, newspaper and fiction­
book publishing), for the most part the sector has been characterized by very high growth, 
especially over the last two decades. As is the case with the high technology sector, the 
growth and the glamorous nature of some parts of the media and communications sector 
contribute to the risk of fraud.
6.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds by officers or directors, such as fraudulent financial reporting, manipulation of 
share prices, insider trading, and antitrust violations.
• Frauds by customers. Some parts of this sector—for example, telephone and cable 
companies-are vulnerable to equipment theft by customers.
• Con artists, who may approach this sector with schemes requiring the payment of 
advances or up front seed money, but then disappear or never deliver on their end of the 
contract.
• Copyright and patent infringement, which can be a problem for some parts of this 
sector-for example, unauthorized decoder boxes in the cable industry.
• Violation of privacy. The nature of the sector can sometimes make this a problem, 
although violations have to be weighed against other rights, such as freedom of the 
press.
6.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the media and communications sector 
include:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong enforcement—for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt 
with for any antitrust violations (by both the company and society generally), and 
prosecuting copyright and patent infringers to the fullest extent of the law.
• Physical access controls, such as credit screening of customers before allowing them to 
walk off with leased company equipment.
• Good computer security, to protect against fraud and avoid breaches of confidentiality, 
or the misuse of information, or both.
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• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits. This should include 
periodic direct confirmation of customer statement information.
6.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the media and communications sector follows 
along with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in 
that sector.
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Media and Communications Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the media and 
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on 
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Management fraud, such as making false financial 
statements, inflating income, manipulating share prices, 
insider trading, and the like (controls include good 
corporate policies such as strong enforcement, and internal 
audit functions)
• Customer and outsider frauds, such as theft of equipment, 
copyright and patent infringement, con schemes, (related 
controls include good corporate policies, supervision, and 
enforcement)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including violation 
of privacy (related controls include good corporate policies 
[especially strict enforcement and supervision])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the media and 
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on 
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions, 
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer 
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit 
function)
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
(continued)
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Media and Communications Sector Checklist (continued)
Media and Communications Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls 
include physical access restrictions and surveillance, 
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and 
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate 
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit 
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring 
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid Low
Media and Communications Sector High Avg or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like 
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
X
X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers 
Employee sabotage or espionage
X
X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like 
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)
X
X
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage) 
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders X
X
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) X
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
False advertising X
Insider trading and antitrust violations
Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving
X
X
X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Media and Communications Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Media and Communications Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Employee relations (fair compensation, counseling, and the like) X
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (locks, alarms, security), and the like 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both 
No management override of controls
X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (physical access, passwords, and the like) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (antivirus, full documentation, and the like) X
Programmer controls (supervision, antisabotage, and the like) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) 
Auditors (internal, external) X
X
Forensic accountants and investigators X
Adequate insurance (fidelity, fire, liability, theft, and the like) X
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7 Nonprofit
7.1 Introduction
The nonprofit sector, for purposes of this section, consists primarily of charitable and 
benevolent organizations. It excludes operations set out under the government sector 
heading in section 3.
Except for cash theft and skimming, this sector is generally less prone to fraud from either 
within or outside the organization. However, there are a number of commercial crime risks.
7.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Employee or volunteer frauds, typically involving the theft or skimming of cash.
• Commercial crime involving such things as breach of trust (that is, cash theft or 
skimming at the organizational level), con schemes in which funds received are not used 
for the advertised purposes, and tax evasion by phony charities. Since this sector collects 
large volumes of information in the form of mailing lists and other data about 
contributors, there is also the potential for abuse of this information, invasion of privacy, 
and so on.
7.3 Key Preventive Controls
Three key fraud prevention controls in the nonprofit sector are:
1. Strong enforcement, that is ensuring that employees are severely dealt with for any 
breach of the law. This is important to send a deterrent message as well as to maintain 
public faith and support in the organization.
2. Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, especially with respect to segregation and 
duplication of duties. For example, the opening of mail should be carefully controlled 
because it may contain cash. An appropriate system might be for two people to open 
mail, one of whom records cash receipts in a log for later balancing against deposit slips, 
charitable receipts issued, and so on.
3. Follow-up of contributor complaints (for example, no receipt received).
7.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the nonprofit sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Nonprofit Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the nonprofit 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of 
trust, false advertising, tax evasion, and violation of privacy 
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially 
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal 
audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the nonprofit sector, 
and related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been 
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal and external 
audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Nonprofit Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)
Accounts receivable (lapping, phony customers or credits, and the like)
X
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like
X
X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers
X
X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)
X
X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and so on
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
X
X
False advertising (perpetration of con schemes)
Insider trading
Money laundering
X
X
X
Organizational bribe giving
Tax evasion (illegitimate charities) X
X
Violating occupational health and (OSHA) safety laws
Violation of privacy X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Nonprofit Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Nonprofit Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) X
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like 
Mandatory annual vacations
X
X
X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both X
No management override of controls X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both 
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, contributor complaints) X
X
Auditors (internal, external) X
Forensic accountants and investigators X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
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8 Professional Services
8.1 Introduction
The professional services sector includes:
• Accountants
• Architects and engineers
• Doctors, dentists, and other medical professionals
• Lawyers
The distinguishing characteristics of this sector are: (1) the form of the business- 
partnership, professional corporation, limited liability company or-sole practitioner; and (2) 
the professional-client relationship, as well as an element of public trust.
Because the management of the business is also generally in the hands of the ownership, 
there is more at stake here in terms of fraud losses. Every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out 
of the professional’s pocket, and not merely a management embarrassment.
8.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds involving accounts receivable, for example, accounts receivable lapping 
schemes. Also, in partnership situations, some partners may commit fraud by 
undertaking work directly, or billing clients directly, or both, rather than for the benefit 
of the partnership as required in the partnership agreement.
• Inflated expense reports.
• Breach of trust such as theft of client funds.
8.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the professional services sector include:
• A strong code of ethics.
• Good basic controls such as (1) job descriptions, such as appropriate segregation of 
duties, (2) mandatory annual vacations, (3) regular accounting reconciliations, and (4) no 
management override of basic controls.
• Good computer controls especially in the area of access restrictions and disaster 
recovery contingencies. This is important not only to ensure smooth operations, but also 
to avoid breaches of confidentiality, or the misuse of information, or both.
• An awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among many 
nonaccounting professionals. Doctors and lawyers, for example, are often unaware of 
the issue because they are too preoccupied with the practice of their own profession.
Adequate insurance is also important, but more from a liability standpoint than in the areas 
of theft or fidelity.
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8.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the professional services sector follows along 
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that 
sector.
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Professional Services Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the 
professional services sector, and related controls, as also set 
out on the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts receivable lapping (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, mandatory annual 
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of 
exceptions [for example, relating to patient or client 
complaints or confirmation discrepancies], and good 
management policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Inflated expense report fraud (related controls include 
internal audit and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of 
trust and money laundering (related controls include good 
management policies [especially strict enforcement and 
supervision], and strong internal audit function and periodic 
external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the professional 
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good management policies [particularly at the hiring 
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good management policies and 
supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Professional Services Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds) 
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, personal billings) 
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
X
X
X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) 
Inflated expense reports by managers and others X
X
X
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and so on X
Manipulation of financial statements by the owning professionals X
Manipulation of valuation of ownership interest by the owning 
professionals
X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Client or patient theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) X
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage) X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders X
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising
X
X
X
Money laundering X
Organizational bribe giving X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws X
Violation of privacy X
Professional Policies:
Mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) X
Fair performance appraisal and review system _____________ ............ X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Professional Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Professional Services Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Senior professionals acting as a good role models X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Patient or client account statements, or confirmations, or both 
No management override of controls X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)
X
X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Professionals’ awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud 
Supervisory review and approval
X
X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
 Senior professional’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) X
Auditors (internal, external) X
Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
X
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9 RealEstate
9.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the real estate sector includes principals or agents conducting 
the following kinds of operations:
• Buying and selling of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)
• Leasing or rental of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)
9.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Three key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
1. Employee frauds involving cash, accounts receivable, or the acceptance of secret 
commissions.
2. Con schemes involving inflated real estate values, for example flipping a property 
several times in nonarm’s-length transactions-each time increasing the price-in order to 
ultimately induce an arm’s-length third-party to pay a fraudulently inflated price. A 
variation of this is when the fraudulently inflated price is used to obtain an inflated 
mortgage or loan on the property.
3. False advertising or representation concerning the property being sold, leased, or rented.
9.3 Key Preventive Controls
This sector is quite average in terms of the importance of specific controls.
Some of the best defenses against fraud in this sector include:
• Strong enforcement, (for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt 
with for any violations of law or the company’s policies).
• Adequate segregation of duties (for example, between cash handling and record 
keeping).
• Good supervisory and audit-investigative controls (for example independent checks to 
ensure that purported real estate values make sense).
9.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the real estate sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Real Estate Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the real estate 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Outsider frauds, such as con schemes (related controls 
include good corporate policies and supervision)
• False advertising and representation, (related controls 
include good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit 
functions and periodic external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the real estate 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit 
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements, 
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good 
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and 
strong internal audit functions)
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Real Estate Sector Checklist (continued)
Real Estate Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring 
stage])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of 
trust, environmental crime, money laundering, tax evasion, 
and violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws 
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially 
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal 
audit functions
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Real Estate Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions and the like X
X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) X
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like
X
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) X
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
False advertising or representation
Insider trading
X
X
Money laundering X
Organizational bribe giving X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) 
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
X
X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Real Estate Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Real Estate Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both X
No management override of controls X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud 
Supervisory review and approval
X
X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both 
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)
X
X
Auditors (internal, external) X
Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)
X
X
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10 Recreation
10.1 Introduction
The recreation sector includes operations such as:
• Amusement parks
• Movie theaters
• Professional sports clubs
• Golf, tennis, and similar sport or recreation clubs
10.2 Key Vulnerabilities
With one major exception, this sector actually has a relatively low vulnerability to fraud. 
Unfortunately, the exception involves a very important asset: cash. However, controls over 
cash tend to be well developed in most of these businesses, so that in practice the main risk 
is outright theft of cash rather than fraud.
Because of the seasonal and part-time nature of much of the employment in this sector, the 
opportunity for payroll-related fraud may also be slightly higher.
10.3 Key Preventive Controls
The key fraud prevention control in this sector is good cash control. This includes good 
physical controls (for example, cash register-ticket dispensing systems with accompanying 
counters, all of which provide an audit trail), segregation of duties for cash handling and 
record-keeping, and accounting reconciliations.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of 
fraud or theft, and (2) a good internal audit function.
10.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the recreation sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Recreation Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the recreation 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft and cash 
skimming (related controls include admission counters, 
physical controls and surveillance, supervision, and good 
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Payroll fraud [for example, ghost employees], (related 
controls include strong internal audit and supervision)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the recreation 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
internal audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including 
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering, 
tax evasion, violating occupational health and safety 
(OSHA) laws, and violation of privacy (related controls 
include good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit 
function and periodic external audits
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Recreation Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
X
X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like
X
X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers 
Employee sabotage or espionage X
X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) X
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage) X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders X
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
X
False advertising
Insider trading
X
X
Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving
X
X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Recreation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Recreation Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) X
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) X
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like 
Mandatory annual vacations
X
X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both 
No management override of controls X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) 
Auditors (internal, external) X
X
Forensic accountants and investigators X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
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11 Natural Resources
11.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section the natural resource sector primarily includes entities 
conducting mining, and oil and gas operations.
11.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector are:
• Inventory, accounts payable, payroll, and expense report frauds. Because of the large- 
project nature of the resource sector, companies can be particularly vulnerable to these 
types of frauds.
• Frauds-by senior managers, officers, or directors-such as bid rigging, kickbacks, or 
secret commissions; fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting and manipulation of 
share prices; insider trading and antitrust violations; or organizational bribe giving as 
part of the contract bidding process. Just as in the high technology sector, many stock- 
related frauds involve mining companies.
• Supplier frauds involving inflated prices, product substitution, or substandard materials.
• Commercial crime in the areas of environmental crime and the violation of occupational 
health and safety (OSHA) laws.
11.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the more important controls in the resource sector include:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong physical controls, particularly with respect to the company’s precious inventory.
• Supervisor awareness of fraud and the possibility of fraud.
• A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.
11.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the natural resources sector follows, along 
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that 
sector.
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the natural 
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls 
include physical access restrictions and surveillance, 
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and 
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate 
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit 
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements, 
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading, 
and the like (related controls include good corporate 
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal 
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Environmental crime, and violating occupational health 
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good 
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement and 
supervision], and strong internal audit functions)
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist (continued)
Natural Resources Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the natural 
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and accounts receivable lapping frauds (related 
controls include job descriptions, division of duties, annual 
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of 
exceptions, [for example, relating to customer complaints 
or confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies 
[especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions, 
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer 
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit 
function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Natural Resources Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others X
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers 
Employee sabotage or espionage
X
X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)
X
X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders X
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising
X
X
X
Insider trading
Money laundering
X
X
Organizational bribe giving X
Tax evasion
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) 
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
X
X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Natural Resources Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Natural Resources Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
X
X
Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconciliations (especially inventory) X
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both X
No management override of controls X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud 
Supervisory review and approval
X
X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) 
Auditors (internal, external) X
X
Forensic accountants and investigators X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
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12 Retail
12.1 Introduction
The retail sector is one of the largest and its diversity precludes a comprehensive list of its 
elements. Any operation that caters to the consumer, from department stores to specialty 
retail stores (clothing, hardware, and so on), fits this category.
Outright theft rather than fraud is the key threat to the retail sector. Just as the insurance 
sector is very conscious of the cost of fraud to its industry, the retail sector is very conscious 
of the cost of theft. Both industries regularly research and publish estimates of the extent of 
fraud and theft in their industries, which is substantial.
12.2 Key Vulnerabilities
As noted, the key vulnerability in this sector stems not so much from fraud as it does from 
theft by the industry’s employees and its customers, perhaps in equal measure although 
shoplifting by customers receives by far the greatest amount of publicity.
Major fraud risks can involve cash, accounts receivable, and inventory, because all of these 
are important to the industry. Outright theft of cash and especially inventory-by both 
customers and employees—receives the largest amount of attention, and it is undeniably the 
biggest in terms of losses. However, the fraud risks in other areas should not be ignored.
The heavily computerized nature of the industry, even among smaller retailers, means that 
the opportunity to use computers in fraud is also increased.
On the commercial crime side, false advertising is a major problem in the industry, even 
among some large retailers who have been charged and convicted of it. Tax evasion can 
also be a problem, but mainly among smaller retailers who make cash-only deals to avoid 
sales and excise taxes.
12.3 Key Preventive Controls
Among retailers of any significant size—for Mom and Pop stores, see section 13, Small 
Business-virtually all the basic and computer controls are critical. Obviously, good physical 
security—especially control over cash and inventory—are the most important. These controls 
range from good point of sale and cash register systems that provide a proper audit trail, to 
security surveillance systems that dissuade thieves.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of 
fraud or theft, (2) supervisory follow-up on all customer complaints, and (3) a good internal 
audit function.
12.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the retail sector follows, along with related 
grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Retail Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the retail 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good corporate policies especially strict 
enforcement)
• Inventory fraud, such as customer or employee theft or 
diversion (related controls include physical access 
restrictions and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts, 
job descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and 
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong 
internal audit function)
• False advertising and tax evasion (related controls include 
good corporate policies, strict enforcement, and internal 
audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the retail sector, and 
related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been 
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit 
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
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Retail Sector Checklist (continued)
Retail Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements, 
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good 
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and 
strong internal audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring 
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Retail Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)
X
X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others X
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions (to buyers) X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers 
Employee sabotage or espionage X
X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like 
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)
X
X
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage) X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising X
X
X
Insider trading X
Money laundering 
Organizational bribe giving 
Tax evasion X
X
X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) 
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
X
X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—retail sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Retail Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) X
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both X
No management override of controls X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both 
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) X
X
Auditors (internal, external)
Forensic accountants and investigators
X
X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
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13 Small Business
13.1 Introduction
The small business sector cuts across a large number of the other sectors. While there is no 
arbitrary dividing line, it is typically thought of as an owner-operated business with 
relatively few employees.
As with the professional services sector, the management of the small business is also the 
ownership. In that sense, there is more at stake here in terms of fraud losses. Once again, 
every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out of the small-business person’s own pocket, and not 
merely a management embarrassment.
13.2 Key Vulnerabilities
By far the most important vulnerability to fraud in this sector is employee fraud involving 
cash (for example, skimming) or accounts receivable (for example, lapping schemes). 
Inventory-related frauds can also be a problem.
13.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the small business sector include:
• Enforcement (for example dismissal and prosecution for the commission of fraud by an 
employee).
• Fair treatment of employees. In closely-held businesses, it is important that employees 
not become alienated from the owner-manager, because that will only help establish a 
motive for fraud.
• Good physical controls over cash and inventory.
• Regular accounting reconciliations.
• Good supervisory control is perhaps the most important preventive control. This 
includes an awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among many 
small-business owners who become preoccupied with other areas of the business.
• Adequate insurance.
13.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the small business sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Small Business Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the small 
business sector, and related controls, as also set out on the 
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash 
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies], and good policies especially strict 
enforcement)
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls 
include physical access restrictions and surveillance, 
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and 
segregation of duties, supervision, and good policies 
[especially strict enforcement])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the small business 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers, inflated 
invoices, and the like (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, and especially 
supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or 
others (related controls include physical access restrictions, 
and good policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
good computer integrity controls, and supervision)
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Small Business Sector Checklist (continued)
Small Business Sector Checklist
• Commercial crime by the business, including breach of 
trust, environmental crime, false advertising, money 
laundering, tax evasion, and violating occupational health 
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good 
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision])
Yes No NA Ref
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Small Business Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)
X
X
X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others X
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like 
Manipulation of financial statements by principals
X
X
Manipulation of business valuations by principals 
Employee sabotage or espionage X
X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) X
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage) X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) X
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
False advertising
Insider trading
X
X
Money laundering X
Organizational bribe giving X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
Corporate Policies:
Mission statement and code of ethics X
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Small Business Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Small Business Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Fair performance appraisal and review system 
Employee screening and testing before hiring
X
X
Principals acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both 
No principal’s override of controls
X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) 
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)
X
X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Principal’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both X
Principal’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) 
Auditors (internal, external)
X
X
Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
X
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14 Transportation
14.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the transportation sector includes:
• Trucking industry
• Railway and airline companies (both passenger and freight)
• Other passenger transportation systems (buses, subways, ferries, etc.)
14.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The most important vulnerability to fraud in this sector is in the billing and accounts 
receivable area. Accounts receivable lapping schemes, for example, are a major risk 
especially among smaller carriers. Cash frauds may also exist where payment by customers 
is in cash.
Because of the competitiveness of the industry and the fact that much of it is contract-based, 
there is also a higher risk of frauds involving bid rigging, kickbacks, and secret 
commissions.
14.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the transportation sector include:
• Strong enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution of employees for fraud.
• Job descriptions with good segregation of duties.
• Reconciliations, especially bank and accounts receivable.
• Customer statements with supervisory follow-up on any related customer complaints or 
exceptions.
• A good internal audit function and periodic external audits.
14.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the transportation sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Transportation Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the 
transportation sector, and related controls, as also set out on 
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash 
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls 
include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting 
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example, 
relating to customer complaints or confirmation 
discrepancies] and good corporate policies especially strict 
enforcement)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony 
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job 
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit 
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements, 
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading, 
and the like (related controls include good corporate 
policies [especially strong enforcement and strong internal 
audit functions])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and 
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and 
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or 
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related 
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Transportation Sector Checklist (continued)
Transportation Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions, 
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer 
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit 
function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including 
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering, 
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety 
laws (related controls include good corporate policies, strict 
enforcement, supervision, and strong internal audit 
functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Transportation Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) X
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees) X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others
Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like X
X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution) X
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage) X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
X
False advertising X
Insider trading X
Money laundering X
Organizational bribe giving X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
X
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Transportation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Transportation Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) 
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like X
X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconcihations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both 
No management override of controls
X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords) X
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files X
Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both 
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) X
X
Auditors (internal, external)
Forensic accountants and investigators
X
X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) X
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15 Wholesale
15.1 Introduction
The wholesale sector basically consists of distributors and importers of just about any form 
of merchandise. Typically, the sector is the bridge between the manufacturing and retail 
sectors.
15.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Employee schemes involving any one or more of the following-accounts receivable, 
inventory, or accounts payable-are probably the most common threats, as well as frauds by 
suppliers, such as overbilling and product substitution.
15.3 Key Preventive Controls
Key controls include:
• Enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution for fraud.
• Strong physical access controls over assets, especially inventory.
• Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, including appropriate segregation of 
duties.
• Mandatory annual vacations. Ongoing schemes are common in this sector. These 
schemes often fall apart and are easily detected when the perpetrator is removed from 
the scene for even a few weeks.
• Regular (that is, monthly) accounting reconciliations, including bank, accounts 
receivable and accounts payable.
• Good computer security, especially access restrictions.
• Supervisory follow-up on exceptions and customer complaints.
• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits.
15.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the wholesale sector follows, along with 
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Wholesale Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or 
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical 
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well 
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk 
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been 
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the wholesale 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, especially accounts 
receivable lapping (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations, 
regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions 
[for example, relating to customer complaints or 
confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies 
[especially strict enforcement])
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls 
include physical access restrictions and surveillance, 
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and 
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate 
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable frauds, especially phony suppliers and 
inflated invoices (related controls include job descriptions 
and segregation of duties, internal audit [especially 
confirmations], and supervision)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation 
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached 
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements, 
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading, 
and the like (related controls include good corporate 
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal 
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and 
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and 
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions, 
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer 
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit 
function)
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Wholesale Sector Checklist (continued)
Wholesale Sector Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related 
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties, 
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict 
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including 
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering, 
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety 
(OSHA) laws (related controls include good corporate 
policies, strict enforcement, supervision, and strong internal 
audit functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Wholesale Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds) X
Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or 
credits)
X
Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion) X
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers) 
Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)
X
X
Inflated expense reports by managers and others X
Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like X
Manipulation of financial statements by officers X
Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers X
Employee sabotage or espionage X
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like X
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)
Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)
X
X
Con schemes or extortion by outsiders
Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like
X
X
Use of Computers in Fraud X
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information) 
Environmental crime (for example, dumping) X
X
False advertising X
Insider trading X
Money laundering X
Organizational bribe giving X
Tax evasion X
Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy
X
X
Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud) X
X
Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling) X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Wholesale Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid 
Wholesale Sector High Avg
Low 
or NA
Fair performance appraisal and review system X
Employee screening and testing before hiring X
Management acting as a good role model X
Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security) X
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like X
Mandatory annual vacations X
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts 
payable variance)
X
Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both 
No management override of controls
X
X
Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)
Regular off-site backups of programs and data files
X
X
Software controls for example, antivirus, full documentation) X
Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage) X
Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud X
Supervisory review and approval X
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both 
Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints) X
X
Auditors (internal, external)
Forensic accountants and investigators
X
X
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft) ........ X
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SAS No. 82
Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit*
◦All references to AU section 110 of SAS No. 1, AU section 230 of SAS No. 1, or to SAS 
No. 47 “as amended by this Statement” reflect the amendments that appear in appen­
dixes A, B, and C, respectively, in this Statement.
1 The auditors consideration of illegal acts and responsibility for detecting misstate­
ments resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal acts that are 
defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on the determination 
of financial statement amounts, the auditors responsibility to detect misstatements 
resulting from such illegal acts is the same as that for errors (see SAS No. 47, Audit 
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended by this Statement [appen­
dix C] [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312]) or fraud.
Consideration of Fraud 5
(Supersedes Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53, AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316; and amends AU sec. 110, “Responsibilities and 
Functions of the Independent Auditor” and AU sec. 230, “Due Care in the 
Performance of Work” of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, 
AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.)
Introduction
1. AU Section 110 of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1, 
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended by this 
Statement [appendix A] (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 
110, “Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor”), 
states that “The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the 
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial state­
ments are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or 
fraud.”* 1 This Statement provides guidance to auditors in fulfilling that 
responsibility, as it relates to fraud, in an audit of financial statements 
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
Specifically, this Statement—
• Describes fraud and its characteristics (see paragraphs 3 through 10).
• Requires the auditor to specifically assess the risk of material mis­
statement due to fraud and provides categories of fraud risk factors 
to be considered in the auditors assessment (see paragraphs 11 
through 25).
7
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• Provides guidance on how the auditor responds to the results of the 
assessment (see paragraphs 26 through 32).
• Provides guidance on the evaluation of audit test results as they 
relate to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud (see para­
graphs 33 through 36).
• Describes related documentation requirements (see paragraph 37).
• Provides guidance regarding the auditors communication about 
fraud to management, the audit committee, and others (see para­
graphs 38 through 40).
2. While this Statement focuses on the auditors consideration of 
fraud in an audit of financial statements, management is responsible for 
the prevention and detection of fraud.  That responsibility is described 
in paragraph 3 of SAS No. 1, AU section 110, “Responsibilities and 
Functions of the Independent Auditor,” as amended, which states, 
“Management is responsible for adopting sound accounting policies and 
for estabfishing and maintaining internal control that will, among other 
things, record, process, summarize, and report transactions consistent 
with management's assertions embodied in the financial statements.”
2
2 In its October 1987 report, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission, noted that “The responsibility for 
reliable financial reporting resides first and foremost at the corporate level. Top man­
agement—starting with the chief executive officer—sets the tone and establishes the 
financial reporting environment. Therefore, reducing the risk of fraudulent financial 
reporting must start with the reporting company.”
3 Intent is often difficult to determine, particularly in matters involving accounting 
estimates and the application of accounting principles. For example, unreasonable 
accounting estimates may be unintentional or may be the result of an intentional 
attempt to misstate the financial statements. Although the auditor has no responsibil­
ity to determine intent, the auditors responsibility to plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of mate­
rial misstatement is relevant in either case.
Description and Characteristics of Fraud
3. Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditors interest 
specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement 
of financial statements. The primary factor that distinguishes fraud from 
error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement 
in financial statements is intentional or unintentional.  Two types of mis­
statements are relevant to the auditors consideration of fraud in a
3
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financial statement audit—misstatements arising from fraudulent finan­
cial reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of 
assets.4 These two types of misstatements are described in the following 
paragraphs.
4 Unauthorized transactions also are relevant to the auditor when they could cause a 
misstatement in financial statements. When such transactions are intentional and 
result in material misstatement of the financial statements, they would fall into one of 
the two types of fraud discussed in this Statement. Also see the guidance in SAS 
No. 54.
5 Reference to generally accepted accounting principles includes, where applicable, a 
comprehensive basis of accounting other than generally accepted accounting princi­
ples as defined in SAS No. 62, Special Reports (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, 
AU sec. 623), paragraph 4.
4. Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are 
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in 
financial statements to deceive financial statement users. Fraudulent 
financial reporting may involve acts such as the following:
• Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or 
supporting documents from which financial statements are prepared 
• Misrepresentation in, or intentional omission from, the financial 
statements of events, transactions, or other significant information
• Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to 
amounts, classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure
5. Misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets (sometimes 
referred to as defalcation) involve the theft of an entity’s assets where 
the effect of the theft causes the financial statements not to be pre­
sented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.  
Misappropriation can be accomplished in various ways, including 
embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods 
or services not received. Misappropriation of assets may be accompa­
nied by false or misleading records or documents and may involve one 
or more individuals among management, employees, or third parties.
5
6. Fraud frequently involves the following: (a) a pressure or an incen­
tive to commit fraud and (b) a perceived opportunity to do so. Although 
specific pressures and opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting 
may differ from those for misappropriation of assets, these two condi­
tions usually are present for both types of fraud. For example, 
fraudulent financial reporting may be committed because management 
is under pressure to achieve an unrealistic earnings target.
9
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Misappropriation of assets may be committed because the individuals 
involved are living beyond their means. A perceived opportunity may 
exist in either situation because an individual believes he or she could 
circumvent internal control.
7. Fraud may be concealed through falsified documentation, includ­
ing forgery. For example, management that engages in fraudulent 
financial reporting might attempt to conceal misstatements by creating 
fictitious invoices, while employees or management who misappropriate 
cash might try to conceal their thefts by forging signatures or creating 
invalid electronic approvals on disbursement authorizations. An audit 
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards 
rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors 
trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication.
8. Fraud also may be concealed through collusion among manage­
ment, employees, or third parties. For example, through collusion, false 
evidence that control activities have been performed effectively may be 
presented to the auditor. As another example, the auditor may receive a 
false confirmation from a third party who is in collusion with manage­
ment. Collusion may cause the auditor to believe that evidence is 
persuasive when it is, in fact, false.
9. Although fraud usually is concealed, the presence of risk factors or 
other conditions may alert the auditor to a possibility that fraud may 
exist. For example, a document may be missing, a general ledger may be 
out of balance, or an analytical relationship may not make sense. 
However, these conditions may be the result of circumstances other 
than fraud. Documents may have been legitimately lost; the general 
ledger may be out of balance because of an unintentional accounting 
error; and unexpected analytical relationships may be the result of 
unrecognized changes in underlying economic factors. Even reports of 
alleged fraud may not always be reliable, because an employee or out­
sider may be mistaken or may be motivated to make a false allegation.
10. An auditor cannot obtain absolute assurance that material mis­
statements in the financial statements will be detected. Because of (a) 
the concealment aspects of fraudulent activity, including the fact that 
fraud often involves collusion or falsified documentation, and (b) the 
need to apply professional judgment in the identification and evaluation 
of fraud risk factors and other conditions, even a properly planned and 
performed audit may not detect a material misstatement resulting from 
fraud. Accordingly, because of the above characteristics of fraud and the
10
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nature of audit evidence as discussed in AU section 230 of SAS No. 1, 
as amended by this Statement [appendix B] (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the 
Performance of Work”), the auditor is able to obtain only reasonable 
assurance that material misstatements in the financial statements, 
including misstatements resulting from fraud, are detected.
Assessment of the Risk of Material Misstatement 
Due to Fraud
11. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 311), provides guidance as to the level of 
knowledge of the entity’s business that will enable the auditor to plan 
and perform an audit of financial statements in accordance with gener­
ally accepted auditing standards. SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and 
Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended by this Statement 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312), provides that deter­
mination of the scope of the auditing procedures is directly related to 
the consideration of audit risk and indicates that the risk of material mis­
statement of the financial statements due to fraud is part of audit risk.
12. The auditor should specifically assess the risk of material mis­
statement of the financial statements due to fraud and should consider 
that assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. In 
making this assessment, the auditor should consider fraud risk factors 
that relate to both (a) misstatements arising from fraudulent financial 
reporting and (b) misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets 
in each of the related categories presented in paragraphs 16 and 18.6 
While such risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud,
6 The auditor should assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud regardless of 
whether the auditor otherwise plans to assess inherent or control risk at the maximum 
(see paragraphs 29 and 30 of SAS No. 47, as amended by this Statement). An auditor 
may meet this requirement using different categories of risk factors as long as the 
assessment embodies the substance of each of the risk categories described in para­
graphs 16 and 18. Also, since these risk categories encompass both inherent and 
control risk attributes, the specific assessment of the risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud may be performed in conjunction with the assessment of audit risk required 
by SAS No. 47, paragraphs 13 through 33, as amended by this Statement, and SAS 
(continued)
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they often have been observed in circumstances where frauds have 
occurred.
13. As part of the risk assessment, the auditor also should inquire of 
management (a) to obtain managements understanding regarding the 
risk of fraud in the entity and (b) to determine whether they have knowl­
edge of fraud that has been perpetrated on or within the entity. 
Information from these inquiries could identify fraud risk factors that 
may affect the auditors assessment and related response. Some exam­
ples of matters that might be discussed as part of the inquiry are (a) 
whether there are particular subsidiary locations, business segments, 
types of transactions, account balances, or financial statement categories 
where fraud risk factors exist or may be more likely to exist and (b) how 
management may be addressing such risks.
14. Although the fraud risk factors described in paragraphs 17 and 19 
below cover a broad range of situations typically faced by auditors, they 
are only examples. Moreover, not all of these examples are relevant in 
all circumstances, and some may be of greater or lesser significance in 
entities of different size, with different ownership characteristics, in dif­
ferent industries, or because of other differing characteristics or 
circumstances. Accordingly, the auditor should use professional judg­
ment when assessing the significance and relevance of fraud risk factors 
and determining the appropriate audit response.
15. For example, in a small entity domination of management by a sin­
gle individual generally does not, in and of itself, indicate a failure by 
management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regard­
ing internal control and the financial reporting process. As another 
example, there may be little motivation for fraudulent financial reporting 
by management of a privately held business when the financial statements 
audited are used only in connection with seasonal bank borrowings, debt 
covenants are not especially burdensome, and the entity has a long history 
of financial success consistent with the industry in which it operates. 
Conversely, management of a small entity with unusually rapid growth or 
profitability may be motivated to avoid an interruption in its growth 
trends, especially compared with others in its industry.
12
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Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting
16. Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from fraudulent 
financial reporting may be grouped in the following three categories: 
a. Managements characteristics and influence over the control envi­
ronment. These pertain to managements abilities, pressures, style, 
and attitude relating to internal control and the financial reporting 
process.
b. Industry conditions. These involve the economic and regulatory 
environment in which the entity operates.
c. Operating characteristics and financial stability. These pertain to 
the nature and complexity of the entity and its transactions, the 
entity’s financial condition, and its profitability.
17. The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstate­
ments arising from fraudulent financial reporting for each of the three 
categories described above:
a. Risk factors relating to managements characteristics and influence 
over the control environment. Examples include —
• A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent financial 
reporting. Specific indicators might include —
— A significant portion of management's compensation repre­
sented by bonuses, stock options, or other incentives, the 
value of which is contingent upon the entity achieving unduly 
aggressive targets for operating results, financial position, or 
cash flow.
— An excessive interest by management in maintaining or 
increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings trend through 
the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
— A practice by management of committing to analysts, credi­
tors, and other third parties to achieve what appear to be 
unduly aggressive or clearly unrealistic forecasts.
— An interest by management in pursuing inappropriate means 
to minimize reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons.
• A failure by management to display and communicate an appro­
priate attitude regarding internal control and the financial 
reporting process. Specific indicators might include — 
— An ineffective means of communicating and supporting the
13
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entity’s values or ethics, or communication of inappropriate 
values or ethics.
— Domination of management by a single person or small 
group without compensating controls such as effective over­
sight by the board of directors or audit committee.
— Inadequate monitoring of significant controls.
— Management failing to correct known reportable conditions 
on a timely basis.
— Management setting unduly aggressive financial targets and 
expectations for operating personnel.
— Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory 
authorities.
— Management continuing to employ an ineffective account­
ing, information technology, or internal auditing staff.
• Nonfinancial managements excessive participation in, or preoc­
cupation with, the selection of accounting principles or the 
determination of significant estimates.
• High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board mem­
bers.
• Strained relationship between management and the current or 
predecessor auditor. Specific indicators might include — 
— Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor 
on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters.
— Unreasonable demands on the auditor including unreason­
able time constraints regarding the completion of the audit 
or the issuance of the auditors reports.
— Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappro­
priately limit his or her access to people or information or his 
or her ability to communicate effectively with the board of 
directors or the audit committee.
— Domineering management behavior in dealing with the 
auditor, especially involving attempts to influence the scope 
of the auditor's work.
• Known history of securities law violations or claims against the 
entity or its senior management alleging fraud or violations of 
securities laws.
b. Risk factors relating to industry conditions. Examples include —
14
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• New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements that could 
impair the financial stability or profitability of the entity.
• High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied 
by declining margins.
• Declining industry with increasing business failures and signifi­
cant declines in customer demand.
• Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnerability to 
rapidly changing technology or rapid product obsolescence.
c. Risk factors relating to operating characteristics and financial stabil­
ity. Examples include —
• Inability to generate cash flows from operations while reporting 
earnings and earnings growth.
• Significant pressure to obtain additional capital necessary to stay 
competitive considering the financial position of the entity— 
including need for funds to finance major research and develop­
ment or capital expenditures.
• Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant 
estimates that involve unusually subjective judgments or uncer­
tainties, or that are subject to potential significant change in the 
near term in a manner that may have a financially disruptive effect 
on the entity — such as ultimate collectibility of receivables, tim­
ing of revenue recognition, realizability of financial instruments 
based on the highly subjective valuation of collateral or difficult- 
to-assess repayment sources, or significant deferral of costs.
• Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course 
of business or with related entities not audited or audited by 
another firm.
• Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially 
those close to year end, that pose difficult “substance over form” 
questions.
• Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in 
tax-haven jurisdictions for which there appears to be no clear 
business justification.
• Overly complex organizational structure involving numerous or 
unusual legal entities, managerial lines of authority, or contrac­
tual arrangements without apparent business purpose.
• Difficulty in determining the organization or individual(s) that 
control(s) the entity.
15
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• Unusually rapid growth or profitability, especially compared with 
that of other companies in the same industry.
• Especially high vulnerability to changes in interest rates.
• Unusually high dependence on debt or marginal ability to meet 
debt repayment requirements; debt covenants that are difficult 
to maintain.
• Unrealistically aggressive sales or profitability incentive pro­
grams.
• Threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile 
takeover.
• Adverse consequences on significant pending transactions, such 
as a business combination or contract award, if poor financial 
results are reported.
• Poor or deteriorating financial position when management has 
personally guaranteed significant debts of the entity.
Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From 
Misappropriation of Assets
18. Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappro­
priation of assets may be grouped in the two categories below. The 
extent of the auditor's consideration of the risk factors in category b is 
influenced by the degree to which risk factors in category a are present. 
a. Susceptibility of assets to misappropriation. These pertain to the 
nature of an entity’s assets and the degree to which they are subject 
to theft.
b. Controls. These involve the lack of controls designed to prevent or 
detect misappropriations of assets.
19. The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstate­
ments arising from misappropriation of assets for each of the two 
categories described above:
a. Risk factors relating to susceptibility of assets to misappropriation
• Large amounts of cash on hand or processed
• Inventory characteristics, such as small size, high value, or high 
demand
• Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds, diamonds, or 
computer chips
16
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• Fixed asset characteristics, such as small size, marketability, or 
lack of ownership identification
b. Risk factors relating to controls
• Lack of appropriate management oversight (for example, inade­
quate supervision or monitoring of remote locations)
• Lack of job applicant screening procedures relating to employees 
with access to assets susceptible to misappropriation
• Inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets susceptible to 
misappropriation
• Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or independent checks
• Lack of appropriate system of authorization and approval of 
transactions (for example, in purchasing)
• Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or 
fixed assets
• Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for transactions 
(for example, credits for merchandise returns)
• Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing key 
control functions
20. The auditor is not required to plan the audit to discover informa­
tion that is indicative of financial stress of employees or adverse 
relationships between the entity and its employees. Nevertheless, the 
auditor may become aware of such information. Some examples of such 
information include (a) anticipated future employee layoffs that are 
known to the workforce, (b) employees with access to assets susceptible 
to misappropriation who are known to be dissatisfied, (c) known unusual 
changes in behavior or lifestyle of employees with access to assets sus­
ceptible to misappropriation, and (d) known personal financial pressures 
affecting employees with access to assets susceptible to misappropria­
tion. If the auditor becomes aware of the existence of such information, 
he or she should consider it in assessing the risk of material misstate­
ment arising from misappropriation of assets.
Consideration of Risk Factors in Assessing the Risk of Material 
Misstatement Due to Fraud
21. Fraud risk factors cannot easily be ranked in order of importance 
or combined into effective predictive models. The significance of risk 
factors varies widely. Some of these factors will be present in entities
17
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
16 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82
where the specific conditions do not present a risk of material misstate­
ment. Accordingly, the auditor should exercise professional judgment 
when considering risk factors individually or in combination and 
whether there are specific controls that mitigate the risk. For example, 
an entity may not screen newly hired employees having access to assets 
susceptible to theft. This factor, by itself, might not significantly affect 
the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. 
However, if it were coupled with a lack of appropriate management 
oversight and a lack of physical safeguards over such assets as readily 
marketable inventory or fixed assets, the combined effect of these 
related factors might be significant to that assessment.
22. The size, complexity, and ownership characteristics of the entity 
have a significant influence on the consideration of relevant risk factors. 
For example, in the case of a large entity, the auditor ordinarily would 
consider factors that generally constrain improper conduct by senior 
management, such as the effectiveness of the board of directors, the 
audit committee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility, 
and the internal audit function. The auditor also would consider what 
steps had been taken to enforce a formal code of conduct and the effec­
tiveness of the budgeting or reporting system. Furthermore, risk factors 
evaluated at a country-specific or business segment operating level may 
provide different insights than the evaluation at an entity-wide level.  In 
the case of a small entity, some or all of these considerations might be 
inapplicable or less important. For example, a smaller entity might not 
have a written code of conduct but, instead, develop a culture that 
emphasizes the importance of integrity and ethical behavior through 
oral communication and by management example.
7
23. SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of 
Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), requires the auditor to obtain a suffi­
cient understanding of the entity’s internal control over financial 
reporting to plan the audit. It also notes that such knowledge should be 
used to identify types of potential misstatements, consider factors that 
affect the risk of material misstatement, and design substantive tests. 
The understanding often will affect the auditor's consideration of the 
significance of fraud risk factors. In addition, when considering the
7 SAS No. 47, paragraph 18, as amended by this Statement, provides guidance on the 
auditors consideration of the extent to which auditing procedures should be per­
formed at selected locations or components.
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significance of fraud risk factors, the auditor may wish to assess whether 
there are specific controls that mitigate the risk or whether specific con­
trol deficiencies may exacerbate the risk.8
8 SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, paragraph 47, states that assessing control risk 
at below the maximum level involves identifying specific controls that are likely to 
prevent or detect material misstatements in those assertions, and performing tests of 
controls to evaluate their effectiveness.
9 See Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2, System of Quality Control for a 
CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing Practice (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2, 
QC sec. 20), paragraphs 14 through 16.
10 The auditor also ordinarily obtains written representations from management con­
cerning irregularities involving management and employees that could have a material 
effect on the financial statements (see SAS No. 19, Client Representations [AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 333]).
24. If the entity has established a program that includes steps to pre­
vent, deter, and detect fraud, the auditor may consider its effectiveness. 
The auditor also should inquire of those persons overseeing such pro­
grams as to whether the program has identified any fraud risk factors.
25. The assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud 
is a cumulative process that includes a consideration of risk factors indi­
vidually and in combination. In addition, fraud risk factors may be 
identified while performing procedures relating to acceptance or con­
tinuance of clients and engagements,  during engagement planning or 
while obtaining an understanding of an entity’s internal control, or while 
conducting fieldwork.  Also, other conditions may be identified during 
fieldwork that change or support a judgment regarding the assess­
ment— such as the following:
9
10
• Discrepancies in the accounting records, including —
— Transactions not recorded in a complete or timely manner or 
improperly recorded as to amount, accounting period, classifi­
cation, or entity policy.
— Unsupported or unauthorized balances or transactions.
— Last-minute adjustments by the entity that significantly affect 
financial results.
• Conflicting or missing evidential matter, including —
— Missing documents.
— Unavailability of other than photocopied documents when 
documents in original form are expected to exist.
— Significant unexplained items on reconciliations.
19
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— Inconsistent, vague, or implausible responses from management 
or employees arising from inquiries or analytical procedures.
— Unusual discrepancies between the entity’s records and confir­
mation replies.
— Missing inventory or physical assets of significant magnitude.
• Problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and client, 
including —
— Denied access to records, facilities, certain employees, cus­
tomers, vendors, or others from whom audit evidence might 
be sought.11
— Undue time pressures imposed by management to resolve com­
plex or contentious issues.
— Unusual delays by the entity in providing requested information.
— Tips or complaints to the auditor about fraud.
11 Denial of access to information may constitute a limitation on the scope of the audit 
that may require the auditor to consider qualifying or disclaiming an opinion on the 
financial statements (see SAS No. 58, as amended, Reports on Audited Financial 
Statements [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508], paragraphs 22 
through 32).
12 SAS No. 47, as amended by this Statement, requires the auditor to limit audit risk to 
a low level that is, in the auditor’s professional judgment, appropriate for expressing an 
opinion on the financial statements.
The Auditors Response to the Results 
of the Assessment
26. A risk of material misstatement due to fraud is always present to 
some degree. The auditors response to the foregoing assessment is 
influenced by the nature and significance of the risk factors identified as 
being present. In some cases, even though fraud risk factors have been 
identified as being present, the auditors judgment may be that audit 
procedures otherwise planned are sufficient to respond to the risk fac­
tors. In other circumstances, the auditor may conclude that the 
conditions indicate a need to modify procedures.12 In these circum­
stances, the auditor should consider whether the assessment of the risk 
of material misstatement due to fraud calls for an overall response, one
20
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that is specific to a particular account balance, class of transactions or 
assertion, or both. The auditor also may conclude that it is not practica­
ble to modify the procedures that are planned for the audit of the 
financial statements sufficiently to address the risk. In that case with­
drawal from the engagement with communication to the appropriate 
parties may be an appropriate course of action (see paragraph 36).
Overall Considerations
27. Judgments about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud 
may affect the audit in the following ways:
• Professional skepticism. Due professional care requires the auditor 
to exercise professional skepticism — that is, an attitude that 
includes a questioning mind and critical assessment of audit evi­
dence (see SAS No. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in 
the Performance of Work,” paragraphs 7 through 9, as amended by 
this Statement). Some examples demonstrating the application of 
professional skepticism in response to the auditor's assessment of the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud include (a) increased sen­
sitivity in the selection of the nature and extent of documentation to 
be examined in support of material transactions, and (b) increased 
recognition of the need to corroborate management explanations or 
representations concerning material matters — such as further 
analytical procedures, examination of documentation, or discussion 
with others within or outside the entity.
• Assignment of personnel. The knowledge, skill, and ability of per­
sonnel assigned significant engagement responsibilities should be 
commensurate with the auditors assessment of the level of risk of 
the engagement (see SAS No. 1 [AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 210, “Training and Proficiency of the Independent 
Auditor,” paragraph 3]). In addition, the extent of supervision should 
recognize the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and the 
qualifications of persons performing the work (see SAS No. 22, para­
graph 11).
• Accounting principles and policies. The auditor may decide to con­
sider further management's selection and application of significant 
accounting policies, particularly those related to revenue recogni­
tion, asset valuation, or capitalizing versus expensing. In this respect, 
the auditor may have a greater concern about whether the account-
21
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ing principles selected and policies adopted are being applied in an 
inappropriate manner to create a material misstatement of the finan­
cial statements.
• Controls. When a risk of material misstatement due to fraud relates 
to risk factors that have control implications, the auditor's ability to 
assess control risk below the maximum may be reduced. However, 
this does not eliminate the need for the auditor to obtain an under­
standing of the components of the entity’s internal control sufficient 
to plan the audit (see SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78). In 
fact, such an understanding may be of particular importance in fur­
ther understanding and considering any controls (or lack thereof) 
the entity has in place to address the identified fraud risk factors. 
However, this consideration also would need to include an added 
sensitivity to managements ability to override such controls.
28. The nature, timing, and extent of procedures may need to be 
modified in the following ways:
• The nature of audit procedures performed may need to be changed 
to obtain evidence that is more reliable or to obtain additional cor­
roborative information. For example, more evidential matter may be 
needed from independent sources outside the entity. Also, physical 
observation or inspection of certain assets may become more impor­
tant. (See SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, as amended [AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326], paragraphs 19 through 
22.)
• The timing of substantive tests may need to be altered to be closer 
to or at year end. For example, if there are unusual incentives for 
management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting, the auditor 
might conclude that substantive testing should be performed near or 
at year end because it would not otherwise be possible to control the 
incremental audit risk associated with that risk factor. (See SAS No. 
45, Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards—1983 [AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 313, “Substantive Tests Prior 
to the Balance-Sheet Date”], paragraph 6.)
• The extent of the procedures applied should reflect the assessment 
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. For example, 
increased sample sizes or more extensive analytical procedures may 
be appropriate. (See SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling [AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 350], paragraph 23, and SAS 
No. 56, Analytical Procedures [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 
1, AU sec. 329].)
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Considerations at the Account Balance, Class of
Transactions, and Assertion Level
29. Specific responses to the auditor's assessment of the risk of mate­
rial misstatement due to fraud will vary depending upon the types or 
combinations of fraud risk factors or conditions identified and the 
account balances, classes of transactions, and assertions they may affect. 
If these factors or conditions indicate a particular risk applicable to spe­
cific account balances or types of transactions, audit procedures 
addressing these specific areas should be considered that will, in the 
auditor's judgment, limit audit risk to an appropriate level in light of the 
risk factors or conditions identified. The following are specific examples 
of responses:
• Visit locations or perform certain tests on a surprise or unannounced 
basis — for example, observing inventory at locations where auditor 
attendance has not been previously announced or counting cash at a 
particular date on a surprise basis.
• Request that inventories be counted at a date closer to year end.
• Alter the audit approach in the current year — for example, con­
tacting major customers and suppliers orally in addition to written 
confirmation, sending confirmation requests to a specific party 
within an organization, or seeking more and different information.
• Perform a detailed review of the entity’s quarter-end or year-end 
adjusting entries and investigate any that appear unusual as to 
nature or amount.
• For significant and unusual transactions, particularly those occurring 
at or near year end, investigate (a) the possibility of related parties 
and (b) the sources of financial resources supporting the trans­
actions.13
• Perform substantive analytical procedures at a detailed level. For 
example, compare sales and cost of sales by location and line of 
business to auditor-developed expectations.14
• Conduct interviews of personnel involved in areas in which a con-
13 SAS No. 45, Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards—1983 (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 334, “Related Parties”), provides guidance with respect to 
the identification of related-party relationships and transactions, including transac­
tions that may be outside the ordinary course of business (see paragraph 6 of SAS No. 
45).
14 SAS No. 56, Analytical Procedures (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 
329) provides guidance on performing analytical procedures used as substantive tests.
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cern about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is present, 
to obtain their insights about the risk and whether or how controls 
address the risk.
• When other independent auditors are auditing the financial state­
ments of one or more subsidiaries, divisions, or branches, consider 
discussing with them the extent of work necessary to be performed 
to ensure that the risk of material misstatement due to fraud result­
ing from transactions and activities among these components is 
adequately addressed.
• If the work of a specialist becomes particularly significant with 
respect to its potential impact on the financial statements, perform 
additional procedures with respect to some or all of the specialist's 
assumptions, methods, or findings to determine that the findings are 
not unreasonable or engage another specialist for that purpose. (See 
SAS No. 73, Using the Work of a Specialist [AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 336], paragraph 12.)
Specific Responses — Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting
30. Some examples of responses to the auditors assessment of the 
risk of material misstatements arising from fraudulent financial report­
ing are —
• Revenue recognition. If there is a risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud that may involve or result in improper revenue recog­
nition, it may be appropriate to confirm with customers certain 
relevant contract terms and the absence of side agreements — inas­
much as the appropriate accounting is often influenced by such 
terms or agreements.  For example, acceptance criteria, delivery15
15 SAS No. 67, The Confirmation Process (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU 
sec. 330), provides guidance about the confirmation process in audits performed in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Among other considerations, 
that guidance discusses the types of respondents from whom confirmations may be 
requested, and what the auditor should consider if information about the respondent’s 
competence, knowledge, motivation, ability, or willingness to respond, or about the 
respondents objectivity and freedom from bias with respect to the audited entity 
comes to his or her attention (AU sec. 330.27). It also provides that the auditor main­
tain control over the confirmation requests and responses in order to minimize the 
possibility that the results will be biased because of interception and alteration of 
the confirmation requests or responses (AU sec. 330.28). Further, when confirmation 
responses are other than in written communications mailed to the auditor, additional 
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and payment terms and the absence of future or continuing vendor 
obligations, the right to return the product, guaranteed resale 
amounts, and cancellation or refund provisions often are relevant in 
such circumstances.
• Inventory quantities. If a risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud exists in inventory quantities, reviewing the entity’s inventory 
records may help to identify locations, areas, or items for specific 
attention during or after the physical inventory count. Such a review 
may lead to a decision to observe inventory counts at certain loca­
tions on an unannounced basis (see paragraph 29). In addition, 
where the auditor has a concern about the risk of material misstate­
ment due to fraud in the inventory area, it may be particularly 
important that the entity counts are conducted at all locations sub­
ject to count on the same date. Furthermore, it also may be 
appropriate for the auditor to apply additional procedures during 
the observation of the count — for example, examining more rigor­
ously the contents of boxed items, the manner in which the goods 
are stacked (for example, hollow squares) or labeled, and the quality 
(that is, purity, grade, or concentration) of liquid substances such as 
perfumes or specialty chemicals. Finally, additional testing of count 
sheets, tags or other records, or the retention of copies may be war­
ranted to minimize the risk of subsequent alteration or 
inappropriate compilation.
Specific Responses — Misstatements Arising From 
Misappropriations of Assets
31. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud relating to misappropriation of assets. For example, the 
auditor may conclude that such a risk of asset misappropriation at a par­
ticular operating location is significant. This may be the case when a 
specific type of asset is particularly susceptible to such a risk of misap­
propriation — for example, a large amount of easily accessible cash, or 
inventory items such as jewelry, that can be easily moved and sold. 
Control risk may be evaluated differently in each of these situations. 
Thus, differing circumstances necessarily would dictate different 
responses.
25
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sec. 330.29).
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
24 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82
32. Usually the audit response to a risk of material misstatement due 
to fraud relating to misappropriation of assets will be directed toward 
certain account balances and classes of transactions. Although some of 
the audit responses noted in paragraphs 29 and 30 may apply in such cir­
cumstances, the scope of the work should be linked to the specific 
information about the misappropriation risk that has been identified. 
For example, where a particular asset is highly susceptible to misappro­
priation that is potentially material to the financial statements, obtaining 
an understanding of the control activities related to the prevention and 
detection of such misappropriation and testing the operating effective­
ness of such controls may be warranted. In certain circumstances, 
physical inspection of such assets (for example, counting cash or securi­
ties) at or near year end may be appropriate. In addition, the use of 
substantive analytical procedures, including the development by the 
auditor of an expected dollar amount, at a high level of precision, to be 
compared with a recorded amount, may be effective in certain circum­
stances.
Evaluation of Audit Test Results
33. As indicated in paragraph 25, the assessment of the risk of mate­
rial misstatement due to fraud is a cumulative process and one that 
should be ongoing throughout the audit. At the completion of the audit, 
the auditor should consider whether the accumulated results of audit 
procedures and other observations (for example, conditions noted in 
paragraph 25) affect the assessment of the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud he or she made when planning the audit. This accumula­
tion is primarily a qualitative matter based on the auditors judgment. 
Such an accumulation may provide further insight into the risk of mate­
rial misstatement due to fraud and whether there is a need for 
additional or different audit procedures to be performed.
34. When audit test results identify misstatements in the financial 
statements, the auditor should consider whether such misstatements 
may be indicative of fraud.  If the auditor has determined that mis­
statements are or may be the result of fraud, but the effect of the 
misstatements is not material to the financial statements, the auditor 
nevertheless should evaluate the implications, especially those dealing
16
16 See note 3.
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with the organizational position of the person(s) involved. For example, 
fraud involving misappropriations of cash from a small petty cash fund 
normally would be of little significance to the auditor in assessing the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud because both the manner of 
operating the fund and its size would tend to establish a limit on the 
amount of potential loss and the custodianship of such funds is normally 
entrusted to a relatively low-level employee.17 Conversely, when the 
matter involves higher level management, even though the amount 
itself is not material to the financial statements, it may be indicative of a 
more pervasive problem. In such circumstances, the auditor should 
reevaluate the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud and its resulting impact on (a) the nature, timing, and extent of the 
tests of balances or transactions, (b) the assessment of the effectiveness 
of controls if control risk was assessed below the maximum, and (c) the 
assignment of personnel that may be appropriate in the circumstances.
17 However, see paragraph 38 for a discussion of the auditor's communication responsi­
bilities.
18 See SAS No. 58 for guidance on auditors’ reports issued in connection with audits of 
financial statements.
35. If the auditor has determined that the misstatement is, or may be, 
the result of fraud, and either has determined that the effect could be 
material to the financial statements or has been unable to evaluate 
whether the effect ismaterial, the auditor should —
a. Consider the implications for other aspects of the audit (see previ­
ous paragraph).
b. Discuss the matter and the approach to further investigation with an 
appropriate level of management that is at least one level above 
those involved and with senior management.
c. Attempt to obtain additional evidential matter to determine whether 
material fraud has occurred or is likely to have occurred, and, if so, 
its effect on the financial statements and the auditors report 
thereon.18
d. If appropriate, suggest that the client consult with legal counsel.
36. The auditors consideration of the risk of material misstatement 
due to fraud and the results of audit tests may indicate such a significant 
risk of fraud that the auditor should consider withdrawing from the 
engagement and communicating the reasons for withdrawal to the audit 
committee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility (here-
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after referred to as the audit committee).19,20 Whether the auditor con­
cludes that withdrawal from the engagement is appropriate may depend 
on the diligence and cooperation of senior management or the board of 
directors in investigating the circumstances and taking appropriate 
action. Because of the variety of circumstances that may arise, it is not 
possible to describe definitively when withdrawal is appropriate. The 
auditor may wish to consult with his or her legal counsel when consid­
ering withdrawal from an engagement.
Documentation of the Auditor's Risk Assessment 
and Response
37. In planning the audit, the auditor should document in the work­
ing papers evidence of the performance of the assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud (see paragraphs 12 through 14). 
Where risk factors are identified as being present, the documentation 
should include (a) those risk factors identified and (b) the auditors 
response (see paragraphs 26 through 32) to those risk factors, individu­
ally or in combination. In addition, if during the performance of the 
audit fraud risk factors or other conditions are identified that cause the 
auditor to believe that an additional response is required (paragraph 33), 
such risk factors or other conditions, and any further response that the 
auditor concluded was appropriate, also should be documented.
19 Examples of “others with equivalent authority and responsibility" may include the 
board of directors, the board of trustees, or the owner in owner-managed entities, as 
appropriate.
20 If the auditor, subsequent to the date of the report on the audited financial statements, 
becomes aware that facts existed at that date which might have affected the report had 
the auditor then been aware of such facts, the auditor should refer to section 561 of 
SAS No. 1 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 561, “Subsequent 
Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditors Report”), for guidance. 
Furthermore, paragraph 10 of SAS No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor and 
Successor Auditors (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 315), provides 
guidance regarding communication to the predecessor auditor.
28
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Communications About Fraud to Management, 
the Audit Committee,21 and Others21 2
21 See note 19.
22 The requirements to communicate noted in paragraphs 38 through 40 extend to any 
intentional misstatement of financial statements (see paragraph 3). However, the com­
munication may utilize terms other than fraud — for example, irregularity, intentional 
misstatement, misappropriation, defalcation — if there is possible confusion with a 
legal definition of fraud or other reason to prefer alternative terms.
23 Alternatively, the auditor may decide to communicate solely with the audit committee.
38. Whenever the auditor has determined that there is evidence that 
fraud may exist, that matter should be brought to the attention of an 
appropriate level of management. This is generally appropriate even if 
the matter might be considered inconsequential, such as a minor defal­
cation by an employee at a low level in the entity’s organization. Fraud 
involving senior management and fraud (whether caused by senior man­
agement or other employees) that causes a material misstatement of the 
financial statements should be reported directly to the audit committee. 
In addition, the auditor should reach an understanding with the audit 
committee regarding the expected nature and extent of communications 
about misappropriations perpetrated by lower-level employees.
39. When the auditor, as a result of the assessment of the risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud, has identified risk factors that have 
continuing control implications (whether or not transactions or adjust­
ments that could be the result of fraud have been detected), the auditor 
should consider whether these risk factors represent reportable condi­
tions relating to the entity’s internal control that should be 
communicated to senior management and the audit committee.  (See 
SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Related Matters Noted 
in an Audit [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 325].) The 
auditor also may wish to communicate other risk factors identified when 
actions can be reasonably taken by the entity to address the risk.
23
40. The disclosure of possible fraud to parties other than the client’s 
senior management and its audit committee ordinarily is not part of the 
auditor’s responsibility and ordinarily would be precluded by the audi­
tor’s ethical or legal obligations of confidentiality unless the matter is 
reflected in the auditor’s report. The auditor should recognize, however,
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that in the following circumstances a duty to disclose outside the entity 
may exist:
a. To comply with certain legal and regulatory requirements24
b. To a successor auditor when the successor makes inquiries in 
accordance with SAS No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor 
and Successor Auditors (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU 
sec. 315)25
c. In response to a subpoena
d. To a funding agency or other specified agency in accordance with 
requirements for the audits of entities that receive governmental 
financial assistance
24 These requirements include reports in connection with the termination of the engage­
ment, such as when the entity reports an auditor change under the appropriate 
securities law on Form 8-K and the fraud or related risk factors constitute a 
“reportable event” or is the source of a “disagreement,” as these terms are defined in 
Item 304 of Regulation S-K. These requirements also include reports that may be 
required, under certain circumstances, pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (codified in section 10A(b)l of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934) relating to an illegal act that has a material effect on the financial statements.
25 In accordance with SAS No. 7, communication between predecessor and successor 
auditors requires the specific permission of the client.
Because, potential conflicts with the auditors ethical and legal obliga­
tions for confidentiality may be complex, the auditor may wish to consult 
with legal counsel before discussing matters covered by paragraphs 38 
through 40 with parties outside the client.
Effective Date
41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for 
periods ending on or after December 15,1997. Early application of the 
provisions of this Statement is permissible.
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Appendix A
Amendment to "Responsibilities and Functions 
of the Independent Auditor"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. I, AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110.)
1. This amendment adds a new paragraph 2 (and renumbers the existing 
paragraphs 2 through 9) to include a statement of the auditor's responsibility, in 
an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, 
for the detection of material misstatement in the financial statements due to 
fraud. The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) believes that the revised descrip­
tion of that presently existing responsibility is more understandable because its 
structure parallels the description of the auditor’s responsibility contained in 
the auditors standard report. The ASB also believes that inclusion of this state­
ment in the general standards should heighten the auditor’s awareness of the 
extent of the current responsibility in an audit for the detection of material mis­
statement due to fraud. New language is shown in boldface italics. The 
amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on 
or after December 15, 1997. Early application of the provisions of this 
Statement is permissible.
2. The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud.1 Because of the 
nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able 
to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstate­
ments are detected.2 The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform 
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements, whether caused 
by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial statements are 
detected.
1 See SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended 
by SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec, 312), and SAS No. 
82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The auditor’s consideration of illegal acts and 
responsibility for detecting misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in 
SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 
317). For those illegal acts that are defined in that Statement as having a direct 
and material effect on the determination of financial statement amounts, the audi­
tor's responsibility to detect misstatements resulting from such illegal acts is the 
same as that for error or fraud.
2 See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the 
Performance of Work,” paragraphs 10 through 13).
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Appendix B
Amendment to "Due Care in the Performance of Work"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230.)
1. This amendment includes an expanded discussion of due professional 
care and reasonable assurance reflected in the change of the section title from 
“Due Care in the Performance of Work” to “Due Professional Care in the 
Performance of Work.” The objective of these revisions is to heighten the audi­
tor’s awareness of the need for professional skepticism throughout the conduct 
of the audit as well as to articulate clearly the concept of reasonable assurance. 
New language is shown in boldface italics; deleted language is shown by strike­
through. The amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for 
periods ending on or after December 15, 1997. Early application of the provi­
sions of this Statement is permissible.
1. The third general standard is:
Due professional care is to be exercised in the planning and performance of the 
audit and the preparation of the report.1
2. This standard requires the independent auditor to plan and perform his or her 
work with due professional care. Due professional care imposes a responsibility 
upon each person professional within an independent auditors organization to 
observe the standards of field work and reporting. Exorcise of duo care requires crit­
ical review at every level of supervision of the work done and the judgment exercised 
by those assisting in the audit.
3. A paragraph appearing in Cooley on Torts, a legal treatise, often cited-by^ttor- 
neys in discussing due care  merits quotation here describes the obligation for due 
care as follows:
Every man who offers his services to another and is employed assumes the duty 
to exercise in the employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable care and 
diligence. In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers 
his services, he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the 
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his 
pretentions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon every man who 
employs him in reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or 
unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes shall be performed successfully, 
and without fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and integrity, but not for 
infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishon­
esty, but not for losses consequent upon pure errors of judgment.2
4. The matter of due professional care concerns what the independent auditor 
does and how well he or she does it. The quotation from Cooley on Torts
1 This amendment revises the third general standard of the ten generally accepted 
auditing standards.
2 D. Haggard, Cooley on Torts, 472 (4th ed., 1932).
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provides a source from which an auditor’s responsibility for conducting an 
audit with due professional care can be derived. The remainder of the 
Statement discusses the auditor’s responsibility in the context of an audit.
5. An auditor should possess “the degree of skill commonly possessed” by 
other auditors and should exercise it with “reasonable care and diligence” 
(that is, with due professional care).
6. Auditors should be assigned to tasks and supervised commensurate with 
their level of knowledge, skill, and ability so that they can evaluate the audit 
evidence they are examining. The auditor with final responsibility for the 
engagement should know, at a minimum, the relevant professional account­
ing and auditing standards and should be knowledgeable about the client.  
The auditor with final responsibility is responsible for the assignment of 
tasks to, and supervision of, assistants.
3
4
3 See SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, 
AU sec. 311), paragraph 7.
4 See SAS No. 22, paragraph 11.
Professional Skepticism
7. Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skep­
ticism. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning 
mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. The auditor uses the knowl­
edge, skill, and ability called for by the profession of public accounting to 
diligently perform, in good faith and with integrity, the gathering and objec­
tive evaluation of evidence.
8. Gathering and objectively evaluating audit evidence requires the auditor 
to consider the competency and sufficiency of the evidence. Since evidence is 
gathered and evaluated throughout the audit, professional skepticism should 
be exercised throughout the audit process.
9. The auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes 
unquestioned honesty. In exercising professional skepticism, the auditor 
should not be satisfied with less than persuasive evidence because of a belief 
that management is honest.
Reasonable Assurance
10. The exercise of due professional care allows the auditor to obtain rea­
sonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. Absolute assurance is not 
attainable because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of 
fraud. Therefore, an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards may not detect a material misstatement.
11. The independent auditor’s objective is to obtain sufficient competent evi­
dential matter to provide him or her with a reasonable basis for forming an 
opinion. The nature of most evidence derives, in part, from the concept of 
selective testing of the data being audited, which involves judgment regard­
ing both the areas to be tested and the nature, timing, and extent of the tests 
to be performed. In addition, judgment is required in interpreting the results
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of audit testing and evaluating audit evidence. Even with good faith and 
integrity, mistakes and errors in judgment can be made. Furthermore, 
accounting presentations contain accounting estimates, the measurement of 
which is inherently uncertain and depends on the outcome of future events. 
The auditor exercises professional judgment in evaluating the reasonableness 
of accounting estimates based on information that could reasonably be 
expected to be available prior to the completion of field work.5 As a result of 
these factors, in the great majority of cases, the auditor has to rely on evi­
dence that is persuasive rather than convincing.6
5 See SAS No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 342), paragraph 22.
• See SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, as amended (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 326).
12. Because of the characteristics of fraud, particularly those involving con­
cealment and falsified documentation (including forgery), a properly 
planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement. For 
example, an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors 
trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication. Also, auditing 
procedures may be ineffective for detecting an intentional misstatement that 
is concealed through collusion among client personnel and third parties or 
among management or employees of the client.
13. Since the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is based on the 
concept of obtaining reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and 
his or her report does not constitute a guarantee. Therefore, the subsequent 
discovery that a material misstatement, whether from error or fraud, exists 
in the financial statements does not, in and of itself, evidence (a) failure to 
obtain reasonable assurance, (b) inadequate planning, performance, or judg­
ment, (c) the absence of due professional care, or (d) a failure to comply with 
generally accepted auditing standards.
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Appendix C
Amendment to Audit Risk and Materiality 
in Conducting an Audit
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.)
1. This amendment revises SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Con­
ducting an Audit, to provide a foundation within the audit risk model for the 
consideration of fraud and to incorporate guidance on errors that was formerly 
included in SAS No. 53, The Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report 
Errors and Irregularities (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), 
which is superseded by this SAS. The revisions also (a) elaborate on factors an 
auditor should consider for an entity with multiple locations or components and 
(b) include changes to conform to the definition and description of internal 
control contained in SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a 
Financial Statement Audit: An Amendment to SAS No. 55 (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319). New language is shown in boldface italics; 
deleted language is shown by strike-through. The amendment is effective for 
audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 
1997. Early application of the provisions of this Statement is permissible.
1 . This Statement provides guidance on the auditors consideration of audit risk and 
materiality when planning and performing an audit of financial statements in accor­
dance with generally accepted auditing standards. Audit risk and materiality affect 
the application of generally accepted auditing standards, especially the standards of 
field work and reporting, and are reflected in the auditor's standard report. Audit risk 
and materiality, among other matters, need to be considered together in determin­
ing the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures and in evaluating the 
results of those procedures.
2 . The existence of audit risk is recognized by the statement in the auditor' standard 
report that the auditor-obtained “reasonable assurance” about whether the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement.1 in the description of the responsi­
bilities and junctions of the independent auditor that states, “Because of the 
nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able 
to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstate­
ments are detected.”  Audit risk  is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail1 2
1For purposes of this section,-misstatements includes both errors and irregularities as 
defined in SAS No. 53, The Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities, paragraphs 2 3.
1 See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended 
by SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110, “Respons­
ibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor”) and SAS No. 1 (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the Per­
formance of Work”), for a further discussion of reasonable assurance.
2 In addition to audit risk, the auditor is also exposed to loss or injury to his or her profes­
sional practice from litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with 
(continued)
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to appropriately modify his or her opinion on financial statements that are materi­
ally misstated.* 3
financial statements that he has audited and reported on. This exposure is present even 
though the auditor has performed -his-the audit in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards and has reported appropriately on those financial statements. Even if an 
auditor assesses this exposure as low, he the auditor should not perform less extensive pro­
cedures than would otherwise be appropriate under generally accepted auditing standards.
3 This definition of audit risk does not include the risk that the auditor might erroneously 
conclude that the financial statements are materially misstated. In such a situation, he the 
auditor would ordinarily reconsider or extend his auditing procedures and request that 
the client perform specific tasks to reevaluate the appropriateness of the financial state­
ments. These steps would ordinarily lead the auditor to the correct conclusion. This 
definition also excludes the risk of an inappropriate reporting decision unrelated to the 
detection and evaluation of misstatements in the financial statements, such as an inappro­
priate decision regarding the form of the auditor's report because of an uncertainty or a 
limitation on the scope of the audit.
4 The concepts of audit risk and materiality also are also applicable to financial statements 
presented in conformity with a comprehensive basis of accounting other than gener­
ally accepted accounting principles; references in this Statement to financial statements 
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles also include those 
presentations.
5 The auditor’s consideration of illegal acts and responsibility for detecting 
misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts 
By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal 
acts that are defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on 
the determination of financial statement amounts, the auditor's responsibility to 
detect misstatements resulting from such illegal acts is the same as that for errors 
or fraud.
3. The concept of materiality recognizes that some matters, either individually or in 
the aggregate, are important for fair presentation of financial statements in confor­
mity with generally accepted accounting principles,  while other matters are not 
important. The phrase in the auditor’s standard report “present fairly, in all mate­
rial respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” indicates 
the auditors belief that the financial statements taken as a whole are not materially 
misstated.
4
4. Financial statements are materially misstated when they contain misstatements 
whose effect, individually or in the aggregate, is important enough to cause them not 
to be presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles. Misstatements result from misapplications of generally 
accepted accounting principles, departures from fact, or omissions of necessary 
information. Misstatements can result from errors or fraud.5
5. In planning the audit, the auditor is concerned with matters that could be 
material to the financial statements. The auditor has no responsibility to plan 
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements, 
whether caused by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial 
statements are detected.
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6. The term errors refers to unintentional misstatements or omissions of 
amounts or disclosures in financial statements. Errors may involve—
• Mistakes in gathering or processing data from which financial statements 
are prepared.
• Unreasonable accounting estimates arising from oversight or misinter­
pretation of facts.
• Mistakes in the application of accounting principles relating to amount, 
classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure.6
7. Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditor’s interest specifically 
relates to fraudulent acts that cause a misstatement of financial statements. 
Two types of misstatements are relevant to the auditor’s consideration in a 
financial statement audit — misstatements arising from fraudulent financial 
reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets. These 
two types of misstatements are further described in SAS No. 82, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The primary factor that distinguishes fraud 
from error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement 
in financial statements is intentional or unintentional.
8. When considering the auditor’s responsibility to obtain reasonable assur­
ance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement, there 
is no important distinction between errors and fraud. There is a distinction, 
however, in the auditor’s response to detected misstatements. Generally, an 
isolated, immaterial error in processing accounting data or applying 
accounting principles is not significant to the audit. In contrast, when fraud 
is detected, the auditor should consider the implications for the integrity of 
management or employees and the possible effect on other aspects of the 
audit.
5. 9. When reaching a conclusion concluding as to whether the effect of misstate­
ments, individually or in the aggregate, is material, an auditor ordinarily should 
consider their nature and amount in relation to the nature and amount of items in 
the financial statements under audit. For example, an amount that is material to the 
financial statements of one entity may not be material to the financial statements of 
another entity of a different size or nature. Also, what is material to the financial 
statements of a particular entity might change from one period to another.
6. 10. The auditor’s consideration of materiality is a matter of professional judgment 
and is influenced by his or her perception of the needs of a reasonable person who 
will rely on the financial statements. The perceived needs of a reasonable person are 
recognized in the discussion of materiality in Financial Accounting Standards Board 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of 
Accounting Information, which defines materiality as “the magnitude of an omission 
or misstatement of accounting information that, in the light of surrounding circum­
stances, makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the 
information would have been changed or influenced by the omission or misstate­
ment.” That discussion recognizes that materiality judgments are made in light of
6 Errors do not include the effect of accounting processes employed for convenience, 
such as maintaining accounting records on the cash basis or the tax basis and peri­
odically adjusting those records to prepare financial statements in conformity with 
generally accepted accounting principles.
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surrounding circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative 
considerations.
7. 11. As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in 
materiality judgments, misstatements of relatively small amounts that come to the 
auditors attention could have a material effect on the financial statements. For exam­
ple, an illegal payment of an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if there 
is a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material contingent liability or a 
material loss of revenue. 6 6 7
67 The auditor's responsibility for illegal acts is discussed-in- See SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by 
Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317).
• See SAS No. 53,- The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregu­
larities, paragraphs 10 12, for a further discussion of the consideration of-audit risk at the 
financial statement-level.
7 8 This Statement amends SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision, paragraph 3e, by substi­
tuting the words "Preliminary judgment about materiality levels” in place of the words 
“Preliminary estimates of materiality levels.”
9 See SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in 
a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,AU sec. 319).
Planning the Audit
8. 12. The auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) planning the 
audit and designing auditing procedures and (b) evaluating whether the financial 
statements taken as a whole are presented fairly, in all material respects, in confor­
mity with generally accepted accounting principles. The auditor should consider 
audit risk and materiality in the first circumstance to obtain sufficient competent evi­
dential matter on which to properly evaluate the financial statements in the second 
circumstance.
Considerations at the Financial Statements Level6
9. 13. The auditor should plan the audit so that audit risk will be limited to a low 
level that is, in his or her professional judgment, appropriate for issuing expressing 
an opinion on the financial statements. Audit risk may be assessed in quantitative or 
nonquantitative terms.
10. 14. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 311), requires the auditor, in planning the audit, to take into consid­
eration, among other matters, his or her preliminary judgment about materiality 
levels for audit purposes.78 That judgment may or may not be quantified.
11. 15. According to SAS No. 22, the nature, timing, and extent of planning and thus 
of the considerations of audit risk and materiality vary with the size and complexity 
of the entity, the auditors experience with the entity, and his or her knowledge of 
the entity’s business. Certain entity-related factors also affect the nature, timing, and 
extent of auditing procedures with respect to specific account balances and classes of 
transactions and related assertions. (See paragraphs 17 24 through 26 33.)
16. An assessment of the risk of material misstatement (whether caused by 
error or fraud) should be made during planning. The auditor’s understand­
ing of internal control may heighten or mitigate the auditor’s concern about 
the risk of material misstatement.  In considering audit risk, the auditor9
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should specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial 
statements due to fraud.10 The auditor should consider the effect of these 
assessments on the overall audit strategy and the expected conduct and scope 
of the audit.
10 See SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.
17. Whenever the auditor has concluded that there is significant risk of 
material misstatement of the financial statements, the auditor should con­
sider this conclusion in determining the nature, timing, or extent of 
procedures; assigning staff; or requiring appropriate levels of supervision. 
The knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel assigned significant engage­
ment responsibilities should be commensurate with the auditor's assessment 
of the level of risk for the engagement. Ordinarily, higher risk requires more 
experienced personnel or more extensive supervision by the auditor with 
final responsibility for the engagement during both the planning and the con­
duct of the engagement. Higher risk may cause the auditor to expand the 
extent of procedures applied, apply procedures closer to or as of year end, 
particularly in critical audit areas, or modify the nature of procedures to 
obtain more persuasive evidence.
18. In an audit of an entity with operations in multiple locations or compo­
nents, the auditor should consider the extent to which auditing procedures 
should be performed at selected locations or components. The factors an 
auditor should consider regarding the selection of a particular location or 
component include (a) the nature and amount of assets and transactions exe­
cuted at the location or component, (b) the degree of centralization of 
records or information processing, (c) the effectiveness of the control envi­
ronment, particularly with respect to management’s direct control over the 
exercise of authority delegated to others and its ability to effectively super­
vise activities at the location or component, (d) the frequency, timing, and 
scope of monitoring activities by the entity or others at the location or com­
ponent, and (e) judgments about materiality of the location or component.
19. In planning the audit, the auditor should use his or her judgment as to the 
appropriately low level of audit risk and his or her preliminary judgment about 
materiality levels in a manner that can be expected to provide him, within the inher­
ent limitations of the auditing process, with sufficient evidential matter to obtain 
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatement. Materiality levels include an overall level for each statement; however, 
because the statements are interrelated, and for reasons of efficiency, the auditor 
ordinarily considers materiality for planning purposes in terms of the smallest aggre­
gate level of misstatements that could be considered material to any one of the 
financial statements. For example, if he the auditor believes that misstatements 
aggregating approximately $100,000 would have a material effect on income but that 
such misstatements would have to aggregate approximately $200,000 to materially 
affect financial position, it would not be appropriate for him or her to design audit­
ing procedures that would be expected to detect misstatements only if they 
aggregate approximately $200,000.
13. 20. The auditor plans the audit to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting mis­
statements that he or she believes could be large enough, individually or in the 
aggregate, to be quantitatively material to the financial statements. Although the 
auditor should be alert for misstatements that could be qualitatively material, it ordi-
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narily is not practical to design procedures to detect them. SAS No. 31, Evidential 
Matter, as amended (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326), states 
that “an auditor typically works within economic limits; the auditors opinion, to be 
economically useful, must be formed within a reasonable length of time and at 
reasonable cost.”
44? 21. In some situations, the auditor considers materiality for planning purposes 
before the financial statements to be audited are prepared. In other situations, his 
planning takes place after the financial statements under audit have been prepared, 
but he the auditor may be aware that they require significant modification. In both 
types of situations, the auditors preliminary judgment about materiality might be 
based on the entity’s annualized interim financial statements or financial statements 
of one or more prior annual periods, as long as he gives recognition is given to the 
effects of major changes in the entity’s circumstances (for example, a significant 
merger) and relevant changes in the economy as a whole or the industry in which the 
entity operates.
15. 22. Assuming, theoretically, that the auditor’s judgment about materiality at the 
planning stage was based on the same information available to him at the evaluation 
stage, materiality for planning and evaluation purposes would be the same. However; 
it ordinarily is not feasible for the auditor, when planning an audit, to anticipate all 
of the circumstances that may ultimately influence his judgments about materiality 
in evaluating the audit findings at the completion of the audit. Thus, his the audi­
tor’s preliminary judgment about materiality ordinarily will differ from his the 
judgment about materiality used in evaluating the audit findings. If significantly 
lower materiality levels become appropriate in evaluating his audit findings, the audi­
tor should reevaluate the sufficiency of the auditing procedures he or she has 
performed.
16. 23. In planning auditing procedures, the auditor should also consider the 
nature, cause (if known), and amount of misstatements that he or she is aware of 
from the audit of the prior period’s financial statements.
Considerations at the Individual Account-Balance or
Class-of-Transactions Level
17. 24. The auditor recognizes that there is an inverse relationship between audit 
risk and materiality considerations. For example, the risk that a particular account 
balance or class of transactions and related assertions could be misstated by an 
extremely large amount might be very low, but the risk that it could be misstated by 
an extremely small amount might be very high. Holding other planning considera­
tions equal, either a decrease in the level of audit risk that the auditor judges to be 
appropriate in an account balance or a class of transactions or a decrease in the 
amount of misstatements in the balance or class that he the auditor believes could 
be material would require the auditor to do one or more of the following: (a) select 
a more effective auditing procedure, (b) perform auditing procedures closer to year 
end the balance sheet date, or (c) increase the extent of a particular auditing proce­
dure.
18. 25. In determining the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures to be 
applied to a specific account balance or class of transactions, the auditor should 
design procedures to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting misstatements that he 
or she believes, based on his the preliminary judgment about materiality, could be 
material, when aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes, to the
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financial statements taken as a whole. Auditors use various methods to design pro­
cedures to detect such misstatements. In some cases, auditors explicitly estimate, for 
planning purposes, the maximum amount of misstatements in the balance or class 
that, when combined with misstatements in other balances or classes, could exist 
without causing the financial statements to be materially misstated. In other cases, 
auditors relate their preliminary judgment about materiality to a specific account bal­
ance or class of transactions without explicitly estimating such misstatements.
19.26. The auditor needs to consider audit risk at the individual account-balance or 
class-of-transactions level because such consideration directly assists him in deter­
mining the scope of auditing procedures for the balance or class and related 
assertions. The auditor should seek to restrict audit risk at the individual balance or 
class level in such a way that will enable him or her, at the completion of his the 
examination, to express an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole at an 
appropriately low level of audit risk. Auditors use various approaches to accomplish 
that objective.
20. 27. At the account-balance or class-of-transactions level, audit risk consists of 
(a) the risk (consisting of inherent risk and control risk) that the balance or class and 
related assertions contain misstatements (whether caused by error or fraud) that 
could be material to the financial statements when aggregated with misstatements in 
other balances or classes and (b) the risk (detection risk) that the auditor will not 
detect such misstatements. The discussion that follows describes audit risk in terms 
of three component risks. 11 The way the auditor considers these component risks 
and combines them involves professional judgment and depends on his the audit 
approach.
a. Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an assertion to a material misstatement, 
assuming that there are no related internal controls structure policies or proce­
dures. The risk of such misstatement is greater for some assertions and related 
balances or classes than for others. For example, complex calculations are more 
likely to be misstated than simple calculations. Cash is more susceptible to theft 
than an inventory of coal. Accounts consisting of amounts derived from account­
ing estimates pose greater risks than do accounts consisting of relatively routine, 
factual data. External factors also influence inherent risk. For example, techno­
logical developments might make a particular product obsolete, thereby causing 
inventory to be more susceptible to overstatement. In addition to those factors 
that are peculiar to a specific assertion for an account balance or a class of trans­
actions, factors that relate to several or all of the balances or classes may 
influence the inherent risk related to an assertion for a specific balance or class. 
These latter factors include, for example, a lack of sufficient working capital to 
continue operations or a declining industry characterized by a large number of 
business fadlures. (See SAS No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and 
Report Errors and Irregularities, paragraph 10.)
b. Control risk is the risk that a material misstatement that could occur in an asser­
tion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity’s internal
11The formula in the appendix (paragraph 48) to SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 350), describes audit risk in terms of four compo­
nent risks. Detection risk is presented in terms of two components: the risk that analytical 
procedures and other relevant substantive tests would fail to detect misstatements equal 
to tolerable misstatement, and the allowable risk of incorrect acceptance for the sub­
stantive test of details.
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control structure policies or procedures. That risk is a function of the effective­
ness of the design and operation of internal control structure policies or 
procedures in achieving the entity’s broad internal control structure objectives 
relevant to an audit preparation of the entity’s financial statements. Some con­
trol risk will always exist because of the inherent limitations of any internal 
control structure.
c. Detection risk is the risk that the auditor will not detect a material misstatement 
that exists in an assertion. Detection risk is a function of the effectiveness of an 
auditing procedure and of its application by the auditor. It arises partly from 
uncertainties that exist when the auditor does not examine 100 percent of an 
account balance or a class of transactions and partly because of other uncertain­
ties that exist even if he or she were to examine 100 percent of the balance or 
class. Such other uncertainties arise because an auditor might select an inappro­
priate auditing procedure, misapply an appropriate procedure, or misinterpret 
the audit results. These other uncertainties can be reduced to a negligible level 
through adequate planning and supervision and conduct of a firm’s audit prac­
tice in accordance with appropriate quality control standards.
21. 28. Inherent risk and control risk differ from detection risk in that they exist 
independently of the audit of financial statements, whereas detection risk relates to 
the auditor’s procedures and can be changed at his or her discretion. Detection risk 
should bear an inverse relationship to inherent and control risk. The less the inher­
ent and control risk the auditor believes exists, the greater the detection risk he that 
can be accepted. Conversely, the greater the inherent and control risk the auditor 
believes exists, the less the detection risk he that can be accepted. These compo­
nents of audit risk may be assessed in quantitative terms such as percentages or in 
nonquantitative terms that range, for example, from a minimum to a maximum.
22. 29. When the auditor assesses inherent risk for an assertion related to an 
account balance or a class of transactions, he or she evaluates numerous factors that 
involve professional judgment. In doing so, he the auditor considers not only fac­
tors peculiar to the related assertion, but also, other factors pervasive to the financial 
statements taken as a whole that may also influence inherent risk related to the asser­
tion. If an auditor concludes that the effort required to assess inherent risk for an 
assertion would exceed the potential reduction in the extent of his auditing proce­
dures derived from such an assessment, he the auditor should assess inherent risk 
as being at the maximum when designing auditing procedures.
23. 30. The auditor also uses professional judgment in assessing control risk for an 
assertion related to the account balance or class of transactions. The auditor’s assess­
ment of control risk is based on the sufficiency of evidential matter obtained to 
support the effectiveness of internal control structure policies or procedures in pre­
venting or detecting misstatements in financial statement assertions. If the auditor 
believes controls structure policies or procedures are unlikely to pertain to an asser­
tion or are unlikely to be effective, or if he believes that evaluating their effectiveness 
would be inefficient, he or she would assess control risk for that assertion at the max­
imum.
24. 31. The auditor might make separate or combined assessments of inherent risk 
and control risk. If he the auditor considers inherent risk or control risk, separately 
or in combination, to be less than the maximum, he or she should have an appro­
priate basis for his these assessments. This basis may be obtained, for example, 
through the use of questionnaires, checklists, instructions, or similar generalized 
materials and, in the case of control risk, his the understanding of the internal con-
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trol structure and his the performance of suitable tests of controls. However, pro­
fessional judgment is required in interpreting, adapting, or expanding such 
generalized material as appropriate in the circumstances.
32. The detection risk that the auditor can accept in the design of auditing pro­
cedures is based on the level to which he or she seeks to restrict audit risk related to 
the account balance or class of transactions and on his the assessment of inherent 
and control risks. As the auditor’s assessment of inherent risk and control risk 
decreases, the detection risk that he can be accepted increases. It is not appropriate, 
however, for an auditor to rely completely on his assessments of inherent risk and 
control risk to the exclusion of performing substantive tests of account balances and 
classes of transactions where misstatements could exist that might be material when 
aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes.
26. 33. An audit of financial statements is a cumulative process; as the auditor per­
forms planned auditing procedures, the evidence he obtains obtained may cause 
him or her to modify the nature, timing, and extent of other planned procedures. As 
a result of performing auditing procedures or from other sources during the 
audit, Iinformation may come to the auditors attention as-result of performing 
auditing procedures or from other sources during the audit that differs significantly 
from the information on which his the audit plan was based. For example, the extent 
of misstatements he detects detected may alter his the judgment about the levels of 
inherent and control risks, and other information he obtains obtained about the 
financial statements may alter his the preliminary judgment about materiality. In 
such cases, he the auditor may need to reevaluate the auditing procedures he or 
she plans to apply, based on his the revised consideration of audit risk and material­
ity for all or certain of the account balances or classes of transactions and related 
assertions.
Evaluating Audit Findings
27. 34. In evaluating whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all 
material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, the 
auditor should aggregate misstatements that the entity has not corrected in a way 
that enables him or her to consider whether, in relation to individual amounts, 
subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they materially misstate the financial 
statements taken as a whole. Qualitative considerations also influence an the auditor 
in reaching a conclusion as to whether misstatements are material.
28. 35. The aggregation of misstatements should include the auditors best estimate 
of the total misstatements in the account balances or classes of transactions that he 
or she has examined (hereafter referred to as likely misstatement** l2), not just the 
amount of misstatements he specifically identifiesd (hereafter referred to as known 
misstatement).10 13 When the auditor tests an account balance or a class of trans-
See SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report—Errors and 
Irregularities, 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, para­
graphs 22-25, 33—35, for a further discussion of the auditors consideration of 
differences between the accounting records and the underlying facts and circumstances. 
This section Those paragraphs provides specific guidance on the auditor's considera­
tion of an audit adjustment that is, or may be, an irregularity the result of fraud.
10  13 If the auditor were to examine all of the items in a balance or class, the likely misstate­
ment applicable to recorded transactions in the balance or class would be the amount of 
known misstatements specifically identified.
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actions and related assertions by an analytical procedure, he or she ordinarily would 
not specifically identify misstatements but would only obtain an indication of 
whether misstatement might exist in the balance or class and possibly its approximate 
magnitude. If the analytical procedure indicates that a misstatement might exist, 
but not its approximate amount, the auditor ordinarily would have to employ other 
procedures to enable him or her to estimate the likely misstatement in the balance 
or class. When an auditor uses audit sampling to test an assertion for an account 
balance or a class of transactions, he or she projects the amount of known misstate­
ments he identified in his the sample to the items in the balance or class from which 
his the sample was selected. That projected misstatement, along with the results of 
other substantive tests, contributes to the auditors assessment of likely misstatement 
in the balance or class.
29. 36. The risk of material misstatement of the financial statements is generally 
greater when account balances and classes of transactions include accounting esti­
mates rather than essentially factual data because of the inherent subjectivity in 
estimating future events. Estimates, such as those for inventory obsolescence, uncol­
lectible receivables, and warranty obligations, are subject not only to the 
unpredictability of future events but also to misstatements that may arise from using 
inadequate or inappropriate data or misapplying appropriate data. Since no one 
accounting estimate can be considered accurate with certainty, the auditor recog­
nizes that a difference between an estimated amount best supported by the audit 
evidence and the estimated amount included in the financial statements may be rea­
sonable, and such difference would not be considered to be a likely misstatement. 
However, if the auditor believes the estimated amount included in the financial 
statements is unreasonable, he or she should treat the difference between that esti­
mate and the closest reasonable estimate as a likely misstatement and aggregate it 
with other likely misstatements. The auditor should also consider whether the dif­
ference between estimates best supported by the audit evidence and the estimates 
included in the financial statements, which are individually reasonable, indicates a 
possible bias on the part of the entity’s management. For example, if each account­
ing estimate included in the financial statements was individually reasonable, but the 
effect of the difference between each estimate and the estimate best supported by 
the audit evidence was to increase income, the auditor should reconsider the esti­
mates taken as a whole.
30. 37. In prior periods, likely misstatements may not have been corrected by the 
entity because they did not cause the financial statements for those periods to be 
materially misstated. Those misstatements might also affect the current period’s 
financial statements.11 14 If the auditor believes that there is an unacceptably high risk 
that the current period’s financial statements may be materially misstated when those 
prior-period likely misstatements that affect the current period’s financial statements 
are considered along with likely misstatements arising in the current period, he the 
auditor should include in aggregate likely misstatement the effect on the current 
period’s financial statements of those prior-period likely misstatements.
31. 38. If the auditor concludes, based on his the accumulation of sufficient evi­
dential matter, that the aggregation of likely misstatements causes the financial
44
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therefore not addressed in this Statement.
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statements to be materially misstated, he the auditor should request management 
to eliminate the material misstatement. If the material misstatement is not elimi­
nated, he the auditor should issue a qualified or an adverse opinion on the financial 
statements. Material misstatements may be eliminated by, for example, application 
of appropriate accounting principles, other adjustments in amounts, or the addi­
tion of appropriate disclosure of inadequately disclosed matters. Even though the 
aggregate effect of likely misstatements on the financial statements may be immate­
rial, the auditor should recognize that an accumulation of immaterial misstatements 
in the balance sheet could contribute to material misstatements of future finan­
cial statements.
88? 39. If the auditor concludes that the aggregation of likely misstatements does 
not cause the financial statements to be materially misstated, he or she should rec­
ognize that they could still be materially misstated duo to because of further 
misstatement remaining undetected. As aggregate likely misstatement increases, the 
risk that the financial statements may be materially misstated also increases. The 
Aauditors generally reduces this risk of material misstatement in planning the audit 
by restricting the extent of detection risk they are he or she is willing to accept for 
an assertion related to an account balance or a class of transactions. The Aauditors 
also can also reduce this risk of material misstatement by modifying the nature, tim­
ing, and extent of planned auditing procedures on a continuous basis in performing 
the audit. (See paragraph 26 33.) Nevertheless, if the auditor believes that such risk 
is unacceptably high, he or she should perform additional auditing procedures or 
satisfy himself or herself that the entity has adjusted the financial statements to 
reduce the risk of material misstatement to an acceptable level.
40. In aggregating known and likely misstatements that the entity has not 
corrected, pursuant to paragraphs 34 and 35, the auditor may designate an 
amount below which misstatements need not be accumulated. This amount 
should be set so that any such misstatements, either individually or when 
aggregated with other such misstatements, would not be material to the 
financial statements, after the possibility of further undetected misstatements 
is considered.
Effective Date
33. 41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for periods 
beginning after June 30, 1984. The amendments are effective for audits of finan­
cial statements for periods ending on or after December 15, 1997.
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44 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82
This Statement entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
was adopted by the assenting votes of the fifteen members of the board, of 
whom three, Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice, assented with qualification.
Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice qualify their assent for paragraphs 17 and 
19, which list risk factors. They believe that it can be inferred from the 
Statement that the selection of appropriate risk factors is mandated by 
the Standard. Also, in paragraph 17, several of the risk factors are supported 
by specific indicators. These indicators, when taken with the risk factors, create 
a list of examples far too numerous for the body of a Statement.
They are concerned that, despite the fact that paragraph 14 of the Statement 
states that “the auditor should use professional judgment when assessing 
the . . . relevance of fraud risk factors,” in practice, auditors may mistakenly 
believe that they need to consider all of the fraud risk factors in the Statement 
on every audit.
In practice, the auditor should apply judgment, based on “entities of different 
size, with different ownership characteristics, in different industries, or because 
of other differing characteristics or circumstances,” as stated in paragraph 14 of 
the Statement. Further, as business practices and processes change, including 
the effects of technology, auditors will need to consider risk factors appropriate 
to changed circumstances.
Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice believe that the profession and the pub­
lic would be better served by publishing fewer risk factors within the Statement 
and by providing example risk factors in nonauthoritative documents that can 
be better tailored to the circumstances, and that can change over time as new 
knowledge becomes available.
Auditing Standards Board (1996)
Edmund R. Noonan, Chair 
John L. Archambault 
Luther E. Birdzell 
John A. Fogarty, Jr. 
James S. Gerson 
Stephen D. Holton 
Norwood J. Jackson, Jr. 
John J. Kilkeary 
Deborah D. Lambert 
Stephen M. McEachern 
Charles J. McElroy
Kurt Pany
Edward F. Rockman
Glenn J. Vice
W. Ronald Walton
Dan M. Guy
Vice President, Professional
Standards and Services
Thomas Ray
Director, Audit and
Attest Standards
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Fraud Task Force
David L. Landsittel, Chair 
W. Steve Albrecht 
Robert E. Fleming 
James S. Gerson 
Norwood J. Jackson, Jr. 
John J. Kilkeary
Joseph P. Liotta
Glenn J. Vice
Jane M. Mancino 
Technical Manager, 
Audit and Attest Standards
Our thanks to Richard I. Miller, AICPA general counsel and 
secretary, for his contributions to the development of this SAS.
Note: Statements on Auditing Standards are issued by the Auditing Standards Board, 
the senior technical body of the Institute designated to issue pronouncements on audit­
ing matters. Rule 202 of the Institutes Code of Professional Conduct requires 
compliance with these standards.
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Absconding with retainers and down payments: A fraud wherein the fraudster obtains 
money from the victim in advance in connection with the promise to provide goods or 
services in the future, but then disappears with the proceeds. Simply put: “Get the money 
and run.”
See also: External fraud for personal gain and property improvement schemes.
Abuse of Trust: The misuse of one’s position or of privileged information (or both) gained 
by virtue of that position in order to acquire for oneself (or for another in whom one has an 
interest) money, property, or some privilege to which one is not entitled. In addition, abuse 
of trust often involves a violation of fiduciary duty. The victims of these abuses are those 
who rely on, to their detriment (that is, who have placed their trust in), the individual or 
group that misuses its trusted position.
The abuse of trust can occur in many areas but is a situation that arises most frequently in 
the following four white-collar crime areas:
1. Banking: for example, abuse of trust can involve self-dealing in connection with loans or 
credit to oneself, one’s friends or business associates.
2. Securities: for example, insider information may be used for personal benefit at the 
expense of clients, stockholders and others.
3. Commercial bribery: for example, the procurement and competitive bidding processes 
may be manipulated.
4. Embezzlement: for example, trustees may misuse property or funds in their custody.
See also: Banking fraud, commercial bribery, embezzlement and fiduciary frauds, Insider training, 
Procurement fraud, and Securities fraud.
Acquisition and payment cycle: The business cycle that deals with a business procurement 
of and payment for all goods and services except for payroll and capital acquisitions.
See also: Capital Acquisition and Repayment Cycle, Payroll and Personnel Cycle, and Procurement 
Fraud.
Advance fee fraud: A scheme in which assurances of some future benefit are made, with full 
compensation to the promisor or perpetrator, who has no intention of performing, but rather is 
interested in obtaining the partial payment requested as an advance service fee or other 
advance good faith deposit (often falsely described as a returnable deposit). Typical victims of 
advance fee schemes are businesspeople who cannot obtain customary banking or credit 
sources. They pay deposits or fees to others on the promise that the perpetrator will arrange loans 
or credit for them.
See also: Commercial crime and Finance fraud
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Allegation: In litigation, a formal assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of a party to an 
action, made in a pleading, setting out what the party expects to prove. In a nonlitigious 
situation, a concern, which is backed by evidence, that a party has committed fraud.
See also: Allege and Suspicion.
Allege: In litigation, the act of making an allegation; to state, recite, assert, or charge. In 
nonlitigious situations, a statement wherein the person making the statement has some 
evidence to suggest that a party has committed fraud.
See also: Allegation and Suspicion.
Altered credit card receipts: A problem in the retail industry and in the restaurant business 
wherein the salesclerk or waiter increases the amount written on a credit card receipt.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Altering input data: Changing the amounts, dates, or other information contained in data to 
be input into a computer system to record a company’s transactions.
See also: Computer crime and Sales and collection cycle.
Altering internal copies of invoices: The altering of a company’s copy of the sales 
invoice to report an amount lower than that actually billed to the customer. When payment 
is received, the employee diverts the excess amount.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Antitrust offenses: Offenses consisting of one or more of the following: combinations in 
restraint of trade, price fixing, predatory pricing, or other schemes to unlawfully drive 
competitors out of business; agreements among competitors to share business according to 
some agreed formula (such as, bid-rigging conspiracies and discriminatory pricing agreements); 
or domination of a business area by one or a few enterprises. Victims of antitrust offenses are 
businesses and purchasers of goods or services who pay higher prices than they would 
otherwise pay if the offenses were not committed.
See also: Price fixing, Procurement fraud, and Restraint of trade.
Arson: The intentional burning of the house or property of another.
See also: Arson for profit.
Arson for profit: The intentional burning of a house or property, whether his or her own or 
another’s, to collect the insurance proceeds associated with the resulting loss.
See also: Commercial crime, Insurance fraud, and Property insurance fraud
Auto repair fraud: A form of consumer fraud involving maintenance services to automobiles 
such as overcharging for labor or parts or use of shoddy or substandard parts, or failure to 
perform promised services, charging for services not performed or parts not used, and 
performing unnecessary services.
See also: Consumer fraud and Repair fraud
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Backdooring: An occurrence in which friends of a promoter in a stock market manipulation 
scheme start selling their shares while the price is still increasing, contrary to their agreement 
with the promoter, and before the promoter gives them the word to sell.
See also: Setting up a distribution network, Stock market manipulation, and Warehousing.
Bait and Switch: A form of consumer fraud involving misleading advertising. For example, in 
a bait and switch scheme, a store advertises a bargain, which is no more than an inducement 
(that is, the bait) to lure customers to the store where they are presented with similar but higher 
priced items (that is, the switch). Thus the advertisement does not constitute a bona fide offer for 
sale of the merchandise in question. This may be because (1) the advertised item is not 
available on the premises or is available in unreasonably short supply, or (2) acts are 
undertaken to prevent the customer from purchasing the advertised item in favor of higher 
priced merchandise (that is, by downgrading or knocking the advertised goods). Similar 
techniques may be found in the financial services industry.
See also: Consumer  fraud and False and misleading advertising.
Banking fraud: Violations by insiders or by customers of banks, savings and loan associations, 
or credit unions. Insider violations generally involve embezzlements or self-dealing—for 
example, insiders lend money to themselves or to businesses in which they have an interest, 
take bribes, or provide special favors, such as, to make loans or to refrain from collecting loans. 
Violations by outsiders would include submitting false financial statements to induce a bank to 
make a loan, the use of fraudulent collateral, check kiting, and similar offenses.
Victims of banking fraud are depositors and shareholders, bank stockholders, creditors, the 
federal government as the insurer of deposits, and surety companies who bond bank 
employees and officials.
See also: Abuse of trust, Check kiting, Collateral frauds, and Commercial bribery.
Bankruptcy fraud: Fraud involving financial insolvency in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding. Victims of bankruptcy frauds are usually creditors and suppliers of the failed or 
failing business, although managers of the business who operate fraudulently can also victimize 
silent partners and stockholders. There are two major kinds of bankruptcy fraud:
1. The scam or planned bankruptcy, in which the assets, credit, and viability of a business 
are purposely and systematically milked to obtain cash that is hidden by scam operators.
2. Fraudulent concealments or diversions of assets in anticipation of filing for bankruptcy, 
which prevents the assets from being sold for the benefit of creditors (that is, squirreling 
away assets when bankruptcy appears imminent).
Planned thefts and fencing activities may be associated with either kind of bankruptcy fraud as 
a means by which assets can be diverted and converted to cash.
See also: Finance fraud.
Bid rigging: A process whereby several contractors conspire, without the knowledge or 
consent of the purchaser, to set the price or terms of a contract in a manner that would 
ultimately raise the cost for the purchaser.
See also: Commercial crime and Procurement fraud.
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Biometrics: A method that is sometimes used to ensure that only authorized people are 
permitted access to computer systems and includes the checking of fingerprints, iris 
recognition, hand geometry, and other evolving technologies.
See also: Computer access control
Blowing off: A stage in a stock market manipulation that involves the sale of unusually large 
amounts of stocks.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Boiler room: A mechanism used to promote fraudulent sales of securities, charitable 
donations, lotteries, and so on through the use of telephone solicitors, operating locally or by 
use of long distance lines, who call lists of victims and solicit them to buy a particular product 
or service. The telephone salespeople work on high commissions using pre-planned sales 
pitches. Their services, particularly in charitable solicitations, are sometimes sold to otherwise 
legitimate enterprises, which rarely see much of the collections. The technique depends 
primarily upon glib misrepresentations.
See also: Charity and religious frauds and Securities fraud
Borrower misapplication of funds: A kind of loan fraud whereby the borrower, who has 
little or no personal risk in the collateral, misapplies loan funds.
See also: Loan or lending fraud
Breaches of the reporting guidelines: Defiance of the U.S. government requirements for 
banks to report details of large cash deposits to assist in the prevention of money laundering. 
For example, a bank insider who conspires with a money launderer, and agrees to make 
deposits for the money launderer without reporting the required details, is breaching the reporting 
guidelines.
See also: Money laundering.
Bribe: Any money, goods, right in action, property, thing of value, or any preferment, 
advantage, privilege, or emolument, or any promise or undertaking to give such items, with the 
corrupt intent to induce or influence action.
See also: Bribery.
Bribery: The offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of something of value for the purpose of 
influencing the action of anyone in the discharge of his or her duties.
See also: Bribe.
Bribery of a loan officer: An inducement offered to a loan officer by a borrower to grant a 
loan that would not otherwise be made (usually because the borrower’s credit is insufficient).
See also: External fraud for personal gain and Loan and lending fraud.
Bundling and unbundling claims: The practice of physicians or clinics billing separately for 
medical services performed at the same time.
See also: Health insurance fraud
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Business opportunity fraud: One of the most prevalent and varied forms of fraud in which 
victims are offered the opportunity to make a living, or to supplement their income, by going 
into business for themselves (full or part-time), or by purchasing franchises or equipment to 
manufacture some item, sell merchandise, or perform some service.
Victims are generally individuals with a small pool of money they have saved and who are 
enticed by the prospect of the promised independence or income, or both.
Such schemes range from total shams to opportunities whose promised returns are highly 
illusory. The operators of these schemes have essentially one goal, which is to acquire the 
money of the subscriber or investor victims. Work-at-home merchandising schemes (for 
example, selling knitting machines, raising mink, and so on) or the sale of distributorships (for 
example, in cosmetics, special rug cleaning processes, and so on) are common examples of the 
kinds of opportunities pitched in this form of fraud. The opportunity presented by the fraud 
operator often includes the promise of guaranteed markets for the goods or services to be 
produced. Often the schemes induce the victim to enlist other victims, creating a pyramid 
scheme.
See also: Franchising frauds, Pyramid schemes, and Self-improvement schemes.
Capital acquisition and repayment cycle: The cycle of a business whereby capital items are 
purchased and paid for (as compared to operating goods and services that are acquired through 
the purchasing and payments cycle). The capital acquisition and repayment cycle is sometimes 
referred to as the financing cycle.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and Procurement fraud.
Casualty insurance fraud: Claims for staged accidents and false claims for legitimate 
accidents submitted under a casualty insurance policy, which covers personal injuries and 
property damage that one may sustain as the result of an accident.
See also: Insurance fraud, Legitimate accidents with false claims, Personal injury insurance fraud, and 
Staged accidents.
Chain referral schemes: Schemes in which the victims are induced to part with money or 
property on the representation that they will make money through inducing others to buy into 
the same deal. First-tier victims usually believe that those they involve in the scheme (second- 
tier victims) will make money—but since second-tier victims can only make money by 
involving third-tier victims, and so on, the scheme must eventually collapse. Generally, only 
the fraud operators who manage the scheme make money on it; few first or second-tier victims 
(especially if they are honest) have a sufficient number of participating friends and 
acquaintances to come out whole.
One common form of chain-referral scheme is the chain-letter; more sophisticated is the 
pyramid scheme (q.v.), in which, for example, the victim is sold a franchise to sell both 
merchandise and other franchises, with the promise of profits on merchandise sold, and 
commissions, or overrides on merchandise sold by any second or later-tier victims who buy a 
franchise. The profits appear, therefore, to be in selling franchises rather than in selling 
merchandise. These schemes ultimately collapse under their own weight.
See also: Consumer fraud, Merchandising frauds, and Pyramid scheme.
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Charity and religious frauds: Frauds arising out of the fund-raising activities of charitable 
groups, or religious groups, or both. Almost anyone can be the victim of these frauds often 
without knowing it, but even if the victim may later suspect the fraud, his or her individual loss 
may be so small that there is little desire to pursue the matter. Three kinds of fraud situations 
are generally observed in this area: the bogus charity or religious group, misrepresentation of 
association with a charity or religious group, and misrepresentation of the benefits or uses of 
contributions.
See also: Boiler room and Corporate shams.
Check forgery: The copying of a check, or some or all of its components (most often the 
signature) onto a fraudulent check, in order to induce a financial institution to believe that it is a 
bona fide check.
See also: Check fraud.
Check fraud: A general term for the attempted negotiation of bad checks at a financial 
institution. Fraud in this category includes: a new account customer attempting to make a false 
deposit; forged, altered or stolen checks; and check kiting.
See also: Check kiting and New account fraud
Check kiting: Any of a variety of frauds against banks that, in order to succeed, depend on the 
time the banking system takes to clear checks. The most common form of check kiting involves 
at least two bad checks that are intentionally used to temporarily obtain credit. This is done by 
writing one check against a bank account in which funds are insufficient to cover it, then, 
before the check clears the bank, depositing funds in the form of another bad check, which will 
temporarily cover the shortfall. In this manner, balances are built up in each account by 
deposits from the other. Checks are circulated between accounts, with no money taken out of 
any account, until at least one of the banks develops confidence in the depositor. To prevent 
detection, the depositor then takes money out of that bank, using a time frame based on the 
circulation of checks between the two or more banks, and the several days it takes to clear 
checks (especially between different cities).
Banks are victims of check kites. When first discovered, check kites appear far more costly than 
when all transactions are analyzed, since hundreds of thousands of dollars in checks may be 
circulated to steal only a few thousand dollars. In some instances, however, massive amounts 
have been stolen. In many instances businesses employ check kites when they cannot get loans 
from banks to tide themselves over a temporary negative business situation, and intend to (and 
often do) put the money back into the accounts before the check kite is discovered. In these 
instances the bank has been fraudulently induced to unwittingly grant what amounts to an 
interest-free loan.
See also: Banking fraud and Check fraud
Churning: A process in which a broker buys and sells stock for a client in order to generate 
fees, rather than to meet the client’s investment objectives.
See also: Commercial crime and Securities fraud
Collateral frauds: Deceptions involving the holding, taking or offering of defective collateral 
pursuant to a financial transaction. In many instances, collateral fraud will be related to bank­
loan transactions. Beyond this, however, these frauds may be encountered in connection with
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any transaction in which defective security is provided, for example, nonexistent accounts 
receivable sold or pledged to factors (as security for private loans). In some cases, collateral 
used as security may not belong to the person offering it It could be stolen (for example, stolen 
securities), borrowed, or already subject to an undisclosed lien or other encumbrance. 
Alternatively, there may be some gross misrepresentation as to the collateral’s value.
See also: Banking fraud.
Collusion or collusive fraud: A private agreement in which several parties plan to commit 
fraud against another party or organization. The group of fraudsters could be as few as two 
people, and could include parties who are internal, or external to an organization, or both. For 
example, collusion occurs if an internal fraudster helps an external fraudster commit a crime in 
return for a secret commission, kickback, or bribe.
See also: External fraud and Internal fraud.
Commercial bribery: A form of insider fraud or abuse of trust in which an employee or 
officer of a business, charitable organization or government entity is given a bribe, or some 
other valuable consideration, to induce the employee or official to make a purchase, or grant a 
contract or provide some special privilege (such as a zoning variance, license, and so on).
See also: Abuse of trust and Procurement fraud.
Commercial crime: A white-collar crime committed by an individual or group of individuals 
in a company for the benefit of that company and, indirectly, themselves.
See also: Economic crime, External fraud, Procurement fraud, Shams, and White-collar crime.
Compartmentalization: A restriction that limits computer users access to the specific files and 
programs for which they have a job-related requirement.
See also: Computer access control
Computer access control: A series of controls used to help ensure that only authorized 
people are permitted to access computer systems. Controls include: passwords, 
compartmentalization, use of biometrics, one-time passwords, automatic log off, time-day 
controls, dial-back systems, random personal information, requests and Internet authentication.
See also: Biometrics, Compartmentalization, Computer crime, Dial-back systems, Internet authentication, 
Random personal information, and Time-day controls.
Computer crime: A crime in which a computer is used, either to commit a crime, or as the 
target of a crime. Crimes committed using a computer may include: embezzlement, larceny, 
fraud, forgery and counterfeiting. Crimes committed targeting computers may include: 
sabotage, vandalism, electronic burglary, wire tapping, and gaining illegal access. The most 
common forms of computer crime involve the manipulation of inputs and outputs.
See also: Computer access control
Computer fraud: Deceptions arising out of the increasing use of the computer to maintain 
business and government records, such as those relating to inventories, accounts payable and 
receivable, and customer and payroll records. Most computer frauds are really old frauds that 
are committed in a computer environment. True computer frauds do exist—such as those
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involving unauthorized changes to a computer’s programming—but these are relatively less 
common and are most often committed by technical computer people.
See also: Computer crime.
Computer intrusion: Unauthorized access into another’s computers.
See also: Computer access control and Computer crime.
Consumer fraud: A deception in the marketplace involving seller misrepresentations to 
buyers. Victims are consumers of all kinds, individual and institutional, public and private. 
Common forms of consumer fraud include:
• Selling of useless goods or services, represented as beneficial, for example, miracle face 
creams
• Misrepresentation of product performance, benefits or safety
• False and misleading advertising
• Failure to service items after sale, including reneging on warranties
• Repair fraud
• Hidden charges with respect to financing, necessary follow-up services, and so on
• Weights and measures violations
See also: Auto repair fraud, Bait and switch, Chain referral schemes, False and misleading advertising, 
Merchandising frauds, Repair fraud, and Weights and measures violations.
Copyright piracy: The infringement of another’s copyright or other business rights for profit 
or to ease a financial difficulty when the infringer does not have any legal right to manufacture 
or copy the product.
See also: Commercial crime.
Corporate shams: A scheme that deals with something that is counterfeit or false. The 
fraudster often acts through a corporate entity, hiding from the public behind the corporate veil— 
thereby gaining an appearance of respectability and substance that would otherwise be lacking.
See also: Commercial crime and Shams.
Coupon redemption fraud: The fraudulent collection and conversion of coupons designed 
to promote various kinds of merchandise. Unscrupulous grocery and supermarket owners will 
collect coupons, in some cases from an intermediary, and redeem them as though merchandise 
has been purchased from them when in fact it has not. Although the individual amounts can be 
small, the volume in most consumables can make it profitable for stores to engage in these 
schemes.
See also: Commercial crime.
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Credit card frauds: Frauds arising out of the application for, extension, and use of credit 
cards. Victims are the issuers of the credit cards. Common credit card abuses include:
• Use of stolen credit cards.
• False statements in the application for a credit card, including application under a false 
name.
• Purchase, using a legitimate credit card with no intention to pay.
• Manufacture of fake credit cards and their use.
See also: Banking fraud.
Credit rating schemes: Frauds arising out of the application for, extension and use of credit. 
Victims are generally the providers of credit. Common credit-related schemes include: the sale 
of good credit ratings to high risk applicants, false statements in credit applications, and the 
creation of false credit accounts for the purpose of theft
The modus operandi of these schemes varies widely. Recently, employees of credit rating 
organizations have altered credit ratings for payment, sometimes using computer techniques. 
False financial statements are another common method. On a smaller scale is a fraud that 
operates like shoplifting—opening a charge account with false information in order to purchase 
and immediately take away goods.
See also: Loan or lending frauds.
Customs duty fraud: A fraud that generally arises when an importer falsely understates 
the value of goods to be imported, thereby reducing the amount of customs duty paid to 
that government.
See also: Commercial crime and Tax and revenue violations.
Debt consolidation or adjustment swindles: Swindles perpetrated against people who are 
heavily in debt, and against their creditors, by purporting to provide a service that will 
systematically organize the marshaling of the debtor’s assets and income to repay all creditors 
over a period of time, with creditors refraining from pressing for immediate payment of all 
sums due. There are legitimate private agencies that provide these services, and they have 
similar workout procedures available after filing for bankruptcy.
The modus operandi of this fraud is often to use heavy television and newspaper advertising to 
lure debtors into signing up. Sometimes the perpetrators talk creditors into waiting for their 
money; in other instances they falsely tell the debtors they have been able to call the creditors 
off. They then take the debtors’ assets, and a portion of their weekly or monthly earnings, 
paying themselves first, and (usually only after they have their entire fee) dole out the remainder 
to creditors. Frequently creditors receive little or nothing, and the debtors are left minus their 
fees and still in debt.
See also: Finance fraud.
Dial-back systems: A computer security system in which access to a computer is through a 
dial-up system. On accepting a user ID and password, the system hangs up and dials a 
predetermined number—this only works when the person dialing in works at a set location.
See also: Computer access control
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Differential association: A theory established by Edwin H. Sutherland that explains why 
crime is committed. There are ten principles to his theory, which, in summary, asserts that a 
person becomes a criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of the law 
over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
Diploma mills: Outlets that grant diplomas to all people who apply for them, in exchange for 
a hefty fee. Because the diploma mill is not accredited, the diplomas it grants are, therefore, 
essentially worthless.
See also: External fraud for personal gain, and Self-improvement schemes.
Direct manipulation of accounts: A procedure in which computer programs may be altered 
to obtain direct access to allow a perpetrator to manipulate files without authorization.
See also: Computer crime.
Directory advertising schemes: Frauds arising from the selling of printed mass advertising 
services. These schemes are of two basic kinds:
1. Impersonation schemes, in which con artists send bills to business enterprises that look 
like those customarily received; for example, from the phone company for yellow page 
advertising, with directions to make checks payable to entities that resemble legitimate 
payees of the bills.
2. Schemes in which it is promised that advertising will appear in a publication distributed 
to potential customers but in which, in truth and in fact, distribution will be limited to 
the advertisers themselves, if the directory is printed at all.
See also: External fraud for personal gain.
Diversion of payments from written-off accounts: The action taken by an employee who 
takes advantage of the opportunity to divert payments from a customer whose account that 
employee has written off. Because most companies do not monitor the activity on these 
accounts, this activity is rarely detected. For example, an employee will work with a customer 
to collect an overdue receivable. Before the customer pays, the employee writes off the 
account—removing it from the books—pocketing the receipts.
See also: Internal fraud and Sales and collection cycle.
Double indemnity fraud: A scheme in which a beneficiary of a life insurance policy reports 
an actual natural death as having been accidental in order to obtain twice the face value of the 
policy.
See also: Insurance fraud and Life insurance fraud.
Double pledging collateral: Fraudulently pledging the same collateral to different lenders, 
before the related liens are recorded and registered.
See also: External fraud for personal gain, Land fraud, and Real estate fraud
Economic crime: A crime that is similar to white-collar crime but broader in its scope to 
include violent crimes committed by people without any particular occupational status.
See also: White-collar crime.
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Economic espionage: An act in which business secrets are stolen for the benefit of another 
organization.
Economic extortion: A crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through 
intimidation or persistent demands.
See also: Commercial crime.
Embezzlement and fiduciary frauds: The conversion to one’s own use or benefit of the 
money or property of another, over which one has custody, to which one is entrusted, or over 
which one exerts a fiduciary’s control. Victims include institutions, businesses in general, 
pension funds, and beneficiaries of estates being managed by fiduciaries.
See also: Abuse of trust, Banking fraud, Insider trading, and Loan or lending frauds.
Employment agency frauds: Fraudulent solicitations of money or fees in order to find 
employment for, to guarantee the employment of, or to improve the employability of another. 
Victims are generally individuals seeking jobs or hoping to improve their skills to obtain better 
paying employment opportunities. Variations of employment-related frauds include:
1. Phony job agencies, that is, an agency that solicits advance fees to find employment for 
the victim, when, in fact, the service is neither performed nor intended to be provided.
2. Job training frauds, that is, money is received from victims to train them for specific 
employment and (1) the training is not supplied, (2) guaranteed job opportunities on 
completion of training are not supplied, or (3) the training is misrepresented as being 
certified or recognized by employers when it is not and does not qualify the victim for the 
anticipated employment.
See also: Shams.
Energy Crisis Frauds: Frauds arising out of the sale of goods or services related to energy or 
fuel use, saving, and production. Victims are generally individual consumers interested in 
stretching their dollars spent on energy sources, or energy saving methods, or both. Energy 
schemes include the following:
• Merchandise schemes: sale of worthless or bogus items that do not deliver the specific 
benefits promised or the degree of benefit promised, for example, carburetor gadgets to 
save gasoline or phony solar heating systems. Often these frauds occur because of the 
novelty of the items involved combined with the naivete of the victims.
• Weights and measures violations: short weighing or measuring of fuels to customers, for 
example, manipulation of gas pump measuring devices, or misrepresentation of fuel by 
changing octane ratings on fuel pumps.
• Distributor’s discriminatory allocation of fuel: distribution to subdistributors and 
retailers, in consideration of commercial bribes to distributors’ executives or special 
payments to companies with the power to make distribution in the form of under-the- 
table payments or required purchases of other items—useful or not needed—in violation 
of antitrust or other laws.
See also: Antitrust offenses, Commercial bribery, Merchandising schemes, and Weights and measure 
violations.
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Entering false transactions: Entering invoices for fake vendors into the accounts payable 
system, or recording false credit memos to accounts receivable.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and Sales and collection cycle.
Entering phony file maintenance transactions: Performing file maintenance transactions 
such as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to the payroll. Phony file 
maintenance transactions can lay the groundwork for any number of frauds, for example, the 
use of ghost employees to embezzle funds.
See also: Computer crime, Payroll and personnel cycle, and Sales and collection cycle.
Environmental abuse: Business behavior that can harm the environment. Considered 
crimes, the two major practices are pollution and misuse of natural resources. Businesses 
commit these crimes to avoid the costs associated with compliance.
See also: Commercial crime, Natural resource abuse, and Pollution.
Ethics: Principles or standards of human conduct.
Evidence: Material that generally takes one of three forms—oral evidence, written evidence, 
or physical evidence—and is presented as proof in a trial or other hearing to convince the trier 
of fact (that is, judge, jury, mediator, arbitrator, and so on) about the facts and allegations.
Expert witness: A person who has special knowledge or training not possessed by ordinary 
people; or one skilled in a particular profession or trade through experience, education, or 
training. Expert witnesses can provide opinions in court, whereas lay witnesses can only 
provide evidence regarding their physical experiences—what they saw, smelled, heard, tasted 
or touched.
See also: Forensic accountant.
External fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by arms-length parties who are 
external to the organization (that is, either individuals or corporations).
See also: Commercial crime, External fraud for personal gain, and Internal fraud.
External fraud for personal gain: Fraud committed against an organization by arms-length 
parties who are external to the organization, that is motivated by personal gain to the individual 
committing the fraud.
See also: Commercial crime and External fraud.
Failure to enter file maintenance instructions: Failure to input information into the 
computer system because of an intention to deceive. For example, deliberately not updating 
computer files when an employee has left the firm and thus not removing that employee from 
the payroll records. An individual committing the failure might do so with the intention of 
creating a ghost employee.
See also: Payroll and personnel cycle.
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False and misleading advertising: Use of untrue or deceptive promotional techniques 
resulting in consumer fraud. Victims are consumers who, to their detriment, rely on the false or 
misleading advertising or promotion. Noteworthy practices include:
• Advertising as a sale item one that is actually at the regular or higher price.
• Misrepresenting the size, weight, volume, or utility of an item.
• Stating false claims about an attribute that a good or service does not in fact possess.
• Misstating the true costs of a good or service through the use of confusing payment 
provisions or otherwise.
See also: Bait and switch and Consumer fraud.
False applications with false credit: False information on a credit application including 
overstated assets, nonexistent assets, understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue, and 
understated expenses. Such credit applications are then used to obtain credit or loans, thereby 
placing the lender at a higher risk than they realize.
See also: External fraud for personal gain and Loan or lending fraud.
False appraisals: False and inflated appraisals used to support loans for an amount larger than 
the true value of the property.
See also: External fraud for personal gain, Land fraud, and Real estate fraud.
False or fraudulent claims: Fraudulently written claims for payment for goods or services not 
provided as claimed, to public or private entities. False claims may involve activities such as:
• Presentation of a bogus claim or claimant, for example, the ghost payroll situation.
• Misrepresentation of the qualifications of an otherwise ineligible claim or claimant, for 
example, welfare fraud.
• Misrepresentation of the extent of payment or benefits to which a claimant is entitled, 
for example, overtime-pay frauds.
• Claims for insurance benefits to which the recipient is not entitled, for example, staged 
accidents.
• Claims for reimbursement for goods and services allegedly provided to nonexistent 
recipients, for example, Medicaid-Medicare fraud by service providers.
The false claim will carry all the trappings of a legitimate claim and is most successfully 
undertaken by individuals with a thorough knowledge of the system being defrauded. False 
claims will sometimes involve the cooperation of executives or officials of the private or 
governmental entity to which such claims are submitted.
See also: Commercial bribery, Frauds against government benefit programs, Ghost employees, Insurance 
fraud, Medicaid-Medicare fraud, and Welfare frauds.
False expense reports: Expense reports prepared and submitted for reimbursement to an 
employee that contain any combination of overstated, fictitious, or duplicated items.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and False or fraudulent claims.
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False financial statements: False information that is generally created by upper-level 
managers whose intent is not necessarily to steal, but to manipulate data to enhance 
profitability and thereby earn higher bonuses, to impress the brass at headquarters, to impress 
stockholders or lenders, or simply to comply with the goals imposed by senior management. 
The methods of creating false financial statements include overstating revenue, overstating 
assets, understating expenses, understating liabilities, and misrepresenting information in the 
notes to the financial statements.
See also: Commercial crime, False statements, and Securities fraud.
False invoices: Invoices submitted by a contractor for goods that have not been delivered, or 
for services that have not been performed.
See also: Commercial crime and Procurement fraud.
False mortgage security: A term used to refer to security offered for mortgage financing 
purposes that is nonexistent or has a value far lower than represented.
See also: Commercial crime and Finance fraud.
False overhead charges: Fraudulently inflating costs, through the addition of bogus labor 
charges or overbilling of materials, to increase profits in a cost-plus contract allowing the 
contractor to keep the difference between actual and inflated costs.
See also: External fraud for personal gain and Property improvement schemes.
False sales invoices: Altered company copies of sales invoices showing lower sales amounts 
than the original bills sent to the clients. The difference between the real sale amounts and the 
adjusted lower amounts are then misappropriated.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
False statements: The concealment or misrepresentation of facts material to the decision­
making process of an entity. False statements are often the means by which a fraudulent 
scheme to obtain money or benefit is effected either because (among other things):
• The false statement constitutes the underlying documentation for a false claim.
• The false statement impedes discovery of the fraudulent scheme, that is, covers up the 
fraud. These statements often provide the opportunity for conditioning the victim to 
unquestioningly accept and approve a false claim.
See also: False or fraudulent claims, Frauds against government programs, and Ghost employees.
False supplier invoices: Suppliers’ invoices prepared and submitted for payment to the 
company when no goods have been delivered; no services rendered; or that bear either an 
inflated quantity, or value, or both.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle and Procurement fraud.
Finance fraud: One of several kinds of finance fraud, including:
• False mortgage security in which the mortgages are much higher than the underlying 
value of the property secured by such mortgages.
• Advance fee fraud in which the victim pays a bogus corporation an up-front finder’s fee 
in exchange for a promise to receive an advance on a loan.
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• Debt consolidation schemes in which fraudulent debt consolidation agencies make 
money by organizing the debtors’ affairs and collecting and retaining most, if not all, of 
the money handled on the debtor’s behalf.
• Bankruptcy fraud in which there are fraudulent conveyances, concealing assets, asset 
stripping, or planned bankruptcy.
The victims of financial fraud are generally financial institutions and other organizations 
that are involved in providing financing.
See also: Advance fee fraud, Bankruptcy fraud, Commercial crime, and False mortgage security.
Financial institution: Any organization engaged in receiving, collecting, transferring, paying, 
lending, investing, dealing, exchanging, and servicing money and claims to money, both 
domestically and internationally.
See also: Offshore banks and tax havens.
Financial statement auditing: A methodology that is used by auditors and is intended to 
evaluate the level of accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of the recording of business 
transactions through the use of sampling and confirmation techniques.
Forensic: Material that is “belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of law.” This term 
describes the standards that are applicable to the discipline in question—that is, a forensic 
medical examiner conducts autopsies to a standard required for court purposes; and a forensic 
accountant conducts financial analyses to a standard required for court purposes.
See also: Forensic accountant and Forensic standard.
Forensic accountant: An accounting practitioner who concentrates his or her professional 
practice on matters necessary for testifying in court as to the findings from the investigation of 
accounting and financial evidence.
See also: Forensic, Forensic accounting and Forensic standard.
Forensic accounting: A discipline involving accounting to a standard required by the 
courts—criminal and civil—as well as arbitration, mediation, and other forms of business 
dispute resolution that require expert evidence to a similar standard.
See also: Forensic, Forensic accountant, and Forensic standard.
Forensic standard: The criteria used in which a professional considers all the relevant 
evidence that could affect his or her opinion to properly assist a court and withstand 
rigorous cross-examination from counsel. The standard involves a strong understanding of 
the legal system.
See also: Forensic and Forensic accountant.
Franchising frauds: Frauds arising out of business opportunity situations in which individuals 
invest time, talents, and money to obtain a business enterprise, relying on others (that is, the 
franchiser) to supply at prearranged rates specified goods and services such as necessary 
business structures, the goods to be sold or materials from which goods can be made, 
advertising, and an exclusive territorial market or market area for the franchisee’s output. 
Victims generally invest their major assets in what are fraudulent franchise opportunities. 
Frauds in franchises generally arise because one or more of the following occurs:
15
Glossary
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
1. The franchiser has no intention of honoring on any of its obligations; that is, the franchise 
is a complete ruse to acquire the victim-franchisee’s initial investment monies.
2. The franchiser fails to provide promised goods or services essential to the success of the 
franchise.
3. The franchiser makes success for franchisee either difficult or impossible by allowing too 
many franchises in a given locale or market area.
4. The franchiser has misrepresented the market or demand for goods or services central to 
the franchise, or has misrepresented the level of skills needed to realize franchise 
profitability.
Item (1) in the list above is outright fraud, while Items (2)-(4) are variations that range from 
fraud to shady dealing to failure to fulfill contractual obligations.
See also: Business opportunity schemes and Chain referral schemes.
Fraud: The criminal deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver. The deception 
must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.
See also: Commercial crime, External fraud, External fraud for personal gain, and Internal fraud.
Fraud auditing: A methodology that is used by fraud auditors to find transactions that differ 
from the normal series of transactions generally processed (usually because they are inaccurate 
or incomplete), and that represent the accounting entries associated with a fraud. To find such 
transactions, the fraud auditor requires a mindset that relies on creativity as much as it does on 
reasoning. It also requires the fraud auditor to think, but not act, like a thief.
See also: Financial statement auditing.
Frauds against government benefit programs: Unlawful applications for and receipt of 
money, property, or benefit from public programs designed to confer money, property, or 
benefit under specific guidelines. Victims are federal, state, and local governments, their 
taxpayers, and qualified, intended beneficiaries of such programs. Typical kinds of frauds 
suffered by government programs include:
• Misrepresentations of applicants’ qualifications concerning program eligibility; for 
example, welfare received by ineligible persons.
• False billing or vouchering in which public programs make good on false claims for 
services not rendered or for nonexistent beneficiaries; for example, physician’s claims 
under Medicaid-Medicare programs for patients not treated, or for specific treatments 
not provided.
• Inflated billing, vouchering or claiming, by which public programs are charged more 
than allowable costs; for example, housing fraud in which the cost of construction is 
inflated so that the builder or owner receives more than the total cost of land and 
buildings, and avoids making the investment required by law and administrative 
guidelines.
• Embezzlement, by which employees or officials of public programs convert funds, 
property, or benefits to their own use (often via their custodial or fiduciary relationship 
to the program), for example, licensed dispensers of food stamps converting them to 
their own use.
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• Misuse of properly obtained funds, in which money, property, or benefit conferred 
under very specific guidelines concerning end use are received and utilized for 
unauthorized ends; for example, receipt of federal loan funds (such as student 
educational loans) with failure to use such for specified purposes.
See also: Embezzlement and fiduciary funds, False or fraudulent claims, False statements, Medicaid- 
Medicare fraud, and Welfare frauds.
Fraudulent disbursement: The theft (embezzlement) of a company’s cash caused by an 
employee who uses company checks either to withdraw cash directly for his or her own benefit 
or pay personal expenses.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Front-end fraud: The improper direction given to a company’s customers to take their 
business elsewhere, thereby depriving the company of profits it could otherwise have earned.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Funeral frauds: A class of guilt-inducement frauds that rely on the emotional stress of victims 
who have lost, or are about to lose, loved ones through death. Victims are the relatives or 
friends of deceased or terminally ill people. Funeral-related frauds often are consumer and 
merchandising schemes and generally involve one or more of the following:
1. The perpetrator relies on the guilt or anxiety of bereaved relatives. Victims are 
persuaded to contract for unnecessary or unduly elaborate funeral services or 
merchandise.
2. The perpetrator bills for funeral expenses that include charges for services not 
performed (here the fraud artist relies on victim anxiety or guilt to preclude the memory 
of whether a particular service was performed or not, or to preclude the victim’s 
challenge of the bill for payment, or both.)
3. The perpetrator states that services or goods in connection with burial are legally 
required, when in fact they are not.
4. The perpetrator arranges contracts for future provision of goods or services in 
connection with funeral and burial arrangements when in reality he or she has neither 
the intention nor the capacity to provide them; for example, the sale of nonexistent 
cemetery plots.
See also: Consumer  fraud, Guilt-inducement frauds, and Merchandising frauds.
Generic-risk factors: Risk factors, which in the context of fraud and the environmental factors 
that promote the occurrence of fraud, are largely within the control of the organization or entity 
that is protecting itself, and largely outside the control of potential perpetrators.
See also: Individual risk factors.
Ghost employees: A payroll fraud in which the embezzler enters the names of fictitious 
employees into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll checks. Fictitious 
employees are commonly referred to as ghosts. In one variation of this scheme, the fraud artist 
keeps the names of individuals whose employment has terminated for several pay periods after 
they leave their job. The embezzler then receives the paychecks for the former employee. In 
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another variation of the ghost payroll, the fraud artist develops an overtime-pay scheme in 
which false claims are made for overtime work performed by bona fide employees.
See also: False or fraudulent claims and Payroll and personnel cycle.
Guilt inducement frauds: Frauds perpetrated via the tactic of inducing guilt or anxiety in the 
victim concerning his or her relationship or obligations to another person who is significant to 
the victim (that is, a child, parent, or spouse). Victims are individuals who, susceptible to the 
guilt or anxiety induced by the fraud operator, are persuaded to part with money or property in 
the belief that the questioned transaction will atone for any shortcomings or fulfill obligations they 
have toward another.
Because guilt inducement is a major tactic used to secure voluntary victim action, it cuts 
across many fraud areas. Some examples of the dynamics of these frauds are noted below:
• Encyclopedia salespeople induce victims to enter into purchase contracts for books, 
having suggested to the victims that imminent scholastic failure of their children can be 
expected if the purchase is not made—here a potential merchandising fraud is 
consummated by the offender’s capacity to induce parental anxiety in victims.
• Children of deceased parents are persuaded to purchase elaborate and unnecessary 
funeral arrangements construed by the fraud operator to constitute a decent burial. The 
implication in funeral frauds is that failure to buy the most expensive items, or close 
checking of the details of bills, are tantamount to lack of affection or respect for the 
deceased.
• Unnecessary and imprudent expenditures for life insurance are made by many wage 
earners, to whom it is suggested that failure to subscribe to the policies constitutes a 
failure to one’s spouse and family.
• Self-improvement merchandise and facilities are marketed to victims on the basis of 
such guilt inducements as “you owe it to your spouse to be as (lovely, manly, successful) 
as you can be” or “you can only be a failure if you fail to take advantage of opportunities 
to improve your (looks, job, speaking ability).”
See also: Funeral frauds and Self-improvement schemes.
Health care fraud: There are a wide variety of health care frauds that have recently been 
the subject of media attention. Although many health care frauds are committed by 
individuals, businesses are also involved. For example, violating occupational health and 
safety laws, and marketing drugs that have not been adequately tested or for which the test 
results have been falsified.
See also: Commercial crime, Health insurance fraud, Medicaid-Medicare fraud, and Medical frauds.
Health insurance fraud: There are several forms of health insurance fraud; for instance 
mobile labs, bundling or unbundling claims, or collusion between an insured and a provider to 
claim health insurance for his or her own benefit.
See also: Bundling and unbundling claims, External fraud for personal gain, Health care fraud, 
Insurance fraud, and Mobile labs.
Home repair or improvement frauds: Frauds arising from the provision of goods and 
services in connection with the repair, maintenance, or general improvement of housing units. 
Victims are generally homeowners but may also include public agencies or programs that
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subsidize or underwrite home purchase and ownership. Home repair or improvement frauds 
include the following practices:
1. Intentionally shoddy or incompetent workmanship.
2. Sale of over-priced or unfit materials or services for home repair projects.
3. Failure to provide services or goods paid for by the customer.
4. Submission of false claims for materials or work not provided.
5. Misrepresentation of the need for particular materials or services to be performed.
6. Misrepresentation or concealment of the costs of credit, or of the nature of liens securing 
the payment obligations.
The victim may be told that the home is in violation of building codes or in a condition 
substandard to the rest of the neighborhood, endangering the value of the home, or the safety 
of the victim’s family.
See also: Consumer fraud, Merchandising frauds, and Repair fraud.
Homicide for profit: A homicide case in which a victim is murdered for a financial gain of 
the murderer or the person who hires the murderer. Insurance companies are also victims in 
these crimes because of the insurance policy payments that are made to the beneficiaries of the 
policies.
See also: Homicide fraud, Insurance fraud, and Life insurance fraud.
Homicide fraud: A fraud in which a beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the policy 
owner in order to collect benefits.
See also: Homicide for profit, Insurance fraud, and Life insurance fraud.
Income tax fraud: Generally, a scheme in which a taxpayer willfully attempts to evade a tax 
by any means including filing false or fraudulent returns.
See also: External fraud for personal gain.
Individual risk factors: Risk factors, which in the context of fraud and the environmental 
factors that promote the occurrence of fraud, change from person to person, and can even 
change for the same individual over time. They are only partially within the control of the 
organization or entity that is protecting itself, and this control is more difficult to exercise 
because it applies to each individual separately. Whenever turnover occurs, the individual risk 
factors change and must be managed.
See also: Generic risk factors.
Inflated costs: Expenses that have been artificially inflated and invoiced when a contractor is 
paid on a cost-plus basis; that is the actual cost of the job, plus a certain profit based on a 
percentage of the costs.
See also: Commercial fraud and Procurement fraud.
Input tampering: A computer scheme that can be accomplished by altering, forging, or 
fabricating computer input documents. In an entity with inadequate logical access control 
(which is common for small businesses), input tampering is quite easy to accomplish.
See also: Computer crime.
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Insider trading: Benefiting oneself, or others in whom one has an interest, by trading on 
privileged information or position. Typical situations include those in which a corporate officer 
or director trades in the stock of his or her company on the basis of inside information as to 
prospective profits or losses; bank officers lending money to themselves or businesses in which 
they have an interest; corporate executives or purchasing officials setting up suppliers of goods 
and services to contract with their companies, and so on.
See also: Abuse of trust, Banking fraud, Commercial bribery, and Securities fraud.
Insurance fraud: Fraud perpetrated by or against insurance companies. Victims may be the 
clients or stockholders of insurance companies or the insurer itself. Insurance fraud breaks 
down into the following categories and subclasses:
1. Frauds perpetrated by insurers against clients or stockholders include:
• Failure, when a claim is made, to provide the coverage promised and paid for.
• Failure to compensate or reimburse properly on claims.
• Manipulation of risk classes and high-risk policy holder categories.
• Embezzlement or abuse of trust in management of premium funds and other assets of 
insurance companies.
• Twisting, that is, illegal sales practices in which the insurer persuades customers to 
cancel current policies and to purchase new replacement ones.
2. Frauds perpetrated by insureds against insurance providers include:
• Filing of bogus claims for compensation or reimbursement, or of multiple claims for 
the same loss from different insurers, and so on.
• Inflating reimbursable costs on claim statements.
• Paying bribes or kickbacks to local agents to retain coverage or to obtain coverage in 
an improper risk category.
• Failing to disclose information or false statements made in application for insurance.
See also: Abuse of trust, Casualty insurance fraud, Double indemnity, False or fraudulent claims, 
Homicide fraud, Legitimate accidents with false claims, Life insurance fraud, Mortgage insurance fraud, 
Personal injury insurance fraud, Staged accidents, and Staged death fraud.
Intellectual property theft: The theft of assets, which can have immense value, ranging 
from business plans to trade secrets. Intellectual property is generally synonymous with 
intellectual work, but carries a clear emphasis on the value of the work as an asset in a 
financial sense.
Internal fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by its employees, officers, or 
directors.
See also: External fraud.
20
Internet authentication: A rapidly evolving computerized security measure used to 
identify a specific Internet user and to send information across the Internet safely. With 
more and more people telecommuting, many companies are taking advantage of low-cost, 
high-bandwidth Internet connections, and therefore find Internet authentication a valuable 
tool.
See also: Computer access control.
Inventory and warehousing cycle: The cycle of a business that handles functions relating to 
the purchase and warehousing of merchandise for manufacture, or resale, or both.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Investment frauds: Frauds in which victims, induced by the prospect of capital growth and 
high rates of return, invest money in imprudent, illusory, or bogus projects or businesses. 
Investment frauds generally victimize those with a pool of liquid or convertible assets. Victims 
can include retirees or near-retirement-age people, widows and widowers, and high-income 
professionals and businesspeople. The hallmarks of many of these frauds are as follows:
• The investment promises a higher-than-average rate of return.
• The investment project is still in development, that is, the project or business is not a 
mature entity.
• The buyer purchases the investment from a stranger.
• The investment has a generalized definition of its nature and scope, and lacks detailed 
plans for measuring any progress.
• The object or site of the investment is geographically remote or distant from investors.
• The seller fails to fully disclose facts that are material to the investor prior to his or her 
commitment of money.
• The seller is not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or 
comparable state regulatory agencies.
• The seller promises special advantages, for example, tax benefits.
See also: Land fraud, Ponzi schemes, Pyramid schemes, and Securities fraud.
Investor frauds: Frauds in which the perpetrator uses techniques to persuade people who 
possess limited financial or investment expertise to invest in the perpetrator’s company to 
produce a quick return or benefit to the perpetrator.
See also: Commercial crime.
Kickbacks: A form of off-book fraud that refers to schemes in which the funds used for 
illegal payments or transfers are not drawn from the payer’s regular company bank 
account, and the payments do not appear on the payer’s books and records. In collusion 
with suppliers, a purchasing agent may get paid a kickback for any number of activities 
including: allowing the vendor to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment, 
excess purchasing of property or services, or bid rigging.
See also: Commercial crime, Procurement fraud, Off-book frauds, and Secret commissions.
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Kickbacks to customers: Schemes that include underbilling for merchandise and splitting the 
difference, and writing off receivables owed to the company for a fee.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Land fraud: An investment fraud that involves the sale of land, based on extensive 
misrepresentations as to value, quality, facilities, or state of development Victims are usually 
individuals buying land for retirement, investment, or both simultaneously. Land frauds usually 
consist of the sale of land or of interests in land:
1. To which the seller has no present title or claim of right; that is, the seller cannot 
properly transfer title or interest to the buyer as represented at the time of the sale.
2. About which a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact has occurred.
3. At inflated or unjustified prices based on misrepresentations made to the purchaser.
4. On the promise of future performance or development, which the seller neither intends 
to provide nor can reasonably expect to occur. Misrepresentations usually involve 
presence of utilities, water, roads, recreational facilities, credit terms, and so on.
See also: Investment frauds.
Landlord-tenant frauds: Unlawful practices involving the leasing or renting of property. 
Common fraud practices by landlords include: keeping two sets of books—that is, tax 
violations, schemes to avoid return of security deposits, rental of property to which one has no 
title claim or right, deliberate and persistent violations of safety and health regulations, and 
failure to provide heat or services, and so on.
Lapping: An internal fraud relating to accounts receivable collections in which a customer’s 
payment is embezzled by the perpetrator, and is then recorded as paid sometime after receipt 
of a subsequent payment from another customer (thereby “stealing from Peter to pay Paul”) — 
that is, the payment from customer A is diverted by the employee. To keep customer A from 
complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to customer A’s account. Customer C’s 
payment is applied to customer B’s account, and so on.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Legitimate accidents with false claims: A scheme in which individuals get involved in 
legitimate accidents and later exaggerate their personal injuries in order to collect excessive 
amounts from insurance companies.
See also: Casualty insurance fraud and Insurance fraud.
Legitimate front: A form of money laundering that involves opening a legitimate front 
business, which handles a great deal of cash, and then depositing the ill-gotten gains to disguise 
its illegal source along with the legitimate income of the business.
See also: Money laundering.
Life insurance fraud: Any form of fraud whereby the victim is a life insurance company. For 
instance, a policy beneficiary commits homicide or fakes his own death to collect benefits from 
the insurer, or a beneficiary reports the policy owner’s death as having been accidental in order 
to obtain twice the face value of a double indemnity policy.
See also: Double indemnity, Homicide fraud, Insurance  fraud, and Staged death fraud.
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Loan or lending fraud: Unlawful practice arising out of the lending or borrowing of money. 
Victims may be financial institutions, the stockholders of financial institutions, or borrowers. 
Loan fraud generally involves either the failure to disclose relevant information, which would 
bear on the extension or granting of a loan, or the provision of false information, or both.
When perpetrated by borrowers, loan fraud may take the form of:
1. False statements, whereby a loan to which one is not entitled is fraudulently obtained.
2. Improper use of legitimately obtained loans, whereby improper use was intended at the 
time the loan application was made.
3. Larceny by false pretenses by which a loan is obtained with no intention of repayment.
When perpetrated by the lending officer, loan fraud may take the form of:
1. Lending to oneself through ghost accounts.
2. Lending to friends or entities in which one has an interest.
3. Commercial bribery.
4. Advance fee schemes, by which borrowers remit money to secure a loan that is not 
forthcoming or for which no payment was necessary.
A separate and important dimension of loan fraud involves the misuse or misrepresentation of 
items of collateral and collateral accounts.
See also: Abuse of trust, Banking violations, Collateral frauds, and False statements.
Loans to nonexistent borrowers: A scheme in which the borrower uses a false identity to 
obtain a loan. This scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower or with the 
assistance of an insider, such as a loan officer.
See also: External fraud for personal gain and Loan or lending fraud.
Manipulating computer inputs: One of the most frequent bases of computer crime through 
the use of false inputs—for example, entering false transactions in the system, modifying actual 
transactions, or in some schemes, not entering information into the system that should have 
been entered.
See also: Computer crime.
Market manipulation fraud: See Insider trading.
Medicaid-Medicare fraud: Fraudulent practices arising in connection with the receipt or 
provision of health care services under government-financed Medicare or Medicaid programs. 
These frauds are nearly always perpetrated by health care providers (both professionals and 
facility operators) against the government financing the programs, or the intended beneficiaries 
of the programs, or both. Specific Medicaid-Medicare fraud practices include:
• Ping-ponging: referring patients to other doctors in a clinic in order to claim 
reimbursements for the “consultation” rather than for bona fide patient treatment or 
observation.
• Upgrading: billing for services not provided.
• Steering: sending patients to a particular pharmacy, medical lab, and so on, for required 
prescriptions or services, and receiving improper payments in return.
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• Shorting: delivering less medication—for example, pills—than prescribed while 
charging for full amount.
• Procurement abuses: establishing supply-purchase arrangements with firms that pay 
kickbacks to health care facilities or providers with firms that are owned by those 
controlling the facility itself.
• False claims: submitting claims for payment by the government for patients who do not 
exist, or who were never seen or treated.
See also: False or fraudulent claims, Frauds against government benefit programs, Kickbacks, and
Procurement fraud.
Medical frauds: Unlawful activities arising out of the provision and sale of bogus, highly 
questionable or dangerous medical services, cures, or medications. Victims are often 
individuals who have been given little hope of recovery or improvement by the traditional 
medical establishment and desperately seek any promise of ameliorating their conditions. Also 
victimized are people who are poorly informed and thus vulnerable to claims made by medical 
fraud artists, often in such areas as beauty treatments and cosmetics. Medical frauds generally 
include one or more of the following abuses:
1. Quackery: false representation of oneself as a legally trained and licensed health care 
professional.
2. Fake cures: sale of bogus or highly questionable cures for specific illnesses or diseases.
3. Misrepresentations of medication: misrepresentations as to the therapeutic value of 
medications, or intentional omissions made regarding known side effects of medications, 
or both.
4. Misrepresentations of treatment: false statements made about the therapeutic value of a 
particular treatment protocol and the degree of its acceptance or bona fide medical 
practice; or omissions of material information concerning known side effects of the 
treatment that would affect the patient’s choice of treatment program, or both.
See also: Medicaid-Medicare fraud.
Merchandising frauds: An umbrella term for a broad variety of consumer frauds involving 
misrepresentations inducing the victims to purchase merchandise, which is either not as 
represented or will never be delivered to them. These frauds usually involve one or more of the 
following:
1. Representation that the item is sold at a lower than usual price, whereas it is sold at the 
usual retail price or higher.
2. Misrepresentation as to the quality or utility of the merchandise.
3. Misrepresentation as to the ultimate price, or credit terms.
4. Misleading information as to warranties, cancellation of transaction, returnability of 
merchandise, and validity of money-back guarantees.
5. Solicitation of money with no intention to deliver the merchandise promised.
6. Bait-and-switch frauds.
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Victims customarily buy from door-to-door salespeople or are entrapped when they respond to 
newspaper, magazine, telephone, radio, or television advertisements.
See also: Consumer frauds.
Misappropriation of accounts receivable: The diversion of payments received from 
customers. An employee may open a personal bank account with a name similar to that of the 
company (Acme Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer payments can then be taken by 
the employee and deposited into the employee’s bank account.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Misappropriation of trust funds: The diversion of client funds held in trust and the use of the 
money for purposes other than the intended use of the funds.
See also: External fraud for personal gain.
Mixing of funds: Commingling client funds with the funds of the brokerage firm, which then 
enables the broker to post the winning trades to the brokerage firm, or the losing trades to their 
clients, or both.
See also: Commercial crime and Securities fraud.
Mobile lab: A scheme in which a group of people set up a lab in a storefront located in a blue- 
collar, low income area to offer free physicals to people who have medical insurance. The 
insured is subjected to extensive, expensive tests that are billed to his or her insurance 
company. The mobile labs are gone when the insured returns for the test results.
See also: Health insurance fraud and Insurance fraud.
Modeling school: A scam in which fraudulent schools tell students to get a portfolio of 
portraits to send to potential customers, ostensibly to enhance the possibility of the victim 
getting modeling assignments. The victim is then charged greatly inflated prices for a 
photographer, who is often a participant in the scam, to take the pictures for the portfolio.
See also: External fraud for personal gain and Self-improvement schemes.
Money laundering: The process of turning “dirty” money into “clean” money to conceal the 
existence, source, or use of illicit money, or to obstruct investigative efforts, preserve assets from 
forfeiture, and evade taxes.
See also: Breaches of the reporting guidelines, Legitimate front, Offshore banks and tax havens, Offshore 
facilities, and Smurfing.
Money transfer fraud: Fraud in which funds are stolen by an outsider or bank employee who 
has access to the correct identification numbers needed to transfer funds by wire.
See also: External fraud for personal gain.
Mortgage insurance fraud: A scheme in which a healthy individual, who has a mortgage 
insurance policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the purchaser of the 
property defaults on those payments because of death or disability, claims that he or she is 
disabled in order to have the mortgage paid via this mortgage insurance policy.
See also: Casualty insurance fraud and Insurance fraud.
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Natural resource abuse: Violation of laws protecting natural resources, such as fishing, 
hunting, logging, mining, and so on, as well as endangered-species legislation. Laws vary from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and generally apply to both noncommercial and commercial 
harvesting of animals, marine life, and endangered species.
See also: Commercial crime, Environmental abuse, and Pollution.
New account fraud: The use of false identification to open new accounts and steal money 
before the bank collects the funds.
See also: Check fraud.
Nominee loans: Loans made in the name of a straw borrower or agent while the identity of 
the real borrower is undisclosed to the lender.
See also: External fraud for personal gain, Loan or lending fraud, and Real estate fraud.
Nursing home abuses: A variety of frauds perpetrated by individuals who provide 
institutional nursing and convalescent care to patients, particularly the aged. Victims of such 
frauds are the patients of the facilities, their families, or governmental entities that subsidize the 
cost of care provided to eligible patients. Forms of nursing home fraud abuses include:
• Unlawful conversion or attachment of patients’ assets.
• False claims to patient, family or government entity regarding services delivered.
• False statements in license application or renewal.
• Maintenance of fraudulent records as to general or overhead costs of operation of 
facilities as a basis for false claims to governmental entities.
• Receipt of kickbacks from facility suppliers.
• Employment of inadequate or unqualified staff in violation of licensing guidelines.
See also: Embezzlement and fiduciary frauds, False or fraudulent claims, Frauds against government 
benefit programs, Medicaid-Medicare fraud, and Procurement fraud.
Obtaining control: Gaining control over an existing company’s stock to ensure that other 
shareholders do not undermine the promoter’s control over the supply of shares.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Off-book fraud: Fraud that occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit trail is 
likely to exist.
See also: On-book fraud.
Offshore banks and tax havens: Banks or financial institutions located in tax havens that 
conduct local and international business transactions in which money and other valuable 
securities can be held or transferred from one jurisdiction to another, at the direction and 
discretion of the assets’ owners, under the protection of secret banking privileges. The owners 
of the assets direct the transactions—personally or through an intermediary, such as a trust— 
and benefit from little or no taxation in their effort to minimize taxes (legally), to evade taxes 
(illegally), or to avoid creditors.
See also: Money laundering and Offshore facilities.
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Offshore facilities: Facilities available in tax havens, such as banks, financial institutions, trust 
companies, agencies, and accountanting and legal firms.
See also: Money laundering and Offshore banks and tax havens.
On-book fraud: Fraud that principally occurs within a business in which an audit trail 
(sometimes obscure) exists that could aid in its detection.
See also: Off-book fraud.
Patent fraud: A form of self-improvement scheme that most closely resembles vanity­
publishing frauds. In patent frauds, the con artist solicits individuals through items such as 
newspaper advertisements, enticing them to send in patentable ideas or gadgets for evaluation by 
experts. The evaluation, of course, usually involves a fee, or at least “further processing” of the 
submission may involve a fee, thus an advance fee situation evolves. The fraud operator 
generally has neither the intention nor the capacity to develop or process a patentable item.
See also: Advance fee schemes, Self-improvement schemes, and Vanity publishing schemes.
Payment of invoices to a fictitious company: A scheme in which the embezzler establishes 
a fake entity (often with a post-office box for an address, and a name similar to that of a 
legitimate company) and gets the fake entity entered into company records as a legitimate 
vendor. The embezzler then produces invoices for the fake vendor, and then processes them in 
the accounts payable system pocketing the payments made to satisfy the fake invoices.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle, Corporate shams, Procurement fraud, and Shams.
Payroll and personnel cycle: A cycle of a business that handles the hiring, firing, and 
payment of employees, along with timekeeping, expense accounts and travel reimbursement, 
and insurance matters.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Pension frauds and abuses: Thefts and fraudulent conversions of pension fund assets either 
by trustees, employers, or employees. Frauds perpetuated by trustees involve the violation of 
their fiduciary duty in the management of pension fund monies by poor investments tied to 
self-dealing or commercial bribery and embezzlement The frauds victimize those who have 
contributed to the fund and those intending to benefit from it.
Fraud perpetuated by employees includes the accrual of abnormal overtime or other similar 
items to form an inflated base period on which pension payment level is established (very often 
in local public sector employment situations). Victims are other employees, whose potential 
benefits are reduced by the fraud of their peers or bankruptcy of the fund, as well as the 
employer whose contributions to the pension plan could be inflated or lost.
See also: Abuse of trust, Embezzlement and fiduciary frauds, Commercial bribery, and False or fraudulent 
claims.
Personal injury insurance fraud: A scheme in which an individual reports a real but 
overstated physical injury or a faked injury to an insurance company to recover unentitled 
benefits, such as, from a tort claim or reimbursement of fake medical expenses.
See also: Casualty insurance fraud and Insurance fraud.
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Personal property pawned: A scheme in which a perpetrator inflates the value of his or her 
personal belongings, insures them, and then pawns them for a lesser amount of cash. He or she 
then reports them stolen and files a claim. When the insurance payment is received, he or she 
then recovers the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance payment and 
pockets the difference.
See also: Insurance fraud and Property insurance fraud.
Pigeon drop or pocketbook drop: One of a large variety of street con games regularly 
perpetrated on gullible victims. In the scheme the victim is persuaded to withdraw a large sum 
of cash from a bank account in order to show good faith or financial responsibility regarding 
the sharing of a discovered cache of money with two other persons (who are con artists). In the 
course of the con, both the discovered money and the victim’s good-faith money disappear, as do 
the con artists. Victims may be anyone, because perpetrators of this fraud have a remarkable 
ability through words to disarm their victims. Keys to the pigeon drop con are:
1. The con artists do not appear to be associated or know each other in any way.
2. A pocketbook, envelope, and so on is foundry one of the confederates, and it contains a 
sizable amount of money, no owner identification, and the suggestion that the money is 
illicitly generated—for example, a gambler’s proceeds.
3. An agreement to share the money is made with the victim showing good-faith (that is, 
putting up money) to those involved. (Alternately, a deal is made for all to put up money 
in a pool to be held by a coconspirator, the one who did not find the money).
4. A switch is made while the victim is distracted, and his or her money is stolen by one of 
the confederates.
See also: Shams.
Pollution: One of many abuses in the environmental area that violate specific 
environmental- and pollution-control statutes and orders. White-collar crime abuses in this 
area consist primarily of the making or submitting of false statements concerning the degree 
of compliance with statutes and regulations for pollution control, in order to cover up 
violations or lack of compliance with environmental standards. Falsification of test or 
sample data designed to measure compliance with standards represent another from of 
white-collar violation in this area.
While a certain level of pollution is tolerated by today’s society, media attention has lately 
been focussed on companies that have gone too far. Society is, as a whole, becoming less 
tolerant of all forms of pollution, and this is reflected all the way down to the consumer-for 
instance, aerosol spray cans and cigarette smoking in restaurants are no longer tolerated in 
many jurisdictions. Laws have been passed to limit the levels of pollution, but not all 
companies comply with the laws, usually because of the cost implications involved.
See also: Commercial crime, Environmental abuse, and False statements.
Ponzi schemes: A general class of frauds (a variation of a pyramid scheme) in which the fraud­
operator uses money invested by later victims to pay a high rate of return to the first group of 
investors instead of making the promised investments. These schemes must inevitably collapse 
because it is mathematically impossible to continue them indefinitely. The length of time they 
can continue will depend on the promised rate of return to investors, the amount of money the 
fraud operator takes out for himself or herself, and the costs of inducing victims to part with 
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their money (for example, sales commissions). Many such frauds have cheated victims of 
millions of dollars; some frauds have operated over a period of years.
Ponzi elements exist in many varieties of investment frauds, under different guises and in 
different variations; for example, long-term investments and short-term business financing.
See also: Investment frauds and Shams.
Possession of property obtained by crime: An offense that refers to either the actual 
possession of property obtained by a crime, or to the possession of proceeds from the 
disposal of property obtained by a crime. For example, when a business is suspected to be 
in possession of stolen inventory (that is, property), an investigator should be able to 
establish after examining the financial records whether this inventory has been legitimately 
purchased. Similar reconciliations could also be performed to determine whether an 
individual is in possession of property obtained by crime.
See also: Fraud.
Posting improper credits to an account: Concealing a fraud involving the sales and 
collection cycle. In this scheme an employee posts credit memos or other noncash reductions 
(for example, a sales return or write-off) to the customer account from which the funds were 
diverted.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Price fixing: Illegal combinations by sellers to administer the price of a good or service, to 
deprive customers of a competitive marketplace, restrain competition, and maintain an artificial 
price structure.
Victims are customers of the combinations who are deprived of freely determined prices for 
the goods and services they purchase. Secondary victims may be competitors of the firms 
participating in the price-fixing agreement.
Often when one thinks of price fixing, one thinks of a large nationwide conspiracy among 
industrial giants. While this is part of the problem, it is equally probable that many 
arrangements occur at the local level. For example, in Virginia the practice of a local bar 
association that set the price for title searches was held to be unlawful. In other locally 
prosecuted cases, druggists have been adjudicated for fixing prices on prescription drugs.
See also: Antitrust offenses and Restraint of trade.
Procurement fraud: Unlawful manipulation of the public or private contracting process to 
obtain an advantage. Victims are competitors not participating in the fraud, the public or 
private entity soliciting bids, and customers or constituents of those entities who do not realize 
benefits that would be derived from a truly competitive procurement process.
Three common forms of procurement fraud are:
1. Bid rigging—that is, a form of illegal anticompetitive conduct in which bidders in a 
competitive procurement collusively set their bids so as to deprive the bid solicitor of a 
competitive process. The effect is an administered bidding process in which the winner 
and the terms and prices of the goods and services involved in the procurement are set 
by the conspirators rather than by the competitive process. Parties to the conspiracy are
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thus able to divide among themselves a set of procurement contracts and to fix prices for 
goods and services at the same time.
2. Bid fixing—that is, a form of illegal manipulation of the procurement process whereby 
one bidding party is provided with inside information (by the bid solicitor or an agent), 
which enables the said bidder to gain an unfair advantage over other bidders.
3. Bribery and kickbacks—that is, a situation in which procurement contracts are awarded 
on the basis of the payment of bribes and kickbacks to procurement officials rather than 
on the basis of competitive procurement guidelines.
See also: Commercial bribery, False or fraudulent claims, Kickbacks, and Public or official corruption.
Product substitution: A scheme in which contractors substitute a lesser product or service, 
which costs much less then the one promised, and keep the cost difference without the 
knowledge of the purchaser. The purchaser is charged for the higher product or service.
See also: Commercial crime, External fraud, Procurement fraud, and Property improvement schemes.
Property improvement schemes: A fraud that involves perpetrators who obtain business 
primarily from door-to-door solicitations, promising repairs to property at bargain rates, 
collecting up-front money, then absconding with the proceeds. The victims of these schemes 
are usually senior citizens.
See also: External fraud for personal gain.
Property insurance fraud: An insured reports a false theft, inflates the value of his or her 
personal belongings and pawns them, or purposely destroys his or her own property to collect 
a benefit from the insurer.
See also: Arson for profit, Insurance fraud, Personal property pawned, Repossessed household goods, and 
Staged false theft.
Public or official corruption: White-collar crime, which generally falls into the category of an 
abuse of trust-type violation involves commercial bribery, collusion with bid-rigging, avoidance 
of the competitive process in connection with the purchase of goods and services by 
governmental entities, and self-dealing in connection with governmental purchases or grants of 
franchises to use public property and real estate.
Most public corruption has its parallel in the private sector. Thus conflict of interest is the 
public equivalent of insider trading; there is little distinction between public and commercial 
bribery situations particularly when they overlap, such as in the government procurement
See also: Abuse of trust, Commercial bribery, and Frauds against government benefits programs.
Pyramid scheme: The commercial version of the chain letter scheme, used by fraud operators 
in the selling of phony investments (Ponzi Scheme), distributorships, franchises, and business 
opportunity plans.
See also: Chain referral schemes, Franchising frauds, and Investment frauds.
Random personal information: Information, which only an authorized individual would 
know, that is used as a means of identifying unauthorized log-in attempts to a computer 
system. The computer randomly transmits a question using this information and denies
30
Glossary
access to the user unless it receives the right answer. If several dozen questions are on file, it 
can be a very useful technique.
See also: Computer access control.
Real estate fraud: A form of loan fraud involving the purchase of under or over-valued real 
estate that is committed either by individuals or corporations.
See also: External fraud for personal gain, False mortgage security, and loan fraud.
Recognizing revenue in the improper period: A method used for preparing false financial 
statements through the improper accruals of revenue on future, anticipated sales. Techniques 
include altering dates on shipping documents or holding the books open until after shipments 
have occurred.
See also: False financial statements and Recognizing revenue on transactions that do not meet the revenue 
recognition criteria.
Recognizing revenue on transactions that do not meet the revenue recognition 
criteria: A method of preparing false financial statements by improperly recognizing revenue 
on transactions for which the earnings process is incomplete—for instance, when the right of 
return exists, or bill-and-hold transactions. The items involved are often concealed through the 
use of written side agreements or oral agreements that are not included with the company’s 
books of account.
See also: False financial statements and Recognizing revenue in the improper period.
Recording fictitious sales: A form of covering up a fraud by using the sales and collection 
cycle and involves, for example, recording sales to nonexistent customers, or recording phony 
sales to legitimate customers.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Referral sales schemes: See Chain referral schemes and Merchandising frauds.
Repair fraud: A form of consumer fraud involving repairs or maintenance services performed 
on consumer goods. The schemes generally involve:
• Overcharging for services performed.
• Charging for services and parts not used.
• Performing services or repairs not wanted or needed.
• Failing to perform services or repairs promised.
See also: Consumer fraud.
Repossessed household goods: A scheme in which household items are repossessed and the 
insured reports to the carrier that the property was stolen in order to fraudulently get the 
proceeds.
See also: Insurance fraud and Property insurance fraud.
Repurchasing: A scheme in a stock market manipulation in which the promoter buys back 
control of the company when the stock price reaches rock bottom.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
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Restraint of trade: Actions, combinations, or schemes that interfere with unfettered 
marketplace transactions. Examples are: price fixing, bribery and kickbacks for commercial 
advantage; interference with competitive bidding processes, dictation of price structure to 
customers or dealers; and exclusive buying arrangements.
See also: Commercial bribery, Price fixing, and Procurement fraud.
Sales and collection cycle: The billing of goods or services to customers, the setting up of 
accounts receivable for customers who purchase goods or services on credit, and the collection 
of funds relating to those receivables.
Secret commissions: The most common form of procurement fraud. It involves the receipt of 
a secret payment, usually from a supplier to a purchasing agent for the influence the purchasing 
agent wields on his or her employer’s decision-making in a way to favor the payer.
See also: Bribery, Commercial crime, Kickbacks, and Procurement fraud.
Securities fraud: Fraudulent activities involving the sale, transfer, or purchase of securities or 
of money interests in the business activities of others. Victims are generally securities investors 
who are not aware of the full facts regarding transactions into which they enter. Abuses cover a 
broad range, and can include, for example, situations where:
• Businesses or promoters seek to raise capital unlawfully or without proper registration 
and oversight.
• Securities of no value are sold, or are misrepresented to be worth more than their actual 
value.
• Purchasers are not advised of all facts regarding securities, or of the failure to file 
appropriate disclosures with federal and state regulatory agencies, or both.
• Insiders use special knowledge to trade in securities to the disadvantage of the general 
public, which lacks the knowledge.
• Broker-dealers and investment advisers act for their own benefit rather than for the 
benefit of their clients.
• False information is provided to security holders and the investing public in financial 
statements published or filed with securities regulatory agencies, or in the media as a 
result of payments to financial writers or publications.
• Manipulation of the price of securities by purchases and sales occurs in stock exchange 
or over-the-counter markets.
Securities violations potentially exist whenever investors rely on others to manage and conduct 
the business in which an investment is made. It is not necessary that there be any formal 
certificates such as stocks and bonds. Any form of investment agreement is potentially a 
security.
See also: Advance fee schemes, Boiler rooms, False statements, Insider trading, and Investment frauds.
Self-improvement schemes: Frauds that appeal to the victims’ desires to improve themselves 
personally or financially, by the acquisition of social, employment skills, or physical skills or 
attributes.
Schemes in this category tend to run on a continuum from improving purely personal or social 
skills and attributes to those tied to an individual’s employment opportunities. On the personal
32 
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
end of the scale are the dance studio or charm school schemes; on the employment end of the 
scale are fraudulent job training schemes and advance fee employment agencies.
Somewhere in the middle are modeling agencies that purport to improve both the person and 
his or her employment prospects. Also included here are courses on improving one’s image or 
ability to communicate with others. Some business opportunity schemes, which hold out the 
prospect of financial improvement plus “being a respected community businessperson,” also 
fall into this category by appealing to the victim’s desire to improve his or her finances and 
lifestyle.
See also: Business opportunity fraud, Employment agency frauds, and Vanity publishing schemes.
Setting up a distribution network: A term used in stock market manipulation. The network 
is set up with the promoter as its head with several distributors associated with the promoter all 
located in cities that have facilities for trading the stock in question. Each distributor has access 
to a brokerage house’s sales force, who in turn have access to the floor traders who will be 
executing the trades. Via this network, the promoter has control over trading in the subject 
stock.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sham transactions: Schemes in which transactions give the impression of legitimate 
transactions at higher prices. For example, a perpetrator sells assets at inflated prices to an 
outside entity, and simultaneously buys assets at inflated prices from that same entity. These 
transactions are particularly difficult to detect because they involve collusion with a 
coconspirator outside the entity.
See also: Corporate shams and Shams.
Shams: An imitation or counterfeit purporting to be genuine. The perpetrator intentionally 
gives a false impression in order to obtain money from the victims by various means.
See also: Commercial crime, Corporate shams, Ponzi schemes, and Sham transactions.
Short weighting or loading: Deliberate shorting of the volume or quantity of a cargo, or 
other purchase, accompanied by a false claim (that is, invoice) demanding payment for the full 
amount Such frauds are easiest to perpetrate where the goods involved are of such nature or 
bulk that it is difficult for the receiver to detect shortages. The reverse of the short weighting or 
loading fraud is often used as a modus operandi for diversions (that is, thefts) of cargo. In this 
situation a transport vehicle is intentionally overloaded; the overage is not recorded (that is, 
false statement by omission), and the overloaded amount forms the basis of kickbacks to 
scheme operators by the recipients of the shipments (that is, often fences of stolen goods). 
Manipulation of the size or volume of loads must always be accompanied by false claims or 
false statements, since accompanying documentation or invoices do not reflect the fraudulent 
changes in the load size.
This violation involves either a false claim to a customer, or a plain and simple theft from the 
shipper. Because insiders are frequently involved, it will often involve commercial bribery, 
kickbacks, and so on. It may also involve federal prohibitions on the interstate shipment of 
stolen property.
See also: Weights and measures violations.
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Single family housing loan fraud: Misapplication of funds by a borrower who purchases 
single family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality is purchasing rental 
properties for resale.
See also: Loan or lending fraud.
Siphoning funds: A scheme in which funds are siphoned in small amounts from a large 
number of accounts. For example, pennies and portions of pennies (resulting from rounding 
off) can be shaved from thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a 
single account that is accessed by the embezzler.
See also: Banking fraud.
Skimming: A scheme in which cash is skimmed before it enters the accounting system. For 
example, an employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt, or prepares a receipt for less 
than the amount received.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Smurfing: The use of couriers (also known as smurfs) to go to financial institutions to deposit 
and withdraw cash or cash equivalents in amounts less than the reporting limit of the Internal 
Revenue Service to avoid reporting requirements.
See also: Money laundering.
Staged accidents: A scheme in which fraudulent claims are made for nonexistent personal 
injuries. For example, an individual purposely pulls out in front of an oncoming vehicle or gets 
rear-ended in order to cause a collision.
See also: Casualty insurance fraud and Insurance fraud.
Staged death fraud: A scheme in which an insured fakes his or her own death in order to 
collect benefits.
See also: Insurance fraud and Life insurance fraud.
Staged false theft: A scheme in which an insured hides property he or she owns, and reports 
it stolen, or alternatively reports property stolen that was never owned.
See also: Insurance fraud and Property insurance fraud.
Stock market manipulation: A crime perpetrated by a stock promoter who artificially 
influences the market price of shares in a company for personal gain at the expense of the 
investing public.
See also: Commercial crime and Securities fraud.
Substituting personal checks for cash: A scheme in which an employee takes money from 
the cash register and substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always in 
balance, but the employee never submits the personal check for deposit to the company’s bank 
account. Consequently, the employee receives free use of the cash.
Suspicion: A concern, which is backed by little, if any, evidence, that a party has or may have 
committed fraud.
See also: Allegation.
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Talent agency schemes: See Self-improvement schemes or Vanity publishing schemes.
Tax violations: Frauds perpetrated with the intent to deprive a taxing authority of revenues to 
which it is entitled, or of information it needs in order to make a judgment regarding revenues 
to which it is entitled, or to avoid admission of involvement in illicit, though profitable, business 
activities.
Tax frauds may be perpetrated through the filing of false returns, as in personal income tax 
frauds; through the bribery of public officials, as may occur in property tax assessment frauds; 
or in the failure to file appropriately, as with an organized crime-figure who may not be 
concerned with avoiding tax liability but rather with revealing the sources of his or her taxable 
income. Many white-collar crimes obligate the offender to commit tax fraud because of illicitly 
obtained monies he or she does not wish to report, for example, assets resulting from bribes, 
larcenies, kickbacks or embezzlements. Common crimes, especially of a business nature, may 
also result in tax violations, for example, bookmaking and fencing of stolen goods; both could 
be income and sales tax abuses.
Tax avoidance through false statements may be a component of otherwise legitimate business 
enterprises, especially in areas of business and occupation taxes, inventory taxes, and sales 
taxes. Individuals and businesses will also seek to avoid or evade excise taxes, for example, on 
cigarettes or in the case of tanker trucks by substitution of low-taxed home heating oil for 
higher-taxed diesel fuel.
See also Income tax fraud.
Theft of inventory for personal use: A fraud that is most likely to happen when the items 
are small and easy to steal, and the items have value to an employee as a consumer. For 
example, a laptop computer is more likely to be stolen for personal use because it has the 
physical characteristics that make it susceptible to theft, plus the employee can use it 
immediately.
See also: Inventory and warehousing cycle, Sales and collection cycle, and Theft of inventory for sale.
Theft of inventory for sale: The theft of inventory of a company that doesn’t have value to 
the employee as a consumer, because the goods won’t be used for personal use. Instead, the 
employee then sells the goods to someone who has use for the stolen goods. For example, a 
receiving department employee signs a report stating that one hundred units were received but 
only ninety are stocked in the warehouse and ten are placed in the trunk of the employee’s car. 
The missing units may not be discovered until the year-end physical inventory count. For 
larger inventory items that are more difficult to transport, the receiving personnel may collude 
with the vendor’s delivery personnel.
See also: Inventory and warehousing cycle, Sales and collection cycle, and Theft of inventory for personal 
use.
Theft of scrap: Theft of scrap can be significant especially when the thief has the ability to 
inappropriately designate saleable inventory as scrap. In most companies, inventory scrap is 
not recorded or well controlled, which makes it easy to steal. For example, a hospital employee 
was convicted of stealing used x-rays, and selling the silver reclaimed from the plates.
See also: Procurement fraud.
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Time-Day controls: Controls that restrict personnel access to computer systems to those 
times when they are supposed to be on duty. An extension of this concept using automated 
time-clock systems is to deny access and report a violation if access is attempted when an 
employee is not shown in the time clock system as being authorized to be present.
See also: Computer access control.
Unauthorized instructions: Commands placed by a computer programmer into a computer 
program so that the computer will perform unauthorized functions. For example, making 
payments to a vendor not listed on an approved list.
See also: Computer crime.
Understating beginning inventory balances: A method used to conceal a fraud involving 
inventory shortages or theft, or involving false financial reporting. The most common method 
for understating beginning inventory is to overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence. 
For example, understating may be perpetrated when there has been a change in management 
and current management wishes to report improved profitability.
See also: False financial statements and Inventory and warehousing cycle.
Unnecessary purchases: Inventory ordered specifically for personal use, theft, or scrap 
proceeds. The embezzlements are then charged to inventory.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle, Inventory and warehousing cycle, and Procurement fraud.
Vanity publishing schemes: Schemes that involve eliciting fees from individuals on the 
promise of promoting their creative talent (real or imaginary), or assisting them in the 
development of said talent.
These frauds rely on the vanity of the victim (that is, his or her belief that he or she has a 
creative talent that has not as yet been discovered). Generally these schemes relate to 
creative endeavors in which clear performance standards regarding the talent are not 
available and are often a matter of taste, such as literary publishing or song writing.
The scheme operator will imply a promise of national advertising, book reviews, distribution, 
and special marketing services, but not so concretely that he or she will be held to any implied 
promise. The victims usually invest heavily, and lose both their money and their hopes. They 
are left with a few copies of a printed and scored song arrangement, or a number of copies of 
books, which established book review publications have not troubled to look at because of their 
publishing source.
See also: Self-improvement schemes.
Warehousing: A scheme in a stock market manipulation that places shares into the hands of 
people who are friendly to the promoter—warehousing or parking—in order to maintain 
control of the shares and continue to restrict and regulate the supply of shares available.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Wash trading: A technique in a stock market manipulation process involving a large volume 
of transactions that are conducted within the promoter’s group and used to encourage the 
public’s interest and increase demand for the promoted stock.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
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Weights and measures violations: Abusive practices involving the cheating of customers by 
failure to deliver prescribed quantities or amounts of desired goods. These violations usually 
involve false statements or claims in which the victim has relied on the seller’s representation of 
the delivered quantity when remitting a fraudulent higher payment. Examples of these white­
collar crimes include:
• Gas pump meter manipulation to show more gas pumped than received by the 
customer.
• A butcher’s thumb placed on the meat scale while weighing goods.
• Odometer rollbacks in auto sales.
These frauds are most successful when the victim cannot easily verify weights or measuring 
devices, or when the victim has no reason to question the seller’s claim or statement, for 
example, when the products sold are bottled or packaged.
See also: Short weighting or loading.
Welfare frauds: Abuses associated with government income and family subsidy programs. 
Government welfare programs are often exploited by applicants who apply for benefits to 
which they are not entitled, or continue to claim eligibility when they no longer meet the 
established criteria for aid.
Receipt of monies from claimants by officials processing welfare claims represents another 
dimension of this fraud area. The monies may be solicited as kickbacks in exchange for 
inflated claims filed, as bribes to certify claimants who are ineligible or to avoid reporting 
claimants’ ineligibility, or as extortion for processing claims to which a recipient is fully 
eligible. In some cases nonexistent recipients (that is, ghosts) may be created to fraudulently 
siphon money out of the programs.
See also: Frauds against government benefit programs.
White-collar crime: A nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception 
by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional, or semiprofessional and 
using their special occupational skills and opportunities; also nonviolent crime for financial gain 
using deception and committed by anyone having special technical and professional 
knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the person’s occupation.
See also: Commercial crime and Economic crime.
Work-at-home schemes: See Business opportunity fraud, Franchising frauds, and Self-improvement 
schemes.
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Looking for a fraudster on the lam?
Take a gamble on Las Vegas. The odds are 
good you’ll find him there.
IT SEEMS ONLY FITTING that the city founded by mobster Bugsy 
Siegel in the 1940s has become the destination of choice for felons 
fleeing the law. Las Vegas is America’s fastest growing metropolitan area, 
with a population of 1.3 million. It also welcomes about a half million 
people a week, making it a seemingly ideal place to become lost in the 
crowd.
“Sooner or later they all end up in Vegas,” Alfredo Cervantes, a 
sergeant with the Las Vegas Criminal Apprehension Team, told the Los 
Angeles Times. “Criminals, like everybody else, know they can get 
anything and everything here, from girls to gambling. If they do get 
caught, at least they had one last hurrah in Sin City.”
And many of them do get caught, at a higher rate than anywhere else 
in the U.S. “During the first 10 months of fiscal year 1999, the Las Vegas 
task force arrested 840 felons, the largest number by any of the 56 
fugitive U.S. apprehension teams,” reported the Times. “In the same 
period, the Los Angeles team netted 382 arrests, New York’s 301 and 
San Francisco’s 251.”
Among the apprehended fraudsters was a disgraced New Jersey 
prosecutor who skipped bail after being arrested on corruption and tax 
fraud charges. During his time in Las Vegas he may have taken in a strip 
show performed by a New York drug dealer. She was arrested onstage 
when task force officers noticed her tell-tale snake tattoos.
One of the more unusual arrests occurred last September, soon after a 
restaurant cashier finished a Reader’s Digest article about Grant Warren 
Beaucage, who was wanted in Canada for the murder of his wife. The 
cashier put down the magazine and looked up at the man about to pay 
for his meal. She recognized him as Beaucage, from the picture in the 
article, and alerted hotel security. He was apprehended a short time 
later.
Considering that fraudsters often have a large stash of money with 
them, it seems likely that Vegas’ bright lights would be a particularly 
compelling lure for them. And it might turn out to be a smart place to 
hide. “Sorting through 700 warrants each month, [the Criminal 
Apprehension Team] forsake embezzlers and scam artists for the more 
violent elusive offenders,” reported the Times. But even if fraudsters do 
gain freedom in Las Vegas, we can take some solace in assuming that 
most of them will lose their ill-gotten gains in the casinos.
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Giving
Fraud the
Think only criminals have their fingerprints taken? Then you don't
know about biometrics security. You likely soon will.
PIN NUMBERS and other types 
of security codes, passwords and 
cards for banking and other 
financial transactions will likely 
become obsolete in the next few 
years. “As we know, these systems 
offer a limited level of security 
from fraud,” says Dr. Edward 
Cheng, VP of Public Relations 
with SecuGen Corporation, a 
global biometrics company located 
in Silicon Valley, CA. “But a 
fingerprint is unique to each 
person. Even identical twins have 
different fingerprints. So a 
fingerprint cannot be stolen or 
copied.”
Biometrics is the automated 
method of using an individual’s 
distinct biological features for 
security purposes. This technique 
can verify an individual’s identity 
using physical measurements such 
as fingerprints, palm size, facial 
features, iris scans and voice 
recognition.
SecuGen has recently begun a 
pilot project with ING Direct,
Canada using a fingerprint 
biometrics security system for 
ING’s Internet banking products. 
ING Direct is a member of the 
ING Group, one of the world’s 
largest financial institutions, with 
assets exceeding US$430 billion. 
Under the project, about 500 of 
ING’s customers will use a special 
mouse developed by SecuGen, 
known as EyeD Mouse II, that has 
built-in fingerprint recognition 
technology.
The users must first register their 
thumbprint with ING (a one-time 
enrollment done over the Internet). 
When they log on to conduct a 
banking transaction, for example, 
their thumbprint is scanned by 
their mouse (there is a small glass 
section on the left side of the 
mouse, known as a platen, where 
the thumb of the right hand 
typically rests) to confirm their 
identity. The verification takes less 
than a second.
“We’re already using this type 
of system with other companies,
for things such as security access to 
offices,” says Dr. Cheng. “But this 
project, I believe is the first ever 
with a financial institution.” He 
says the system is highly accurate, 
which was not necessarily the case 
with earlier versions of this 
technology. “A person’s unique 
features are extracted and turned 
into a 60-digit code number,” he 
says. “The image is basically 
distortion-free.”
Less worrisome than the quality 
of the technology is the question 
about consumer response to having 
their fingerprints stored in the 
computers of a large corporation. 
“The fear of ‘Big Brother’ is 
certainly a concern with some 
people,” says Dr. Cheng. “But 
we’ve found that once they 
understand how secure their 
fingerprints are from misuse, they 
are very happy to cooperate with a 
system that protects them from 
fraud.” ■
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Fraud detection goes high-tech as 
many industries turn to software 
programs to uncover scams.
THE 3-D COMPUTER graphic 
swirled around and revealed a tall 
tower with many strings attached. 
It was a graphic representation of a 
high-rise building on Toronto’s 
Yonge Street and the strings 
represented 167 people from that 
address who had filed insurance 
claims with a prominent Canadian 
insurance company.
The next graphic showed that 
130 people from a two-story 
building outside Ottawa had all 
made claims with the same insurer.
With a look of horror, an 
executive from the insurance firm 
scribbled down the addresses as he 
suddenly realized both buildings 
were office towers — not residential 
locations, as the claims indicated. 
It was a telltale sign the claims 
were suspect.
In the very recent past those 
fraudulent claims might not have 
been uncovered. They would 
likely have contributed to the $1.3 
billion insurance losses a year, 
which makes insurance fraud one 
of Canada’s biggest white-collar 
crime problems. But they were 
detected, during an impressive 
demonstration of a new software 
program called “Fraud 
Investigator” from InfoGlide Corp.
Fraud Investigator was run on 
the insurance company’s computer 
database. In a matter of minutes, 
the software found serious 
IL
LU
ST
RA
TI
O
N 
BY
 JO
SH
 L
EI
PC
IG
ER
problems that the insurance 
company’s existing fraud detection 
methods had not discovered.
“We searched claims and
residential addresses and then had 
the program visualize the
4 Volume 2, Issue 4
by Jock Ferguson
Getting
On Fraud
addresses with the most claimants,” 
says Lee Thistle of TSI Solutions 
Inc., the Canadian distributor of 
Fraud Investigator.
Most insurance computer 
systems in Canada have little or no 
ability to search their own 
databases to find suspect claims. 
But the patented “similarity search 
engine” at the heart of Fraud 
Investigator can detect any 
possible interrelated data in 
insurance claims.
Fraud-detecting software is a 
recently new tool on the 
marketplace. It’s of value to most 
sectors that face large-scale fraud, 
but particularly the insurance 
industry, banks, telephone 
companies and government health 
insurance plans.
One Size Doesn’t Fit All
Report on Fraud set out to discover 
what software was on the market 
and how companies and 
professionals can best judge what 
will work for them. We quickly 
discovered there is no “one size fits 
all” solution.
Insurance industry chatter is 
focused on Fraud Investigator 
because it was the clear winner of 
an informal fraud detection 
software test run by the U.S. 
National Insurance Crime Bureau 
(NICB). (See sidebar on page 7.)
Fraud Investigator’s similarity 
search engine can cross-search 
multiple databases even if 
they have different formats 
and “dirty data” containing 
numerous errors. It can
find names, addresses and 
as many as 30 other identifiers, 
even if criminals have carefully 
changed the data to avoid 
detection. As well, it can 
incorporate other public records to 
expand its own detection 
effectiveness.
Scott Bothwell of the NICB says 
it plans to use the Internet so that 
insurance companies using Fraud 
Investigator can access NICB’s 
questionable claims database to 
check to see if a person, or 
someone similar to that person, 
has filed multiple claims with 
different companies. This would 
allow them to conduct a search in 
real time and approve or reject a 
claim very quickly.
Another characteristic that 
makes Fraud Investigator popular 
is its ease of use. Field investigators 
need only a day’s training and do 
not require the assistance of 
computer programmers.
InfoGlide is initially marketing 
the software to the property and 
casualty segment of the insurance 
industry, but will soon target auto 
and healthcare insurers. It says the 
similarity search technology is also 
being used by a U.S. intelligence 
agency to help track terrorists.
Fraud Investigator may also 
prove effective in combating some 
forms of Internet fraud. InfoGlide 
just signed a contract with the 
leading Internet auction site, eBay 
Inc., to help it attack identity fraud. 
The problem of customers who 
take money from purchasers and 
then never deliver the goods has 
plagued eBay. It will use InfoGlide 
software to keep known fraudsters 
off its network even if they change 
their names and other identifiers. 
In a test on eBay’s computer 
system, the InfoGlide software 
found one person posing as 345 
others, the company says.
Tracking Telephone Fraud
A very different type of software is 
being used to combat fraud in the 
telephone industry. Most phone 
companies use a form of neural 
network technology that tracks 
customer calling-patterns and flags 
any unusual deviations.
An explosion of wireless and 
Internet services has made the 
telecom industry more prone to 
fraud than ever. An estimated 
$6-$8 billion a year is siphoned 
from telephone revenue in the U.S. 
Typical frauds include:
...continued
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• cloning cell phones — duplicating 
transmitter codes of individual 
phones and then using the code to 
run up huge long distance charges 
that are billed to the unsuspecting 
cell phone owner. It’s a favorite 
trick of Canadian telemarketing 
fraudsters who target Americans
• dial-through fraud — hacking into 
corporate PBX systems and then 
making long distance calls
• calling card theft — stealing calling 
card numbers and selling them on 
the black market
• clip-on fraud — tapping into an 
exposed telephone line outside an 
office building and then selling 
access to unlimited numbers of 
people. It’s prominent in poor 
ethnic communities where many 
people lack the means to make 
telephone calls home.
MCI Worldcom’s “Sheriff” 
program and “Supersleuth” from 
Nortel Networks are leading 
solutions in the telecom industry.
Nortel developed its anti-fraud 
software over the past decade in its 
UK labs and commercialized it two 
years ago. It’s based on neural 
network artificial intelligence 
technology that is modeled on 
human thought patterns, says Walt 
Shedd, Nortel’s vice president of 
business development for North 
America.
Supersleuth has been a hot seller 
with German, Dutch and Central 
American cell phone firms. As well, 
four local exchange carriers in the 
U.S. are using it, as are two 
Canadian companies.
The rise of flexible, unified voice, 
data and Internet networks has 
increased the vulnerability to fraud.
There are about 50 different forms 
of fraud, including subscription 
fraud, identity fraud, technical 
cloning fraud in analog wireless 
networks and clip-on fraud in 
landline networks.
“We see different types of fraud 
emerge almost on a daily basis and 
a lot of times it may be just a 
variation of an old scheme,” Shedd 
says. “It takes awhile for people to 
see it.”
With Supersleuth, he adds, “we’re 
looking at 70 different events or 
characteristics in any given record 
and mapping that to known fraud 
types. We’re also looking at what is 
expected behavior within this 
service being provided and we’re 
tracking deviations from that 
behavior. We’ve found that 100 per 
cent of the time if a new fraud is 
perpetrated it may not show up and 
be recognizable as something we’ve 
seen in the past. But it certainly will 
show up as something that is not 
expected.”
Supersleuth can work with any 
type of computer network. It 
reaches into a database and collects 
records, analyzes them and 
produces results so an analyst can 
see if it’s a high priority alarm.
An independent study of 40 
global wireless operators, each with 
its own anti-fraud program, showed 
they averaged one fraud analyst per 
133,000 subscribers. Those using 
Supersleuth averaged one analyst 
for every 666,000 subscribers, 
making the phone company’s “hair 
and blood” costs substantially lower, 
Shedd says.
As well, the hardware costs 
associated with installing 
Supersleuth were one-quarter to 
one-half the cost of competitive 
systems. Pricing for the software is 
based on the size of a company’s 
subscriber base, typically being less 
for smaller companies and more for 
larger.
Benefit to Banks
Banks are a prime target of 
fraudsters. Stolen credit and debit 
cards (see “Card Tricks” page 8) are 
a multi-billion dollar a year problem 
for banks and the outsourcing 
industry that banks use to process 
credit and debit card transactions.
As with telephone companies, 
banks use neural networking 
software to scan transaction patterns 
and recognize any deviations from 
established customer practices. For 
instance, if a credit card is used 
normally in a certain geographic 
area, say Quebec, and then 
suddenly is used in Mexico, the 
software will flag the transaction. A 
bank analyst may then decide to 
require an identification check of the 
cardholder before the bank will 
approve further charges.
International Neural Machines 
Inc. (INM) of Waterloo, ON has 
developed anti-fraud software for 
Canadian and Mexican banks. The 
data mining software searches the
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bank’s databases and analyzes 
transactions, comparing them to 
the past history of customers and 
merchants to recognize potentially 
fraudulent activity. Its software has 
the advantage 
of learning 
from the data it 
searches to 
pick up new 
tactics that 
criminals may 
develop, says 
Oleg Feldgajer, 
president of 
INM. The 
company 
recently
received a contract from the World 
Bank to install its hybrid software 
in the Central Bank of Estonia 
specifically to combat money 
laundering in the country’s small 
banking sector.
INM is also in discussions with 
Canada’s new anti-money 
laundering agency, FINTRAC, to 
provide it with software to help 
monitor cross-border financial 
transactions including inter-bank 
wire transfers to detect money 
laundering. In time, the scrutiny 
will be run via the Internet, making 
laundering analysis much faster 
and more effective. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.
How do you decide which software is best for 
your needs? Put them to the test.
OBVIOUSLY you can hire a 
consultant to advise you of 
your needs, but at the end of 
the day there is only one 
reliable method for selecting 
anti-fraud software: have 
competing software vendors 
run a demonstration on your 
company’s own computer 
database.
That was the approach taken 
last year by Scott Bothwell at 
the National Insurance Crime 
Bureau to evaluate anti-fraud 
software technologies. He 
salted the NICB’s database 
with information from a 
sophisticated Russian fraud ring 
that it had stopped in 1998. He 
gave the database to two 
companies to see what they 
could find.
In just three days InfoGlide 
found the fraud ring while the 
other software product found 
nothing. The similarity search 
engine was able to search 
several dozen fields besides 
names, addresses and vehicle 
identification numbers to find 
the clever criminal who had 
changed data to avoid 
detection. Fraud Investigator 
found the Russian crime gang 
material in the database “but it 
also found things we weren’t 
aware of in our own data,” 
Bothwell says.
NICB is a non-profit 
investigative agency supported 
by more than 1,000 U.S. 
property and casualty 
insurance companies. Bothwell 
advises any company to do 
what NICB did — have various 
vendors do pilot studies using 
their own company data and 
then judge the results. “Some 
software packages are very 
expensive so you want to make 
sure what you buy will work,” 
he says. ■
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Card Tricks
Losses from credit card, debit card and ATM 
fraud exceed more than a billion dollars 
annually in the U.S. alone. But the problem is no 
longer a national one, as an expert tells us. It’s 
now become an international crime.
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JOE MAJKA (pronounced My- 
kah) is a Regional Director for Visa 
U.S.A.’s Risk Management Fraud 
Control Department. He has over 
24 years experience in corporate 
security and criminal investigations, 
specializing in the area of financial 
crime, and is certified by the 
American Society of Industrial 
Security as a Certified Protection 
Professional. During his career, 
Majka has been Director of Security 
for Eurekabank and Corporate 
Security Manager for Homefed 
Bank, in San Diego. He holds a 
Bachelor’s degree from California 
State University, Hayward and a 
lifetime teaching credential from the 
University of California at Berkeley.
ROF: From Visa’s perspective, how 
serious a problem is fraud?
JM: It’s very serious. Overall, fraud 
increased last year, from the 
previous year, by approximately
14 per cent. However, I should also 
say that for Visa, in terms of fraud 
to sales volume, fraud only 
represents 6 cents for every one 
hundred dollars in sales volume, or 
.06 per cent.
ROF: Many of the crimes related to the 
fraud losses have some kind of 
international connection.
JM: That’s exactly right. From a 
banking and law enforcement 
perspective, if you are still thinking 
locally you are behind already, 
because the crooks are thinking 
globally. And, to no surprise, the 
Internet is bringing them to you. In 
the past, a merchant was used to 
doing business locally or maybe 
state wide. Most customers would 
walk into the business to conduct 
their transactions. The Internet 
takes that all away. Today, you can 
be doing business with somebody 
in the UK or Russia or Latin
America. They don’t have to walk 
into your store any more. And the 
criminals are using that to their 
advantage.
ROF: Can you give an example? 
JM: A Wisconsin merchant 
received an order from Belarus, 
part of the former Soviet Union, for 
50,000 pentium chips. The guy in 
Belarus gave a credit card number 
that he’d obtained from a fraud 
program available on the Internet 
called CreditMaster. The merchant 
called his bank and got 
authorization and shipped the stuff 
out. Now you and I might be a little 
suspect about sending a first order 
of 50,000 chips to someone in 
Belarus that you’ve never done 
business with before. But the 
merchant wasn’t. After it was too 
late, it was discovered that the card 
number, which was from Canada, 
had been stolen.
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ROF: How did that happen?
JM: CreditMaster, which anyone 
who surfs the Net can find, was 
developed in 1992 by a group of 
hackers who decided to have fun 
with the financial industry. It’s in 
version 4.0 now. This program 
allows you to generate credit card 
and debit card account numbers. 
The way it works best is to take 
one good account number, which 
can be obtained off a receipt. They 
know that the first four to six 
numbers identify whether it’s a 
Visa, Mastercard, American 
Express or Discovery number. 
They put the number into a 
program and ask it to give them 
999 account numbers, half above 
and half below the good number. 
The program then generates a 
number, usually 13-16 digits, that 
meet a very simple algorithm used 
in the banking industry to create a 
credit card number. It’s that simple.
ROF: But they don’t know if the 
numbers are legitimate.
JM: No they don’t. But if a bank 
issues their numbers sequentially, 
which many of them do, chances 
are they’re going to come up with a 
lot of good numbers. Then what 
they do is test the number out. For 
example, they call AOL and if they 
can open up an account with that 
number, then it’s good. Or, they 
transfer the number to a piece of 
plastic and go to a gas station 
where you can pay at the pump 
with a credit card. And, as one of 
my colleagues likes to say, if it 
passes gas then they know they can 
go ahead and commit fraud.
ROF: How else are numbers stolen 
these days?
JM: The most current method is 
something called skimming. If you 
remember a few years ago, crooks 
were stealing credit card numbers 
by copying them off a restaurant 
receipt, for example. To combat 
that, the industry put this little 
three-digit number on a card’s 
magnetic stripe, which didn’t show 
up on the receipt. If it wasn’t on an 
authorization, the transaction was 
refused. But the crooks now have a 
device that we call a wedge. It can 
be as small as a pack of cigarettes 
or a pager. If they take your card, 
typically at a restaurant, and swipe 
it through the device, it stores 
everything on the card: your name, 
number and the three-digit code. 
They then download that onto their 
computer and transfer it onto a 
counterfeit card. You still have your 
card in your wallet. It hasn’t been 
stolen or lost but the crooks can use 
it. Often somewhere far away.
ROF: Where have stolen U.S. card 
numbers turned up?
JM: The crooks often email the 
numbers outside the country. We 
have found numbers skimmed from 
a restaurant in Virginia on some 
suspects arrested in Taiwan. They 
were linked to individuals selling 
skimming devices in Japan, 
Malaysia, Korea and the U.S. 
Interestingly, they used the Royal 
Bank logo on all their plastic. 
Another example was a little 
Chinese restaurant in Wilson, 
Oregon. Within three to five days 
after skimming customers’ 
numbers, those numbers showed 
up in Beijing, China. Months later 
we saw the same numbers in 
Chicago and Latin America.
ROF: As a recent case in Canada 
revealed, skimming also takes place at 
ATM machines.
JM: That’s right. Last year some
Russian nationals arrested in 
Sweden had equipment on them 
that they would lay over the PIN 
pad of an ATM machine. When 
you entered your PIN number it 
would capture it. They also put a 
device on the face of the machine 
that would capture everything on 
your card.
ROF: Are mostly amateurs or 
organized criminals involved in this? 
JM: Both, but increasingly we see 
international organized crime. And 
they’re using the profits from this 
type of fraud to fund other 
activities, such as drugs and guns. 
About two years ago in southern 
California, a highway patrolman 
was shot and killed when he made 
a routine traffic stop. In the trunk 
of the car were counterfeit 
travellers’ cheques. The person who 
shot and killed him was a member 
of an Asian organized crime group. 
That’s how serious this business is. 
I met with the Secret Service 
recently and they were telling us 
everything lately involving these 
kinds of frauds seems to come back 
to Hong Kong, Vancouver and San 
Francisco. There’s always that 
connection there.
ROF: Can you stop this kind of 
fraud?
JM: We can and we’re working on 
ways right now. But whatever we 
come up with, the crooks will likely 
find a way to crack it. What we 
hope to do is stay ahead of them 
for as long as we can, and to keep 
the losses down to as minimum a
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story: a high flying financial wizard
crashes down to earth amid
THE
LATEST
itself as “perhaps 
the largest global
for Fraud
FALLEN hero is
Martin A. Armstrong, 
the head of the Princeton 
Economic Institute (located 
in Princeton, NJ., but not 
connected to Princeton University), 
who was charged last fall by the 
U.S. Attorney of the Southern 
District of New York with “a 
massive scheme through which 
billions of dollars of promissory 
notes were fraudulently sold to 
Japanese corporate investors.” The 
same day the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filed 
a civil action and obtained an 
injunction to freeze his assets, stop 
him carrying on business and 
appoint a receiver to take over his 
companies. Armstrong is currently 
out on $5-million bail.
Prior to the charges, the 
Princeton Economic Institute billed
by Jock Ferguson
advisory firm in the world 
to major multinationals, 
governments and institutions.”
Made His Stamp at Age 13 
A child prodigy, Armstrong, now 
49, began his career as a 13-year- 
old stamp dealer. The author of 
several influential books on stamp 
collecting, he was drummed out of 
the philatelic community in 1972 
after being accused of having sold 
rare stamps that he didn’t own.
Undaunted, Armstrong 
reinvented himself over the next 
two decades as a financial guru, 
establishing an impressive- 
sounding legend. He claimed that 
his $60-million artificial 
intelligence forecasting system 
correctly predicted crashes in the 
U.S. stock and bond markets in 
1987 and 1994 respectively. He
IPs becoming an all too familiar
allegations of wrongdoing.
also boasted how he had correctly 
forecasted the steep downturn in
the Japanese economy in 1989, 
and more recent fluctuations in the 
value of the yen against the U.S. 
dollar. His web site showed a 
picture of him with former UK 
prime minister Margaret Thatcher 
in 1996.
His stellar reputation as an 
economic forecasting guru 
attracted well-heeled institutional 
investors, particularly from Japan. 
In the last half of the 1990s they 
gave his Tokyo office more than $3 
billion to manage.
Ponzi Scheme
The breaks were applied to 
Armstrong’s wild ride when he was 
charged with criminally 
masterminding an international 
Ponzi scheme that defrauded his 
Japanese corporate investors of 
close to US$1 billion.
IL
LU
ST
RA
TI
O
N 
BY
 JO
SH
 L
EI
PC
IG
ER
10 Volume 2, Issue 4
Documents filed in criminal and 
civil proceedings show a vast 
chasm between appearance and 
reality, a gulf that is embarrassing 
for professional advisors and 
executives deceived in the scam, as 
there is little evidence of thorough 
due diligence by investors. The 
case illustrates vividly the inherent 
dangers of entrusting money with 
people who promise greater 
returns than those being offered by 
most of the market.
Investors thought Armstrong 
had unique economic forecasting 
expertise that other money 
managers lacked, giving them an 
advantage that would produce 
higher returns. His crystal ball 
skills, he claimed, had produced an 
average annual return of 28 per 
cent for six consecutive years, a 
performance that would double 
investors’ money in just three 
years. At the time, Japanese banks 
were paying zero interest. 
Armstrong promised a minimum 
of four per cent annual return with 
an upside potential for much more.
A key to the facade were regular 
reporting letters sent to investors 
that falsely claimed they were 
earning large returns. In fact, for 
almost two years Armstrong’s 
trading activity produced dramatic 
losses of at least $500 million.
The greatest losses were in the 
18 months prior to his arrest. As 
the yen grew stronger and 
stronger, Armstrong became more 
desperate. Still convinced of his 
own forecasting rhetoric, he bet 
the U.S. dollar heavily against the 
yen. It was a dreadful mistake. 
Most investors bought into his 
deals in U.S. dollars and were to 
be paid back in yen. This 
significantly compounded 
Armstrong’s problem. Deals that 
had a stated interest rate of four 
per cent were in fact owed over 
twenty per cent with the rise in the 
value of the yen against the dollar.
It’s fascinating to go back and 
look at Armstrong’s published 
views on the Japanese yen during
“Someday I want to be 
rich. Some people get so 
rich they lose all respect for 
humanity. That’s how rich 
I want to be. ”
- Rita Rudner
those 18 months in 1998 and 1999. 
He appeared to have used his 
writings to try and stem the yen’s 
downward flow. In July 1999, for 
example, Armstrong engaged in 
some self-serving warning that if 
the yen closed below 110.65 yen to 
the dollar, then it could “result in 
an economic catastrophe. Such a 
decline in the dollar will wipe out 
any sign of economic recovery and 
plunge Japan into yet another 
massive round of deflation. This 
would most likely impact the 
entire Asian region and at the 
same time perhaps push China 
over the edge.” But in the end, it 
was Armstrong who fell.
When the FBI raided
Armstrong’s Princeton office they 
found records showing obligations 
to repay between $700 million and 
$ 1 billion at a time when there was 
only $46 million left in the kitty. 
They also found that many early 
investors had been repaid with 
funds raised from recent investors, 
the classic hallmark of a criminal 
Ponzi scheme. Investigators found 
at least 113 separate investment 
accounts under Armstrong’s 
umbrella and one company, Alps 
Electric Company, could lose as 
much as $185 million this year, 
Bloomberg News reported. It’s not 
yet been determined how much 
Armstrong pocketed in 
management and performance fees 
or where that money is located.
Says He’s a Scapegoat 
Armstrong strongly denies the 
criminal allegations. His lawyer 
was quoted as saying that 
Armstrong is being made a 
scapegoat for “honest non-criminal 
trading losses.”
No matter how the criminal and 
civil proceedings resolve, it is 
obvious that many investors — 
including upward of 80 Japanese 
companies — put their blind faith 
in Armstrong’s self-proclaimed 
genius. Just as there are too many 
stories lately of financial gurus who 
may be anything but, there are 
even more examples of supposedly 
sophisticated investors who failed 
to look beneath the surface to 
determine whether a deal that 
seemed too good to be true was in 
fact just that. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.
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A selection of fraud 
stories culled from around 
the globe
A Really Sick Fraud 
Bobby Heaton fleeced five 
investors of $6,100 late last year 
from a scam he ran out of his 
hospital bed. Heaton, who used a 
fake name, pretended to have had 
a heart attack to get into St. 
Joseph’s Hospital in Houston. 
Then he convinced a pastor’s wife, 
who counseled the ill, to get her 
friends to invest in a scheme that 
promised them a 600 per cent 
return on their money. Heaton not 
only fled with their money, but left 
without paying his $41,000 medical 
bill.
Soccer Fraud Balls-Up 
Twenty-two football players with 
Newcastle United were double­
crossed by a scalper last December 
after they tried to sell their 
complimentary FA Cup Final 
tickets, with a face value of £36, 
for £450 each. When reserve 
goalkeeper Peter Keen, who was 
the plan’s mastermind, returned 
from handing over the tickets to 
the scalper, he discovered the 
payment envelope contained only 
Monopoly money. According to 
The Mirror, some of the players, 
many of whom earn thousands of 
pounds a week, wanted the money 
to pay for vacations with their 
girlfriends.
Send Him to Sing Sing 
Ever thought of filling out more 
than one of those offers from 
music companies that send you up 
to a dozen CDs for the price of 
one? David Russo, 33, of New 
Jersey sure did. Over a four-year 
period, Russo opened 1,630 fake 
accounts with BMG Music 
Services and Columbia House. He 
used the 22,260 CDs, worth about 
$350,000, to stock his flea-market 
booths. Russo, who paid about 
$50,000 for the CDs that he had 
sent to post-office boxes under 
false names, was charged with mail 
fraud.
Get Your Money 
Smelling Pacific Ocean 
Fresh
How can Nauru, an eight-square- 
mile coral island in the Pacific 
Ocean near Australia, have one of 
the highest per capita incomes in 
the world? By doing laundry for 
the Russian Mafia. According to 
The Sunday Times of London, the 
Russian mob washed about US$70 
billion worth of dirty money 
through the island’s 200 banks last 
year. Nauru’s inhabitants were 
already wealthy from the island’s 
fossilized, phosphate-rich bird 
droppings. They are now even 
better off, thanks to a different 
kind of deposit: proceeds from 
drug trafficking, prostitution and 
people smuggling. ■
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